SECURITISATION WITHOUT SPEECH ACTS: SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION AND FAILURE OF TURKEY-KURDISH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Abstract

After decades of marking the Kurds as an existential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and ontological security, a new peacetime period is coming, accompanied by peace initiatives and the conflict’s de-escalation. Taking into account the fact that the Turkish-Kurdish peace process failed during the most significant migrant crisis of the modern age, the paper seeks to examine the causality of these processes, i.e. to answer the question of whether and how the securitisation of the migration affected the failure of peace process. Using the analysis of verbal and non-verbal acts of securitising actors, but also a descriptive method of internal and external processes of Turkish politics in the period from 2009 to 2015, the paper will explain that securitisation without the use of verbal acts of Kurdish refugees contributed to mutual mistrust which would lead to the collapse of peace talks.

Keywords: Turkey, Kurds, peace processes, securitisation of migration, speech acts
INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish-Turkish relationship has been used on the international scene for centuries as a synonym for asymmetric, diffuse and unbalanced ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, historically, initiatives to resolve this conflict have been repeated cyclically, depending on regional and international conditions. The last such attempt, although different in terms of actors – negotiators, process and dynamics, had the same outcome as all the previous ones. Many authors believe that the negotiations were doomed before the Government declared their beginning because one side was looking for what the other could not offer in a hundred-year relationship. Even when starting from such an assumption, the negotiations did fail, but that does not diminish the need to analyse potential causes, i.e. what was used as an alibi to make the negotiations fail.

As the largest ethnic minority globally, the Kurds have never managed to create a single state, both because of their fragmentation into the territories of the nation-states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and because of mutual cultural, linguistic and religious divisions. Unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey wanted to bring its tradition closer to European cultural values in order to be recognised as a modern, contemporary state. At the same time, it is a militant community with a conquering tradition that has inherited its identity through the processes of securitisation of the Other. Regardless of whether the enemy was portrayed in the character of radical Islamists, socialism or terrorism, in the modern Turkish state, there has always been an Other in relation whom the unity of the nation has been created. Ever since the founding of the Turkish state in 1923 under Kemal Atatürk, with a population of 15–20 million, the Kurds have been an easy target for securitisation in Turkey, both because of the political elite’s justified fear of Kurdish separatism and because of the need to prevent any opportunity for unification with ethnic relatives in the countries of the region.

In 2013, peace process between the Turkish Government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, appeared to come to an end, preceded by the “Kurdish opening” in 2009. The Kurdish opening was reflected in starting a public debate and
involving all stakeholders in peace processes and finding the most adequate and lasting solutions. Only after the secret negotiations known as the Oslo process, it could be talked for the first time about the indications of peace talks between the Kurdish and Turkish representatives. The conditions for a successful start of negotiations were met thanks to strong leaders of widespread legitimacy on both sides, the creation of favourable political opportunities reflected in the unilateral ceasefire of the PKK, as well as predetermined principles and methods of negotiations (Weiss 2016). Considering the main reason for the Kurds’ dissatisfaction—the lack of territorial autonomy or independence, Turkey has never entered into peace negotiations with them sincerely enough. Even if it did, Turkey had to change its original intentions due to internal circumstances and the savagery of the civil war in Syria, the fight against the Islamic State and the influx of a large number of refugees from the war-torn areas. However, it is problematic that Turkey, despite affirmative speeches on the issue of open reception of refugees, still applied securitisation measures that were not accompanied by securitisation speeches. The practical return of the Kurdish issue to the emergency sphere was reflected in the emergence of mistrust among the negotiating parties and escalated with the peace negotiations’ collapse. The conciliatory rhetoric, accompanied by the Turkish Government’s openness to concessions, soon turned into an open confrontation between the parties and returned the relations between the two sides to their original state.

The consequences of the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in 2010, started as a call for more democratisation in traditionally undemocratic societies, and ended with the spillover of conflicts to all countries in the region, and culminated in the outbreak of war in Syria. Overall, the consequences of conflict spillover theory which posits that there is a greater possibility of conflict in a country geographically closer to that in which the conflict is active have become visible owing to a large number of migrants and refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, towards the countries of the European continent. An unavoidable point on that journey was Turkey as a transit country. Among the first who came were the

Syrians, whose war began when the desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey had just begun. Until the Kobane crisis outbreak in 2014, Turkey was propagating a policy of open borders towards the migrant and refugee population. However, as a large influx of Kurdish people from Syria began in 2014, Turkey changed its policy of receiving migrants. As the processes of securitisation of migrations co-occur with the growth of mistrust between the parties in the peace process, the author wants to investigate the consequences of the securitisation of the migrant crisis in Turkey after the start of peace negotiations, i.e. has their securitisation doomed the negotiations? To determine the connection between these processes, the author will re-examine how the Kurds’ securitisation went hand in hand with the return of the Kurds to the field of emergency political measures.

The paper is conceived as an equilateral triangle composed of three processes whose cause-and-effect relationship the author seeks to examine: (de)securitisation of the Kurdish issue, the course of peace negotiations and the securitisation of migration. In the first part after the introduction, the author will review the works of authors who dealt with the same or similar topics, present the theory of securitisation and desecuritisation, its significance and criticism, and present different views on migrants, as a security threat to the reception state. In the next part, the author will chronologically go through a historical overview of Turkish-Kurdish relations and the most important initiatives to resolve the Turkish-Kurdish conflict peacefully. The emphasis will be on the period after the Kurdish opening. Finally, thanks to the analysis of discourse, migrations will be presented, i.e. the influx of Syrian Kurds as a possible indicator of the Kurdish-Turkish peace processes’ failure, which will follow by a discussion and conclusion.
LITERATURE OVERVIEW

The topic of the relationship of the migrant crisis to security discourses in Turkey, especially when observed as one of the indicators of the failure of peace processes between the Kurds and Turkey, has not been analysed in more detail in Turkish and international academic circles. Such a statement does not directly mean that migrations were not the subject of securitisation in Turkey, nor that the topic of peace negotiations was not eagerly followed in the academic world. On the contrary, to answer the research question clearly, it is necessary to select the most influential authors who dealt with the field of conflict resolution, classical securitisation-theory, its critics, and those who focused their research on studying migration as a reference object of securitisation.
In the context of studying peace processes, conflict resolution or its transformation, it is essential to understand that such processes do not occur in a vacuum. Their direction, duration and outcomes should correlate with other significant dynamics that can lead to peace process transformation. Taking the typology of Väyrynen, it is possible to distinguish five different frameworks that affect the transformation of peace processes — the transformation of context, structure, actors, goals, and individual/group transformation (Ramsbotham 2016). The case study of the Kurdish-Turkish peace processes is certainly the contextual transformation, which occurs through a change in security dynamics and it is reflected in numerous securitisation moves.

The securitisation theory represents one of the most significant contributions of the Copenhagen School of Thought created in the post-Cold War period, whose creator is Ole Waever. As a radical type of politicisation seen in its traditional sense, securitisation is viewed through the locating of an existential threat in one of the security sectors — political, military, social, economic and environmental sectors (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 21–23). Waever states that securitisation is an altered political elite’s discourse that identifies phenomena as security threats to the reference object and demands legitimacy against them to introduce special measures that deviate from standard political procedures and processes (Waever 1995, 46–86). On the other hand, desecuritisation is a reverse process in which the state of extraordinary measures returns to the political process’s normal state (Emmers 2007, 111). The essential elements of the theory are the securitising act, the securitising actors, the extraordinary measures, and the audience that gives legitimacy to their application. The classical theory of securitisation has suffered much criticism since its inception, but it still survives as the theoretical basis of almost all processes shifting a particular phenomenon from the sphere of everyday political practice to extraordinary one.

The securitisation theory’s contribution is also the theory of speech acts as an analytical tool in the securitisation process research. Speech acts are borrowed from linguistics, i.e. from John Austin and John Searle’s works, thanks to which Waever explained that mere pronunciation is a securitising act in itself (Waever 1995,
Securitising actors are high political representatives, officials, leaders of political parties, heads of security agencies, generals, and representatives of civil society, the opposition, the church, who seek legitimacy through the acts of speech to introduce special measures. Some criticisms could apply to Turkey’s case, which is related to the conclusion that in non-democratic societies, it is not necessary to view the use of extraordinary measures exclusively as an act of the securitisation process (Vuori 2008, 69). In such states, special measures become a means of regular political life. Excluding the securitisation processes during the military juntas in Turkey, the securitisation processes that are the subject of this paper occurred when Turkey had deeply entered into institutional reforms and harmonisation of legislation with the *acquis communautaire* of European Union. For securitisation processes to be successful, it is necessary to meet three criteria (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 31–33). It is necessary to adhere to the security grammar, i.e. dramatise the story of “existential threats” and “survival”; securitising actors must have the social capital, credibility, or moral authority to speak out about security; and finally, the threat must be accepted as potentially threatening by the majority (Ejdus 2016, 205).

In practice, the theory of speech acts is realised through direct address to the audience, or through the media as functional actors. Functional actors are presented in classical securitisation theory as non-state actors who do not participate directly in securitisation decision-making but facilitate it through their activities. The media is becoming a dangerous securitisation channel for countries with a deficit of democracy, such as Turkey. The mass media provide a distorted picture of the cohesion of Government, civil society and the military around specific and daily political decisions and thus legitimise the introduction of special measures (Birdisli 2014, 4). That is why the processes of securitisation or desecuritisation in Turkey took place promptly, and in most cases, received great trust and support from the citizens.

One of the fundamental criticisms of the traditional school of securitisation is the lack of imagination in determining the scope of social sector, which should include the ability of society to maintain traditional aspects of culture, language, religion and national identity (Booth 2005, 34). On the same track is Birdisli(2014) who,
dealing with the issue of securitisation of the Kurds, understood their demands for recognition of identity and autonomy as a threat to the Turkish national being because since the end of the Second World War the state has been understood as one nation, one identity and one language (1). In the modern understanding, security is not concentrated only on the protection of the state from ideological and military threats, but also refers to the issue of migration, ethnic, spiritual survival, and the identity of the actors (Kaya 2009, 8). Therefore, the authors are increasingly focused on researching the specific domain of ontological security and securitisation of migration.

Ontological security is the connective tissue of the case study because the securitisation of the Kurdish minority and the migrant/refugee population begun due to the threat to the Turkish state’s self from the significant Other. Borrowed from the works of sociologist Anthony Giddens, ontological security applied to the understanding of the “experience of oneself as a whole”, i.e., the state’s self in learned relations with the significant Other (Mitzen 2006, 342–344). Whether it is good or bad relations, the subject learns and determines his own identity in relation to someone. Mitzen (2006) comes to significant conclusions that actors who are in a long-standing conflict are beginning to feel safe in that role of being threatened. It is concluded that such states prefer conflict, rather than peace, because only through conflict they know who they are (361). It is necessary to say that there are different understandings of the relationship between peace and war and what is expected of them. One side can expect to provide self-identification through conflict, while the other may view conflict as a way to survive (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). While some feel comfortable using violence, others try to avoid it. In the example of Kurdish-Turkish relations, whose history dates back a hundred years of experience, it is necessary to look at the problem from the perspective of learned roles. Decades of bad relations have not only diminished the possibility of a solution but have built a relationship of self-determination concerning each other, precisely through violence and securitisation. Following this logic, Turkey’s ontological insecurity did not arise when the Kurdish issue was securitised. On the contrary, it arose when, after many years of established relations, the conflict de-escalated by the Kurdish
opening, by which the predictability of action was lost. It is an exciting finding that states that even in cases of desecuritisation of a long-term Other, can reactivate the created conflict identity with completely new opponents (Ej dus 2016, 214).

The entry of refugees/migrants into a society causes ambiguities that the modern state cannot quickly solve because, since in the nation-state, such a person is a disturbing element. It breaks the identity between man and citizen, birth and nation, and therefore endangers sovereignty’s original function (Agamben 1995, 117). This thinking tends to amnesty the securitisation processes that, according to this view, take place in every nation-state in which a large number of non-residents enter. Bourbeau (2011) states that securitisation of migration is necessary because the domicile population’s ontological security is endangered by the entry of a mass of non-citizens as a disturbing factor (1).

One of the essential representatives of the Paris School, Huysmans, expands the concept of securitisation by focusing on the securitisation of migration. In his view, the securitisation of migration does not end with the speech act, and it is enriched by the action of bureaucracy, which further shapes (in)security through risk assessment and statistical calculations (Huysmans 2006). Despite their exclusive focus on Western European countries, i.e. the European Union, Huysmans’s postulates can be applied to Turkey as a de facto democracy. He states that since the 1990s, migration has been seen as a potential threat to internal stability (17). Huysmans wrote the book before the migration crisis, but after the declaration of the global war on terrorism, so that the reasons for the securitisation of migration in Turkey can be treated equally as a threat to ontological security, socioeconomic prosperity, but also in line with the fight against terrorist organisations (ISIL, Gulen movement). Regardless of the cause of the securitisation of migrants, Huysmans relativises speech acts as necessary for the securitisation process. Securitising practices include discursive and non-discursive acts that protect the domiciled community from the dangerous force of migrants (93).

Unlike Huysmans, who does not exclude speech acts, but relativises their necessity, Bigo criticises the Copenhagen school’s postulates and further elaborates the work of bureaucracy and the
socio-cultural way of securitising migrations, putting speech acts in the background. According to him, it is possible to securitise a particular phenomenon without using linguistic acts, following political practice, manoeuvres, discipline that is of equal importance in the security grammar as discursive practice (Bigo 2006, 198). Sara Léonard (2010) went a step further by analysing the European Union’s migration policy, which believes that it is wrong to interpret securitisation speeches when securitisation is deeply institutionalised through political frameworks, which primarily refers to the issue of migration (234).

Peace studies and security studies have brought significant papers in the field of Kurdish-Turkish peace negotiations and on the Middle East’s security dynamics, which have produced one of the greatest migrant crises in human history. Research on migration as a consequence of security processes, and not as a cause of creating new ones, leaves much room for analysis. The fact is that the current migrant crisis is a process the duration of which is still unpredictable, as well as that many transits and final destination countries have opened their doors to the migrant population due to the duration of various peace and security processes. Research on the securitisation of migration, i.e. their perception as a security issue, and indicators of various peace negotiations’ potential outcomes have received little attention from peace and security studies. In contrast, the paper seeks to link refugee securitisation processes and their impact on the outcomes of the processes that began before they were placed in the field of extraordinary political practice.

HISTORICAL REVIEW: KURDISH MINORITY SECURITISATION PROCESSES

Securitisation of Kurdish minority was expressed through public discourses of political elites, spread through the media and education system, and achieved by concrete measures that have always been radical. Depending on Turkey’s internal political developments, the attitude towards the Kurdish minority was different, but it was always reduced to more or less securitisation and can be divided into several epochs. It is necessary to explain
the development of the learned roles and mutual learned relations to understand the context and mistrust between the parties to the peace process.

After the war for liberation and the creation of a modern Turkish state, the Kurds, thanks to their participation in the liberation struggle, were spared the introduction of extraordinary measures and securitisation, as seen in the *Amasya Protocol* (Yeğen 2007, 127). However, the Kurds have more or less always been excluded from everyday political life. The first phase in which Kurds’ political and civil rights were set aside is related to the period from 1925 to 1961. It is a period of social and political transformation of the multiethnic identity of the Ottoman Empire into the project of creating the nation-state of Kemal Ataturk, in which a strong centralisation of the state was carried out, and any possibility of survival of the Kurdish minority was disputed (Yavuz 2001, 3). From 1962 to 1983, the second phase completely securitised the Kurdish identity and put it in the same camp with the growing socialist ideology’s followers. The West welcomed such policies and the religious moment’s return to the secular Turkish state because it saw Turkey as a geopolitical guardian against the spread of communism and Soviet influence (Criss 2003, 67).

The Kurdish issue became one of the burning issues of the Turkish state in the 1980s with the election victory of Turgut Özal, who, by changing the political discourse towards the creation of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, distanced himself from Kemalist ideals. Later in the 1990s, Kurdish political activity was reflected in terrorist acts by paramilitary formations and the activities of the PKK, which is still associated with the symbol of Kurdish separatism. As early as 1984, there was a major armed conflict between Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish army that resulted in the violent death of 40,000 people, the burning of 5,000 Kurdish villages and approximately one million refugees and displaced persons (Savran 2020, 778). The establishment of the OHAL region

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2 Founded in November 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist party by Abdullah Öcalan. After the 1980 military coup, Öcalan fled to Syria where he reformed the PKK and after 1987 began to carry out terrorist attacks in Turkey. They were mostly aimed at the Kurdish population, which did not want to join the organization. Between 1987 and 2012, 22,849 terrorists and 11,785 members of the armed forces and 10,885 Turkish civilians were killed. See Birdisli 2014, 6–9.
(State of Emergency Region) in 1987 in the Kurds’ south-eastern provinces was a response to the Kurds’ separatist aspirations. The securitisation of the daily life of the Kurdish minority in the territories inhabited by Kurds in Turkey lasted for more than twenty years. It was reflected in the extreme violation of human rights, killing, displacement from villages and settlements destroyed by the army and gendarmerie (Çelik 2015, 54). Such measures had the opposite effect from what the Turkish authorities expected by applying institutionalised discrimination – strengthening of Kurdish nationalism and even more decisive separatist intentions. The President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller tried for the first time to calm Kurdish separatism with mild options. They proposed establishing a special civil-parliamentary National Security Council whose only activity was focusing on the Kurdish issue: the beginning of the broadcasting of Kurdish shows on television, the possibility of choosing the Kurdish language in schools and the possibility of applying the “Basque model” to solve this issue (Barkey 1998, 137). Demirel was the first president to use the word Kurd to refer to this community’s ethnicity in 1991, but he emphasised creating a collective, civic identity of all Turkish citizens from which common constitutional rights and obligations would be derived (Yavuz 2001, 17). Two years later, he acknowledged the “Kurdish reality”, thus beginning the first peace initiatives that the PKK prevented by opening fire (Ensaroglu 2013, 11).

With Turkey’s strategic move towards the European Union and gaining candidate status, the Kurdish issue has been internationalised. Simultaneously with the arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, a more peaceful period for Turkish-Kurdish relations ensued, as Öcalan renounced violence with a promise to fight for Kurdish rights by democratic means (Yavuz 2001, 16). Officially, desecuritisation began at the end of the last millennium, when Turkey started fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen criteria, among other things, included the protection of the cultural rights of minorities, i.e. encouraged institutional solutions that were mostly related to Kurdish status (Weiss 2016, 6). Apart from several incidents with outlaws of Öcalan’s negotiating strategy, the early beginnings of the AKP, led by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, brought more optimistic solutions and the readiness of Turkish political elite to resolve the “Kurdish issue” and break out of habitual hostile relations.
Through the Grand National Assembly, Erdoğan pushed through five harmonisation packages with the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union, which in 2003 and 2004 wholly democratised the attitude towards the Kurds, abolished torture and enabled them freedom of expression and association (Pusane 2014, 85). Allowing the use of Kurdish at universities in predominantly Kurdish cities and the opening of radio and television stations, in no way encouraged the Turkish political elite to consider constitutional changes and the introduction of Kurdish as the second official language in the country (Tol 2012). Finally, the Kurdish minority is allowed to give children Kurdish names that are not subversive—they do not have the letters x, z, w that do not exist in the Turkish alphabet (Romano 2014, 175–176). On the other hand, there was work on the partial amnesty of PKK prisoners and the presentation of a project (Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project) for the repatriation of internally displaced persons (Pusane 2014, 85).

Even though Kurdish–Turkish relations have had drastic amplitudes since the creation of the modern Turkish state, it is inevitable to conclude that every period of desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue was stimulated by the development and prosperity of the state. The more stable the situation in regional and internal security was, the more democratic the attitude towards the Kurdish minority was. Given that the paper is limited in time to the beginnings of institutional and political reforms in Turkey, which suspended emergency measures against the Kurds and reduced them to everyday political decision-making, it is clear that this is a process of desecuritisation that resulted in the Kurdish opening and launching of the first official peace negotiations in 2013.

**KURDISH OPENING AND THE COURSE OF PEACE PROCESSES**

Desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue began not only with the abolition of emergency measures but also with the creation of a social contract between the political elite and the citizens of Turkey which transferred the Kurds to the political sphere and marked the relationship with the PKK’s paramilitary part—a declared terrorist organisation, as a security problem (Oğuzlu 2007, 88). Turkish
authorities have made a distinction between PKK civilians who have chosen nonviolent means to achieve their goals and PKK paramilitary organisations with which the Turkish Government has continued violence. Otherwise, it would not be possible to enter into negotiations with a terrorist organisation. A precondition for such an understanding was the arrest of PKK leader Öcalan in 1999, who soon stated that the essential principles he wanted to build the Turkish-Kurdish future were “Democratic Nation, Shared Homeland, Common Individual and Collective Rights and Freedom” (Unver 2015, 160). The PKK demanded the exercise of civil liberties and rights, the recognition of Kurdish identity, and the right to autonomy of Kurdish-populated areas through constitutional solutions (Savran2020, 778). In the decades-long conflict between the two sides, for the first time, it became clear that a solution can be reached only through negotiations, i.e. that neither side can pursue its interests by violence. However, such initial positions of the negotiating parties collapsed in the summer of 2015.

Along with democratic reforms and the beginning of the Kurdish issue’s desecuritisation, the Turkish Government has skilfully used the alibi of de facto the fight against terrorism to destroy PKK members who opposed Öcalan’s nonviolent fighting strategy. Due to acting decisively against terrorists in numerous actions on the one hand, and building a new presidential arrangement of the state on the other, the peace processes remained in the background. It appears that the Turkish side has not wholeheartedly entered the negotiation process, or that it has used the Kurdish standstill to distract the international public from regional issues in which Turkey has been involved, rejecting the “zero-problem with neighbours policy” set by the former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu.

The transformation of the death penalty into the life sentence of Öcalan led to secret negotiations between the diaspora, the PKK and Turkish representatives from 2009 to 2011, better known as the Oslo process (Pope 2015, 149). During the secret negotiations, Öcalan stated that the Kurds’ political rights should be realised by non-military means, so he officially gave up all other paramilitary activities (Yeğen2016, 13). Öcalan’s statement encouraged PKK members but also abstaining Kurds, to start believing in nonviolent
means. Turkish think-tank KONDA published data that the public supported peace processes with 81 per cent (Savran2020, 784). After enabling precise negotiation principles, Öcalan officially announced in 2013 that he would enter the negotiation peace process with representatives of the Turkish Government. In that way, the Turkish Government *de jure* completed the process of desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue, officially starting peace negotiations with the civilian part of the PKK. When it comes to the parts of PKK who did not believe in peace talks and thus continued to fight by violent means, the Turkish authorities continued to view them as terrorists.

That there has been no radical change in the attitude toward the Kurds, although the discourse analysis cannot claim this, is proved by the numerous actions that Turkey carried out from the moment of the Kurdish opening until the collapse of the peace negotiations. Under the slogan of the fight against terrorism, in April 2009, when the Kurdish democratic opening was declared, broad actions were approved against activists suspected of having ties to the Kurdistan Communities Union; thousands of people were arrested under accusation of spreading terrorist propaganda (Pope 2014). The Kurdistan Communities Union brings together many Kurdish parties in the Middle East but is most strongly influenced by the PKK. That is why it is not surprising that Turkey is afraid of their strengthening, as well as this kind of action, which is just one in a series of the same action that were carried out until 2015 and in some way abused the distinction made between civilian and paramilitary (dispersive) PKK, as well as the motivation of the civilian part of the Kurdish community to enter into negotiations. One of the manifestations is the broad interpretation and non-selective application of the Anti-Terror Law, which served to abolish the previously given freedom of expression of the Kurds, interpreting it as calls for separatism and use of violence (Weiss 2016, 9). Thus, Kurdish activist Leyla Zana was re-arrested for spreading propaganda and because of her links to PKK leaders, as well as many other individuals who chose to fight by political, nonviolent means – academics, professors and journalists (9). According to one PKK leader, Murat Karayılan, 85 per cent of those arrested had nothing to do with their actions, nor were they members (International Crisis Group 2012, 22). The hasty reactions of the Turkish military, which
in 2011 mistakenly identified as terrorists and bombed 34 Kurdish smugglers near the Iranian border, further demotivated Kurdish civilians to resolve the Kurdish issue through peace talks (25–26). By changing the public narrative only, the Turkish Government blurred the distinction it had made. Thus, Turkey continued its showdown with the Kurdish separatists, even where none existed, while public discourse indicated its determination to reach a lasting solution. Turkey has applied a similar policy of applying extraordinary measures without securitising discourse to Syrian migrants, which will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the paper. The previous policy of stifling the Kurds’ freedoms and rights continued under the slogan of efforts to start the peace process, even though the trust in the Turkish Government and its motivation to negotiate on concessions to the Kurds decreased.

With interruptions, peace talks managed to survive until 2015. That year is crucial for several reasons. First of all, the ruling AKP lost the majority in the elections, while the majority Kurdish party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) managed to enter the parliament as the third-largest. With such a redistribution of votes, Erdoğan needed to maintain the declared peace with the Kurds for as long as possible to use the necessary support to hold a referendum to change the system from a parliamentary to a presidential one and thus further expand presidential powers. On the other hand, the PKK launched a new wave of terrorist attacks and expression of dissatisfaction with Turkey’s official policy towards the Kobane crisis. It was expected that the Kurdish minority would not be satisfied with the status quo position, which guaranteed them negative peace, i.e. the absence of physical violence. At the same time, their ethnic relatives enjoyed broad political and cultural autonomy in Syria and Iraq (Tezcür 2013, 75). Besides, in 2015, another securitisation process began in Turkey, but this time aimed at the migrant population that came from the war-torn countries and encouraged by the immigration of Syrian Kurds.
MIGRATIONS: A SIMULTANEOUS CATALYST FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT IN TURKEY

Since the beginning of its secessionist struggle in the 1980s, the PKK has used the northern parts of Syria as a base for attacks against Turkey, leading to a significant deterioration in the bilateral relation of Turkey and Syria (Okyay 2017, 832). Relations with Syria improved after the Syrian authorities expelled Öcalan in 1998 and, under the Turkish army’s military intervention ultimatum, closed all terrorist camps in the South (832). A joint initiative against the creation of a Kurdish state, but also an economic, neoliberal shift between the two countries, led to the signing of various agreements on the free movement of goods and services in 2004, projects on transport, and the conclusion of reciprocal visa waivers in 2009 (833). As interstate relations experienced a renaissance, in addition to good relations between Erdoğan and Assad, it is not surprising that at the time of the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey had a visa-free regime for Syrian citizens and an “open door” policy towards Syrian refugees and migrants.

It is important to note that by 2011 there were only 58,000 foreigners under international protection in Turkey, while in 2015 the number of Syrian refugees was around 2,500,000 (Erdoğan 2019, 2). The Turkish Government’s attitude towards refugees is tough to observe only in a securitising framework, especially when talking about the consequences on the Kurdish-Turkish peace process. There are several explanations: first, the fact that Turkey had a different attitude towards migrants and refugees from Syria in early 2011 and 2015; the second is that the analysis of speech acts alone cannot say with certainty that there has been a securitisation of Syrian migrants/refugees, which supports Big’s critique of the speech acts of the classical theory of securitisation.

The policy of open doors towards Syrian refugees can be understood as a Turkish Government’s reaction to the insufficiently responsible policy it pursued in Syria. That is why in the early beginnings of the civil war, securitising speeches addressed to Syrian refugees cannot be diagnosed. The topic of refugees and migrants in public speeches had an exclusively humanitarian tone, which can be seen from the letter of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu, addressed to the UNHCR High Commissioner
in 2013 (Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey 2013). The same is stated by the president of AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) who believed that the issue of Syrian refugees would be delegated to the army if it was a security issue, and would not be seen as a humanitarian crisis (Korkut 2016, 10). Finally, Erdoğan stated in 2011 that “Syria is now an internal problem of Turkey”, where protectionist policy towards migrants can also be interpreted, i.e. humanisation of foreign policy (4–5).

Until 2014, regardless of the organisation of civil protests and occasional escalations between the domicile and migrant population, there was no public discourse securitising this population.

The situation changed drastically at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014. Turkey decided to build a wall on the border with Syria in October 2013, like the wall the United States built on the border with Mexico, in south eastern Turkey (Nusaybin) and north eastern Syria (Quamışko), known as the Wall of Shame (Koca 2015, 219). Locals began protests because the walls looked like an attempt to further separate Kurds from Turkey and Syria, but the Ministry of Interior explained that they built the wall for security reasons to reduce illegal crossings, smuggling routes, and prevent alleged clashes of Kurdish leaders on both sides of the border, but also to protect the local population from minefields (219).

Regarding the construction of this type of wall, opponents stated:

_If it is about mines, they have been there for 60 years. Not that the Government was much concerned with their victims – if you walk around 10 minutes in Nusaybin, you will see people with missing hands and feet. If it is about smugglers, they have always been around and will continue to be around. If it is illegal crossings by Syrian refugees, they use the Senyurt-Derbesiye crossing 60 kilometres away. Some days 400 to 500 people use that crossing to go to Turkey. The vast majority of them are Kurds. As long as that crossing is open, why would the refugees choose the dangerous way through a minefield?_ (Taştekin, 2013).

Thus, the absence of securitisation speeches did not delay the implementation of securitisation measures. At the same time, the Party of Democratic Union (PYD), as the leading Kurdish organisation in Syria, managed to consolidate power in the territory of three districts where Kurdish majority was, such as Jazir,
Kobane and Afrin, as well there was declared territory of Kurdish autonomy (Jojić 2018, 38). The emergence of a new entity in Syria called Rojava, was frightening for the continuation of peace negotiations from Turkey’s perspective, it was also dangerous given the fact that the autonomous territory was organised according to the principles of democratic confederalism devised by Öcalan (Leezenberg 2016, 681).

Another reason for the turn of Turkish policy towards the peace processes happened with the Islamic State’s incursion into the region of Kobane in Syria on September 14, 2014. Turkish authorities refused to take part in the crisis and the fight for this region’s defence, which resulted in a conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish security forces that were on Syrian territory (Salih and Stein 2015). Despite the bombing of Ankara and Istanbul by the PKK military, Turkey did not want to send aid to Kurdish fighters, nor did it allow anyone to do so (Kadioglu 2016). The conflict in the border zone was stopped under the threat of Öcalan that he would leave the peace process if the mentioned Turkish-Kurdish conflict continued. Since the region itself had close ties to the PKK terrorist, and as a result of the Islamic State’s attack on Kobane, there was an influx of a large number of Kurdish population into Turkey. Turkey found itself in a securitising dilemma. It was challenging to separate civilians from terrorists and let them enter Turkish territory unhindered. It was even harder to allow the Kurds who wanted to do so – to return to Syria and help to fight the Islamic State. On the one hand, fighting the terrorism of the Islamic State, and on the other, with a holistic approach towards the migrant population, Turkey found itself in an unenviable position. Pursuing a policy of friendship towards the Kurds from Kobane would lead to significant concessions to Turkey’s decades-old enemies – the Kurdish separatists, and it would significantly weaken Turkey’s negotiating position (KorkUT2016, 15).

It was clear that the open door policy primarily referred to the Syrian Arabs and Sunnis, and any dislocation of the Syrian Kurds from the refugee reception policy would have political consequences for the peace process. On the one hand, in 2014, securitisation and discrimination against the Kurds would condemn the peace talks to ruin with the exit of the Kurdish side, while on the other
hand, the unhindered influx and equal rights of these people with other refugees would weaken Turkey’s negotiating position and demand additional concessions. That is why Turkey chose the third way – selective humanisation and silent securitisation. The choice between securitisation and humanitarisation of refugees from Kobane would not have been of great importance, had it not been happening during the Kursk-Turkish peace talks. Since the Kobane incident, official border crossings near Kobane have been closed to those who seeking asylum in Turkey (Amnesty International 2014, 9). Such restrictions were accompanied by the decline of several border crossings to the Islamic State, which meant that only three of the eight border crossings remained for crossing, humanitarian aid and trade, which were occasionally closed (Kanat and Ustun 2015, 12). Since then, the return of Syrians without passports from the border began, unless they needed urgent medical care (Amnesty International 10). Ankara allowed entry only to those who had a place in the camps, which were already overloaded. The only alternative for entering Turkey were dangerous irregular crossings or transport by smugglers (Koca 2015, 217). Turkey appears to have opted for a non-verbal securitisation option to drastically reduce the influx of Kurdish refugee populations. What can certainly be classified as securitisation without speech acts is Ankara’s insufficient precision about the selective entry of Syrian Kurds. However, given the time indicator since such a measure came into force, it is easy to conclude to whom it refers. It is essential to emphasise that the public discourse on refugees, especially towards the Syrian Kurds, has remained unchanged.

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s statements highlight hospitality and openness to Syrian refugees, as “Turkey has to protect the population fleeing to save their lives” (Korkut 2016, 16). Although about 230,000 Kurds from Kobane arrived in Turkey, AFAD data from September 11, 2014 indicated that refugees from Kobane did not have access to temporary protection status and, therefore, health and social services (16). According to official information, on the Turkish-Syrian border, in 2014 alone, more than 40 people were shot or died due to beatings by the Turkish border police (Amnesty International 14). The lack of an adequate border control mechanism contributed to the concealment of human rights violations from the public, so there is a reasonable suspicion that
there were many similar undocumented cases (Koca 2015, 218). Discrimination against a specific part of the population from the wider refugee group, placing it outside the legislative framework, is a form of applying extraordinary measures, even though there were no discursive actions. The conclusion is that, in the wake of securitisation advocates without securitising discourses, Turkey did not want to be accused of the failure of peace talks by securitising the Syrian Kurds. However, the absence of speech acts did not delay the application of securitisation acts, which in this case were reflected in a different approach to the migrant population depending on its ethnic identity.

The question is why Turkey securitised 230,000 Syrian Kurds when more than three million refugees transited through its territory? It is crucial to emphasise that of all the ethnic Kurds, the Turkish and Syrian are the closest, because they see the Syrian–Turkish border as non-existent, which significantly endangers Turkish security interests. When peace talks were ongoing, and the Kurds managed to organise self-government in one part of Syria, Turkey’s ontological security was significantly compromised due to the influx of Kurdish ethnic relatives, and this influenced the parties to come to a confrontation again, rather than a solution. Ankara’s decision not to provide equal access to services to all ethnicities of refugees was significant, but it was even more essential to prevent Syrian Kurds from crossing the border with Syria and help the fight against the Islamic State. The creation of frustration among Turkish and Syrian Kurds in Turkey has led to increased support for the PKK’s paramilitary part. The Government accused the PKK of using peace processes to expand regional political and military influence (Savran 2020, 784). It is not difficult to conclude that panic, mistrust, and fear spread among the Turkish negotiating party ranks. The PKK’s call for the Kurdish population to show their dissatisfaction with the Turkish Government’s policies in Syria in 2014 and with the prevention of border crossings resulted in mass protests that froze peace talks for a while (Yeğen 2015, 174). In 2015, after the elections in Turkey, the PKK violated the ceasefire agreement, to which the Turkish Government responded by bombing their camps in Syria which was the official failure of the negotiations. Erdoğan’s statement that he would oppose any Kurdish independence, even in Argentina best describes the end
of the peace negotiations (Stansfield 2014, 17). The failure of the peace negotiations completed the last process set in the work, which was the parties’ return to their initial negotiating positions, the re-securitisation of the Kurdish issue and their transfer to the field of extraordinary political processes.

The securitisation of ethnic groups is so historically rooted in Turkey that it is not surprising that the securitisation of migration has been successful even though it was not meet all the necessary security grammar criteria. Following the logic of Biga and Leonardi, placing the Other in the realm of extraordinary political practice in societies like Turkey, where it is deeply institutionalised, is not necessarily accompanied by securitising speeches. Perhaps the securitisation of the Syrian Kurds would have gone unnoticed and unaccompanied by functional actors if the restriction of movement of only one part of the population, the closure of borders, the erection of walls had not caused consequences that aroused mistrust between the parties and ultimately failed peace talks.

**CONCLUSION**

The paper has sought to include and analyse the processes related to whether and how the securitisation of migration can affect the processes that began before they were placed in the field of extraordinary political decision-making. On the example of the Kurdish-Turkish peace initiative, the question had to be answered whether the securitisation of the influx of one ethnic community’s population into the Turkish state condemned the peace negotiations to ruin. It has been shown, first of all, that there was no traditional securitisation of the threat in Turkey, i.e. grammar of security set by the Copenhagen school was not respected, but that a latent securitisation was at work, which was not aimed at pulling Turkey out of the peace negotiations. On the contrary, by the absence of speech acts, Turkey has shown that it abused the securitisation of only a specific part of the Kurdish refugees from Syria, to whom it has applied extraordinary measures. Extraordinary measures were reflected in the construction of a wall on the Turkish-Syrian border, the demolition of border crossings, the impossibility of this population’s right to gain access to temporary protection, and the restriction of movement after 2014 and the Kobane crisis. Turkey
did not want to allow the Syrian Kurds to cross the border with Syria and defend the territory of Kobane from the Islamic State, because that would significantly weaken the negotiating position and endanger Turkey’s national interests. The creation of autonomous areas that could potentially include Kurds’ territories in four different states could lead to unification and the creation of a common Kurdistan state. Considering that the civilian part of the PKK, the negotiating party, also received confirmation that it would not get what it stood for through peace negotiations – territorial autonomy, it decided to return to violent means and terrorist attacks to achieve its goals. On the other hand, Turkey, acting under the influence of fear, returned the Kurdish issue as a subject of dispute to the security framework, re-securitising it. The peace talks’ failure ended with the re-securitisation of the Kurdish minority and the beginning of unprecedented conflicts between the parties. The Turkish-Kurdish relationship can be explained by the statement of a pro-Kurdish leader who stated: “Turkey is ‘us’ too … but the Turks have fear in their genes that ‘if we give the Kurds anything, we won’t be able to stop them.”\(^3\)

The peace processes officially began in 2013, after the successful desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue, and the temporary negative peace between Turkey and the Kurds was interrupted by the securitisation of a part of the migrant population. Although the selective application of extraordinary measures did not jeopardise Turkey’s open migration policy, the securitisation of only one ethnic group of refugees reminded the Kurds that they could not expect the territorial autonomy for which they advocated from Turkey. Although securitisation did not directly lead to the Kurdish-Turkish peace talks’ failure, it created mistrust and fear among the negotiators under whose influence the talks failed in 2015, confirming the initial hypothesis and interconnectedness of the processes that influenced each other. The desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue was a precondition for starting peace negotiations; peace negotiations were slowed down and shaken by the emergence of the securitisation of the Kurdish part of the migrant population,

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\(^3\) For further information and interviews read Crisis Group interview, Remzi Kartal, exiled Kurdish movement leader, Brussels, June 2012, p. 27, Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.pdf Last accessed 8 August 2021.
while the desecuritisation of migration facilitated the return of the Kurdish issue to the field of emergency policy.

Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds from Syria, who fled the war-torn area, did not receive enough attention in security studies and peace studies due to the war in Syria and security dynamics in the entire region in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The findings of this research confirm and deepen the already researched relations in Turkey in the relation between securitisation and peace processes. The inconsistency of public discourses and the covert application of extraordinary measures can lead to implications, not only on domestic issues, but also on the international level. Turkey has built the image of an actor who cannot be trusted at the negotiating table and thus returned to the role with predictable actions with the Other. On the other hand, Turkey’s maximalist policy towards the Kurds has led to a severe national security threat.

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