

Dejan Bursac*

Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

THE EFFECTS OF PARTY IDEOLOGY ON PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY SPENDING IN FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES**

Abstract

The study is designed to empirically test the effects which different ruling party ideologies have on spending for public order and safety budget component in Central and Eastern European countries. The transitional environment and especially post-Cold War security context have altered the concept of security in former socialist societies. Our assumption, based not just on theoretical concepts of left and right ideologies, but also on studies examining this matter in more developed Western democracies, was that right-leaning cabinets will have higher levels of budget consumption for law and order than leftist governments. The empirical model confirmed this hypothesis, albeit only partially. A number of other political, economic, and contextual variables connected with transitional setting, which usually have effect on general levels of spending or certain budget areas, have demonstrated a low significance when comes to law and order spending.

Keywords: *party ideology, public spending, law and order, public order and safety, left-right scale, fiscal policy, Central and Eastern Europe*

* dejan.bursac@ips.ac.rs

** This paper is developed within the research activity of the Institute for Political Studies, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

INTRODUCTION

The transformation of former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe from authoritarian single-party regimes to democracy and from socialist planned economies to capitalism has been characterized, among other things, by the withdrawal of state from its former heavy involvement in economy. Socialist states provided their citizens with various and often relatively generous aspects of welfare services, including pensions, subsidized housing and employment. The process of transition changed the scope and structure of fiscal expenditure, proclaiming the former spending patterns inefficient and wasteful. Moreover, the dissolution of single-party regimes brought immense changes to formerly widespread authoritarian practices, especially with regard to the maintenance of internal public order and safety. Police states and heavily funded internal security services lost much of their purpose in new democratic environment (Caparini and Marenin 2005). The change in social, political and economic paradigm certainly influenced the evolution of understanding of security challenges, which especially applies to the size and fiscal costs of services responsible for maintaining of public safety. However, there are different and conflicting conceptions of fiscal costs even in new democratic and aspiring capitalist societies, not just with regard to law enforcement, but also when comes to other areas of government consumption. Political and ideological motivation of these conceptions may cause different effects with regard to fiscal outcomes, depending presumably on different worldviews of decision-makers in a new, democratic setting.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Ever since the 1970s, the issue of partisan effects on fiscal outcomes has been occupying the political science researchers, who analyzed the topic mainly with regard to the developed industrial democracies of the West. The works of Cameron (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980), Hicks and Swank (1984), Murrell (1985), Berry and Lowery (1987), Blais, Blake and Dion (1993), and Kittel and Obinger (2003), to mention just a few, established positive correla-

tion and even a significant effect on public spending, with regard to partisan variable. Overwhelming number of these studies operationalized its independent variable through the left-right ideological scale, using the one-dimensional spatial model to summarize all cleavages present in certain party system. The logic of binary divide was supported by Budge (2013), who states that a variety of values comprising some party's ideology are not accidental, but derived from a common evolution of ideological positions from their very beginnings. According to him, the typically right-wing values of tradition, liberty, and security are all derived from common root of all conservative or related ideologies: ideas of social hierarchy and continuity, so all divides can indeed be presented in a single dimensional left-right scale, which contains the sum of all ideological divisions of a party system. Other authors that also tested the ideological congruence of parties' various programmatic areas concluded that all other dimensions are generally interrelated within dominant left-right dichotomy (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006; Benoit and Laver 2006).

As it might be supposed, the aforementioned studies examining the correlation of parties and public spending in Western democracies have found a positive effect of leftist parties on expenditure increases, while the right-wing cabinets have usually demonstrated lower levels of consumption. Same can be said for total spending, as well as for certain budget components examined in these studies: most commonly, the segment of social transfers, which include the number of categories in which the left-wing parties are interested because of their advocacy for redistribution and elimination of social inequalities. These include pensions, unemployment benefits, family benefits, health and disability compensations, education subsidies, housing subsidies, social assistance etc. There is also conflicting evidence with regard to seemingly established partisan influence on spending. The analysis of research papers provided by Imbeau, Petry and Lamari (2001) shows that significant partisan effect was found in just 37 percent of studies dealing with the effects of left-right divide on spending or size of the state. This research also points to several important conclusions. Namely, among the hundreds of papers they analyzed, none have previously tested the effect of ideology on budget components related to law enforcement or public order in general. The issue

is severely understudied. Moreover, number of papers focused in general on spending patterns in former socialist countries is disproportionately lower, with only a handful of studies focusing on post-socialist area. Having in mind the extraordinary scope of changes during the transition processes, along with the dynamic process of creation and evolution of party systems in these countries, the low level of academic interest is astonishing.

Very few studies that have tried to examine the strength of partisan effect on fiscal outputs in former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe brought mutually conflicting evidence. The work of Careja and Emmenegger (2009) confirmed the patterns found in Western democracies finding the significant impact of partisan variable not just on total spending levels, but also on budget component of social transfers. Tavits and Letki (2009) argued the opposite, claiming that left-leaning parties in post-socialist context had been more prone to cutting spending, especially during the first waves of transition. Meanwhile the conservatives of Central and Eastern Europe in turn transformed to social populists in their demands for more spending, principally with regard to social transfers. On the other hand, Pavlović and Bešić (2019) did not find any significant effect of ideology when examining the impact of a number of political variables on fiscal outcomes in former socialist countries. Coman (2019) criticized some of the previous studies, stating that no correlation between partisan variable and consumption can ever be confirmed, because heavy external constraints those post-socialist countries are faced with during the processes of opening their economies to global markets and integrating their societies in EU and NATO. The foreign constraints, according to Coman, dictate spending levels, leaving all other variables with diminished effect. Hence the debate on partisan effect on public spending in Central and Eastern Europe remains inconclusive.

As we mentioned before, the spending on order and safety has rarely been examined, even though the issue is regularly represented in political debates, reflecting through the topics of crime, terrorism, penal system reform, or even migrant crisis. The politics of law and order is frequently highly politicized, with a number of even moderate politicians taking over the issue rhetorically during political clashes, in order to appeal to more populist or far right

voters (Wenzelburger 2015, 1). The general logic of ideological left-right divide implies that right-wing parties are traditionally more interested in issues of security, sometimes considering them as their exclusive domain (Stojiljković 2011, 134-136). Therefore, in operationalization of law and order spending as a dependent variable, we are employing a reverse logic than other studies which sought to establish the partisan effect in budget components primarily connected with amelioration of social inequalities and presumed a positive impact of left-wing cabinets on spending levels. When comes to law enforcement budgets, we presume there is an increase in spending when right-wing parties are in power, and similarly, there is a decrease in spending in this area when leftist parties hold majority. In the context of our study, it is also an ideologically motivated difference in spending outputs, only the direction of the partisan effect is presumably reversed.

The systematic studies of public order and safety policies are very much absent from comparative literature of political sciences. There are few case studies analyzing the partisan connection to some aspects of law enforcement policies, such as police or prison reform, but none of them is providing us with evidence regarding spending patterns (see: Beckett 1997; Hoyle and Rose 2001; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Newburn 2007). Obviously, none of them is focusing on post-socialist countries. The very rare example of a systematic comparative study comes from Wenzelburger (2015), who demonstrated that government ideology moderately matters when comes to law and order spending. This author has quantitatively tested different explanations for law and order spending levels in twenty wealthy industrialized democracies, founding that, although the spending on law enforcement is generally higher if parties in government exhibit a tough position on crime, the correlation falls short of being statistically significant. Wenzelburger has also determined that liberal economies spend more on law and order policies than social democratic or corporatist societies. This conclusion is in accordance with our hypothesis, assuming that societies leaning to right-wing values are more prone to spend more on public order, than social democratic redistributionist systems.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The main hypothesis of our study is presuming the statistically significant increase in public order and safety spending in former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the years in which right-wing parties formed the government, and vice versa, lower levels of spending in this budget component when left-wing parties were in power. In order to test the hypothesis, we will also employ a number of additional explanatory variables, apart from partisan composition of government.

The research is spatially defined to cover former socialist countries of Central and Eastern (including Southeastern) Europe. The sample is further limited by including only the democratic countries (according to Polity IV database, see: Marshall 2013), and only states with parliamentary or premier-presidential systems (Shugart 2005, 333-341). Based on these criteria, the sample included 16 countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Timeframe for every country is starting from the first fiscal year in which we can conclude that parliament has adopted a budget at the proposal of democratically elected government, namely from the first multi-party elections since the fall of socialism. The final year of the research is 2017, based on available data. There are certain corrections in the timeframe. During the given period, some of the countries in our sample were still part of larger federations, namely Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslav republics and former Soviet republics. Due to the complexity of divide of fiscal competences between federal center and member states, and generally due to the lack of data from the years of early transition, these cases were omitted from the sample, until member states reached their national independence. Furthermore, the years in which some of the sampled countries were involved in armed conflicts (Croatia, Macedonia, Albania) were also excluded, due to the presumable distortions of consumption level and structure during the wartime. Naturally, the number of individual cases is further dictated by the availability of data, primarily when comes to the dependent variable of the research.

The research is designed to test the effect of different political, economic, and contextual variables connected with the transitional post-socialist countries on the annual level of spending for public order and safety. This variable has been expressed relative to the GDP (Eurostat 2018). By definition of the classification of the functions of government (COFOG; see: OECD 2018), expenditures for public order and safety component include following categories: police services, fire protection services, courts, prisons, public order and safety research and development, as well as all other unclassified expenses in this segment. As Wenzelburger (2015, 14) notes, the disaggregated data that would include only police, prisons, and courts are available only for a few nations, so the researchers are bound to use the aggregated data. This author is also assessing that spending on fire protection accounts for 5 to 10 percent of the overall figure, so the use of this variable will not alter the results significantly.

Main independent variable is constituted as the ideological position of government in a given year, presented on the single-dimensional left-right scale and further summarized in three meta-categories: left, right, and center. The variable was obtained from an expert survey of the government ideological compositions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bursac 2018), which weighted ideological position of every member party with its relative parliamentary strength, in order to position governments on left-right scale. The base contains total of 373 observations for 16 sampled countries in a given period: in 79 of those cases (years in certain country) left cabinets were in power; 129 belonged to center governments; while in 165 right-wing parties dominated the governments.

The model will also employ a number of variables as alternative explanations, with most of them being derived from similar studies trying to establish the partisan influence on general public spending or certain budget components, since we presume that similar factors impact the levels and structure of spending along the former socialist area. First group of these variables are those related to the economy, most notably the unemployment rate (World Bank 2018), for which several authors (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993, Kittel and Obinger 2003, Careja and Emmenegger 2009), found to have a positive impact on spending increases. Furthermore, the

rate of GDP growth (World Bank 2018) is presumably having an impact on spending, according to surveyed studies (Crepaz 1996; Kittel and Obinger 2003). Another economic factor is presence of International Monetary Fund, in terms of existence of structural adjustment arrangements in certain countries, which could cause cuts in law enforcement expenditures (IMF 2018).

Political variables tested in the model include the electoral year binary variable, indicating the government in last year of its term, with the assumption of more expansive spending for those cabinets (Klomp and de Haan 2013). The impact of electoral system as predictor is also tested, as well as the coalition size, minority governments, and the existence of upper chamber of parliament with competences in the budgetary process. For all the aforementioned variables, we employ the similar logic: more veto players involved in the process presumably increase the spending levels.

Third and final group includes various contextual variables: the demographics, especially the share of population under the age of 15 and over the age of 65 (World Bank 2018). While we can expect that older population is more conservative and even authoritarian (Danigelis and Cutler 1991), we can presumably claim that societies with younger population are more susceptible to post-materialist worldviews (Inglehart 1997, 133-137). Therefore the effect on spending for security services could be lower in countries with higher shares of young population. Next variables are binary variable of conflict legacy, constructed to differentiate the countries involved in armed conflicts during transition, which would presumably have a high positive impact on law and order spending; and variables of EU integration level and NATO membership. Finally, we will also employ a composite variable of transformation level, constructed from several indexes such as Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2018), the Bertelsmann Foundation's Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) and indicators of the level of openness of the economy: level of foreign investment, share of foreign trade in GDP, and share of services sector in GDP (World Bank 2018). The transformation level variable is devised to test the impact of openness of the economy and general level of transformation of countries from socialist authoritarian regimes to liberal democracy.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Descriptive statistics for three ideological positions provided expected preliminary results with regard to law enforcement spending (see: Table 1). Governments composed of right-wing parties spend 0.15% of GDP more for law and order services than leftist cabinets. Interestingly, center governments have displayed even larger consumption levels. This is highly unusual finding having in mind the ideological composition of center ideological area in terms of our research, with most of these parties coming from the leftist tradition, either as former communist parties transformed to adopt liberal policies; or as social democratic parties which moved to ideological center during the transition, similar to British Labour Party or German Social Democrats, as well as other Third way parties in developed democracies. It is surprising that these parties adopted conservative views of security which reflected in their spending patterns. Of course, a fragment of center governments is composed of primarily social conservative and Christian democratic parties (especially in Baltic countries, Poland, and Slovakia), but we they alone could not account for such large increase in spending levels for the whole center variable.

Further tests indicate significant differences in variance between three ideological positions: $F(2,144.21) = 8.59$, $p = 0.000$. The post hoc tests also confirm significant difference in spending between left and center ($p < 0.05$), while difference between center and right are very close to statistical significance ($p = 0.65$).

Table 1. Average level of public order and safety expenditures in 16 CEE countries

Government ideology	Mean value of government consumption (%GDP)
Left	1.96
Center	2.25
Right	2.11

In order to test the impact of selected variables on public spending, two almost identical regression statistical models were constructed, their difference being only the alternative inclusion of right- and left-wing cabinets. The database employed to provide the dependent variable, annual level of spending (Eurostat 2018) is lacking data for certain years for several countries, so the number of cases is somewhat lower than expected ($N = 225$). It is worth to note that it is still the most comprehensive publicly available database on the issue.

Nevertheless, the expected effect of main predictor is confirmed: right-wing cabinets display a value of 0.24 points higher than left cabinets (see: Table 2). It is established that, due to the different ideologically motivated priorities when comes to budgetary allocation, the left parties tend to divert funds to other segments of spending, based on their own preferences or the preferences of their voters. The center governments also have higher propensity towards higher spending levels in this budget component. However, it should be noted that the explanatory power of this model is limited, with the percentage of explained variance of $R^2 = 0.294$. Logically, the segment of law and order is affected by a number of factors more closely connected with security and crime, which stand outside of our model of political, economic, and other factors connected with transitional context.

Table 2. The effect of partisan ideology (and other predictors) on public order and safety expenditures in 16 CEE countries

	Model 1	Model 2
(constant)	2.112** (.115)	1.872** (.105)
Left cabinet	-.240** (.069)	
Center cabinet	.171** (.056)	.411** (.077)
Right cabinet		.240** (.069)
Unemployment	.030** (.006)	.030** (.006)

GDP growth	.015* (.006)	.015* (.006)
IMF arrangement	.083 (.059)	.083 (.059)
Electoral year	.008 (.050)	.008 (.050)
Electoral system	.050 (.090)	.050 (.090)
Coalition size	-.071** (.019)	-.071** (.019)
Population over 65	-.722** (.205)	-.722** (.205)
Post-conflict	-.019 (.114)	-.019 (.114)
Transformation level	.031 (.031)	.031 (.031)
R2	.294	.294
CI	13.640	12.698
N	225	225

Dependent variable: public order and safety spending (%GDP)

+p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Other tested variables do not provide much to the explanation of law enforcement spending levels. There is statistical significance when comes to unemployment rate, for which we can assume that may indicate increases in crime rate, possibly related to high unemployment (Winter-Ebmer and Raphael 2001). However, the value of coefficient for this correlation is rather small ($B = 0.030$). Furthermore, GDP growth variable demonstrates positive value, while the existence of structural adjustment arrangement with the International Monetary Fund has no significant effect, possibly implying that law and order segment is priority in terms of budget spending.

We expected greater impact from the post-conflict variable, assuming that problems emerging from armed conflicts, including transitional justice, public order maintenance, proliferation of arms among population etc. could be directly related to increased demands for law enforcement spending. We were wrong. The spending in this component clearly does not relate to demands possibly arising from the post-conflict situation. Within the demo-

graphic category, results were also surprising. The share of the elderly population has a high negative coefficient, meaning that it is lowering the spending levels, although we have expected a positive effect, mostly due to the traditionally more conservative orientation of elderly population toward security issues.

CONCLUSION

Our study has been devoted to empirical examination of difference in effects which party ideologies produce on national budget components for financing law and order in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on the results of conducted tests, we can conclude that the main hypothesis is partially confirmed. Namely, the difference between left and right governments is manifested as significant, with right-wing cabinets spending substantially more on public order and safety services than left parties and coalitions. However, it should be noted that center governments exhibit even greater levels of spending than both left and right cabinets. Also, it is important to state that explanatory power of the applied model is limited, with less than a third of variance explained. Most of the political, economic, and contextual variables connected with post-socialist societies, which we applied in the model based on the numerous studies which analyzed the correlation between partisan ideology and spending levels in other budget components, have proven to have very little effect when comes to law and order consumption. To conclude, we can say that in post-socialist and post-Cold war context, the law enforcement spending is, at least in part, influenced by the worldviews of ruling parties toward law and order, which are manifested in their ideological stances.

REFERENCES

- Beckett, K. 1997. *Making Crime Pay*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Beckett, K. & T. Sasson. 2004. „Crime, Politics and the Public: The Sources of Mass Incarceration in the USA“. *Japanese Journal of Sociological Criminology*, 29: 27-50.

- Benoit, K. & M. Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Berry, W. D. & D. Lowery. 1987. *Understanding United States Government Growth: An Empirical Analysis of the Postwar Era*. New York: Praeger.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. *Transformation Index*: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/>
- Blais, A., D. Blake, & S. Dion. 1993. „Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies“. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1): 30-62.
- Budge, I. 2013. „The Standard Right-Left Scale“. *Manifesto Project*: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/papers/budge_right-left-scale.pdf
- Bursac, D. 2018. *Expert Survey on Party Ideology in Former Socialist Countries, 1990-2017*: <http://www.ips.ac.rs/researchers/dejan-bursac/>
- Cameron, D. R. 1978. „The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis“. *American Political Science Review*, 72(4): 1243-1261.
- Caparini, M. & O. Marenin. 2005. „Crime, Insecurity and Police Reform in Post-Socialist CEE“. *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, 2/2005: <http://journals.openedition.org/pipss/330>
- Careja, R. & P. Emmenegger. 2009. „The Politics of Public Spending in Post-Communist Countries“. *East European Politics and Societies*, 23(2): 165-184.
- Coman, E. E. 2019. „When Left or Right Do Not Matter: Ideology and Spending in Central and Eastern Europe“. *Research & Politics*, 6(1): 1-9.
- Crepaz, M. 1996. „Consensus Versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes“. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29(1): 4-26.

- Danigelis, N. L. & S. J. Cutler. 1991. „Cohort Trends in Attitudes about Law and Order: Who’s Leading the Conservative Wave?“. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55(1): 24-49.
- Eurostat. 2018. *Eurostat database*: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>
- Golden, D. G. & J. M. Poterba. 1980. „The Price of Popularity: The Political Business Cycle Reexamined“. *American Journal of Political Science*, 24(4): 696-714.
- Hicks, A. & D. H. Swank. 1984. „On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion: A Comparative Analysis of 18 Advanced Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1971“. *Comparative Political Studies*, 17(1): 81-119.
- Hooghe, L., G. Marks & C. J. Wilson. 2002. „Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?“. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(8): 965-989.
- Hoyle, C. & D. Rose. 2001. „Labour, Law and Order“. *Political Quarterly*, 72(1):76-85.
- Imbeau, L. M., F. Petry & M. Lamari. 2001. „Left-Right Party Ideology and Government Policies: A Meta-Analysis“. *European Journal of Political Research*, 40(1): 1-29.
- Inglehart, R. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- International Monetary Fund. 2018. *International Monetary Fund Data*: <http://www.imf.org/en/Data>
- Kittel, B. & H. Obinger. 2003. „Political Parties, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Social Expenditure in Times of Austerity“. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(1): 20-45.
- Klomp, J. & J. de Haan. 2013. „Political Budget Cycles and Election Outcomes“. *Public Choice*, 157(1-2): 245-267.
- Marks, G., L. Hooghe, M. Nelson & E. Edwards. 2006. „Party Competition and European Integration in East and West. Different Structure, Same Causality“. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39: 155-175.

- Marshall, M. G. 2013. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>
- Murrell, P. 1985. „The Size of Public Employment: An Empirical Study“. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 9(4): 424-437.
- Newburn, T. 2007. „Tough on Crime: Penal Policy in England and Wales“. *Crime and Justice*, 36(1): 425-470.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018. *Classification of the functions of government, COFOG*: <https://stats.oecd.org/>
- Pavlović, D. & M. Bešić. 2019. „Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Post-Communist Europe“. *East European Politics*, 35(2): 220-237.
- Shugart, M. S. 2005. „Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns“. *French Politics*, 3(3): 323-351.
- Stojiljković, Z. 2011. „Političke formacije u Evropskom parlamentu“. In *Političke grupacije u Evropi*, eds. Z. Stojiljković & G. Pilipović, 101-251. Belgrade: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Tavits, M. & N. Letki. 2009. „When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe“. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4): 555-569.
- Transparency International. 2018. *Corruption Perceptions Index*: <https://www.transparency.org/>
- Wenzelburger, G. 2015. „Parties, Institutions and the Politics of Law and Order: How Political Institutions and Partisan Ideologies Shape Law-and-Order Spending in Twenty Western Industrialized Countries“. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(3): 663-687.
- Winter-Ebmer, R. & S. Raphael. 2001. „Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime“. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 44(1): 259-83.
- World Bank. 2018. *World Bank Open Data*: <https://data.worldbank.org/>

Дејан Бурсаћ*

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

УТИЦАЈ ПАРТИЈСКЕ ИДЕОЛОГИЈЕ НА ПОТРОШЊУ ЗА ЈАВНИ РЕД И БЕЗБЕДНОСТ У БИВШИМ СОЦИЈАЛИСТИЧКИМ ДРЖАВАМА**

Резиме

Студија је осмишљена са циљем да емпиријски тестира ефекте које различите идеологије владајућих политичких партија могу да имају на јавну потрошњу у буџетској области јавног реда и безбедности у државама Централне и Источне Европе. Транзициони процеси и уопште пост-хладноратовски безбедносни контекст су значајно изменили концепт безбедности некадашњих социјалистичких друштава. Претпостављена хипотеза, базирана не само на теоријским концепцијама идеологије левице и деснице, већ и на студијама које су се бавиле овим питањем на примеру развијених западних демократија, сматра да ће владе састављене од десних странака имати више нивое буџетске потрошње за питања закона и реда, у контрасту са левим владама. Емпиријски модел потврђује ову хипотезу, иако тек делимично. Значајан број политички, економских и контекстуалних варијабли везаних за транзиционо окружење, а које смо укључили у модел због тога што је на основу компаративне праксе утврђено да могу да утичу на општи ниво јавне потрошње, или на одређене буџетске компоненте, нису значајан предиктор потрошње за јавни ред и безбедност.

Кључне речи: *партијске идеологије, јавна потрошња, закон и ред, јавни ред и безбедност, левица, десница, фискална политика, Централна и Источна Европа*

* dejan.bursac@ips.ac.rs

** Рад је настао у оквиру научно-истраживачке делатности Института за политичке студије, коју финансира Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије.

* Овај рад је примљен 5. априла 2020. године, а прихваћен за штампу на телефонском састанку Редакције, 13. априла 2020. године.