



SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu in the Capitals of the Little Entente: Belgrade (1936) and Prague (1937)

Abstract

The present article presents certain aspects of the relations between Romania, the Czech Republic and Yugoslavia in the inter-war period. The fourth decade of the last century in particular was extremely rich in political, diplomatic and military events. Within this international context, Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu (1934-1937) sought to establish bilateral contacts – with the great powers of Europe, but mainly with the members of the Little Entente – meant to both strengthen bilateral relations and clarify the states' perspective on the events in progress.

During his visits to Belgrade and Prague – as emerges from the press of the time – Gheorghe Tătărescu permanently advocated maintaining the *status-quo* and the political, economic and military cooperation between the states of the Little Entente.

Key words: the Little Entente, Gheorghe Tătărescu, Milan Hodža, Milan Stojadinović.

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Introduction

Gheorghe Tătărescu was appointed Prime Minister of Romania on 5 January 1934 by King Carol II (Giurescu 2003: 428). He left his mark on the entire government activity in 1934-1937, promoting, *on the economic plane*, a policy of stimulation of the national industry; *on the social plane*, he supported the assertion of a middle-class group connected to the state; and *on the foreign plane* he sought to preserve the Versailles system, to promote regional alliances – the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, – to prevent both Germany and the Soviet Union from dominating south-eastern Europe (Chistol 2007).

Gheorghe Tătărescu's administration, performed in the name of the National Liberal Party, proved capable to “steer the stabilisation and re-launching of Romania's economy, the organic development of the national culture and society, the strengthening of Romania's international prestige through a coherent foreign policy, meant to contribute to the defence of European order.” (Tătărescu 1996: XXV)

In the summer of 1936, acting on Nicolae Titulescu's suggestion, King Carol II and Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu decided to devise a document outlining Romania's foreign policy. Thus, on 14 July 1936, the document was compiled, stipulating the following: the need to conclude a pact between France and the Little Entente against any aggressor; cessation of the attacks launched by the Romanian press against all foreign states; publication of articles in favour of a rapprochement to the USSR “indicating that we cannot preserve our current alliances with France, the Czechoslovakian Republic and Turkey if we do not reach an agreement, or even become an enemy of the USSR, the ally of our allies.” (Scurtu 2003: 503; Popișteanu 1968: 177) Essentially, this document was meant to underline the following: how destructive was the division of continental security into western security and eastern security; the need to accomplish a unified system of security; the conclusion of regional politico-military pacts which would emphasise the necessary relation between local security, continental security and world security. (Potra 2007: 29-166) “In order to accomplish these permanent goals – emphasised Gheor-

ghe Tătărescu – we strengthened our alliances and friendships, at the same time maintaining the best relations with all states indiscriminately. Our cooperation with the Czechoslovakian Republic and Yugoslavia within the framework of the Little Entente proved increasingly fertile for the destiny of our peoples and the life of this part of the world, where history placed us guardians.” (Tătărescu 1996: 192) The government led by Gheorghe Tătărescu continued to promote the regional alliances – the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente – as means of preserving the Versailles system of peace agreements. At the same time, starting with 1934, meetings and consultations between the representatives of the Balkan states expanded. In the context of the existing international relations, Nicolae Titulescu’s removal on 29 August 1936, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated as Romania’s adjustment to the new realities, the search for new political and diplomatic measures and methods which would allow it to counteract the obvious danger to the security of the country’s territorial *status-quo*, to its national independence, deriving from the failure of collective security, as a result of the open assertion of German revisionism and revanchist attitudes, the policy of appeasement followed by “the Western democracies” (France and England) and the American “isolationism”. (Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, Nicolescu 1999: 194) Tătărescu was aware that Nicolae Titulescu’s replacement with Victor Antonescu, “a true traditionalist in our foreign policy,” would be construed as “a new direction in the country’s foreign policy” but, he added, this interpretation “would soon be invalidated by the government’s future actions and attitudes.” (Moisuc 2003: 246) Throughout his administration, Gheorghe Tătărescu’s foreign policy observed the leitmotif of “extending alliances and establishing friendly relations with all peoples.” (Tătărescu 1996: 232) In connection with the relations between the member states of the Little Entente, the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister Milan Hodža declared – following the June 1937 meeting on the Danube, on board the *Carol II*, attended by Stojadinović, Hodža, Tătărescu and Victor Antonescu: “The Little Entente becomes an indispensable tool in the consolidation of the Danube basin and, therefore, an instrument of world peace;” (Campus 1968: 286) while in October 1937 Victor Antonescu emphasised that “The international situation is, evidently, evolving. There has not been a remarkable event which would

necessitate any change in the previously established decisions of the Little Entente. In Geneva we had permanent contact with the delegates of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente [...] who convinced us that the policy followed so far does not require new decisions. The essential character of both the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente is the widest mutual trust; the two organisms build a unitary entity. It is essential that in all possible events the two organisms maintain an unwavering joint attitude.” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 3: 177-178)

To put into practice the “new direction,” the Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu made several official visits to Belgrade, Prague, Paris, London, among others.

Foreign press on Gheorghe Tătărescu’s visit to Belgrade

In October 1936, Gheorghe Tătărescu made a private visit (unofficial, as the foreign press agencies claimed) to Belgrade in an attempt to “liquidate Titulescu’s planned Romanian-Soviet alliance” (AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 13) – specified the Hungarian newspaper *Nemzeti Újság*. This thesis – maintaining the reality of “certain changes in Romania’s foreign policy” – was also supported by the Polish newspaper *Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny*, which published a special telegram from Vienna – entitled “*Romania and Yugoslavia moving away from the Soviets. The Czech Republic threatens isolation*” – and which emphasised the following: “Prime Minister Tătărescu, who arrived in Belgrade yesterday [21 October 1936], brings King Carol II’s approval of a complete change in Romania’s policy towards the Soviets. In Belgrade the standards of Romania’s and Yugoslavia’s foreign policy will be established, in the sense of a reserved attitude towards Russia. This step is meant to present Czechoslovakia with an accomplished fact. If Czechoslovakia does not draw the correct conclusions, it will in future be completely isolated in its foreign policy, although it is a member of this agreement. The Romanian Prime Minister’s visit to Belgrade is all the more important as it is made on the eve of King Carol’s visit to Prague. According to different intelligence, during his stay in Prague, King Carol will inform President Beneš about the changes made in Romania’s and Yugoslavia’s foreign policy.” (AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 15)

Around Gheorghe Tătărescu's visits to Belgrade, the Danish press also "echoed certain news from an English and French source." ((AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 18) Thus, the *Social-Demokraten* made a synthesis of the contradictory news, emphasising that "the Tătărescu-Stojanović meeting would have something to do with the possible change in the traditional policy of Romania and the Little Entente, indicating this political organisation's concern to avoid any commitments that could draw it in a conflict with Germany. England's and France's ineffectuality at truly opposing Germany's arming, intended to lead to the Reich's hegemony in Europe soon, would clarify – the newspaper continued – Romania's and Yugoslavia's tendency to liberate themselves from the French alliance, in order to achieve a perfect neutrality. However, in relation to Mr. Krofta's categorical statements, it remains to be seen if these divergent attitudes could – in the Danish opinion – cause the break of the Little Entente." ((AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 18-19)

The Hungarian newspaper *Budapesti Hírlap* of 22 October 1936 mentioned that "Tătărescu will have political talks with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister Stojadinović," (AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 16) while the French newspaper *L'Oeuvre* reported that "Prime Minister Tătărescu travelled to Belgrade to convey to the Yugoslavian Prime Minister the King's [Carol II's] approval of Romania's and Yugoslavia's new foreign policy, which displays great reserve towards Russia. In this way, they intend to present Beneš, the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, with an accomplished fact." (AMAE, fund Special Files, vol. 375/2: 16-17)

The foreign press alluded to Nicolae Titulescu's removal from office (29 August 1936), as a result of the fact that he militated in favour of a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, reaching, in July 1936, the conclusion of a protocol with Maksim Litvinov (People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union). Nicolae Titulescu's removal from Gheorghe Tătărescu's government – emphasised N. Krestinski, Soviet minister to Bucharest – was due to the fact that "Titulescu is a great, great man, only not for Romania." (Bold, Ciupercă 2010: 127) Following Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal, the foreign office was assumed by Victor

Antonescu, who insisted that Romania's foreign policy remained unchanged, because it was not the prerogative of one single person, but of the entire government, led by Gheorghe Tătărescu in agreement with King Carol II. On these lines – of continuity in the foreign policy – the foreign press also mentioned that “when Mr. Antonescu succeeded Mr. Titulescu, he was quick to deny any profound change; but those who are advised know that certain goals had been established: improving relations with Poland, the agreement with Italy, settling differences between Yugoslavia and Romania, preparing the ground for better cooperation with Germany and redressing the poor impression seemingly created in Great Britain by Mr. Titulescu's latest outburst at the Convention regarding the Straits in Montreux.” (AMAE, fund 71 Anglia, vol. 39: 288) Moreover, in an interview given by Victor Antonescu to *L'Intransigeant*, of 5 October 1937, regarding Romania's foreign affairs, he emphasised that “Our friendship and our alliance with France are the basis of Romania's overall foreign policy. Romania also wants to intensify its alliance with the states of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente and strengthen the one with Poland. Friendly relations with England will also be consolidated. We will develop our friendship with Italy and entertain friendly and good neighbourly relations with Russia; as regards Germany, we have sound economic relations with this country.” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 3: 175; Cîrstea 2012: 217-227)

Romanian and Czechoslovakian interest in strengthening cooperation in all domains “politically, diplomatically, militarily and economically,” as reflected by the foreign press

In the tumult of the events that took place between 1936 and 1938, Romania remained completely faithful to its traditional policy. In order to convey a message of solidarity between the member states of the Little Entente, King Carol II made an official visit to Czechoslovakia (between 28 October and 1 November 1936), (Calafeteanu 2003: 297) entering the Czechoslovakian territory on 27 October and the state capital on 28 October “on the very day of Czechoslovakia's national celebration,” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 375/3: 13; Cîrstea, 2013: 392-404) and after “a

three-day stay in Vienna, accompanied by President Beneš, he would leave for Brno, the capital of Moravia, and Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia.” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 375/3: 14) On this occasion, there were “several councils during which current political problems were debated in a spirit of perfect harmony and means of joint future action were decided.” (AMAE, fund Czechoslovakia, vol. 40: 280)

Politically, the visit which King Carol II made in Prague proved that “the Little Entente, far from displaying inner frictions, balances a perfectly united front against the fluctuations of European politics.” (AMAE, fund Czechoslovakia, vol. 40: 133) Moreover, the first speech held by the Czechoslovakian president emphasised “the complete agreement between the member states of the Little Entente” and that, although the prince regent of Yugoslavia was not in Prague, “we sense the presence of our friend Yugoslavia and I am certain that these relations will become even closer.” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 375/3: 21) The talks between the officials of the two countries’ also covered the future of the Little Entente, “in the sense that – by enlarging the field of the mutual obligations arising from the fundamental pact and their alliance treaties – the three states should commit to defending each other concertedly and unreservedly against any attack from a neighbouring state, whether it is Italy, Germany or Soviet Russia.” (AMAE, fund 71 Romania, vol. 375/3: 133)

This visit would be followed by another in the spring of 1937, that of Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu, “a new opportunity to assert the community of feelings and interests between the two peoples;” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 93) therefore, his visit to Czechoslovakia (22-25 March 1937) began in the Královo tourist centre, where “the people overcrowding the platforms welcomed the Romanian Prime Minister with ovations. The railway station was decorated with Romanian and Czechoslovakian flags.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111) Gheorghe Tătărescu’s first official meetings were with Prime Minister Milan Hodža, Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta and President Edvard Beneš. The cities of Prague, Plzeň and Brno were visited. Referring to the friendship between the two countries, “dating from before the war, from the time when, both oppressed by Hungarianism, they fought

hard to defend their spiritual heritage and preserve their language, their traditions and their rights,” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 93) The newspaper *L'Indépendance Roumaine* emphasised that: “The solidarity between Bucharest and Prague being absolute, for all possible reasons. The two countries’ national freedom relies on the same treaty, which they are determined to put into practice until the last drop of their strength. They are equally preoccupied with safeguarding the existing European peace and order, with opposing revisionism, and preventing any change in the balance, which would only be the prelude of new and upsetting developments.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 93)

During conferences with the Czechoslovakian officials “all areas of cooperation between the two states were examined, from a political, diplomatic, military and also commercial perspective, in all details.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 112) Moreover, the representatives of the two states “ascertained that development was parallel in the two counties and they share a perfect unity of effort and goals, in relation to international rapports.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 113) During the talks it was underlined that “in Europe there is no other union whose solidarity and inner strength corresponds with that of the Little Entente” (maintained Mr. Milan Hodža) and that “our union is a lifeline for each of us and for all of us collectively” (emphasised Mr. Tătărescu). (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 114) It was also highlighted that the two governments agreed that “a constructive policy in the Danube basin was the most appropriate means to employ in resolving Central Europe’s problems with Germany and Italy unequivocally and, at the same time, one of those instruments in the absence of which European consolidation could not be achieved.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 115)

The entire Czechoslovakian press covered the official visit of the Romanian prime minister, Gheorghe Tătărescu, in Czechoslovakia. Thus, the government-oriented newspaper *Prager Presse* published an editorial note with the following content: “Starting with the first moment when he stepped on Czechoslovakian soil, Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu was the target of cordial and spontaneous manifestations on the part of public opinion in our country. The press called the tune on the eve; it was joined by the

crowds come to all the railway stations along the route to greet our guest [...] Czechoslovakia understands this visit not only as the proof of the steadfast and indestructible friendship that joins out countries together, but also as evidence of the fact that we, the Romanians, the Yugoslavians and the Czechoslovakians, are determined to become even closer through mutual acquaintanceship.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 93; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) The policy of rapprochement of the three states was partly attributable to Prime Minister Tătărescu, – as the *Pražské Noviny* emphasised, – who “has run the destiny of Greater Romania with a firm hand for more than three years, a period which clearly represents a critical time in the international political life of Europe and of each country separately. One can say the head of the Romanian government is one of those European men of state who are responsible for peace and security in Europe and are fully aware of it. Mr. Tătărescu, who possesses so many remarkable qualities and who demonstrated numerous merits in all areas of political activity, is greeted warmly by the entire Czechoslovakian people.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>)

The influential newspaper *Národní Politika* published an article penned by Mr. Borsky, which mentioned, among others, that “Czechoslovakia and Romania belong to the great coalition of peace and their rapports are dictated by the overall interests of the guardians of peace, which constitutes the healthiest foundation of any alliance of foreign policy, (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) while under Dr. Schoferle’s signature, the same newspaper wrote: “The visit of Prime Minister Tătărescu, who knows the art of winning affection and popularity, offers the Czechoslovakian public the opportunity to welcome a dear guest as warmly and sincerely as possible. Abroad, Mr. Tătărescu’s visit to Prague will constitute new evidence of the solidarity within the Little Entente.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) The *Právo Lidu*, the Social Democrat publication, also emphasised that “Mr. Tătărescu’s visit represents the best reply to the campaign led by a certain part of the foreign press against Czechoslovakia and against the Little Entente.” (AMAE,

fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) The *České Slovo*, the newspaper of the Czechoslovakian Socialist-Nationalist Party, also published an interesting article, which highlighted the significance attributed by the Czechoslovakian public opinion to the presence in Prague of the head of the Romanian government “In itself, the fact that the Romanian Prime Minister decided to come to us at this very moment is evidence that the Romanian-Czechoslovakian relations are completely unambiguous and that they have remained influenced by all the recent attempts to weaken them. Mr. Tătărescu’s words were adequate proof that these relations are developing and deepening and that the Little Entente, as a concerted organ, truly is part of European order and peace. A further guarantee is provided by the fact that our countries are animated by shared ideals, among which Mr. Tătărescu revealed reliance on allies and loyalty to the League of Nations and to the idea of collective security. We are especially delighted with Mr. Tătărescu’s affirmation of these last two instruments of European peace: building trust in the Little Entente and in the European community to which we all want to contribute. This is the reassuring role of Mr. Tătărescu’s visit to Prague.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 101-104) The *Venkov*, the publication of the Agrarian Republican Party, emphasised Mr. Tătărescu’s remarkable qualities “as a publicist, an erudite, a playwright, an art critic and a true Romanian character, with an outstanding French education.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 101-104; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) The *Národní Listy*, the National-Democrat Party newspaper, wrote: “In Mr. Tătărescu are joined a talented man of state and a talented literate and speaker. Even before the war, Romania knew the inspired art critic Gh. Tătărescu, appreciated and admired the distinguished playwright Tătărescu and appreciated the resourceful journalist and publicist Gh. Tătărescu. Romania’s political and economic consolidation, as well as the strengthening of the state unity, which contributed largely to the increase in the esteem and the confidence that Romania was shown by the international political life, are as many merits of this exceptionally energetic, tenacious and cautious man of state. In him, we greet a true friend of our people and our state. The goal of his strategy is closer unity of the Little Entente and especially of the Romanian-Czechoslovakian relations. This

does not, however, preclude him from pursuing a purely Romanian policy.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>)

The *Prager Tagblatt* wrote, among others, that “Mr. Tătărescu’s journey at the end of the winter complements the visit made by H.M. King Carol II to our state at the beginning of the winter. Of particular note is the fact that Romania’s Prime Minister pays special attention to the economic ties between the two countries. As always, the solidarity of the Little Entente is again emphasised, which is firm enough to ensure unified action in important matters, but also flexible enough to allow each of the three states a certain degree of freedom.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 105; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>) The same newspaper mentioned the various diplomatic plans which preoccupied European chancelleries. “The German project meant to replace the Pact of Locarno is considered unsatisfactory in Paris and London. In the last few days, the problem of Central and South-Eastern Europe has gained prominence. Austria’s attitude towards the German-Italian axis on the one hand, on the other hand its attitude towards the other Danube basin states, Mr. Schuschnigg’s visit to Budapest, the voices raised in Austria in favour of a rapprochement with Czechoslovakia, the rumours of closer cooperation between the block of the Rome states and the Little Entente, are all capable to lend great importance to the talks carried out in Prague. The two heads of government have the opportunity to evaluate all the issues raised by the present day.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 105; <http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>)

The *Bohemia* noted in an editorial: “Last autumn, when H.M. King Carol II, accompanied by Grand Voievod Mihai and Foreign Minister Victor Antonescu returned the visit made by the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Prime Minister Gh. Tătărescu, the main counsellor of the Romanian Sovereign, was unable to attend H.M. the King to Prague. He is doing it now and is cordially welcomed by the government and the entire press of Czechoslovakia. The newspaper underlines the importance of this meeting following Mr. Victor Antonescu’s recent visit to Ankara and on the eve of President Beneš’s visit to Prince Regent Paul in Belgrade. The newspaper showed that although Mr. Tătărescu’s

visit is presented as an expression of courtesy, it nevertheless is of the most important political nature, given on the one hand the personality of the Romanian Prime Minister and, on the other, the international situation.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 106; <http://dspace.bcucuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>)

On 22 March, the press in Belgrade also recorded in newspapers such as the *Vreme* and the *Politika*, that: “the Romanian Prime Minister will have important appointments with the political leaders of Czechoslovakia and especially with the heads of the military industry and important factories of military industry will be visited, especially those in Plzeň and Brno.” (<http://dspace.bcucuj.ro/handle/123456789/81870>)

Commentaries of the Western press regarding the meetings of the two heads of state

The French press, through *Le Petit Parisien* of 22 March, published a correspondence from Prague: “Mr. Tătărescu’s visit to Prague, following the solemn reception of H.M. King Carol II last October, will not be a simple show of friendship, but, judging by the composition of the Romanian delegation itself and the programme of the journey in Czechoslovakia, will allow the settling of important economic and financial matters, especially those concerning the equipment of the Romanian army.” (<http://dspace.bcucuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) The 23 March issue of the *Journal des Débats* published an article on the visit made by Mr. Tătărescu to Prague, signed by Mr Albert Mousset: “This visit, said the newspaper, is part of a series of meetings and conferences during which the representatives of the two alliances, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, will attempt to conjugate their action in the face of a rapidly developing international situation. The warmth of Mr. Tătărescu’s reception in Prague proves that nothing remains of the regrettable incident regarding the book written by the former minister to Bucharest, Mr. Jan Seba, an incident which was exploited by those who oppose the solidarity of the Little Entente and the Romanian-Czechoslovakian friendship. As a matter of fact, the talks in Prague not only constitute a solemn manifestation of solidarity, but they also target material goals,

especially the motorisation of the Romanian army with the support of the Czechoslovakian industry, on the strength of the financial agreement concluded a few weeks ago.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The 27 March issue of *Le Temps* published from its special correspondent in Prague the following: “Mr. Tătărescu dedicated a large portion of his time to visiting Czechoslovakian armament manufacturers, and especially those in Plzeň and Brno, which confirms, if conformation was still needed, the desire of the Little Entente states to dispose of well equipped and homogeneous armies; but it goes without saying that the current political issues were approached by Mr. Tătărescu and his various interlocutors, Messrs. Beneš, Hodža and Krofta. The frequently brandished idea, yet so far kept unsuccessful, of cooperation between the States of the Danube basin, from which naturally, neither Germany, nor Italy would be excluded, or, in other words, cooperation between the block of Rome and the Little Entente seems to be progressing sensibly.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The English press mentioned as well, in *The Morning Post* of 22 March: “Prime Minister Tatarescu’s visit to Prague is connected with a vast plan to open new factories in Romania, branches of Czechoslovakian armament manufacturers, so that the Romanian army could be motorised in the shortest time.” On the other hand, the newspaper determined that the Prime Minister’s visit was interpreted in Prague “as indication that Romanian-Czechoslovakian relations are about to become even closer than before, due to their cooperation in matters of armament. On this occasion, it announces that after his return from Prague, Mr. Tătărescu is to go on an official visit to Ankara, and in May will receive in Bucharest the visit of the prime-ministers of Turkey, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) *The Yorkshire Post* of 23 March wrote: “Recent reports, according to which Germany and Italy are interested in closer connections with Yugoslavia, pay special attention to the present talks. Messrs. Tătărescu and Hodža exchanged opinions about the political situation in the Danube basin as well.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) *The Daily Telegraph* of the same say was of the opinion that “all conversations move towards establishing

measures to unify the system of armament of the Little Entente.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The Manchester Guardian of 25 March emphasised that “Mr. Tătărescu’s visit to Prague draws everybody’s attention because of the importance of its military, economic and political goals. [...] This visit was crowned with the greatest success, constituting a re-statement of the solidarity between Czechoslovakia and Romania, as well as of the friendly cooperation between the three states of the Little Entente.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) Announcing the departure from Prague of Prime Minister Tătărescu, *The Times* of 27 March said: “According to an official statement, the goal of Mr. Tătărescu’s visit was – apart from talks on general political matters – extending commercial affairs between the two countries and a detailed plan for financing Czechoslovakian supplies for the Romanian army. Mr. Tătărescu’s talks with Mr. Hodža and Mr. Krofta demonstrated the complete agreement between the two governments and the perfect unity of goals of the three member states of the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia and Romania look kindly on the Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement as a contributing factor in the consolidation of peace in that part of Europe. The Little Entente wishes to cooperate with all the other countries in the Danube basin, but at the same time resolutely opposes the restoration of the Habsburgs.” (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The German press also commented on Prime Minister Gh. Tătărescu’s visit to Prague, the visit of Foreign Minister V. Antonescu to Ankara, as well as the visit to Berlin of Mr. M. Constantinescu, the governor of the National Bank, and the visit to Warsaw of Dr. C. Angelescu, Minister of Public Instruction, regarded as “living demonstrations of the Romanian foreign policy.” The newspapers mentioned the fact that this new activity corresponded to current requirements which the Romanian foreign policy was facing in relation with the new constellation and the new currents which can be noticed in European politics. The German press insisted mainly on the perceived political aspect of the visit made by Mr Tătărescu, the president of the Council of Ministers. Thus, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 19 March reported that “this visit is not only of economic nature and neither is it limited to matters

of armament. The talks to be held are going to cover the entire complex of problems which interest the relations between the member states of the Little Entente between themselves and also each state's rapports with its neighbours." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) At the same time, *Deutsche Allemeine Zeitung* of 23 March wrote: "Prime Minister Tătărescu's visit to Prague assumes a very distinctive character due to the fact that it includes the review of the armament factories in Czechoslovakia. And the time chosen for this visit clearly expresses its purpose: to show that there can be no weakening of the Romanian-Czech relations and to put an appropriate end to the embarrassing discussions occasioned by the publication of the book *Russia and the Little Entente*, written by Czechoslovakia's minister in Romania." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) The *Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten* of the same day also reported: "the visit of the Romanian head of government to Prague does not have an economic character, as it was implied. On the contrary, the fact that he is accompanied by General Glatz, the secretary general to the Ministry of War, commissioned to discuss matters relating to armament, shows that the military alliance between the states of the Little Entente, respectively the alliance between Romania and Czechoslovakia, will feature at the top of the agenda. The toasts given by Messrs. Hodža and Tătărescu indicated that the cooperation between the States of the Little Entente had turned into a function of a concerted regional organ, with unified goals and methods in its foreign policy, which will prove resolute in its determination to defend both peace and its own borders." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>) On the same lines, the *Kölnische Zeitung* reported the following: "The presence of the Romania Prime Minister, Gh. Tătărescu, in Prague may be somewhat construed to some extent as a prelude to the Little Entente conference, planned to take place at the beginning of April in Belgrade [...] Both parties showed their willingness for more intensified cooperation which would increase the efficiency of the Little Entente." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The Belgian press was also interested in the relations between the member states of the Little Entente. Thus, *L'indépendance Belge* of 28 March informed: "The results of Mr. Tătărescu's visit to Prague refuted all rumours of a dissociation of the Little Entente.

Mr. Benes's future visit to Belgrade will further emphasise the firm commitments between these states [...] There is no trouble in the Little Entente [...] Mr. Tătărescu, who was accompanied by General Glatz, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of National Defence, made prolonged visits to several industrial armament manufacturers. Within the General Staff of the Czechoslovakian army, a coordination bureau has operated for some time responsible with all military matters of the cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. After this short visit of the Romanian man of state, there will be no delay in completing the rearmament programme of the Little Entente." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The Swiss press, through the newspaper called *La Tribune de Genève* of 30 March, saw in Mr. Tătărescu's visit to Prague "a prelude of the conference in Belgrade" and cited Mr. Hodža, "who desires close cooperation with the Danube states, which would finally allow an improvement in the relations with Germany and Italy [...] Mr. Stojadinović has declared that he is kept informed by the governments of the Little Entente in the matter of the treaty with Italy." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

The American newspapers also published the correspondence from Prague regarding the visit of Prime Minister Tătărescu. Thus, *The New York Times* of 22 and 23 March attributed it "special significance, from the perspective of a unification of the armaments in the member states of the Little Entente." (<http://dspace.bcuculuj.ro/handle/123456789/81871>)

A few conclusions regarding the significance of the conferences between the two heads of states: Romania and Czechoslovakia

The visit of Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu in Prague represented, as emphasised by the newspaper *Văitorul*, "a new and joyful occasion to state the indissoluble bonds which unite us with Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, while on the other it showed once again that the Little Entente constitutes, in the perfect unity existing between Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as the perfect understanding that animates it, the ideal expression of the

most faultless, complete and definitive alliance [...] All the visits in the last months, the journey of H.M. the King to Czechoslovakia, the conferences between Messrs. Gh. Tătărescu, V. Antonescu and Stojadinović, the president the Yugoslavian Council, the meetings of the Little Entente and of the economic council, as well as the visit of the authorised representatives of the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian governments in Bucharest, etc. – were characterised by brilliant manifestations of warm, honest and brotherly friendship.” (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 111)

On the occasion of this visit, several deliberations were held, regarding the international situation, the connections between the member states of the Little Entente and the bilateral relations between Romania and Czechoslovakia. On these lines, the Romanian Legation in Prague issued a document on 24 March 1937 (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 112-116) referring to the results of the talks between Gheorghe Tătărescu and Milan Hodža, which specified the following: “The conferences between Prime Ministers Tătărescu and Dr. Hodža, in which Foreign Minister Dr. Krofta also participated, concluded on 24 March. The goal of these conferences, aside from general political matters, was to engage in discussions relating to the extension of the political commercial basis. To that effect, a special agreement was signed, regarding two important standard items of production which take a very important place in the economic rapports of both countries. In addition, a complete and detailed agreement was concluded, concerning the financial aspect of the Czechoslovakian supplies for the Romanian army [...] All areas of cooperation between the two states were examined from a political, diplomatic, military and commercial perspective in all details. The presidents of both governments ascertained that the development of the two states runs parallel and there is an absolute unity of labour and aspiration between them, in relation to international affairs. (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 112, 113)

Referring to the cooperation between the states allied in the Little Entente, the said *Report* of the Romanian Legation emphasised the following: “The latest conference of the Balkan Entente proved that the cooperation between the member states of the Little Entente is consistent with the Balkan politics [...] An important

part of the talks was devoted by both heads of Government to the relations between the states of the Danube River basin, emphasising that the Little Entente maintains with all its consistency its opposition to any attempt to restore the Habsburgs. Then, they ascertained the perfect identity of perspective of the two Governments on the political, economic and commercial situation in the Danube River basin. In agreement with Yugoslavia, an agreement which results from the talks which Prime Ministers Tătărescu and Hodža had with the president of the Yugoslavian government, Stojadinović, the Little Entente is capable and willing to intensify its rapports with the signatory states of the Rome Protocols and thus contribute to the foundation and the establishment of fair relations with all the Danube states. The Romanian and the Czechoslovakian governments acknowledge that a constructive policy in the Danube basin was the most appropriate means to employ in resolving Central Europe's problems with Germany and Italy unequivocally and, at the same time, one of those instruments in the absence of which European consolidation could not be achieved. The two governments therefore agree that the friendly relations between their countries as well as their contract clauses may provide a successful contribution to the establishment of a *modus vivendi* in Europe on the basis of the above-mentioned principles." (AMAE, fund 71 Czechoslovakia, vol. 41: 114, 115)

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Electoral Management in the Western Balkans – Overview of Institutional Setting**

Abstract

Countries of the Western Balkans (WB) – former federal units of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania have undergone a lengthy and complex process of democratisation from late 1980s. Free and fair elections are among the cornerstones of democratic consolidation. Even though the institutional setting for electoral management differs greatly across the globe, during the Europeanisation process it was widely recommended to transitional societies to set up independent electoral management bodies in order to guarantee fair electoral conditions, with standards mostly promoted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (VC) and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Based on this influence, all the countries of the WB have established electoral commissions that are to great extent formally independent from the executive, with the intention of being less prone to electoral meddling. This is enhanced by regular election

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monitoring in the region by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the process being followed and evaluated by both the European Union institutions and member states as part of fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU. This paper gives an overview of the institutional setting of electoral management in the WB that was created following the model of independent bodies and outlines main features of their design.

Key words: Western Balkans, electoral management bodies, electoral process, electoral integrity, independent bodies.

Introduction

Free and fair elections are generally considered the cornerstone of modern democracy. One of the preconditions for smooth functioning of the electoral process and its integrity¹ are well functioning and impartial electoral management bodies (EMB).² This article, the first in a series, reports and explores the main features of the institutional setup of EMB in the Western Balkans and their role in the electoral process. The main goal of this analysis is to map these features.³ There are basically three models for EMB - Independent, Governmental and Mixed Models. (Catt *et al.* 2014: 5-6)⁴ In a transitional context, it is traditionally advised by international

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- 1) For a definition of electoral integrity see: Jeffrey. (2017).
 - 2) As it was pointed by Mozaffar and Schedler: “This role is obviously important, although not well examined nor understood, in established democracies. But it has a special resonance in emerging democracies, where deliberate electoral manipulation and systematic fraud by recalcitrant authoritarian rulers unwilling to give up power have often blocked, derailed or truncated transitions to democracy. ... Effective electoral governance alone does not guarantee good elections, of course, because a complex variety of social, economic and political variables affect the process, integrity, and outcome of democratic elections. But good elections are impossible without effective electoral governance.” (Mozaffar, Schedler 2002:6)
 - 3) The role and concrete examples of the EU Institutions and other international factors involved in the legal, political and cultural transformation of the Western Balkan societies in terms of developing institutional pre-conditions for free and fair political game will be examined in the next article in the series.
 - 4) See annex of this publication for the comprehensive list of the EMBs throughout the World.

actors that political elites follow an independent model and set up an EMB accordingly. As the following analysis will demonstrate, this model has been followed by all countries of the region. A recent comparative analysis of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern European post-communist states, namely Serbia Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, still positions them within the group of “unconsolidated electoral democracies” (Merkel 2010: 20). One of the crucial questions for this kind of analysis is whether institutional setup really matters. Does it guarantee anything in terms of the quality of the electoral process? If it does, what are these contributions? As Mozaffar and Schedler put it: “To what extent, if any, does electoral governance determine the democratic quality of elections?” (Mozaffar, Schedler 2002: 12) Even if not crucial, we still think examining the role and position of EMBs is needed for understanding the democratic processes in the societies and legal orders under observation.

In this paper we are concentrating on central electoral management bodies that are generally in charge of overall organisation of elections and the calling of official results of parliamentary elections, and in some cases presidential elections. In this analysis, we exclude bodies in charge of organising local and regional elections. The article gives an overview of the legal position of the electoral management bodies, their composition and the modes of appointment of their members, and the role of EMBs in electoral governance. We are doing that by looking into relevant constitutional provisions, electoral laws regulating EMBs at the central level of the state, data provided by EMBs themselves, scarce literature and limited international accounts of electoral governance related to these very bodies (as opposed to wider monitoring of the electoral process).⁵ “As a new field of study and practice, election management has emerged from the areas of democracy-building and democratic consolidation” (Lopez-Pintor 2000:15), and even though the literature has grown significantly over the past two

5) Neglected nature of study of EMBs are commonly mentioned by authors working in the field. Anne van Aaken also stresses that beside EMBs, electoral observer missions also remain under researched. See further: (Aaken 2009) As it was stressed by Mozaffar and Schedler - Electoral governance is a crucial variable in securing the credibility of elections in emerging democracies, but remains largely ignored in the comparative study of democratization (Mozaffar, Schedler 2002:1).

decades, scholarship is still limited for many regions of the World⁶ and specifically legal scholarship in the area remains scarce.

Setting the scene – do independent electoral bodies guarantee free and fair electoral processes?

Elections are complex political and legal processes. Electoral management bodies may be classified as only one of thirteen elements of electoral management.⁷ Other aspects, even though partially covered by this paper, remain outside the scope of the analysis. The term *election management body (EMB)* “has been coined to refer to the body responsible for electoral management whatever wider institutional framework is applied.” (Al-Musbeh 2011:3) In a transitional context, electoral management design does have importance. As argued by Catt: “Electoral frameworks, including the choice of electoral system and the design of electoral administration, determine both the outcomes and the credibility of electoral processes and thereby trust in democracy.”⁸ The essential roles assumed by EMBs include: determining who is eligible to vote, receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates), conducting polling, counting the votes, and tabulating the votes.⁹ Back in 2000, Lopez Pintor observed a worldwide trend of commissions developing as permanent and independent of the executive. He also stressed that electoral administration that relies on permanent and professional staff is more cost-effective than *ad hoc* electoral bodies based on empirical evidence (Lopez-Pintor 2000:11). As defined by

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- 6) Probably the first analysis of the implications of the electoral management design on the legitimacy of democratic processes in consolidating democracies (in African context) was done by Elklit and Reynolds. See further: (Elklit, Reynolds 2002).
 - 7) ACE. Topic areas. The Electoral Knowledge Network. Available at: <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics> [10.3.2019]
 - 8) “The development of professional electoral administration is not merely a technical and managerial issue, but a process that crucially engages political stakeholders who have their own interests and objectives. Its role in the overall development and strengthening of democracy cannot be overstated.” (Catt *et al.* 2014: V).
 - 9) “In addition to these essential elements, an EMB may undertake other tasks that assist in the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments, such as voter registration, boundary delimitation, voter education and information, media monitoring and electoral dispute resolution.” (Catt *et al.* 2014: 5-6)

IDEA – “The *Independent Model* of electoral management is used in countries where elections are organized and managed by an EMB that is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of government; its members are outside the executive. Under the Independent Model, the EMB has and manages its own budget, and is not accountable to a government ministry or department. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary or the head of state. EMBs under this model may enjoy varying degrees of financial autonomy and accountability, as well as varying levels of performance accountability.” (Catt *et al.* 2014: 7) In their study of EMBs from five regions of the World, Trebilcock and Chitalkar associate successful electoral experiences with independent and impartial EMBs vested with broad mandates (Trebilcock, Chitalkar 2009). This model is widely used in emerging democracies and has been a policy fashion in the Western Balkans as well.¹⁰

To study the institutional setting of EMBs, it is essential to observe the work of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)¹¹ and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission.¹² This is coupled with regular monitoring of elections in the region by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)¹³ and the process being followed and evaluated by both the European Union institutions and its member states as part of the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU. IDEA defines the following guiding principles for EMBs: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness.¹⁴ Aspect of the institutional model that the International IDEA is pointing to are: institutional arrangement,

10) International IDEA’s 2014 survey of electoral management in 217 countries and territories worldwide showed that 63 per cent followed the Independent Model, 23 per cent the Governmental Model and 12 per cent the Mixed Model (the remaining 2 per cent corresponds to countries that do not hold national-level elections). (Catt *et al.* 2014: 8)

11) The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). See further: <https://www.idea.int/> [10.3.2019]

12) The European Commission for Democracy through Law, see further: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/>

13) OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) regularly observe elections in many countries with well documented accounts on electoral process. See further: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections> [10.3.2019]

14) See further for detailed description of these principles: (Catt *et al.*, 2014: 21-24)

implementation, formal accountability, powers, composition, term of office and budget.¹⁵ These components are useful for the comparative study of EMBs, including those in the observed region. The role and powers of the EMBs depend on the legal system and the extent to which electoral laws prescribe for EMBs to be involved in regulating the electoral process. Although some EMBs have executive, legislative and judicial powers, the majority primarily exercise executive powers relating to electoral implementation activities (Catt *et al.* 2014: 74).

As a (normative) basis for the institutional design of electoral management bodies in the Western Balkans region, we can use Venice Commission Explanatory Report adopted at its 52nd Plenary Session (Venice, 18-19 October 2002). This document outlines conditions/criteria that need to be met by electoral management bodies. This is a result of electoral observation experiences and reports prepared by the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe observing “shortcomings concerning the electoral commissions”.¹⁶ This lengthy citation we find as crucial for determining why (potential) candidates in the European East were required to set up independent institutions: “In states where the administrative authorities have a long-standing tradition of independence from the political authorities, the civil service applies electoral law without being subjected to political pressures. It is therefore both normal and acceptable for elections to be organised by administrative authorities, and supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. However, in states with little experience of organising pluralist elections, there is too great a risk of government’s pushing the administrative authorities to do what it wants. This applies both to central and local government - even when the latter is controlled by the national opposition.” (Venice Commission 2002: 26-27). This normative stance clearly points to mistrust in consolidating democracies vis-à-vis the existence of proper public administra-

15) See further: (Catt *et al.* 2014: 9) For advantages and disadvantages of three models see (Catt *et al.* 2014: 20).

16) These included: lack of transparency in the activity of the central electoral commission; variations in the interpretation of counting procedure; politically polarised election administration; controversies in appointing members of the Central Electoral Commission; commission members nominated by a state institution; the dominant position of the ruling party in the election administration. (Venice Commission 2002: 27)

tion with the ability to undertake the complex task of organising elections, suggesting that “new democracies” are not ready for the governmental type of electoral management. Therefore, according to the document, in countries with limited experience of organising pluralist elections (where “there is too great a risk of government’s pushing the administrative authorities to do what it wants”) it is needed to set - *independent, impartial electoral commissions* from the national (central) level to polling station level to ensure that elections are properly conducted.¹⁷ This can be considered the *first criterion*.

According to VC opinion, we can distinguish a *second criterion* - *Any central electoral commission must be permanent, as an administrative institution* responsible for liaising with local authorities and the other lower-level commissions (Venice Commission 2002: 27). It is further stipulated: “As a general rule, the commission should consist of: - a judge or law officer: where a judicial body is responsible for administering the elections, its independence must be ensured through transparent proceedings. Judicial appointees should not come under the authority of those standing for office; - representatives of parties already represented in parliament or which have won more than a certain percentage of the vote. Political parties should be represented equally in the central electoral commission; “equally” may be interpreted strictly or proportionally, that is to say, taking or not taking account of the parties’ relative electoral strengths.... Moreover, party delegates should be qualified in electoral matters and should be prohibited from campaigning.”¹⁸ The International IDEA Manual from 2014 also stresses that organising/placing a secretariat of the EMB within the government, or as independent, comes with a number of advantages and disadvantages. As our previous research on Serbia has demonstrated, albeit in a different field of public affairs, having an independent body without a separate professional secretariat puts

17) In more detail: “68. Only transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process, from the pre-election period to the end of the processing of results. (Venice Commission 2002: 26-27).

18) Report additionally advises for the inclusion of the representatives of national minorities and a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, if the given historical context of the country does not preclude from the second option. (Venice Commission, 2002: 27).

members of the commission at risk of being completely dependent on the work of government employees who might, in turn, influence the decisions of the members of the commission and undermine the very independence they ought to enjoy.¹⁹

The Venice Commission has also considered electoral observation experiences regarding transfers of responsibilities from a fully-fledged multi-party electoral commission to an institution subordinate to the executive. Therefore, the *third criterion* is that - *co-operation between the central electoral commission and the Ministry of the Interior is possible only for practical reasons*, e.g. transporting and storing ballot papers and other equipment (Venice Commission 2002: 27).

A *fourth criterion* we can extract from the Commission Report opinion is that bodies that appoint members to electoral commissions should not be free to recall them, as it casts doubt on the independence of appointees.²⁰ As a *fifth criterion* we can distinguish adoption of decisions by high majority (2/3) and preferably by consensus of members (Venice Commission 2002: 28). As the *sixth criterion* we distinguish having Commission members with specialised skills to organise elections and preferably composed of legal experts, political scientists, mathematicians or “other people with a good understanding of electoral issues” (Venice Commission 2002: 28). The document also contains recommendations for inclusion of party members, right of members to speak in the sessions, openness of commissions’ meetings to the public and especially media including access to all documents, creation of lower level (regional commissions) in similar fashion, training of electoral staff and obligation to provide technical aid to central commission by executive branch (Venice Commission 2002: 28-29). None less important feature of the independence of any (regulatory) body is its financing. In the case of EMBs, this is a hugely variable given the fact that elections are generally run every four to five years and expenses will vary accordingly.²¹

19) We have already studied this phenomenon in the case of state aid reforms in the country. See further: (Milenković, 2018 a,b).

20) It is further stressed that discretionary recall is unacceptable, but recall for disciplinary reasons is permissible - provided that the grounds for this are clearly and restrictively specified in law. (Venice Commission, 2002: 27).

21) For a detailed overview of comparative examples and most pressing issues see:

Here we point again to a basic distinction between electoral management as practiced in developed/old/established democracies and states on the path to consolidation of democratic structures. Van Ham and Lindberg have examined the influence of institutional design (Ham, Lindberg 2015) on electoral integrity by employing data obtained thorough the V-DEM project.²² They point to the fact that the model of independent institution have been “championed” in the previous period²³ but also find that global comparative studies appear to show that EMB institutional design is either negatively, or only very weakly related to election integrity. They propose that in contexts of high quality of government (QoG) and higher levels of democracy, “EMB institutional design is inconsequential for election integrity, because the bureaucracy already operates professionally and other partial regimes of democracy are well established.” For that type they point to systems like Sweden and Norway. On the other hand, “In countries with low QoG and sturdy electoral autocracy ... EMB institutional design may not affect election integrity either. If the bureaucracy and other political institutions are captured and controlled by authoritarian incumbents, the particular institutional design of EMBs should make little difference.” For this second type they give examples of Congo and Russia. Finally, in contexts of medium QoG and medium levels of democracy they argue that “EMB institutional design should be expected to strengthen election integrity, as in these cases, formally independent EMBs should have both stronger *de facto* autonomy and greater capacity to administer and monitor elections.” (Ham, Lindberg 2015: 455-456). This is especially relevant for the study of the Western Balkans given the varied democratic development and rising tendencies towards authoritarianism and stabilocracy.²⁴ With this analytical framework in mind, we will proceed to study the features of electoral management bodies in the Western Balkans.

(Catt *et al.* (2014: 207-220)..

- 22) For more details on V-DEM see: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/> [10.3.2019]
- 23) Explicitly pointing to widely referenced works by Lopez Pintor for UNDP and works by International IDEA 2006 (updated in 2014) – both cited multiply in this paper.
- 24) BiEPAG. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. Available at: <https://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf> [10.3.2019]

Main features of Electoral management systems in the countries of the Western Balkans

In the previous two decades, all the countries of the Western Balkans have opted for some kind of independent institution following the widely promoted institutional design for consolidating democracies. There could be two explanations for this. The first, and less likely, is that this trend can be compared to a great extent with the “fashionable” diffusion of public agencies as a way of organizing administration across the jurisdictions in 1990s and early 2000s.²⁵ The second, and more plausible one, would be acceptance of this form of electoral management as explicitly and/or implicitly required to be considered a democratic regime.

In *Serbia*, the Republic Electoral Commission (REC)²⁶ is established through Law on the election of members of the Parliament.²⁷ Members of the Republic Electoral Commission and their deputies are appointed for a period of four years, while members of polling boards and their deputies are appointed for each election (article 30). The standing composition of the Republic Electoral Commission consists of the Chairperson and sixteen members appointed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, while the enlarged composition also includes one representative of each submitter of the electoral list.²⁸ The Republic Electoral Commission has a Secretary, appointed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia from among the experts in its services, who participates in the work of the Commission without the right to make decisions. According to the Law, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia ensures the conditions necessary for the work of the Republic Electoral Commission (article 35) which in practice means that the administrative staff is recruited from the

25) See further: Pollitt, *et.al.* (2001).

26) <http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/english/index.php>

27) Law on the election of members of the Parliament “Official Gazette of the RS” No. 35/00, 57/03 – Decision of the Constitutional Court, 72/03 – other law, 18/04, 85/05 – other law, 101/05 – other law, 104/09 – other law, 28/11 – Decision of the Constitutional Court 36/11.

28) The Republic Electoral Commission also has one member, a representative of a state organization responsible for statistics, who shall participate in work of the Commission without the right to make decisions. For inclusion of representatives of electoral lists see article 39.

poll of Parliament secretariat employees. Therefore, the Secretary, along with the other administrative/secretarial staff of the ERC, is not completely independent from the Parliament; indeed, as Parliamentary employees, they are susceptible to pressure from the parties in control of Parliament. The Republic Electoral Commission has a number of competences, and also adopts its Rules of Procedure. The Chairperson, members of the Republic Electoral Commission and their deputies must hold a BA degree in law, closing the composition professionally which is one of the known policy options recognized comparatively with set of advantages and disadvantages.²⁹ To sum up, although the Commission is *de lege* independent, it is potentially susceptible to significant influence by the parties forming a majority in the National Assembly; furthermore, the budget is appropriated from the central budget of the State with no separation and the secretariat is effectively within the Parliament. This approach is cost-effective on the one hand, but creates a situation where the work of the electoral commission could come under the undue influence of the parliamentary majority on the other. Therefore, it could be advisable to establish a separate, permanent secretariat, in spite of higher operating costs.³⁰

Next in our analysis is *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, which is specific for many reasons. First, for existence of a transitional EMB set up by the international community in the aftermath of the war that raged between 1992 – 1995.³¹ After this transitional post war period, the Electoral Law was adopted in 2001, and as noted by Hadžiabdić: “It represented a great success and was the result of efforts of the international community, negotiations among the political parties, and the patience of BiH citizens.” (Hadžiabdić 2014: 329). The transitional nature of the electoral commission continued up until 2006, some ten years after the war, as some of the members of the commission were foreign. The current system

29) See further: Catt, *et al.* (2014)

30) However, there have been no objections and recommendations from international actors to this regard, probably in line of allowing countries to keep things organised according to their respective constitutional and administrative traditions.

31) Mostly, international EMBs are an outcome of international, regional and national efforts to manage conflicts and/or post conflict environments, and they are normally sponsored and set up by international or regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and it consist of, or include, international experts as members. (Kumar 1998)

of electoral rules in BiH is reflective of its complex constitutional structure consisting of federal entities, special district, cantons and municipalities (Hadžiabdi, 2014: 329). Therefore, the electoral management system of the country is very multifaceted, with different elections organized by different bodies at various levels of governance. The main electoral body in the country is the Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Hercegovina³² which is comprised of seven members in accordance with the Election Law of BiH.³³ The Secretariat of the BiH Election Commission is established by the decision of the Commission and it is in charge of “professional and administrative-technical duties” for the BiH Election Commission (article 2.11). Pursuant to article 2.6 of the BiH Election Law, the President of the BiH Election Commission is appointed amongst its members. Each member of the BiH Election Commission, a Croat, a Bosniak, a Serb and a representative of the Others³⁴, according to the Law perform the duty of the president of the BiH Election Commission according to the rotation principle, once in seven years for the period of twenty-one months. There is also complex system of financing the electoral process in place (article 1.2a) which is in line with the multilayer structure of atypical federation created by the Dayton agreement. It can be concluded that the complexity of the Bosnian electoral system is the result of the post-conflict societal context, multi-ethnic setup of the society, and the complicated constitutional architecture of the country and its entities.

The only country of the Western Balkans that has become an EU member state is *Croatia*, whose specific institutional design allows for the independence of the electoral governance. The State Election Commission of the Republic of Croatia was established in 2006 and is a permanent and independent state body according to

32) <http://www.izbori.ba/> [10.3.2019]

33) The Law has been subject to numerous changes since 2001. Available at: http://www.izbori.ba/Documents/documents/ZAKONI/BiH_Election_Law_last_consolidated_version_2018.pdf [10.3.2019]

34) Others - Citizens not belonging to any of three constitutive ethnic groups. This omnipresent ethnic concept in Bosnia and Hercegovina has led to numerous constitutional and human rights challenges leading to landmark Judgement of European Court of Human Rights in case *Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Hercegovina*. See inter alia: Bardutzky (2010).

the Law on State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia³⁵ (article 2). The Commission is comprised of nine members - the Chairperson, four Vice-Chairpersons and four members, elected according to the procedure stipulated by the Law (article 3). The Chairperson of the Commission is the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia (article 4), two Vice-Chairpersons are elected by Supreme Courts' General Assembly among judges of that Court, based on the proposal of the Croatian Supreme Courts' President (article 5), with further two Vice-Chairpersons and remaining four members of the State Electoral Commission are elected by the majority vote of all representatives of the Croatian Parliament (article 7). According to the Law, one Vice-Chairperson and two members are nominated by the majority political party or coalition, and the other Vice-Chairperson and two members are nominated by the opposition political parties or coalitions (Article 7), in accordance with the party structure of the Croatian Parliament at the time of the election. The Law also envisages for a relatively long mandate of eight years, a characteristic which contributes to the permanence of the Commission and its stability irrespective of electoral cycles. The competences of the SEC are stipulated by article 11 of the Act and include, among others, presenting opinions on additions and improvements to the electoral and referenda legislation. The Croatian SEC has a dual role as it also oversees the annual financial performance and annual financial reports of political parties, independent MPs, and members of representative body of local and territorial (regional) government elected from the list of a group of voters.³⁶ The Commission also has permanent Secretariat/Expert service. Within the Expert Service, there is a Financial Department that is in charge of supervising political activities and electoral campaign financing. However, despite good formal setup, in Croatian case we can also observe a classical problem of lack of resources on disposal to the electoral Commission in order to conduct its functions. The Commission became an independent (and permanent) state body back in 2007 but did not have its offices until the end of 2010.³⁷ However, overall

35) Official Journal of the Republic Croatia, No. 44/06 and 19/07.

36) See further: <https://www.izbori.hr/site/en/about-the-commission/competence/competences-of-the-state-electoral-commission-relating-to-the-political-activities-and-election-campaign-financing-supervision/1748> [10.3.2019]

37) <http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html?documentId=039CA1E2CE93551AC->

it is possible to conclude that the complex system of electing the Commission members, together with the professional and separate existence of the secretariat, establish a foundation on which a sound electoral process can take place.

Montenegro, with just over 650.000 inhabitants, is one of the smallest countries in Europe. Although it has progressed further in the EU integration process than other current candidates for EU membership, it has experienced continued rule by the same party—a successor of the Communist party³⁸—since first democratic/multiparty elections held in 1990. Montenegro has an independent State Election Commission (SEC).³⁹ The body has legal capacity and a Secretariat. It is comprised of eleven permanent members and is being extended by one more authorized representative of each of the submitters of electoral lists thus making this a combined body. The permanent members are appointed for the period of four years by the Parliament, while the head of the Commission is elected by the SEC itself. Among permanent members, four are appointed on proposal of majority in the Parliament and four on proposal of the opposition. Specific solution is envisaged for the Secretary of the Commission as one of the SEC members appointed on the proposal of the opposition is acting as Secretary.⁴⁰

Northern Macedonia was a prime example of EU conditionality being put into practice in the context of the integration process, as attested by Giandomenico (Giandomenico 2013). Before 2006, the Macedonian Commission was an *ad hoc* body without any full-time staff; while a secretariat had been provided for by the law, it was not set up. The members, including judges, were effectively political representatives. Since 2006, the State Election Commission (SEC) has been a full-time body and the secretariat has been inaugurated.⁴¹

1257C5C004703E9 [10.10.2017]

38) See further: Vuković (2015).

39) See further: <http://dik.co.me/en/> [10.3.2019]

40) See further: Law on Election of Councilors and Members of Parliament, Official Journal no. 4/98 and subsequent amendments.

41) See further: (Giandomenico 2013:76).

The Electoral Code in Northern Macedonia has been subject to numerous amendments since 2006.⁴² According to article 26, the SEC is composed of a president, vice-president and five members. The member's term in office used to be 4 years, but with recent amendments from 2018 was shortened to 6 months, which is highly dubious solution in terms of meeting the criterion of EMB being permanent.⁴³ The Parliament announces the election of the president, vice-president and the members of the SEC in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" and in daily newspapers. The Law prescribes for a peculiar appointment procedure for the Commission members. The vacancy remains open for 8 days from the day of its publication, which is rather short period of time for a public call. The Parliamentary Committee on Election and Appointment Affairs prepares a draft list from the candidates who have applied and submits it to the Parliament. From the candidates on that draft list, the political parties in opposition nominate the president of the State Election Commission and two members of the SEC and the ruling parties nominate the vice-president and three members of the SEC. The president, vice-president and the members of SEC are elected by the Parliament with a two-third majority of the Members of Parliament, which in practice means that a wide multi-party agreement needs to be reached in order to have the Commission elected. (article 28) The State Election Commission is a separate legal entity and has a Secretariat comprised of a Secretary General appointed for a five-year period and his or her deputy. A support service (professional service as defined by the Code) is also established for the State Election Commission. It is charged with executing the professional/administrative and organizational/technical responsibilities of the State Election Commission and is headed by the Secretary General. The resources for the work of the State Election Commission are provided from the state budget. In spite of numerous international engagements with the electoral process and design in the country numerous problems remain.

Albania is an interesting study case for at least two reasons. First, for prolonged international involvement in the oversight of

42) Electoral Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 40/06 and subsequent amendments.

43) Compare article 27 of the Electoral Code.

legislative drafts, thus establishing direct influence on the creation of electoral management in the country. The second is the setting up of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in articles 153 and 154 of Albania's Constitution. The Commission is a permanent body made up of seven members. The Assembly of Albania adopted The Electoral Code in 2008 but has amended it (with external consultancy) several times.⁴⁴ Albania is a specific case among Western Balkan States as its legislators have opted for one comprehensive Electoral code, as opposed to having electoral process regulated by several different acts. It contains detailed provisions on the CEC. Members must fulfill a complicated set of conditions guaranteeing their impartiality.⁴⁵ Furthermore, according to article 12, the member must fulfil following criteria: not be convicted of a crime; *has not been a member of any political party in the last 5 years; has not been elected a deputy of the Assembly in the last 5 years*; that he or she was not a member of the State Police, Armed Forces and State Intelligence Service in the last 5 years; and that has not been dismissed from the public administration or any other public function due to a violation. This is by far the most elaborate list of conditions EMB membership of any state in the region. According to the Law, members of the CEC have a 6-year mandate with the right to be reelected. The Chair of the CEC has a 4-year mandate with the right to be reelected. A member of the CEC exercises this duty full time and his/her function is incompatible with any other political, public or private duty or function, with the exception of teaching (article 13). This way Albania has opted for professional independent members. Finally, the Law also provides for a secretariat which is managed in the same manner as other independent institutions in the country (article 25). Interestingly, the CEC itself is not defined by the Electoral code as an independent institution but rather that "CEC member shall exercise his/her function in an independent manner" (article 17). It was assessed that the Alba-

44) Law no. 10 019, dated 29 December 2008, amended by Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, dated 2 April 2015.

45) With requirements for a member to be: older than 35 years; hold a higher education degree; has a professional experience of no less than 10 years of work, in at least one of the following fields: i. law; ii. public administration; iii. administration of elections; and interestingly - iv. a director of non-profit organizations that have as their object the protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms, the conduct of democratic elections or public policy. (article 12)

nia's Electoral Code provides a thorough technical foundation for democratic elections, according to a Joint Opinion by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission,⁴⁶ as both institutions have been very involved in helping the country develop its electoral rules. However, as in other countries of the region, many challenges still prevail.

Kosovo()*⁴⁷ is the last in this analysis. Kosovo occupies a unique space as its sovereignty is not recognized by approximately half of UN members, including five EU member states, following its 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia. As in 2008, it still is, partially under international governance. Various human rights problems remain. There is a Central Election Commission (CEC)⁴⁸ in place, but the OSCE remains involved in the process.⁴⁹ According to article 139 of the Constitution of Kosovo, the CEC is a permanent body, which prepares, supervises, directs, and verifies all activities related to the process of elections and referenda and announces their results. The Commission is composed of eleven members with a chair appointed by the President of Kosovo from among the judges of the Supreme Court and courts exercising appellate jurisdiction. Six members are appointed by the six largest parliamentary groups represented in the Assembly, which are not entitled to reserved seats. One member is appointed by the Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for the Kosovo Serb Community, and three members are appointed by the Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for other Communities that are not in majority.

Concluding remarks

Western Balkan societies have gone a long way since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Albania's split with communism.

46) <http://www.osce.org/odihr/86441> [10.3.2019.]

47) Kosovo(*), Republic of Kosovo is in many international forums and by the European Union referred to with Asterisk which reads: "This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence".

48) For further info see: <http://www.kqz-ks.org/an/> [10.3.2019.]

49) <https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/elections> [10.3.2019.]

However, numerous transitional challenges remain. All countries of the region have decided to establish some sort of the independent electoral commissions, as it was advocated by leading international initiatives in the field to be a right model for consolidating democracies. However, many features across the region point to semi-dependent nature such as the absence of a secretariat, involvement of high number of representatives of political parties, or lack of financial and other resources. Out of six criteria based on the Explanatory Opinion of the Venice Commission defined in part two, analysis indicates that many national institutions are missing some. However, institutional design alone is not a guarantee of the quality and integrity of the electoral process, and the wider societal and political context should be taken into account. As outlined above, models of independent institution have been “championed” in the previous period, but findings of global comparative studies appear to show that EMB institutional design is either negatively, or only very weakly related to election integrity, even though there are indications that independent EMBs should be able to contribute to electoral integrity in countries with medium “quality of government,” a conclusion bearing relevance for the Western Balkans region. Finally, it should be noted that further analysis of various influences on electoral process and management design are needed, especially in the context of European Union conditionality and accession process for the region.

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Political discourse, military and securitization of health nexus: contemporary security challenges and the military role in public health security***

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to the questions why health is viewed through the lens of national and international security, and what might be the potential role of the armed forces in strategic response to health security challenges. Relying on theoretical settings of Foucault's discourse studies and securitization concept developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies, authors will try to illuminate the nexus between political discourse, military and securitization of health. The analysis of the political and academic discourse has found that with regard to security the most important health challenges are considered the occurrence and spread of infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, and the ability to make use of biological agents as weapons. As the most important reasons why health is viewed through the lens of

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security are considered to be major economic losses incurred due to health crises, high mortality rates, migration, the impact of health crises on the armed forces and peacekeeping operations. The paper concluded that the armed forces play a role in the public health security through monitoring and early warning, through epidemiological and laboratory opportunities for early detection of new epidemics or pathogens, as well as through providing assistance after major natural disasters. The paper analyzes the public health and security in the Republic of Serbia, and it was concluded that it is necessary to undertake more efforts in recognizing health as a field of national security, and health risks as the risks of security.

Key words: political discourse, securitization, military, contemporary security challenges, health security, health risks, war against diseases

Introduction

One of the hallmarks of post-Cold War security environment is the emergence of new, as they are called, non-traditional or non-military security risks. According to Ulrich Beck “being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century” (Beck 2006:330). According to Beck’s words, unsafe and risky society entered the scene, whose main characteristic is the emergence of new risks that have three basic characteristics: de-localisation (their causes and consequences of risks are present everywhere), incalculability (consequences of these risks cannot be calculated) and non-compensability (damages that occur as a result of the action of these risks are irrecoverable) (Beck 2006:333-4). The 2016 World Bank report states as well that the society is facing challenges that are different in nature, but they have common features. Firstly, they are a threat to the achievements of the society, and secondly, they do not stay within the boundaries of any state (The World Bank 2016).

Although in the context of contemporary security challenges the focus has largely been placed on the migrant crisis in Europe and terrorism, one of the challenges to security of the past 15

years, attracting attention of both policy makers and academic community are also infectious diseases (such as HIV, Ebola, etc). The basis for the consideration of infectious diseases as a security issue is provided by the theory of securitization, by means of which through “speech act” certain problems are presented as security issues. Davies states that infectious diseases can be observed from the political and apolitical aspect. The political aspect of infectious diseases is when they are used as a biological weapon, while the apolitical aspect is their independent expansion among the population (Davies 2008:300). Whatever the aspect, the emergence and spread of infectious diseases can have social, political, economic and military consequences, and thus endanger the stability and security of the country and the region (Rushton 2011, Fidler 2003). Infectious diseases have been identified as strategic documents of many developed countries in the field of security as a challenge and a threat to national and international security, and therefore the role of the armed forces in response to these challenges and health crises has become legitimate (Watterson, Kamradt-Scott 2016). Therefore, in the political and academic discourse is often present military terminology, accordingly it speaks of ‘the enemy’, ‘fight’ against the disease, a ‘war’ is being declared to specific diseases (O’Manique and Fouire 2010:243). On the other hand, in small countries such as the Republic of Serbia, health in the context of national security is devoted very little attention. In Serbia, health is exclusively discussed from a medical point of view, although rare research suggests a link between health and security, as well as the role of the Serbian Armed Forces in the sphere of public health.

In this paper, by analyzing the academic literature on the field of security, by analysis of speeches by political officials, reports by international organizations and national strategic documents, we will show why infectious diseases are considered the challenges of national and international security, and what role is played by the armed forces in response to these security challenges. At the same time, we shall examine the relationship between health and security in Serbia, and point to the necessity that in new strategic documents in the field of security, health should be devoted more attention.

A conceptual framework for health security: political discourse and securitization of health

Davis, in his analysis of securitizing perceptions of infectious diseases, stated a relatively narrow definition of the political aspect, reducing it to the use of biological weapons (Davis 2008). Our opinion is that it is, nevertheless, a much wider, less exclusive, more inclusive issue. Political aspect of health threats involves not only the use of infectious diseases as biological weapons (and the devastating implications of such act) but also segments of the Davis apolitical field. The spread of infectious diseases at the national and international level inevitably has its political implications, primarily the role of the state and its institutions in the prevention of infectious diseases, fight against the pandemic, and mitigation of the consequences of health disasters.

In order to understand the scope of political aspect and mechanism of health threats securitization (as well as preconditions for its effectiveness), it is necessary, at first, to define the terms of discourse, political discourse and securitization.

Discourse is not simply a translation of reality into language, but rather a system that structures the way in which we perceive reality (Mils 2019: 51). Recalling Foucault's theory of discourse, Iver Neumann notes that discourse is not any written or spoken language, but rather a system of statements and practice that is fixed to certain institutions and which appears more or less as normal (Ejdus 2012: 99). Following Foucault's definition, according to which discourse should be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is at same time general area of all statements, a group of individually identifiable statements and activity regulated by rules relating to a certain number of statements (Fuko 1998: 88), in this paper, we will focus on the last two indicated manifestations. When it comes to health threats, it is clear that this is a group of statements which have, as common denominator, anything that can endanger human health, especially in the context of the wider population. When we attach this group of statements to the intention of presenting these threats not only as health threats, but also as security threats, we are then entering the domain of political discourse, i.e. politicization of discourses, which, in this

particular case is regulated by rules of the securitization process. Just like discourse itself, political discourse could be determined in a multitude of ways. Highlighting “the reflexive and potentially ambiguous nature of the term political discourse” Wilson sees it through lenses of dualism - as discourse “which is itself political” and like political discourse which is “simply an example discourse type, without explicit reference to political content or political context” (Wilson 2003: 398). In the first case, emphasis is on the production and reproduction of power and control, while in the second case it is about discourse that belongs to one specific area of social action. However, not many authors support the view of political discourse as an umbrella term that includes all forms of discourse in which power, control and domination are present. Wilson believes that this view is too broad and that it opens the possibility of introducing almost every discourse as a political discourse (Wilson 2003: 398, 411). On the other hand, he points to certain disadvantages of the reduction of political discourse to discourse “concerned only with formal/informal political contexts and political actors” (Wilson 2003: 398, 399).¹ Nevertheless, in the absence of a better solution, most researchers use this term pragmatically in the context of “Discourse which is implemented in politics as a social activity and produced mainly by politicians in its official professional roles and institutional environment” (Vukovic 2014: 213). We will accept this, to some extent, simplified view, and extend it to people who are not professionally involved in politics (in our case, scientists and military figures) but that are linked to the discourse expressed with political intent and/or in political context (Vukovic 2014: 213).

When it comes to health threats in the context of security threats, then we are talking about a specific type of political discourse that takes on the form of securitizing discourse. According to the interpretation of the Copenhagen School, securitization is the process of translating an particular issue in the security issue through speech act, whereby securitizing actor insists that there is an existential threat to the reference object that is necessary to protect, and therefore requires the application of extraordinary measures (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 23; Van Dijck 2006: 2;

1) E.g. Wilson raises the issue of family political debates, considering whether this is a matter of political discourse or family discourse on politics?

Ejdus 2012: 107). Accordingly, Balzacq defines securitization as “a set of interrelated practices, and the process of their production, diffusion and reception/translation that bring threats into being” (Balzacq 2011: xiii). Van Dijck notes that the consequence of this action can be seen as a form of rules violation “by which issues is moved out of the realm of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations” (Van Dijck 2006: 2).

It is important to underline that securitisation is a phenomenon that, by its scope, goes beyond the boundaries of discourse. Primarily because of its last stage, which consists in the adoption of extraordinary security measures² and that, accordingly, we can speak about successful or unsuccessfully implemented securitization.³ It is precisely at this last stage i.e. the implementation of an extraordinary measure, one can find the reason for which we can't not label every speech on security and security threats as securitization. Here is in force Foucault's principle of “rarefaction of discourse” through “rarefaction of the speaking subjects” (Fuko 2019: 18, 19, 24; Mills 2019: 57). This means that securitization implies an exclusive access to discourse, i.e. the right to speak authoritatively is not allowed to everyone and authority itself arises from the ability of “broadcaster” to put a monopoly of legitimate use of physical force into the service of securitization or at least to influence its activation in order to combat the designated threat.

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- 2) It should be noted that there are securitization theorists who believe that legitimization of the future use of special measures doesn't have to be the final outcome of this process. Juha A. Vuori lists several forms of securitization, of which one that Copenhagen school speaks of is only the first in a row. For example, Vuori identifies the form of securitization primarily focused on putting a particular issue on the agenda, which then aims to convince the audience in its security dimension (Ejdus 2012: 112).
 - 3) For example, Andrew W. Neal interprets the establishment of FRONTEX (The European Border and Coast Guard Agency) as a failure of the EU's attempt to securitize the migration issue. According to Neal, although immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attack EU tried to prevent future terrorist threats by securitizing the issue of migration, FRONTEX is not the result of emergency measures derived from securitizing discourse, but is the result of gradual political and security negotiations conducted in the institutional structures of the EU. Therefore, according to Neal, FRONTEX should be “considered in the context of the numerous other institutional, technical and legal tools being developed by the EU for the management of migration, security and indeed many other areas of policy” (Neal 2009: 333-356).

As the monopoly of force fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state and political authorities (Weaver 1995) then securitization can be characterized both as a political and security process. As Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde notes, “Security” is “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 23). Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde 1998: 23). Therefore, not every speech about security and security threats can be interpreted as securitization, but on the contrary, it can only apply to those speeches which for the “broadcasters” i.e. securitizing actors have political decision-makers and actors that can influence political decision-making process. In other words, following Weaver’s terminology, it’s all about the state and the ruling elite (Weaver 1995).

To summarize, the initial phase of the securitization process implies the intention of political actors to present a particular issue as a security threat of existential significance. Then, by discursive instruments they move this issue into the sphere of security, portraying it as a threat whose solution requires the urgent engagement of the state apparatus. It is easy to see that a key link in a chain that connects political nomenclature (as a securitizing actor) and wider population (as a securitizing message recipient) is a speech act. It acts as discursive agent in the process of transformation of a particular social problem into the category of security threat. However, as we shall show in the text below, speech act, as the fundamental segment of securitization, is not the only way to take part in a securitizing discourse. The way in which military is tackling the challenge of infectious diseases gives us an example of how it is possible, outside the narrative, to be the carrier of securitizing discourse.

As an example of the transformation of political discourse on health issues into the securitization of health threats, we will use US government’s attitude towards the spread of HIV/AIDS, which has gradually changed from viewing HIV/AIDS as “challenge” to treating them as “threats to stability and security”.⁴

4) Although the terms “challenge” and “threat” are often used as synonyms, there is a significant and not so subtle difference between them. Under the term “challenge” we can identify processes, changes, or activities in a particular sphere (political,

Health issues as security issues

Back in the early 90s of the 20th century the National Intelligence Council in the report ‘The Global AIDS Disaster’, described AIDS as a “time bomb” with serious economic, political and military consequences (United States Department of State 1992:1). Although, in this document, AIDS was treated as a “challenge”, already in 1995 US strategy on HIV/AIDS emphasized that “HIV directly impacts military readiness and manpower, causing loss of trained soldiers and military leaders and shrinkage of recruit and conscript pools” (United States Department of State 1995:40). The following year, the then US President Clinton, issued a directive NSTC-7 confirming that infectious diseases such as Ebola, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS present one of the most significant health and security challenges facing the global community (Rokvić, Jeftić 2015: 60, Rokvić 2016:230). The National Intelligence Council published a new report in 1999 (declassified in 2000), titled ‘The global infectious disease threat and its implications for the United States’, stating that HIV/AIDS has significant consequences on the military (including peacekeepers), affects social cohesion and potential conflicts, but it can also affect the relationships between the developed and developing countries due to restrictions in terms of travel and immigration policy (The US National Intelligence Council 2000, Rokvić, Jeftić 2015: 60). The efforts by the US to present HIV/AIDS as a security issue, led to the fact that in 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1308, designating HIV as a threat to stability and security, a threat which greatly endangers peacekeepers and their operations, the threat to which is declared a ‘peaceful war’ (Security Council 4087th Meeting 2000).

In addition to HIV/AIDS, in the focus of securitization there are also other infectious diseases, especially after the SARS epidemic in 2003 and influenza A H5N1 (bird flu) in 2004. So in 2005 the United States adopted the ‘National Strategy for Pandemic

social, ecological, etc.) that require a specific reaction or activity “which will be a test of strength, skill or ability of certain actors cope with the resulting change or process” (Stanarević, 2018: 12). On the other hand, the notion of “threats” is very complex, and in defining it it is difficult to determine whether it is only about the dangers of human activities or we suppose to take into account all the dangers that one or something can endanger (Stanarević, 2018: 12). In the continuation of this paper, we will be more inclined to this later “threats” term interpretation.

Influenza’, in which it was emphasized that pandemics could have “significant implications for the economy, national security, and the basic functioning of society” (Homeland Security Council 2005: ix, Rokvić, Jeftić 2015: 60). The report of the National Intelligence Council from 2008 titled ‘Strategic Implications of Global Health’, states that “virulent infectious diseases-including HIV/AIDS, a potential influenza pandemic, and ‘mystery’ illnesses such as the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) - remain the most direct health-related threats to the United States” (The US National Intelligence Council 2008:5). The report said that the above-mentioned infectious diseases pose a threat to the health of American citizens; a threat to military operations; it brings about a slowdown in socio-economic development of countries of particular interest to the United States; thus jeopardizing relations because of the travel ban and immigration policy; as well as it leads to the possibility of bioterrorist attacks. After the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 in West Africa, President Obama has declared the epidemic a “national security priority” of the US and the UN Security Council securitized Ebola through Resolution 2177. In this resolution Ebola has been marked as “a threat to international peace and security” (UN Security Council Resolution 2177 2014).

The United States in 2009, published the first National Health Security Strategy, and epidemics of infectious diseases are classified as top strategic risks that threaten US interests by the National Security Strategy of the United States. National Security Strategy of the United States also emphasized that the United States are “the world leader in fighting pandemics, including HIV/AIDS, and improving global health security” (The White House 2015:14). In order to provide adequate responses to the health challenges of security, after a bioterrorist anthrax attack in 2001, the Global Health Security Initiative was founded which brings together several countries in order to strengthen the preparation and response to the global threats of biological, chemical, radio-nuclear terrorism and pandemic influenza (Rokvić 2016:231). As part of the US Department of Homeland Security the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) was established with the aim of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on infectious

diseases, so that the national response to such diseases could be as efficient as possible.⁵

The US is not the only country to recognize infectious diseases as a threat to security. After the bird flu pandemic British officials held a similar view, believing that the “bird flu is as much of a danger to Britain as terrorism” (Lean 2005). The National Risk Register UK edition of 2015 has recognized influenza pandemics as the highest priority risks: “influenza pandemic continues to represent the most significant civil emergency risk” (Cabinet Office 2015:14). Attention to infectious diseases as security challenges was also paid by the Russians. In 2006, the President of Russia has gathered the National Security Council to discuss the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in Russia and necessary measures to be taken to prevent further spread of HIV/AIDS (Sjöstedt, 2008). In his opening address to the National Security Council, President Putin said that “HIV infection is having a negative impact on the country’s demographic situation” and needed “more than words; we need action, and the whole of Russian society must get involved” (The Kremlin 2006). At Russia’s request the topic of AIDS is included in the agenda of the G8 summit held in 2006 in St. Petersburg. The summit adopted the document confirming that “major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and measles continue to exact a heavy toll on economies and societies around the world, particularly in developing countries” (Levin 2006). Russian National Security Strategy to 2020, as the most important challenge in the field of health and national security has recognized a mass spread of HIV infection (Указ Президента Российской Федерации 2015).

From the foregoing, one can easily see how political discourse focused on infectious diseases, at first treating them as challenges, takes the form of securitizing discourse, and begins to treat them as a security threat. The international community has crossed the path from “global AIDS Disaster” and “AIDS time bomb” as political discourse in the USA in the early 1990s, to HIV/AIDS as a “threat to stability and security” against which “peace war” should be launched, at the beginning of the XXI century. In other words, the process of securitization began in the United

5) For more information on National Biosurveillance Integration Center see: <https://www.dhs.gov/national-biosurveillance-integration-center>

States and thanks to their efforts UN has made step towards global securitization of infectious diseases, which led other major nations to identify public health threats as “a threat greater than terrorism” (UK) and “most significant emergency risk” (Russia).

Securitization of health has found its place in the political but also in the academic discourse. In the last 15 years a large number of research papers in the field of international relations and security, is dedicated to the observation of health through the lens of security.

Health threats as contemporary security challenges – Academic Discourse

Maclean states that the issues of globalization, threats of bioterrorism and mass and rapid spread of infectious diseases are interrelated and that as such have attracted the attention of scientists in the field of international relations (Maclean 2008:475). Moreover, Fidler in his work as ‘Health Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power’, talks about “political revolution” in the relationships between health, foreign policy and international relations (Fidler 2005:179). Therefore, the themes of health security are largely represented in journals on international relations, such as the journal *International Relations*, *International Affairs*, *European Journal of International Relations*, as well as the leading journal in the field of security - *Security Dialogue*. Health has become an unavoidable issue, and in many other publications in the field of security. For the purpose of this paper we have analyzed: *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*; *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*; *Security Studies A Reader*; *Critical Security Studies An introduction*, 2nd edition; *Security Studies: An Introduction*. In the publication, *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, among contemporary security challenges are also studied challenges in the field of health (Cavelty, MMauer 2010), while *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies* deals with a new area of security, including the security of pandemics and biological security (Burgess, 2010). *Security Studies: A Reader* deals with dimensions and security issues, such as HIV/AIDS (Hughes, Meng 2011) and *Security Studies: An Introduction*,

talks about the key concepts in the field of security, among which is health (Vilijams 2012). About health, as a security issue, also deals with the Critical Security Studies An introduction, 2nd edition (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams 2015). There is a growing number of publications dedicated exclusively to health security, such as Securing Health (2016), Disease Diplomacy - International Norms and Global Health Security (2015), The Routledge Handbook of Global Health Security (2014), Security and Global Health (2010) and others.

These facts are important for the reasons beyond the strictly academic framework. Although the academic community is not directly involved in the process of political decision-making, it can be one of the bearers of political and therefore security discourse. The sensitivity of issues such as the issue of health security dictates imperative of the competence of actors who are the carriers of its discourse. Here we have in effect, already mentioned, Foucault's principle of "rarefaction of the speaking subjects" which makes it impossible, for those who did not meet certain requirements or from the beginning was qualified for it, to enter the discourse order (Fuko 2019:24). The question of health security fits perfectly in Foucault's claim that not all areas of discourse are equally open and accessible, on the contrary - that some of them are largely prohibited (Fuko 2019: 24). In this case, scientific competence represents entry ticket for the participation of academics in the health threats discourse. At the same time, it is the basis of authority that allows entry into the order of discourse and the source of authority of that discourse itself. Although the academic community cannot independently be the carrier of the securitization, it can be, with its scientific credibility, a pillar of support for the securitization of health threats.

In the academic literature is currently in progress a debate over the question of whether health and security should be linked at all, then which issues in the field of health should be viewed as a security threat, and further why certain issues in the field of health are considered security threat and also what are the positive and negative effects of health securitization? In this article we shall deal with issues of what in the area of health is considered a threat to security and why it is considered a threat to security.

Fidler argue that the concept of health security is associated with mass spreading of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS; as well as with the fact that pathogenic microorganisms can be used as a biological weapon (Fidler 2003:791-2). In fact, most of the works in the field of securitization of health is dedicated to HIV/AIDS. Due to the consequences entailed by HIV/AIDS, Fouire states that health is now seen as “exemplar of humanity’s new collective insecurity” (Fouire 2014:43). Altman even considers that the HIV/AIDS is even bigger security threat than terrorism, since it destabilizes “the social and economic order to the extent that the very survival of entire nations is at stake” (Altman 2003:417). In his works on securitization HIV/AIDS, Elbe pointed out that HIV/AIDS significantly influences the conflicts in Africa (Elbe 2002), as well as the security sector (Elbe 2005).

In addition to HIV/AIDS, as the issues of national and international security are also viewed influenza pandemics, as well as the possibility of using a biological weapon for terrorist purposes - bioterrorism. Kamradt-Scott and McInnes believe that securitization of pandemic flu is not a new phenomenon and that the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, represents a milestone in the securitization of infectious disease (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes 2012). However, only with the spread of SARS in 2003, the securitisation of respiratory diseases is paid special attention. After the SARS pandemic, Elbe thinks that it is “legitimately possible to view any disease with the potential to cause significant mortality and economic damage as a national security threat” (Elbe 2010:46). A special place in the securitization of health represents the analysis of infectious diseases having in mind their political point of view, or the possibility that they are used as a biological weapon. The development and use of a biological weapon, as Kellman states, represents “the dark side of globalization” and requires a global response to this threat to security (Kellman 2010:241).

The analysis of the political and academic discourse showed that health issues are viewed through the lens of security. But it certainly lacks a complete answer to the question of why health has become an issue of national and international security?

Why health issue is constructed as threats to national and international security?

McInnes states several reasons that might endanger the health of national and international security: a high mortality rate, a negative impact on the economy, migration, the impact on the armed forces and peacekeeping operations (McInnes 2014:9-10). And thus, according to Makinis, because of the impact on the economy, high rates of infection among the security forces, the consequences for the peacekeeping and fear that conflicts may contribute to the spread of the virus, HIV/AIDS has become a matter of national security (Makinis 2012:364-366). The similar viewpoint have O'Manique and Fouire, who, as the main threats that originate from HIV, consider economic problems, increased violence, migrations, the possibility of spread of the virus because of low intensity conflicts and others (O'Manique and Fouire 2010:250). Singer believes that HIV can have significant consequences for national and international security, endangering primarily armed forces and creating a new generation of fighters who are ready to fight – “new children of war” (Singer 2002:141-2). Price-Smith also points to the link between AIDS and conflict, believing that AIDS undermines political and economic stability which creates a fertile ground for the outbreak of the conflicts (Price-Smith 2002).

When it comes to the mortality rate, WHO Global Health Observatory (GHO) data show that only in 2017 AIDS killed 940.000 people (WHO Global Health Observatory Data, 2019), while up to 650 000 deaths annually are associated with respiratory diseases (World Health Organization 2017). However, the analysis of literature and relevant reports showed that among the most important reasons for the securitization of health are stated the effects of health crises on the national and global economy. High costs are set aside in the preparation, as well as to respond to the pandemic. Thus, the British government in 2009 spent \$ 708 million for the drug Tamiflu to combat swine flu, while sales of the drug in 2009 reached as much as \$ 3 billion (Frangoul 2014). According to World Bank estimates, the economic impact of the epidemic of Ebola Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone reached 2.8 billion dollars. Also, the World Bank estimates that there is a high

probability that in the next 10 to 15 years the world is supposed to experience a pandemic of some infectious disease that can destabilize society and economy. It is estimated that the annual costs of the pandemics could amount to 570 billion, or 0.7% of GDP, while the cost of severe pandemic like the Spanish fever that hit the world in 1918 might amount to 5% of global GDP (The World Bank 2017).

Contribution to the expansion and the emergence of new infectious diseases is also brought about by greater people's mobility - migrations. Given that Europe is currently facing a large migrant crisis, one of the issues that is in focus is the impact of migration on public health. This is of particular importance because most migrants come from poor and war-affected areas. Some European officials claimed that migrants can bring "possible epidemics" (Ferguson 2015) so that the EU and WHO took the unique position that "the risk of an outbreak of infectious diseases resulting from the current influx of migrant populations is extremely low" (Scholz 2016). On the other hand, the national health system and the economy is under pressure, since it needs to respond to the health needs of migrants and enable them access to health facilities.

Next link between health and security is reflected in the fact that the military may be at higher risk of certain diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, which affects its operational capacity. It is believed that the rate of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers is 2 to 5 times higher than among civilians (UNAIDS 1998:2). By HIV/AIDS are the most affected the armed forces of African countries, where the prevalence is moving up to 60% (The U.S. National Intelligence Council 2000). However, this problem is not only confined to African countries. The big problem with HIV/AIDS has Russia. It is estimated that over a period of five years, 9,000 young people could not serve in the army because they were HIV positive (Feldbaum H, Lee K, Patel P 2006:0775). Ambrosio in his work 'The geopolitics of demographic decay: HIV / AIDS and Russia's great-power status', raises the question whether the HIV/AIDS impacts on the ability of Russia "to restore and maintain its global standing" (Ambrosio 2006:10), while Sjöstedt in her work 'The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia', claims that Russia is a clear case of how HIV/AIDS affects the military, the econo-

my and demographics, and thus the national security of the state (Sjöstedt 2008).

Members of the military can play a role in the spread of HIV, especially during peacekeeping operations. Thus, it is estimated that among Nigerian peacekeepers HIV prevalence increased from 7% to 15% during the three years of service in the mission in Sierra Leone (Feldbaum H, Lee K, Patel P 2006: 0776). The spread of HIV/AIDS in a particular area can influence the decision of some countries whether to send their forces to peacekeeping operations, but also on the other side of a recipient country's willingness to accept peacekeepers if there is a risk that the troops contribute to the spread of the disease.

In addition to the armed forces being directly affected by certain diseases or contributing to the spread of such diseases, they have a role in combating health threats to national and international security.

The military role in public health security

Since the armed forces may be directly affected by certain diseases, their main role in the field of health is "medical force protection" (Licina 2006:6-8). In accordance with the 'NATO Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine', force protection in medical terms means "the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it is healthy, fully combat capable, and can be applied at the decisive time and place" (NATO 2002:23). In addition to medical care, the armed forces have other roles in the field of health. Kamradt-Scott McInnes believe that some armed forces "have been complicit in framing pandemic influenza as a security threat" (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes 2012). As an example, they cite the formation of Global Laboratory-based Influenza Surveillance Program in 1997, by the US Department of Defense. The main function of this program, which was further expanded in 1998, by formation of the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, is conducting the control of "influenza-like febrile or respiratory illnesses" (Sueker et al. 2010:156). This system had a significant role in the detection and control of bird flu pandemic, as well as early detection and response to the swine flu in 2009. Watterson

and Kamradt-Scott believe that the military is a potentially powerful tool for the preparation and response to a possible pandemic of infectious diseases (Watterson & Kamradt-Scott 2016), in particular through the surveillance system and early warning, as well as through epidemiological and laboratory opportunities for early detection of new epidemics or pathogens both among the civilian and military population (WHO 2013).

The army plays a significant role in the field of public health after major natural disasters. Thus, the various states provided military aid to Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005 and the major floods of 2010, aid to Haiti after the devastating 2010 earthquake, but also to many other countries that have been affected by large-scale natural disasters. Help related to the transport and delivery of water and food, and other humanitarian assistance, as well as the establishment of military field hospitals (Licina 2012).

The role of the military in the field of public health is brought into focus after the epidemic of Ebola in 2014, when the US President Obama declared “war” against Ebola and announced to send 3,000 members of the armed forces in the “war”. According to the U.S. Department of Defence until 2015, the role of the armed forces in the fight against Ebola related to the provision of logistical support and training of health workers, as well as the construction of laboratories. It is estimated that the cost of the US in this battle amounted to 384.9 million dollars. Other countries, such as France, Great Britain and Norway sent the members of their armed forces, which significantly influenced the increased military presence in Ebola-affected African countries. People’s Republic of China for the first time also sent 480 members of the medical military personnel beyond the borders of the state, and Lin Songtian, director general of the Ministry’s Department of African Affairs, said that “China’s assistance will not stop until the Ebola epidemic is eradicated in West Africa” (Taylor 2015:41). And local security forces (police and military) had a significant role in the fight against Ebola, which referred to the house search and detection of people infected with Ebola, and their referral to medical institutions (Schröder 2015). In response to the Ebola outbreak, based on General Assembly Resolution (A / RES / 69/1) and UNSC Resolution 2177 the UN established for the first time a medical mission UNMEER

(UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response), in order to prevent further spread of the disease, treatment of infected people as well as providing basic services and preserve stability.⁶

The role of the military in the fight against infectious diseases can be seen beyond the triangle of prevention, suppression and rehabilitation. An army, just like academic community, with its authority can provide additional legitimacy for efforts of the state authorities to treat infectious diseases as security threats. Just like in the case of academic community, the military can not be the direct bearer of securitization, because of the construction of civil-military relations in democratic societies which grants the right of speech act as an instrument of securitization exclusively to civil authorities (in autocracies things are essentially different, but they are not the subject of this consideration). However, actions such as launching Global Laboratory-based Influenza Surveillance Program in 1997. can make military indirectly part of a securitizing discourse, and even position it as its inspirer, both at national and international level. When we say this, we have in mind the assumption that discourse, and, consequently, securitizing discourse, is also made not only from statements (that is, spoken or written narrative) but that its order, as Neumann observes, is also constituted of other forms that include “non-spoken language, such as visual symbols, as well as established social practices, such as body language or military exercises” (Ejdus 2012: 99). Therefore, the act of launching the influenza surveillance program by the institution in charge of security at the symbolic level can be a strong message (both to the civilian authorities and to the wider population) that issue of influenza should be securitized. This way, the military becomes part of the securitizing discourse behind the front lines of narratives.

While to securitization of health and observation of infectious diseases as security challenges, in developed countries is devoted due attention to the question of how much this theme is represented in the political and academic discourse of small countries such as the Republic of Serbia.

6) For more information on UNAMEER see: <https://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer>

Public health security in the Republic of Serbia

To health in the context of national security in the Republic of Serbia has been given little attention both in the political and academic discourse. Insufficiently are also represented research and evaluation capacity of the civil and military sectors in the early detection, prevention of and combating potential infectious diseases, cooperation between these two sectors, as well as the role of armed forces in the field of public health. On health is mainly discussed from a medical viewpoint. Thus, for example, in the than Prime Minister Vučić expose of 2016, in the ‘Health comes first: a new plan for health care for you and your family’ is discussed exclusively about health care reform and the improvement of healthcare services.⁷

The current National Security Strategy covers the health risks to security, but it is thought that they actually represent “a security risk that could be growing in the future” (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia 2009:13). However, in the work ‘Public Health in Serbia Through the Lens of Security’, Rokvić et al., through the analysis of significant events in the 20 and 21 century suggest that the health crises in the past significantly affected the security of the country so that the consequences of these crises are still being felt today, and it will definitely pose a security risk in the future (Rokvić et al. 2016). As an example, they cite an epidemic of typhus in 1915, which claimed about 135.000 lives, among them more than 35.000 soldiers. The epidemic was successfully halted thanks to the capacity of the army. Another big epidemic befell Serbia (then Yugoslavia) in 1972. It was an epidemic of smallpox, which was considered the largest epidemic of smallpox ever in Europe. The total capacity of the country, including security, were engaged to contain the epidemic that led to the closing borders and declaring a state of emergency. This epidemic has claimed 35 lives and caused economic losses of 600 million dollars. The research conducted by Rokvić et al., subsequently underscores the tremendous consequences for the public health in the aftermath of economic sanctions, wars and NATO bombing in 1999. The research indicates that since the 90s until today there

7) The Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic’s exposé (9 August 2016) [online] Available at: <https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1418818>

has been an evident increase in mortality rate, population decline, the rise in suicides, the increase of malignant diseases, the increase in infectious diseases, and in recent years the evident increase in HIV-infected persons. At the same time, in the period from 2005 to 2009, there was an increase in the number of patients suffering from infectious diseases, which are viruses classified in the A category of potential biological agents such as anthrax, botulism and tularaemia. Every year there is an evident increase in patients suffering from respiratory diseases, while the swine flu pandemic of 2009, in addition to a large number of infected persons, left in its wake significant economic losses in production and trade which according to estimates amounted to 8.2 billion euro. In 2009, in an irrational way were purchased large amounts of the Tamiflu drug, which made damage to the state budget of about 1.25 million euro (Rokvić et al. 2016). At the same time, the costs of health care in Serbia are very high. It is estimated that the health care consumes about 10 percent of GDP, or 3.5 billion euro every year.⁸

According to the data of the Institute of Public Health of Serbia, on the territory of the Republic of Serbia (without data from Kosovo and Metohija) in 2015 were reported a total of 261,919 persons suffering from infectious diseases (Институт за јавно здравље Србије “Др Милан Јовановић Батут” 2016:i). In Serbia were also registered cases of West Nile fever, which is why the Institute of Public Health of Serbia on 01 June 2016, sent ‘Recommendations for control of West Nile fever in the human population on the territory of the Republic of Serbia’. Based on the Recommendation were registered 41 confirmed cases of the presence of the West Nile fever, including two deaths (Institut za Javno zdravlje Srbije „Dr Milan Jovanović Batut“ 2016a). In 2018 there were 213 confirmed cases of the presence of the West Nile fever, including 21 death cases (Institut za Javno zdravlje Srbije „Dr Milan Jovanović Batut“ 2018). According to available data, currently living in Serbia are 2239 people infected with HIV, and it is believed that there are about 1100 people not knowing to have been infected. Only in the period from January to November 2016 were registered 124 new cases of infection (Institut za Javno zdravlje Srbije „Dr Milan Jovanović Batut“ 2016b)

8) [accessed on 16 December 2016].

Since the Republic of Serbia is on the path of a large migrant wave, and that on its territory are reception transit centers and centers for asylum, attention is paid to the health dimension of migrations. According to the available data, among the migrants in Serbia, are mostly registered respiratory infections. In detention centers and asylum centers were also registered body lice, but far more public attention was attracted by news of the registered cases of malaria among migrants. As malaria is eradicated in our country in 1964, due to a large area of water at the Sava riverside, the WHO has declared this area susceptible to malaria, and the Institute of Public Health of Serbia in 2016 published 'Guidelines for surveillance, prevention and control of malaria, especially within the migrant population in the territory of the Republic of Serbia' (Institut za Javno zdravlje Srbije „Dr Milan Jovanović Batut“ 2016c). In addition to the Institute's announcements and the media releases of the infected migrants and possible malaria epidemic, the reaction of political officials was not evident.

Although in the Republic of Serbia there are a number of cases of infectious diseases, including HIV, cases of West Nile fever and malaria, as well as cases of infection by viruses that are classified as A category of potential biological agents, and significant economic losses caused by infectious diseases, health is not viewed from the standpoint of security. The question then arises whether the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) plays a role in the area of public health?

By the analysis of the basic missions and tasks of the SAF it can be concluded that the military plays an important role in the security sphere of public health. The defence system and the Serbia have significant medical and sanitary facilities available for combating the spread and treatment of infectious diseases. This can be illustrated by the example of the III mission of the SAF (civil-military cooperation) and its role in biological decontamination of buildings and land and to preventing the emergence and spread of infection after major floods in 2014. By July 2014, the decontamination of 353 facilities and of 538 090 m² of land (Влада РС 2014:37) was carried out. Also, within the III mission the action "Military Physicians in the Countryside" is carried out with the goal of providing medical care for the population in remote

areas, as well as the affirmation of the partnership of the civil and military sectors. There are also significant capacities of the Military Medical Academy (MMA) in the treatment of infectious diseases, especially of the Clinic for Infectious and Tropical Diseases of the MMA. The clinic is also the national reference center for the treatment of patients with hepatitis C and hepatitis B virus infections. In the context of the Mission II (participation in building and maintaining peace in the region and the world), the SAF by its medical and medical teams is participating in the UN and EU peacekeeping operations thus and contributes to building and maintaining international peace and security (Jeftić, Ristanović, Rokvić 2015).

Conclusion

At the end of the 90s of the 20th century health risks are being recognized as a serious challenge to national and international security, and for the last 15 years in terms of health security, and security of public health, they have been dominating the political and academic circles. The bases for the consideration of health as an issue of security provides the securitization theory, while the US government, as well as numerous international organizations, are considered the main actors of the securitization of health. With regard to security as the most important challenges in the field of health are considered the occurrence and spread of infectious diseases, pandemics of HIV/AIDS and the ability to take advantage of biological agents for terrorist purposes. Recognizing health as security issues has led to the adoption of a series of strategic documents, the publication of reports, formation of initiatives and departments within the relevant ministries aimed at collecting, analyzing and distributing information about the diseases, so as to respond to them more efficiently. As one of the most important issues in the field of securitization of health is raised the question why health, or certain diseases, are considered the threat to security in general? As the most significant reasons are huge economic losses, high mortality rates, migration, the impact on the armed forces and peacekeeping operations.

Since infectious diseases are considered the threats to national and international security, as confirmed by the resolutions of

the Security Council in the case of HIV/AIDS and Ebola, as well as strategic documents in the field of security of many developed countries, inevitably raises the question of whether the armed forces play a role in the fight against these threats and preservation of both the national and international security? It was found that the armed forces play an important role, in particular through a system of monitoring and early warning, through epidemiological and laboratory opportunities for early detection of new epidemics, and providing assistance after major natural disasters.

While the health security is the dominant concept in Western literature and political discourse, as such it is not represented in the political and academic discourse of small countries, such as Serbia. The sparse research and papers on the subject of securitization of health in Serbia show that health and security were connected in the past, that their relationship is evident at present, and as stated in the National Security Strategy of Serbia, it will be reflected in the future. Bearing in mind that Serbia has a large number of cases of infectious diseases (including HIV, West Nile fever, malaria, infection with viruses that are classified as A category of potential biological agents); that the extremely high costs of health care, and that certain infectious diseases cause significant economic losses, such health security should be given more attention. Namely, in the future we should be prepared adequately for a new epidemic / pandemic in its early detection and timely response, so as to undertake more efforts to recognize health as a field of national security, health and security risks as well as risks. Although the defense system and the SAF are participating in the preservation of public health, it is necessary to do research and evaluation of both military and civilian capacities for the early detection, prevention, response and remediation of potentially major health crises, such as the smallpox epidemic of 1972. The study should include the manner and level of communication and cooperation between the civil and military sectors in the event of potential health crises. Otherwise, in the future Serbia may face a serious deficiency capacity for the prevention and remediation of epidemic / pandemic and other health threats.

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Military Interventions As Omitted Variable Of Inversed Democratic Peace: An Empirical Evidence***

Abstract

The paper examines the relationship between military interventions and democratisation processes which took place in targeted states. While many researchers try to identify relationship between the regime type and countries' war proneness, the authors of this paper put these two variables in a reversed order. To test this so-called "inversed democratic peace" thesis based on an argument that an ongoing war is likely to lead to democratisation, we focus our analysis on the US interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). We deploy three variables: 1) Foreign policy similarity, to determine whether the intervening actor (USA) had similar or different foreign policy goals at the beginning

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of interventions; 2) Political regime similarity, to indicate whether there were any deviations in the quality of political regime between the intervening state and the target country, as indicated by the democratic peace postulates; 3) military interventions (independent variable). Foreign policy score includes *S score* dataset developed by Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter (1999), while for the political regime quality, the authors deploy *Polity IV* data. Statistical analysis including Pearson's correlation, logistic regression and descriptive statistics, will be presented for specific dyad level in three specifically designated models. The authors conclude that it is more likely that military interventions affect further democratisation of the targeted post-conflict societies, if observed in a short term rather than in longitudinal domain, while the foreign policy similarity (with the United States) positively correlates in cases with more successful democratisation process.

Key words: interventions, democratic peace, democratization, foreign policy, political regime.

Putting Military Interventions into the Democratic Peace Matrix

Level of violence among national states within the international system is one of essential topics in IR research. Often being inducted by various factors, interstate violence has been identified and connected with various causes, such as the structure of the system (Levy 1988), national power (Morgenthau 1978), natural resources (Ross 2004), whereas differentiations within the political regime type go to the category of more specific factors (Doyle 1983; Maoz & Russett 1993; Mansfield & Snyder 1996). Nuances in political regime types formed a basis upon which liberal provenance wave of studies eroded in the late 1980s, and cast an argument that democracies were perceived as more stable societies – both in domestic and international level – than authoritarian regimes. Initially, the global gradual democratisation has triggered a more significant academic niche centred on several questions: what factors make countries to ally with each other; when and how countries decide to wage wars; how to determine country's war

proneness; how violent is the international system; and, when do the countries consider their decision to intervene unilaterally. This entire set of questions has formulated the basics for establishment of the democratic peace theory (DPT).¹ Its postulates were widely accepted by the scholars ever since the idea was introduced in 1983 (Doyle 1983a; Doyle 1983b). During the last decade of the 20th century, the linkage between war and “internal variable” – political regime type, was being investigated mostly through quantitative research studies (Maoz & Russett 1993; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999). Among the divergent implications of the DPT idea, one of the most vivid outcomes is the vast number of available datasets, indexing data on two key variables: level of democracy/autocracy and the level of violence within the international system.²

However, even though the literature has been enriched with significant research results, not many scholars reference the inversed causal mechanism of these two key variables through the lenses of the DPT. Knowledge on the impact of external military interventions on political regime change is still inconsistent and is initially known as inversed democratic peace. It is argued that inverse nature of democratic peace sheds the lights to an inversed relation among variables according to which coercive force, precisely military interventions, influences peace and the level of democracy within the target state. As concomitant phenomena within the IR, military interventions drew significant academic attention. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt – PRIF’s data show that more than 1100 cases of the unilateral use of force were registered between 1946 and 2005 in regards to violation of the air/terrestrial space of a sovereign country (PRIF 2019). Patricia Sullivan and Michael Koch report on 139 cases of military interventions conducted by powerful states in the same period (Sullivan & Koch 2009).³ Not only their frequency, but the effects they leave

- 1) Terms that are being consistently used to mark the DPT are usually titled as “democratic peace”, “liberal peace”, “democratic peace idea”, and “interdemocratic peace”.
- 2) For the comprehensive analysis over the datasets utility in IR research see: Vanhanen, T. (2000) “A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810–1998”. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(2): pp. 251–265; Achen, C. H. (2002) “Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART”. *Annual review of political science*, 5(1): pp. 423–450.
- 3) These two authors developed *Military Interventions by Powerful States* (MIPS) dataset which includes cases of military force usage by the five permanent UN

in intervened states, promote military interventions as a significant variable which should be included in research.

We will examine whether there are any causal relation between US military interventions and democratization processes which took place in a selected group of states – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. The concept of inversed democratic peace casts an argument according to which a unilateral coercive use of force would leads to further democratization of a targeted state. To inspect the specifics of military interventions, we shall deploy a multi-case study research design, aiming to determine political regime changes as a consequence of military interventions. We chose the selected cases because they depict in the clearest way possible how the pragmatic misuse of DPT forms a ground for legitimisation of military interventions. After the brief introduction of the DPT's key arguments and development of the theoretical framework, we argue an innovative way of military interventions research – the inversed democratic peace. In line with this argumentation, the central part of our article focuses on specific democratisation effects left by the conducted military interventions, and the investigation of similarity in foreign policy decisions between the intervening state and four analysed target countries.

Theorising Inversed Democratic Peace

Without any doubt, democratic peace theory belongs to one of the most discussed theories within the IR discipline. Ever growing number of theoretical postulates brought saturated empirical evidences on the research agenda. Ever since the DPT was pitched into academic discourse, the key debate was branched out into several main versions. Having great research and explanatory potential, the DPT serves as a fruitful analytical tool to both bilateral and systemic level of violence, induced by the internal political regime characteristics. The claim that it is *less likely* for two countries to get involved into an interstate conflict was initial basis upon which dyadic variant of DPT was conceptualised (Doyle 1983). Dyadic variant casts its assumption according to which dyad (pair of two

Security Council members, against both state and non-state targets between 1946 and 2003.

countries) is less war prone as the level of democracy rises. Within the dyadic variant, two sub-branches are developed. The first group of authors advocates that any conflict among democracies is impossible to occur (Hermann & Kegley 1998; Mansfield & Snyder 2005), while the second group argues that there were some examples of such conflicts, but they are statistically marginal (Maoz & Russett 1993; Bremer 1993; Dixon 1994; Peceny 1999). According to the central hypothesis, dyads of democratic states “will not be involved in serious military conflicts in their relations” (Bremer 1993). Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, who supported the ideas of Bremer, corroborated findings by Simon, Gartzke, and Weart who set forth hypothesis with a positive prognostic prefix, stating that “two democratic states are more likely to form an alliance” or “the alliances that have been formed by democratic states last longer” (Simon & Gartzke 1996: 632). Another massive wave of studies favoured the normative monadic assumption, which stipulates that democratic state externalises its internal norms and values through its foreign policy action, while in a dyadic case, the potential conflict of democratic and non-democratic norms would be resolved in favour of undemocratic ones (Rummel 1998; Russett 2005).

Some considerations whether the global lasting peace could be built by spreading the liberal model of democracy with use of violent methods are still vivid (Anderson 2018; Ray & Dafoe 2018; Bell & Kuek 2018). This issue seems to question the very ethical substance of democratic peace as it “presupposes a morally ambivalent stance in the form of simultaneous advocating the idea of international peace as well as easy legitimisation of the pragmatic use of violence” (Korać & Stekić 2018: 112). Such an internal ethical DPT discrepancy paves the path towards theoretical deepening of the initial postulates.

In the previous section, we have covered some of the key debates and concerns on the DPT development and empirical research. All of these debates were being improved on the one-way (cor)relation among the two key variables. This is why inversed democratic peace can add epistemic value to the theoretical puzzle of the DPT. The central argument should be understood in a way that DPT advancement could be facilitated via inverting the causal mechanism between interventions and democratisation processes

occurring right after the intervention took place. Much has been achieved in understanding how the political regime influences war proneness, but there are not many studies investigating this issue from the opposite view. This study intends to contribute in filling this gap.

Methodology

The methodological debates about the vital role of statistics in IR research – and especially about the “big data” usage – raise the question of analytical level of a particular concept – whether it is democracy, development, stability, or peace. Michael Coppedge states that political science concepts, as represented in IR, are extremely sensitive to quantitative analysis, and therefore advises design proportionality in research. These concepts cannot be reduced to a single indicator without losing some important part of their meaning; therefore, development is a term which includes more determinants than average wealth; stability is more than the absence of a coup attempt in a particular country, and democracy is more complex term than the mere holding of regular elections (Coppedge 1999). All of these concepts are often multidimensional because no aspect of the concept can be reduced to another (Coppedge 1999). For example, the right to vote and the competitiveness of elections are two aspects of modern democracy, but knowing one does not allow us to predict the other reliably (Coppedge 1999: 468).

Empirical part of our research is based on three main variables: military interventions (independent variable), the foreign policy similarity index – *S Score* (control variable), and the type of political regime as a dependent variable. Even though often discussed within the literature, military intervention is not much conceptually contested notion. Clear distinction from the humanitarian intervention, “new” types of wars such as proxy and hybrid wars, and other notions, has provided nuanced approach towards the definition of military interventions. The authors of the *Major Powers Military Intervention (1945–2003)* dataset, Patricia L. Sullivan and Michael T. Koch, designate military intervention as the official use of armed force involving the engagement of at least 500 members of the regular military force (of any kind and

type) for the sake of attaining current political goals, manifested through activity directed at an external enemy (Sullivan & Koch 2009: 709). The first criterion is the use of armed force, which signifies the active use of force by members of the armed forces or the willingness to use it in the face of resistance/attack, while the official criterion relates to authorisation by legitimate political leaders has also to be met in the same time. Military intervention has to enable the accomplishment of concrete political objective, which excludes from the analytical framework the routine and tactical movements of the armed forces for joint military exercises (2009: 709). An external enemy within the context of this definition may be either a state or a non-state actor, such as terrorist organisations in the territory of another state. The political goal of intervention is operationalised as a concrete value (territory, political power, or resources) that is the subject of consideration of the intervening state's political leaders (Sullivan & Koch 2009). The political objective is the crucial element of the definition. According to Sullivan & Koch, it could be specified as maintaining foreign regime authority or its removal, policy change, acquiring or defending territory, maintaining empire, or providing social protection and order (2009: 711).

Foreign policy similarity index, the control variable in this research, is used to determine to what extent does the foreign policy of the intervening actor (state/coalition/alliance) match the goals of targeted state at the beginning of the intervention. Though academic endeavours recognise the importance of quantifying and measuring consensuses of foreign policy actions (Häge 2011; D'Orazio 2013; Häge & Fug 2016; Strüver 2016), most of efforts to operationalise indicators have largely remained partial. The most successful attempt to systematically determine similarity between two states' foreign policies was done in 1999 by Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey Ritter. They introduced a complex quantitative measurement they called *S Score* (Signorino & Ritter 1999). This measure quantifies the level of alignment between any possible pair of states within the system on a scale between 0 and 1 (Signorino & Ritter 1999: 117).

We chose to exploit *S Score* in our research as it includes these two key variables observed in an inversed causal order, unlike

the classical DPT perspective. We deploy a time-series, cross-section research design to examine whether military interventions had positive effects in terms of democratisation of target countries. It is not always the case that single state acts as an intervener; on the contrary, in most cases the military alliance, or a group of states were subjects of interventions (Simon & Gartzke 1996). Though the alliances are acknowledged with status of dyad actor, our research takes sovereign country (member of an international system at a given time) as a unit of analysis.

Table 1. Overview of variables used in this research

Variable name	Operationalization	Data source/s
Military intervention	Official use of armed force involving the engagement of at least 500 members of the regular military force towards an external enemy.	IMI, MIPS, PRIF (Sullivan & Koch 2009)
Political regime type	Political regime quality measured on a scale between -10 and +10, for specific country at a given year.	Polity IV Data, (Systemic Peace Center 2019)
Foreign policy similarity index	Similarity of foreign policy positions quantitatively expressed between 0 and 1.	S Score (Signorino & Ritter 1999)

Source: Authors

Some studies conducted at the very end of the 20th century emphasised a strong correlation between military intervention and democratisation process (Hermann & Kegley 1998; Peceny 1999). On the contrary, Mernik reported the lack of existence of

correlation between the two variables (Mernik 1996) being among the first scholars who included non-US interventions as a control variable. This provided him further data validity for comparison as he conducted a probit analysis on 159 cases in which the US military interventions took place versus 27 cases in which the US was not the intervening state. Eventually, Mernik found that majority of selected cases did not experience further democratisation after the interventions took place (Mernik 1996: 400). Based on the previous findings, and with the aim to further develop the inversed DPT argument, the central hypothesis of our study states that

H: ...US military interventions in FR Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya had positive democratising effects.

To narrow the research focus, we will test two more auxiliary hypotheses. In some studies, the short term effects of the interventions had been measured (Bremer 1993; Meernik 1996). To compare their findings with the ones in selected cases, the first auxiliary hypothesis claims that

H1: ...military interventions influence democratisation more effectively in short term (Model I), rather than in longitudinal domains (Models II and III).

The second argument is that control variable (*S Score*) significantly influences democratisation process. It advocates the positive correlation between the democratisation and *S Score* measurement before, and after the intervention took place, and therefore presumes that

H2: ...the more democratic the target state become, the more similar foreign policy indexes with the United States are.

Unlike almost univocal stance on what nurtures the definition of military interventions, the determinants of what constitutes democracy in contemporary scientific literature is contested. In DPT research, democracy is perceived not in an idealistic way, but in more operationalised level through its key sub-variables and their interrelations (Marshall, Gurr & Jagers 2019). Initial division of political regime type was set to distinct dichotomous autocracy-democracy reality within the concrete society at a given time. Most scholars agree that the temporal unit that describes the level

of democracy (or political regime in general) is one calendar year per case. But what does not constitute high academic consensus is the issue of adequate democracy measurement. Quantification of political regimes in IR is a tremendously complex issue and poses a threat for inconsistent measurements and findings.

The DPT sheds light on the exact terms under which the empirical evidence, variables, and indicators should be measured. In order to gain insights into the quality of the political regimes of respective states, authors shall deploy data developed within the *Polity IV* project.⁴ It indexes basic features of the political regimes and classifies them into three categories: democratic, anocratic, and autocratic (Marshall M. et al. 2019). By quantifying key variables of the political regime, Polity IV presents findings on a twenty one scale (between -10 and +10), with all regimes having a score between -10 and -6 denoted as autocratic, anocratic between -5 and +5, while democratic ones score between 6 and 10 (Marshall M. et al. 2019). The *Polity IV* project covers all states and political-territorial entities with population of over 500.000, with the time span beginning in 1816. Usual temporal domain in similar studies compounds post-World War II period underlines the Cold War legacy. Most critiques regarding temporal problems are addressing the narrow scope of both years taken into analysis and cases. At the very beginning of the 21st century the structure of international system significantly changed, and so the types and characteristics of the military interventions did change as well. Empirical studies often opt out from analysing case studies. Instead, most of them are focusing on the big data (large *N* studies) aiming to prove consistence within the vast number of cases which to some extent could not really be statistically compared. This study addresses several selected cases and includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the then FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). All of these cases are being put within the one decade temporal domain subjected to more precise analytical discourse. As this research focuses on four preselected cases, the spatial domain is limited to the territories of the countries subjected to the US-led military interventions. Studies were insofar driven inconsistently in terms of their research design. We will use descriptive statistics to demonstrate the key

4) Annual Polity scores have been plotted for each of the 167 countries currently covered by the Polity IV data series for the period 1946–2018.

characteristics of the military interventions as well as the trends in military interventions likelihood.

Statistical models


Available datasets and other statistical tools on disposal to academics have had improved and advanced statistical studies of DPT. Comprehensive datasets in which every single case is statistically aligned to follow the occurrences on a basis of one calendar year as an analytical unit, alleviates research endeavours. Our study will follow case per year logic to determine whether there were any changes in political regime type at a given time. To test the robustness of the linkage between the two variables, each case will be subjected to statistical analysis in three models. The first model involves the observation of not only the year in which the intervention occurred but also three years prior to it, as well as three years after the intervention (3–1–3 constellation). A seven-year period will provide insight into the short term impact of interventions towards the democratisation process (Model I). The second analytical model will compound comprehensive period from World War II (1945) up until 2014 for which the data exist. We will apply longitudinal approach with the aim to observe potential deviations within the long term impact of interventions, and the prior stability of the political regimes (Model II). It strives to determine whether the democratisation represents the result of long term endeavours regardless of the nature of their origin (internal or external). All of similar arguments and models were tested in similar studies (Bremer 1993; Mernik 1996). The third analytical model will include statistical observation of PRC only after the intervention has occurred. This model will involve the year in which intervention took place (Model III). All of the analytical parts will include both political regime change and foreign policy similarity index variables.

Results

To demonstrate the general trends of military interventionism within the international system, we present statistical findings for the selected cases based on the exported data from available

datasets. We initially present prevalence of all the military interventions occurred after the World War II until today. US willingness to spread democracy wherever possible pledged a motion for a pragmatic misuse of the democratisation concept. Both during the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War era, the United States has been among the prophets of democratisation spread across the globe, brining what Samuel Huntington called “the third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). It is believed that democracy promotion became the official US foreign policy constituent in 1984 when the National Endowment for Democracy was established. The importance of the US promotion of democracy lays behind the concept of the “US excellence” and the willingness of the USA to promote the spread of democracy.


Graph 1. Prevalence of military interventions 1945–2018



Source: Compiled data from Sullivan & Koch 2009 and PRIF Data Set of the Humanitarian Military Interventions (PRIF 2019)

Although it is generally acknowledged that frequency of military interventions recently increased, statistics show the opposite. Ever since they are being systematically registered from the 1945, polynomial trend line corroborates their gradual decrease. Explanations for this finding are heterogeneous, stating that military interventions occurring in the last two decades are more intense, and are being placed through viral media so they become more receptive for an average citizen. Another reason could be distinction from the classic conflicts which occur on a daily basis, most of them being classified as interstate rather than unilateral coercive use of force.


Graph 2. Longitudinal alignment of foreign policies with the USA (*S Score* index)



Source: Compiled data from *S Score* (Signorino & Ritter 1999)

Another longitudinal parameter includes control variable of this research (*S Score*). To demonstrate the similarity of foreign policy orientations with the United States (respectively) as a main intervener, we present compiled and extracted data from Signorino & Ritter dataset for the selected cases, per annum (Graph 2). The first trend indicates that right after the World War II *S Score* was the highest in each compared country's record. The second trend shows that Libya was the only country that had negative *S Score* with the United States in the moment of intervention (-0.28). All others, FR Yugoslavia (0.28), Iraq (0.01), and Afghanistan (0.26) measured positive index of foreign policy alignment with the United States (Signorino & Ritter 1999). This research applies three measuring models to the selected cases. The first, Model I (3-1-3 constellation) indicates the values of political regime quality three years before and three years after the intervention, including the year of intervention (Graph 3).

Graph 3. Model I: Democratization in 3–1–3 constellation




Source: Compiled Polity IV data

In a seven-year period, FR Yugoslavia (later Serbia) experienced the biggest political regime change, managing to transform itself from autocracy to democracy (from -6 to $+6$ Polity score). And while Iraq and Afghanistan both transformed from autocracy to closed anocracy (from -9 to -2 in Iraq, and -7 to -2 in Afghan case), Libya was the only stagnating country in terms of democratisation (remained in -6). All the four countries managed to increase their *Polity* values in the year of intervention, excluding Libyan stagnation.

The Model II intends to determine whether democratisation is caused as a result of long term impact of military interventions regardless of the nature of their origin (internal or external). To test this Model, we compiled data for four selected cases with the period between the 1946 and the respective year in which intervention occurred.

Graph 4. Model II: Longitudinal impact of interventions (polynomial trend line)



Source: Compiled Polity IV data⁵

Graph 4 demonstrates the longitudinal changes in political regimes type. From 1946, up until the year of intervention, Afghanistan and FR Yugoslavia measured general rise of democracy level, except Iraqi declining, and again, stagnating Libya. The polynomial trend lines indicate that in all cases, except Libya, political regime have been changing their types several times prior to the conducted intervention/s. The final Model demanded inclusion of control variable (*S Score*). We correlated foreign policy similarity index with the changes of political regime types for all the three models. Table 2 shows that in Model I the strongest correlation between the democracy rise and S Score was measured in Yugoslav case ($r = .79, p < 0.01$), while the moderately negative correlation was registered only in case of Afghanistan ($r = -.64, p < 0.01$). Model II demonstrated very strong negative correlations in Afghanistan ($r = -.75, p < 0.01$) and Yugoslav cases ($r = -.69, p < 0.01$). Unlike in Model 1, findings for Iraq in Model II have

5) Interruptions shown in the graphs are caused by the lack of data for the given year/s. According to the Polity IV Codebook, these interruptions are classified as: interruption in regime functioning, interregnum in governance, and transition periods within the political regime change.

significantly changed into moderate positive correlations ($r = .38$, $p < 0.01$). Longitudinal observation of political regime dynamics changed correlation coefficients in all the four cases in regards to the Model 1 findings. The third Model which tested correlations among variables only after the intervention took place, show that there were no changes in the case of Afghanistan. *S Score* and political regime change negatively correlated in Libya ($r = -.29$, $p < 0.01$) and Iraq ($r = -.76$, $p < 0.01$), while in case of FR Yugoslavia the correlation was moderately positive ($r = .38$, $p < 0.01$).

Table 2. Integrated correlations findings

	afg	lib	yug	irq	
	Polity IV correlated with sScore				
P. Correlation	-,643	,130	,790*	-,681	Model I
Sig. (2-tailed)	,120	,781	,000	,092	
N	7				
P. Correlation	-,754**	-,265	-,690**	,382	Model II
Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,612	,001	,118	
N	72				
P. Correlation	-,754**	-,293	,382	-,760**	Model III
Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,573	,118	,001	
N	16	6	18	14	

* Autocorrelation performed on basis of the intervention–year case.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

This section presented the key findings and results for the three proposed models of researching the inversed DPT. Results indicate the justification of all the models, as presented correlations highly vary from model to model. Robustness of the applied mod-

els is also demonstrated as each of them corresponds to different temporal domain of the selected cases.

Are Military Interventions an Omitted Variable in Democratic Peace Theory?

In our non-mainstream research design based on the inversed democratic peace, we employed three main variables: military interventions (independent variable), the foreign policy similarity index – *S Score* (control variable), and the type of political regime as a dependent variable. The results of our research indicate several groups of findings which might foster further academic debate.

First, we demonstrated that proposed descriptive statistical models might be valuable tool for further research since they indicate significant statistical variations regarding the temporal domains in which the key deviations are observed. For instance, Model I results (3–1–3 constellation) demonstrated that the highest rise of the political regime quality was measured in case of FR Yugoslavia (succeeded by Serbia), with impressive 16 points-change on Polity scale. It was followed by Iraq and Afghanistan, both managing to decrease their autocracy levels for 7 points, while Libya was in stagnating status (Graph 3). The second model on other hand shows that political regime quality varied over the decades with ups and downs in terms of Polity score. Besides low number of statistical items (only 10–15 years for analysis), Model III was interrupted as in some cases Polity wasn't able to measure the scale of democracy/autocracy level. It is why its usage is still not fully valid in statistical studies.

The second group of important findings relates to variations in relations among the inspected variables. Before discussing the general hypothesis findings, arguments and findings of the auxiliary ones shall be firstly presented. The first auxiliary hypothesis argued that the impact of military interventions is more statistically significant when observed in the short term, rather than in longitudinal domain. This research shows that in all cases except Libya, this hypothesis was corroborated. However, when observed within the Model II, this hypothesis could not be fully confirmed, as the temporal domain of several decades implies many factors except

coercive use of force. This is why *HI* is only partially corroborated based on our findings. The second auxiliary hypothesis brought into correlation the *S Score* and democratisation process. Correlations between these two variables unequivocally confirm this hypothesis, as it shows in the most obvious way the variations between the two models. The Table 2 demonstrated that in Yugoslav and Iraqi cases, not only these correlations have varied, but their nature has changed from negative in Model I to positive (Iraq), and *vice versa* in Yugoslav case. Basically what this hypothesis argues is that the rise of democracy correlates with the similarity of targeted country with the United States at a given year. On a short term, Libya and FR Yugoslavia corroborated this claim, while in Model II only Iraq was the one which *S Score* positively correlated with its democratisation (Table 2).

The departing general assumption of our research claimed that the US military interventions left positive democratising effects to the target countries. As it is discussed earlier, this claim could be partially accepted, as it was corroborated only in individual cases. Besides, social and political occurrences could also have significant impact to democratisation of a society. Furthermore, simple correlations among variables do not imply causality, nor do they leave a direct link between them. Statistical findings could serve as a complementary addition in understanding depth of the research phenomenon.

In their earlier endeavours to inspect military interventions, Herman and Kegley introduced the pivotal regime change model in which they explicitly marked the Iraqi case. They argue that the power vacuum emerged after the end of the Cold War, with the United States as the only remained superpower, must have been filled in with the promotion of democratic values, which in the most cases needed to be imposed by the coercive use of force (Hermann & Kegley 2008: 24). Even though military intervention in Iraq did not induce democratisation process, it triggered democratisation issue within academic debate, thus it was acknowledged as a “pivot among democratising societies” (2008: 25).

The findings of this study directly tackle classic DPT theoretical matrix. The authors of liberal provenance report theoretical inconsistency which consequently leads to misinterpretation of

empirical evidence. This is what Hermann and Kegley were faced with in their study in which they were accused of being “radically liberal” (Hermann & Kegley 2008). All things considered, we sought to respond whether the inversed democratic peace is an obsolete idea in the current theoretical debates. Turbulences within the international system are so frequent, that it is almost impossible for scholarly community to calibrate clear and straightforward research priorities that would be applicable in long terms. This is why establishing a theoretical framework which would set strong basement for empirical research among the two macro variables is never finished work.

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Leisure Patterns and Values in Adolescents from Serbia born in 1990s: An Attempt at Building a Bridge between the Two Domains**

Abstract

This work is an attempt at empirically establishing a relation between leisure and values in adolescents. Being new, this topic could help a broader understanding of youth leisure and its association with inner psychological dispositions, but also with specific social context (prolonged economic crisis and post-war environment). Five typical leisure patterns were previously identified: academic, sports, going out, following celebrities in the media and music, and computers pattern. The main objective was to discover whether students with high and low scores on these patterns differ regarding their values. The sample consisted of 2426

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Serbian secondary school students from 9 towns. A discriminant analysis was performed and showed that it was possible to identify a specific mix of personal and social values for every leisure pattern. This confirms the existence of a relation between students' behaviour during free time and their values, expressed as a preference for specific personal and social goals. The results imply that connecting two domains is achievable and fruitful in both ways. The identified leisure patterns contribute to a more detailed and elaborate portrayal of adolescents' values but those values also bring a new insight into specific features of adolescents' behaviour during leisure time.

Key words: adolescents; leisure patterns; materialistic and post-materialistic values

Introduction

Adolescents' leisure time has been an important research topic for decades (Bartko & Eccles 2003: 233-237; Hofferth & Sandberg 2001: 295-297). In a post-materialistic world leisure activities gained new expressions and became a significant sign of life quality (Roberts 1997: 1-13; Pyšňáková & Miles 2010: 15-28). Leisure studies are generally focused on the frequency of leisure activities (Cotterell 1990: 1-30; Skriptunova & Morozov 2002: 70-78; Videnović, Pešić, & Plut 2010: 203-209). Lately the efforts have been made to group the various leisure activities and to discover patterns and orientations during spare time. Bruyn & Cillessen (2008: 447-448) established four factors related to: social activities (going to the movies, shopping, etc), creative activities, sports and computer use. Piko and Vazsonyi, (2004: 717-732) also found four leisure dimensions: peer-orientated commercial pattern, aesthetic-sophisticated dimension (theatre, pop concerts, reading), conventional type (sports, hobbies, housework, religious events) and sensation/technical orientation (computer, TV). López-Sintas and associates (2016: 283-286) identified four patterns: social, omnivorous, entertainment, and religious.

When it comes to values, the research shifting from materialistic to post-materialistic values represents the foundation of

contemporary studies (A'gulia et al. 2008: 275-290; Inglehart 1977: 3-392; Inglehart 2008: 130-144). However, such a shift may not occur in countries in a deep economic crisis, in transition or those involved in war conflicts (Inglehart & Abramson 1994: 346-350). Serbian society has been going through a massive change from communistic social order to liberal capitalism (Kuzmanović, Popadić & Havelka 1995: 7-25). This transformation was accompanied by the disintegration of previous country, war, transition and poverty (Gavrilović & Stojanović 2010: 62-64). Hence it would be interesting to investigate the differences in the existing values in adolescents born in 1990's that grew up in that turbulent period.

Problem

Our main objective is to connect leisure patterns of the adolescents born in 1990s with the values they appreciate. There is a lack of knowledge regarding the relation between adolescents' leisure activities and their dispositions, except personality traits (Schwartz & Fouts 2003: 205-212; Weaver 1991: 1293-1297). Rare studies focus on orientations towards broader values and several related activities. Stattin and Kerr (2001: 22) argue that self-focused (focus on one's own needs and enjoyment) and other-focused values (focus on people, relationships and the common good) are reflected in adolescents' leisure habits. Youngsters with other-focused values are home-centred and involved in sport, music, hobbies. Conversely, over-involvement in peer culture might be the hallmark of self-focused adolescents. Similarly, Hofer and associates (2007: 22-23) argued that values are relevant for academic achievement and found a relationship between achievement and wellbeing orientations and a preference regarding spending time in school-related or leisure activities.

It is unusual that the relationship between values and leisure is rarely investigated since valuing is often a salient factor in the field of leisure studies. Several psychological and sociological theories consider leisure activities as a sign of a life quality or opportunities one has. An (in) explicit assumption is that some adolescents spend free time in a more productive way than others (Eccles & Berber, 1999: 10-25; Mahoney, Harris & Eccles 2006: 3-30). The positive development theory sees leisure as a possible

resource for enhancing youth interests and skills (Hunter & Csikszentmihalyi 2003: 27-32; Larson 2000: 170). Extracurricular activities are especially highlighted as beneficial for such development (Eccles & Berber 1999: 10-25; Mahoney, Harris & Eccles 2006: 3-30). Stebbins (1997: 17-21) distinguishes serious and casual leisure considering effort, devotion and preservation associated with activities during one's spare time. Spending most of time socialising with friends or/and in passive activities are connected with boredom and maladaptive behaviours (Mahoney & Stattin 2000: 113-125; Mc Hale, Crouter & Tucker 2001: 1764-1776; Osgood et al. 1996: 635-652).

Leisure within the quality life framework is associated with the presence of social equality and justice as significant values in the contemporary society. Hence, Bourdieu's theory (Bourdieu 1979: 4-7, 1984: 154) about social class effect on inequalities in opportunities to engage in certain lifestyle, manifested through the leisure activities, is well acknowledged and empirically established (López-Sintas, Ghahraman & Rubiales 2016: 289-290). Roberts (2012: 328-331) closely connects social class division with the leisure concept. Unlike positive development theory and Stebbins' serious leisure notion, Roberts (1997: 10-13) argues that global trends from the end of XX century made youth's leisure time a rapidly changing phenomenon whose function is dominantly fun. Accordingly, leisure could affect youth identity and values but older social markers such as age, gender and social class seem to be more influential (Roberts 2013: 1-9).

We investigate the relationship between values and leisure from a different perspective. We did not consider values as tools for evaluating the quality of leisure or in the context of social differences. Instead, we treat it as inner disposition and a characteristic of each adolescent. Values are usually defined as 'desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, which serve as guiding principles in the life of a person' (Schwartz 1994: 20-25). Authors emphasise (Ajzen 1991: 199-200; Moretti & Higgins 1999: 186-191) that people incline towards goals related to their private life (personal values) and the others connected to the society they live in (social values). With respect to the claim that values presumably govern experience, youth behaviour during leisure

should be considered as a field where values are expressed. Besides, experiences themselves may modify or reinforce the salience of values over time (Rokeach 1985: 1 53-169; Stattin & Kerr 2001: 21-23). Accordingly, exploration and commitment to certain leisure activities is regarded as an important factor in adulthood transition (Coatsworth et al., 2005: 362-363; Feinstein, Bynner & Duckworth 2006: 305-307, Northcote 2006: 1-4; Shaw, Kleiber, & Caldwell 1995: 247-248). Serious leisure activities have potential to become a source of meaning, identity and solidarity (Rojek 2001: i-iv).

Aims

Previously mentioned investigations imply that, albeit insufficiently investigated, a relation between the domains of values and leisure exists. Thus our main goal is to empirically explore the existence of that connection and possibly provide additional understanding of the youth life. As mentioned before, until now values have mostly represented salient factors in the field of leisure studies and have not been considered as intrapsychic characteristic of an individual. Rare studies investigated few value orientations rather than a whole list of particular values. Furthermore, sociological studies usually followed generations differences in values (Bynner & Parsons 2000: 237-247; Sun & Wang 2010: 65-79) while we shall be focused on individual differences in values and their connection with particular leisure patterns within one developmental period, adolescence.

Insight into the appreciation of values among Serbian adolescents is also investigated. This aim is related to the discussion regarding changes of values in modern society that made the role of leisure in adolescents' life more important (A'gulia, et al. 2008: 275-290; Inglehart 2008: 130-144). Additionally, specific social and historical circumstances in former Communist countries (such as Serbia) as a context for adolescents' growing up are thought to be relevant for our research topic.

Method

Setting and Participants

The sample was the quota including 2426 secondary school students aged 14-19 from 9 towns and different regions in Serbia (northern, central and southern). Schools from 3 towns (large, medium and small) in each region were included and in every school one class from each year was chosen randomly. All in all, students (59% female and 41% male) from 26 schools (21% from three-year vocational schools, 38% from four-year vocational schools and 41% from grammar schools) and 97 classes participated in the study and came from the first (27%), second (28%), third (26%) and fourth year (19%).

Procedure and Measures

Procedure

The survey was done in 2008, in the course of 2 regular school classes by the school psychologist, who had been trained to conduct the instruments. Students were told that the goal of the study was to learn about their habits during spare time. Anonymity of data was ensured and all students participated voluntarily, with parental consent obtained.

Leisure Pattern Measures

In the previous data analysis (Stepanović, Videnović & Plut 2009: 255-258) leisure patterns were identified, but the relationship with values was not investigated at that time. The patterns were extracted from a questionnaire consisting of 70 items. Examined leisure activities covered the following domains: music (preferences for: folk, pop, rock, hip-hop, techno); reading books; reading various journals (popular science, culture, sport, celebrities, crossword puzzles, Sudoku, horoscope, romance novellas); watching different TV programmes (sport, popular science and reality shows); computers usage (socialising, educational purposes, writing blogs, playing computer games, listening to music, watching

movies); going out (to open spaces like parks, school yards etc., cafés, discotheques, clubs); attendance at the various events (theatres, classical music concerts, pop and rock concerts, folk music concerts, DJ events, sport matches); engagement in sport activities, extracurricular activities and volunteering.

Leisure patterns: The structure of extracted main components from the previous study

Academic pattern	Sport pattern	Entertainment media pattern	Going out pattern	Music & computers pattern
Scientific mag .662	Sport magaz. .837	Celebrities magaz. .650	Clubs .712	Techo music .638
Theatre .634	Sport on TV .835	Reality shows .646	Disqoteq. .708	Hip-hop .609
Books .662	Sport events .733	Folk music .641	Cafes .701	Pop music .558
Culture magaz. .616	Sport activities participation .622	Trivia magazines .618	DJ events .645	Computers .370
Extracurricular activit. .464		Short romance novels .596	Rock concerts .322	
Rock concerts .427		Folk concerts .437	Folk concerts .331	
Science TV shows .407		Computers -.343	Computers .314	
Concerts of classical m. .380		Rock concerts -.318		
Volunteer activities .358				
Computers .352				

The principal component factor analysis and Varimax rotation were performed and the 5 leisure orientations were extracted (see Table 1): academic, sport, orientation towards entertainment media, going out and orientation towards music and computers (Stepanović, Videnović & Plut 2009: 255-256).

Personal and Social Values' Scale

Values have been examined by 2 scales related to the relatively general personal and social goals widely used in Serbian youth studies (Kuzmanović & Petrović 2007: 456-460, 2008: 159). The instrument consists of 18 personal and 18 social goals estimated by a 5-degree scale (Table 2). The list of goals was formed in accordance with well-known theoretical concepts from social psychology (Fromm 1959: 151-165; Maslow 1954: 265-280; Murray 1938: 36-282; Rokeach 1973: 357-361), Ronald Inglehart's research (1977: 3-18) into materialistic and post-materialistic values, and previous empirical studies in Serbia (Kuzmanović, Popadić, & Havelka 1995: 7-25).

Statistical analysis

In order to investigate the relation between students' values and the extracted leisure patterns, for each pattern 2 extreme groups of students (25% of students with highest and 25% students with lowest scores at the certain factor) were formed. The upper group is seen as representing students prone to a certain leisure pattern, and the lower was formed from students who do not manifest that type of behaviour. The 2 groups have been compared by a discriminant analysis within each of five leisure patterns regarding personal and social goals taken together.

Results

Table 2 shows students' preferences of personal and social goals. At the top of the table we placed personal and social goals which are most accepted, and at the bottom are the least accepted ones.

Descriptive statistics of personal and social goals

Personal goals	M	SD	Social goals	M	SD
Friendship	4.42	.888	Solving employment	4.42	.929
Love	4.37	.983	Free education & health care	4.31	.992
Material values	4.32	.974	Living standard	4.24	.986
independence	4.28	1.048	Environmental objectives	4.23	1.025
Knowledge acquisition	4.06	1.015	Fight against crime and corruption	4.14	1.144
Hedonism	3.93	1.121	Harmonious humane relations	4.06	1.089
Safety/security	3.93	1.140	Traditional values & nat. identity	3.96	1.125
Self-actualization	3.82	1.157	Development of science, education and culture	3.96	1.061
Healthy life	3.82	1.243	Social equality	3.95	1.099
Altruism	3.79	1.084	Rule of law	3.78	1.171
Religious values	3.75	1.318	Territorial integrity	3.74	1.248
Exciting life	3.69	1.224	Democracy	3.58	1.262
Reputation	3.42	1.178	Strengthening of defence forces	3.58	1.211
Achievement	3.39	1.269	Good inter-ethnic relations	3.57	1.245
Social activism	3.11	1.260	Joining the EU	3.44	1.350
Popularity	2.51	1.415	One party system	3.32	1.357
Submissiveness	2.51	1.346	Strong economy	3.13	1.355
Social power	2.04	1.210	Completing privatization	2.90	1.230

It is obvious that the most valuable personal goals are interpersonal relationship with peers, love, material standards, independence and hedonism. The least preferable ones are social power, submissiveness and popularity. The most important social goals for Serbian youth are dominantly connected to economic issues (employment, free education and health care, living standards), environmental objectives and fight against crime and corruption. Social goals students deem least significant are privatisation, strong market and economy and one-party system. Regarding social goals it is obvious that even the least preferable values have average acceptance of above or around 3, which means that these goals are also quite important.

As already mentioned, the relationship between leisure and goal preferences was examined by discriminant analysis involving the comparison of 2 extreme groups within identified 5 leisure patterns. For each pattern one statistically significant discriminant function is found which suggests the presence of values that differentiate adolescents with opposite habits during free time. The rate of correct classifications was similar for each discriminant function, showing that 63-74% of the students can be correctly classified in two extreme groups. The data regarding extracted discriminant functions are presented in Table 3.

The summary of canonical discriminant functions

Functions corresponding to leisure patterns	Canonical correlation	Chi square	df
Academic pattern	0.543**	295.995	36
Sport pattern	0.464**	203.126	36
Entertainment media pattern	0.464**	209.799	36
Going out pattern	0.365**	121.526	36
Music and computer pattern	0.328**	98.190	36

Note: ** parameter significant at level 0.01

The content of obtained discriminant functions can be seen in Table 4, which represents a structure matrix for each leisure pattern. In the presented matrix the correlations between personal and social goals and suitable discriminant function are given. In accordance with conventional guidelines, loadings of less than .30 were not interpreted (Tabachnick & Fidell 1989: 509).

Structure matrices for five leisure patterns

Academic pattern	Sport pattern	Entertainment media pattern	Going out pattern	Music and computer pattern					
Knowledge acquisition (P.G.) ^a	.534	Territorial integrity (S.G.)	.370	Submissiveness (P.G.)	.528	Excitement (P.G.)	.622	Reputation (P.G.)	.468
Self-actualization (P.G.) ^b	.508	Traditional values and nat. identity (S.G.)	.361	Religious values (P.G.)	.478	Popularity (P.G.)	.405	Achievement (P.G.)	.456
Good inter-ethnic relations (S.G.)	.448	Strength. of defence (S.G.)	.338	Healthy life (P.G.)	.421	Hedonism (P.G.)	.339	Hedonism (P.G.)	.445
Altruism (P.G.)	.416	Popularity (P.G.)	.323	Popularity (P.G.)	.344			Exciting life (P.G.)	.435
Excitement (P.G.)	.407			Love (P.G.)	.319			Social activism (P.G.)	.409
Safety/Security (P.G.)	.394			Joining the EU (S.G.)	.301			Ffriendship (P.G.)	.404
Development of science, education and culture (S.G.)	.367							Safety/Security (P.G.)	.328
Fight against crime and corruption (S.G.)	.337								
Harmonious humane relations (S.G.)	.313								
Environmental objectives (S.G.)	.309								

Note:

^a Personal goal

^b Social goal

According to the structure matrix, values which dominantly indicate the difference between the group of students orientated towards academic content and the group from the opposite extreme are: knowledge, self-actualisation, good inter-ethnic relations, altruism, excitement, safety, development of science and culture. Students who follow and do sports more than those who do not, appreciate values such as: country and territorial integrity, tradition and national identity, the strengthening of defence forces and popularity. Students who seek entertainment through media differ from those who do not incline to it mostly with respect to the following values: submissiveness, religious values, healthy life, popularity, love, joining the European Union. Differences between adolescents who like to go out and those who do not, are predominantly related to: excitement, popularity and hedonism. Distinctive values of adolescents who spend time listening to music and in front of computers (dominant activity on computers: listening to music and watching movies) are: reputation, achievement, hedonism, excitement, civic engagement, friendship and safety.

Discussion

When it comes to general acceptance of personal values, two dominant tendencies can be seen. Firstly, values like friendship, love and independence, typical for adolescence as a developmental stage (Brown & Larson 2009: 74-103; Collins & Steinberg 2008: 551-590; Erikson 1994: 51-97; Petersen & Spiga 1982: 515-528) are widely accepted, and values in contrast to becoming independent (submissiveness) are hardly ever accepted. Secondly, appreciating economic welfare, concrete pleasures and the need for safety reflects materialistic values. Attaching importance to such survival values could be, at least partially, attributed to the prolonged economic crisis in Serbia. However, Twenge (2017: 205) claims that millennials in USA, the generation born in 1990s as our respondents, also value high economic standard. Low score on obtaining social power is seemingly in contrast with the desire for better economic and social conditions. However, the other data from our questionnaire show that adolescents are relatively uninterested in politics (25% follow political events, and 40% would use their right to vote) which is also found in Western countries

when it comes to official politics represented through politicians and their parties (Farthing 2010: 185-186). In Serbia particularly the exaggerated politicisation of society and the lack of trust in the political elite can be seen as the reason for alienation of the adolescents from politics, despite the fact that political issues are a very frequent topic in the media (Kuzmanović & Petrović 2005: 441; Stepanović Ilić, Blažanin & Mojović 2017: 10).

Preferred social goals are entirely concordant with the other tendency identified in the area of personal goals. Namely, the young attach importance to employment, free education and health care and higher living standards, hoping for a more secure future taking into account the situation in Serbia, which offers significantly fewer opportunities compared to other European countries. This is in agreement with the data on high unemployment rate in Serbia, since almost one fifth of the population was unemployed during the survey time (Serbian Institute for Statistics, 2008). One of widely accepted social goals is fight against crime and corruption, which is understandable bearing in mind post-conflict transitional society with a relatively high incidence of organised crime (Đekić 2016:783; Golubović & Džunić 2015: 174-177; Mladenović, 2012: 195-208) and high presence of corruption at all levels (Balšić 2016: 65-86; Madžar 2015: 17). Low preference of liberal values (strong market economy, privatisation) could be part of socialist legacy but probably to a certain extent a result of a badly conducted economic transition also.

Values characteristic for young people orientated towards some of the previously identified leisure patterns offer additional insight into their lifestyle and world view. In general, findings have confirmed the assumption that there is a relationship between leisure behaviour and values. Discriminant analysis shows that it is possible to extract interpretability function which serves as the criterion for distinguishing between 2 extreme groups (decliner and incliner) on each pattern. In accordance with that, leisure time is connected with inner dispositions such as values which are, as Hitlin (2003: 118-135) suggested, one of the core components of identity structure. The results imply that personal goals are a more significant for differentiation between adolescents inclined to patterns orientated towards fun (entertainment media, going out, music

and computers patterns) and those who are not. When it comes to other patterns, a mix of social and personal goals describes students with academic orientation, while social goals mostly characterise adolescents who follow sport.

The appreciated values of youth engaged in academic activities are related to self-actualisation dominantly through knowledge acquisition. It can be considered consistent with findings of Hofer and associates (2007: 22-23) regarding tendency of adolescents with achievement value orientation to invest more time in learning than in fun. These adolescents also emphasise the importance of normal social conditions in which they can fulfil their goals, expressed in preference of good inter-ethnic relations, personal safety, crime and corruption reduction, but also with the presence of altruistic behaviour. Serbia is notorious for its brain drain (Tung & Lazarova 2006: 1853-1870) and it is likely that these adolescents belong to a potential next generation of highly educated migrants to countries with a regulated social system and better social policy.

Preferable goals within the group of sport followers reveal importance of maintaining territorial integrity of the country by preserving tradition and strengthening military forces. Although sport orientation can be considered as a protective factor related to positive developmental outcomes (Eccles & Barber 1999: 10-41; Yin, Katimas & Zapata 1999: 183) it can also be related to the fact that success of sport players often has an important role in social construction of national identity (Jackson & Ponik 2001: 43-59). It is plausible to assume that adolescents interested in sport use sports manifestations, national athletes and their success for strengthening their national identity. Social goals connected with strong national identity are already extracted in previous youth research in Serbia as a negative dimension of values system (Kuzmanović & Petrović 2007: 579). These values are associated with choosing radical political orientation and strong religious identity (Kuzmanović & Petrović 2008: 167, 2010: 467), which is usually interpreted as a consequence of war conflicts and unsolved problem of Serbia's territorial integrity. Besides, students interested in sport value popularity, which is understandable having in mind that athletes frequently are their role models (Lin & Lin 2007: 579; Stepanović, Pavlović Babić & Krnjaić 2009: 407-408).

Submissiveness most differentiates students orientated towards rather passive entertainment activities from those not inclined to that pattern. This appreciation may be explained by frequent exposure of these adolescents to entertainment in the media and content that does not promote a critical attitude (Verma & Larson 2002: 180). The goals of these young people at first sight seem to be quite an extraordinary mixture, ranging from religious and healthy life, acceptance through love and popularity glorification, and ending with highlighting the significance of joining the EU. However, this values mixture may be understandable when it comes to the content these young people follow in the media (folk music, celebrities, reality shows etc.) This interpretation is in accordance with Zhang and Harwood's (2004: 5) finding regarding coexistence of traditional and modern values in dominant themes in the media. Namely, in mass media the common themes are related to the looks and appearance of singers and actors and their love life. Very popular folk singers often present themselves as people who fulfil socially desirable norms with high moral and religious standards, and who strive for love and have a life without vices. Therefore, it is not surprising that their fans also consider themselves as devoted to religion, healthy life and finding real love. Such influence of the media and superstars on people's conscience and values was some time ago considered by Roberts (1997: 6) but also discussed in role model studies (Engle & Kasser 2005: 264; Yancey, Siegel, & McDaniel 2002: 36). Similarly, taking into consideration life style and interests of these adolescents, the reasons for supporting the EU accession are probably not connected with free trade, human rights and similar values, but with their belief that the EU means carefree and luxurious life style, presented in the media as typical for their show-biz idols.

Unlike previous group of adolescents who are rather passive, we identified adolescents who spend leisure time actively searching for fun. They visit a variety of places: clubs, discos, cafés, DJ events, concerts of different types of music (Table 1). Their orientation towards different types of amusement seems to be in accordance with the *carpe diem* motto expressed in the inclination towards postmodern values and appreciation of exciting life, popularity and hedonism in general.

Adolescents who spend time listening to music and in front of computers are dominantly oriented towards fun also. They spend time listening to music, watching movies and playing games on computers (Table 1). Their goals again show a mixture of modern and postmodern values. Reputation, achievement and civic engagement reflect modern values (Hoffer et al. 2007: 18-19), while hedonism and excitement correspond to postmodern values (A'gulia et al. 2008: 276) same as in students orientated to active amusement.

Besides discussing the results based on findings obtained by statistical analysis and showing that each leisure pattern could be characterised by a specific set of values which differentiates youngsters inclining to it from those who do not spend their free time in that way, it is possible to go a step further. In our opinion it is also plausible to analyse similarities and differences regarding values related to different leisure patterns. In terms of similarities in values between young people inclined to different leisure patterns, some mutual values can be identified. Three postmodern values were identified as common for at least two different leisure patterns: excitement (present in academic, going-out and music & computer patterns), popularity (in sport, entertainment media and going-out patterns) and hedonism (in going-out and music & computer patterns).

The differences between identified patterns are based on a specific mixture of materialistic and post-materialistic values within each of them. Post-materialistic values (good inter-ethnic and humane relationships, altruism and environmental objectives) associated with the academic activities match Stattin and Kerr's (2001: 22) concept of other-focused values which they claim are related to structured spending of leisure time. Materialistic values related to academic spare time pattern (safety, fight against crime and corruption) could be result of the previously mentioned social context in Serbia marked with economic crisis and society in transition. Sport free time pattern is predominantly linked with social materialistic values usually associated with nationalism and militarism. Fun pattern consisted of activities oriented towards following the media is mostly in touch with personal post-materialistic as

well as traditional values. The established connection between this pattern and post-materialistic values is in accordance with findings of Hoffer and associates (Hoffer et al. 2007:18), stating that students with wellbeing value orientation favour fun over learning. The going-out pattern includes values linked with previously analysed patterns. Spending time in this manner is entirely associated with post-materialistic values (excitement, popularity, hedonism) which are also related to other leisure patterns. Unlike previous two patterns orientated towards fun, the fun pattern consisted of activities which presuppose usage of computers for entertainment is connected with values of wellbeing (hedonism, excitement, friendship) as well as achievement values.

Conclusions

This study represents a rare attempt at determining the relationship between two significant segments of young people's lives: the way they spend their spare time and the values they appreciate. The results of the survey have brought additional insight into studies of leisure as well as into studies of young people's values. Regardless of the fact that the preferred values are in accordance with universal characteristics of adolescent age, our results do reveal some specificity of growing up in a post-socialistic country with a prolonged economic crisis manifesting itself in valuing goals reflecting the need for safety: employment, higher living standard and reducing crime and corruption rate. When the preferences related to personal and social values are observed from the perspective of Inglehart's theory, it can be concluded that these adolescent goals represent a mix of post-materialistic and materialistic value systems. Thus it can be argued that the long-term inter-generational shift from a system of materialistic to the one of post-materialistic values maybe did not materialise to the full extent within generation borne at the end of XX century (Inglehart & Abramson 1994: 347). The reason for that could be found in the absence of physical and economic safety of our respondents during their childhood in the context of social crises and war conflicts in Serbia. Furthermore, this mixture of values is in accordance with some authors (Arts & Halman 2004: 28-29) who argue that Inglehart's theory should be

revised because even in developed European countries majority of people appreciate both modern and postmodern values, instead of a predicted increase in postmodern values.

The main conclusion of our study is that the inclination towards a particular leisure pattern during spare time presupposes preference of specific values different from those in students who do not spend their time in the same way. Moreover, some additional interesting insights emerged from comparing values appreciated by youngsters prone to different leisure patterns.

This research can be seen as a first step in linking the domains of leisure and values. From that perspective, our interpretations of established relations should be treated as future hypotheses which need to be confirmed through further empirical investigations which we intend to do with so called iGen generation of adolescents. Various combinations of materialistic and post-materialistic values within different leisure patterns justifies investigating the relationships between individual values and the manner of spending spare time, instead of opting for differences in wider value patterns, which has been the case up to now (Hoffer et al. 2007: 20-27; Stattin & Kerr 2001: 22-57). Further research could go in the direction of finding the answer to the question of whether the value orientation of adolescents changes depending on them organising their spare time in a particular fashion or whether it is more likely that adolescents because of their value orientation choose to spend their spare time in a specific way.

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The Role of Information War in the Strengthening of Stereotypes about Russia in the Western Political Space***

Abstract

Negative perceptions of Russia as “the Other” in societies belonging to the Western political tradition have been shaped in a long historical perspective and have their own cultural and geopolitical matrix. These stereotypes mostly perceive Russia and its population through collectivism, authoritarianism and impulsiveness. Media and information policies play an indispensable role in shaping stereotypes in the modern and postmodern era. Therefore, the aim of this research is to point at the role of media discourse in supporting and forming negative stereotypes about contemporary Russia. In the introductory part of the Paper, the problem of

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stereotyping the notions of Russia and the Russians in the Western political space is contextualized, and then the case study on the empirical basis describes the role of the so-called Western media in supporting the established stereotypes in modern times. The main narratives of the information war between the European Union and the Russian Federation were used for media mediation and interpretation of events on the international scene in which the Russian Federation was the main actor during the year of sanctions (2014) and immediately afterwards (2015). We conclude that in the observed period there was a mutual deterioration of the images among the citizens of the EU and RF, while the leading media sacrificed the principle of impartiality of reporting.

Key words: stereotypes, information policy, media, European Union, Russian Federation

Introduction

One of the most significant factors that are affecting perception of any state in contemporary international relations is its image in the consciousness of audience which is, considerably, constructed by the media. However, that image is not always grounded on objective facts and their neutral presentation, but on the irrational and even negative emotional basis characterized on subjectiveness, prejudgements, aggressive affections and stereotypes. Representations of the Russia under the presidency of Vladimir Putin that have emerged in information policies in Western political space in the recent years are stereotypical in full sense of that word. They are all very reminiscent of the Cold War representations such as: subversive activities, resurrected imperial ambitions, plans of invasion, flexing the muscles etc (Fedorov 2014, Tomi 2001). All of the stereotypical representations about Russia have been constructed within the Western geopolitical contexts.

The aim of this research is to point at the role of media discourse and information policy in supporting and shaping stereotypes about Russia in countries belonging to the Western political tradition. The subject of research is the information policy that was conducted in the countries of the European Union and the United

States of America in the period of sanctions imposed to the Russian Federation in years 2014-2015. But, if we intend to observe current characteristic of information policies in Western political space, we must first turn our attention to their historical cultural roots and their geopolitical usage. Therefore, in the introductory part of the paper where the problem of stereotyping the notions of Russia in the Western political space is contextualized, the descriptive analysis method is used, and the case study which follows, on empirical basis, describes the role of the so-called Western media in supporting the established stereotypes in modern times. Under the notion of information policy, we mean activities in the information and security domain, which go beyond the basic functions of the media system and are oriented to comprehensive activities of creating, interpreting and distributing information. We also use the definition of a stereotype, according to which stereotypes are a special case of mental images based on over-generalized beliefs about their distinctive characteristics (Nikitina, Mohd Don & Sau Cheong 2015: 3). They are generalized because one assumes that the stereotype is true for each case that fits in the category. As etymology of the term indicates (from the Greek words “stereo” meaning “firm”, “solid” and “typos” meaning “a model” or “impression”) they are solid impression about someone/something that are inflexible by nature.

Short genesis of stereotyping about Russia in historical and geopolitical context

There are numerous scholarly works that have explored historical and cultural background that shaped the image of Russia in Western cultural space (Mead 1951, Beller & Beller 1999, Neumann 2001: 25–32). “An illuminating analysis of European representation of Russia from the 15th to the 20th centuries was done by Neumann (1999) who demonstrated how in the course of centuries constructing Russia as the “Other” helped forging a common European identity. Such historical perspectives on the major and ubiquitous images of a country are important because, especially in the case of Russia, the representations of the past “have sweeping contemporary salience” (Nikitina, Mohd Don & Sau Cheong 2015: 4). Martin Malia, the most distinguished scholar

on Russia history in the West during 20th century, also claimed that “in different epochs, Russia has been demonized or deified in the West, not so much because of its true role in Europe, but because of the fears and frustrations, or expectations and aspirations created in Europe by its domestic problems” (Martin 2003: 10). Edward Said has noted that power to define “the Other” also implies controlling “the Other” by fixing stereotypes about him and allowing us to keep him definable and distinguished for us, while denying “the Other” any possibility to change (Said 2000).

The emergence of Russia under Muscovy rulers in the 15th century as strong political entity that is growing and getting much more powerful coupled with the increased cultural distance between it and the rest of the Europe. That gap was enlarged mostly due to Russia’s reliance on Byzantine cultural and political traditions (imperial idea of “Third Rome”) and Eastern Orthodox Christianity, while the western part of Europe went on its modern, secular and expansionist path that led to their first global colonial adventure. The solitary non-western political entity that not only successfully resisted western colonialism but even became stronger and larger in the early modern period was Russian Empire inhabited mostly by Slavic peoples (that were also white Europeans but with different cultural background and habits than the western part of the Europe). Both similarities and differences contributed to the construction of stereotypical images of Russian “the Other“ that was both feared and understated, envied and glorified. “On the positive side, Russia’s geographical and a perceived cultural proximity to various Oriental political entities raised hopes among some European visionaries that the country could become a ‘conduit’ for European enlightenment or, as Leibnitz imagined, “a bridge between Europe and China” (Groh cited in Neumann 1999). Such views promoted the representation of Russia as an apprentice or “a learner in the European state system” and this metaphor is still very much in use in the present discourses on Russia (Neumann 1999: 76) Parallel to the serene and unthreatening “apprentice” image of Russia there has existed a more menacing image of the country as “the barbarian at the gate” (Neumann 1999: 77). The ideas of Russia’s inherent expansionist nature can be traced back to the 16th century. Thus, in a letter written by a Hubertus Langeutusin 1558, Muscovy was singled out among all the European political entities

as the principality most likely to grow and expand (Groh cited in Neumann 1999). These perceptions grew even stronger during the Northern War between Russia and Sweden (1700–1721) and the representations of Russia in contemporary literary sources grew even more menacing (Neumann 1999). In 19th century, Britain became one of the major geopolitical rivals of the Russian Empire. The result of these past hostilities between the two nations has been enduring. As Lieven (2000/2001: 26) argued, “intellectual basis for, and even the specific phraseology, of Russophobia was put forward in Britain in the nineteenth century” (Nikitina, Mohd Don & Sau Cheong 2015: 5). Most of these negative stereotypes were simply taken over in the twentieth century during the Cold War and placed in the war between ideologies and their geopolitical representatives: anti-communist West, led by United States, and communist East, led by Russia’s successor, Soviet Union. Old geopolitical representations created during the 19th century imperial contest between Great Britain as leading “sea power” that constantly tries to prevent expansion of Russia as leading “continental power” to the rims of the oceans were reconstructed into Cold War circumstances and laid basic for US “strategy of containment” (Gaddis, 1982). Recent resurrection of Russia’s power into Euroasian Heartland gave birth to those old cultural and geopolitical images of Russian imperial expansionism.

Negative stereotypes about the Russia and Russians are based on three assumptions: that Russians are collectivists (and they tend to oscillate between unconscious fears of isolation and loneliness and an absence of feelings of individuality; that Russians depend on authority (they submit to firm imposed on them from above, and merge themselves willingly with an idealized figure or leader; and that Russians are impulsive and emotional (they tend to oscillate suddenly and unpredictably from one attitude to its contrary, especially from violence to gentleness, from excessive activity to passivity, from orgiastic indulgence to ascetic abstemiousness).

All of those stereotypical images of Russians are once again empowered by contrasting images of EU (or West as whole, compact structure) and Russia as completely different entities in contemporary international relations. Russia sees itself as sovereign Westphalian state with classical, realistic approach to world pol-

itics, while EU auto-perception is based on images of idealistic, normative supranational structure with (post)modern mission that, declaratively, despises every kind of real-politics or geopolitical approach (Simionov 2014: 231-241). EU sees Russia as re-born expansionist power, while Russia thinks that he is just returning to it previous, classical geopolitical role of “central balanser” in multipolar world order that just tries to protect itself and its interests from foreign interference (Gajić 2017: 261-277). On the other hand, EU perceive itself as idealistic and pluralistic community without any true geopolitical expansionist aspirations, while Russia considers it as Atlantists (US and NATO) bridgehead that systematically tries to conduct geostrategy of Russia’s encirclement and weakening which main goal is not only to prevent any new Eurasian continental integration but, to bring Russia to the brink of its deconstruction in the longer period of time. These different approached clashed in Ukraine which West perceives as an area of its normative mission opened for integration and future EU enlargement, while Russia (based on its historical memory) considers it as a strategically important zone for its own protection and, therefore, part of its interest sphere.

Case study: EU information policy vis-à-vis the RF in 2014-2015

The following pages will be describe main narratives in the so called information warfare between the European Union and the Russian Federation, used to mediate and interpret developments on the international scene and involving the Russian Federation as their main actor, during the year of introducing the sanctions and immediately after. This research stems from a comparative analysis of empirical data and assessments given in two reference documents released at roughly the same time. The first one was prepared by the Moscow-based Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (РИСИ 2016) for the state information security service. The second is a consultative-analytical document commissioned by the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and prepared by the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris (EU ISS 2016) on whose basis the European Parliament adopted a resolution on propaganda from Russia in November 2016 (EP Resolution 2016).

After several months of Euro-maydan demonstrations culminating with the resignation of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine in February 2014, the Kremlin intensified the campaign with the rise of Ukraine's conflict. According to the official thesis of Russia, West is the most responsible for this crisis, due to the rejection of the Yanukovych government to sign an agreement on closer integration with the EU. On the other side, after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union successively imposed sanctions against certain corporations, business transactions and citizens of the Russian Federation. In analyzing the information policy of EU states towards the RF in the period of instituting sanctions in 2014, Russian sources used the "Aggression Index" (AI)¹ indicator to measure the so-called hostility rating of a state's media system and find that, in the majority of European countries, this indicator was unusually high for Russian topics in the year of introducing sanctions against Russia. Namely, the average value of this index in the monitored countries (also including some non-European states, as well as those who did not join the sanctions) was 1.59. German and US media stood out with the highest AI scores, far surpassing the level of this index typical for the period before the outbreak of the civil war in Ukraine (just above 2) (ПИЦИ 2016: 26, 16). States were not equal by the size of media coverage of Russian topics and the level of demonstrated negative tonality. Most stories on Russia in the course of 2014 and 2015 were featured in German, American, British, French and Swiss media, but in terms of their value orientation, British, French and Swiss media demonstrated more moderation (Table 1). In a few countries, it is possible to note a neutral and positive information policy towards the RF. In the period of introducing sanctions, among the European countries which held a neutral position were the media in Italy, Norway, Finland, Belarus and Armenia, as well as in Turkey, while positive tones predominated in the media systems of non-European states: India, Syria and Cuba.

1) The Agresion Index (AI) is the ratio of positively vs. negatively worded articles on a topic. Countries in which the score is one neutral to five negative articles indicates that a country is waging information warfare. The so-called hostility rating marks the ranking on the list of countries by the degree of the assessed security threat of their information-political activity.


Table 1: Russia in foreign media, ratings of states.

	2014.		2015.	
	... according to the Aggression Index	... according to the extent of media coverage	... according to the Aggression Index	... according to the extent of media coverage
1.	Germany	Germany	Czech Republic	Germany
2.	USA	USA	Ukraine	France
3.	Czech Republic	G. Britain	Poland	G. Britain
4.	Austria	France	Sweden	USA
5.	Poland	Switzerland	Austria	Switzerland

Source: РИСИ 2016. The table was created by the authors.

When it comes to the EU, most features devoted to Russian topics during the time were published in German media. They also showed the largest disproportion between negatively and neutrally worded features (AI), and according to RISS sources, the most biased reporting among them in 2014 was noted in “Der Spiegel”, and in 2015 in “Deutsche Welle” (Chart 1). During 2014, German media on the average featured one neutral article per 7.5 negative ones. They focused on the issue of Ukraine, with economy and investment climate in Russia following far behind. At the same time, the most reported Russian topic in the French media was also Ukrainian crisis, but the “Mistral” helicopter carrier affair received huge publicity, too. In 2015, the reporting tone in the French media became overall more favorable, so AI dropped below 2. Media monitoring in the UK showed no particularly intense reaction to the events in the Ukraine and Crimea by the British press on the whole, so the overall picture was balanced to moderately negative, with the exception of the “Financial Times”, which published no less than 86 negative articles for each positive one in reporting on Russian topics. In Poland, Russian topics were covered scarcely and negatively: four negative articles to one neutral, while the most active media to address Russian topics was the paper “Gazeta Wyborcza”. The highest AI score was noted for the internet wPolityce.pl, which surged drastically in 2015 (up to 14) (РИСИ 2016: 47).

Chart 1: Print media ranking by AI, 2014



Source: ПИСИ 2016. The chart was created by the author.

For comparison, the US media have individually achieved the largest disproportion between the number of neutral and negatively intonated contributions in 2014, which is expressed in the Russian interpretation by the index of aggressiveness: on average, one negative article comes in six negative ones. The greatest number of articles with Russian's themes were published in "Wall Street Journal", then in "Washington Post" and "New York Times", with a significantly high IA (Chart 1). In these media, the Ukrainian theme took a much larger media space than the second-placed theme - and these are Russian-American relations. The Crimea problem was represented on the 3rd place, while the Olympic Games in Sochi gained much publicity with the topic of corruption during the construction of the Olympic objects. These themes were exploited more than the actual sanctions (ПИСИ 2016: 16, 28–47).

It is interesting that in 2015, in nearly all EU countries, a significant drop in negative news on Russia is noted, so the infor-


mation warfare abated or was completely neutralised. AI scores for the media in Germany (as well as the US) returned to their average levels from the period before the outbreak of the civil war in Ukraine (ПИСИ 2016: 16), while the ranking of this country by the media “hostility rating” dropped the first to the seventh position. However, in Eastern European countries, bordering with the RF, the AI values rose considerably by comparison to 2014: in Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Sweden and other northern states - Norway, Denmark and Finland - thus demonstrating the media shift in these countries from neutral to a moderately negative zone. A slight AI increase in Moldova (up to 0.42) maintained this country in the neutral status, while in Belarus and Armenia, the tone of media rhetoric is more distinctly inclined toward moderate-negative. Regarding the circumstances in the world’s media the slight increase in IA was recorded in Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Canada and Japan, with their IA values remaining below the global average of “hostility” and predominantly neutral, with the exception of Japan (ПИСИ 2016: 7, 16).

Germany was replaced by the Czech Republic in the top position by the media “hostility rating”. The media sphere in that country is polarized in values related to Russian topics: one segment of the media is strongly pro-Russian, while the other is anti-Russian, so the AI value seems high as neutral media reports are minimized (ПИСИ 2016: 9-10).

In the course of 2015, the agenda shift and a gradual decline in average AI scores of the media in West European countries is attributed to the relative stabilization of the situation in Ukraine and the launch of cooperation between Russia and the West in the fight against terrorism (ПИСИ 2016: 15-20). Reportings in the first quarter were marked the topics: Debaltzevo Cauldron, meeting in Minsk on the situation in Ukraine, murder of Russian Liberal and opposition Boris Nemtsov; in the second quarter, the greatest informational significance for the European media were events: the Victory Day celebration, the creation of a “black list” for certain European politicians by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the expansion of EU sanctions against Russia, and the third quarter began with Russia’s engagement in the military operations in Syria, when the focus of media interest completely shifted from Ukraine

to Russian missile strikes on terrorist camps in Syria. Topics of significant informational importance at this stage were also the fall of the Russian passenger plane over the Sinai Peninsula, the doping scandal of Russian athletes and the collapse of the Russian Su-24 bomber by Turkey. In the media systems with the highest AI scores in 2015, most space was devoted to the role of Russia in the political and military crisis in Ukraine and to economic sanctions, followed by a proportionally smaller share of reports dealing with the topics of Russian political and military alliance in Syria (Chart 2). It is interesting that virtually all European agendas devote their attention Russian-Turkish relations in an equivalent percentage as to Russian-American relations.

Chart 2: The distribution of Russian topics in countries with the highest “hostility rating”, 2015.



Source: ПИСН 2016. The chart was created by the author.

When the topics of international sanctions against Russia and Russian countermeasures in reporting in 2015, the highest number of reports about the sanctions was released by the media in Germany and France followed by Italy, and the AI score was the lowest in Italy (therefore, the least biased) while the highest was in Poland (not counting the US). It is interesting that in Great Britain, the topic of sanctions was not among the top 10 on the media agenda, which was also the case in the countries with the low AI – Turkey and India. Generally speaking, given that the total average index in that year was 2.2, we can see that almost all countries (except Italy and Sweden) had the higher-than-average or even extremely high AI score on this topic, which may point to the sustained continuity of some kind of propaganda activity, despite the creation of a more balanced general picture.

This chapter shows that images of Russia in the Western media were extremely negative and biased in the observed period. They had to have a certain impact on the formation of the European public. In the minds of EU citizens image of capricious Russia was systematically produced, which not only threatens the other's borders, but also responds inadequately, at the expense of its own citizens. In Western media, Russian hypocrisy and inconsistency are also emphasized: namely, using all potential for intensifying divisions within the EU, Russia supports anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic attitudes in Europe, while simultaneously covering up problems with its Muslim communities and hiding information about it (EU ISS 2016: 10). Public opinion surveys over the last few years show a clear deterioration of Russia's image across the EU, supporting and strengthening historical stereotypes (EU ISS 2016: 13). A significant majority of EU citizens (more than 80 percent) blamed either Russians or the pro-Russian separatists for the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

EU strategic communications against the Russian threat - Diplomatic initiatives and sanctions with which the EU responded to Russian military engagement in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have led to the point where the citizens of the RF have drastically changed their attitudes towards the EU, from positive in early 2013 to the resolutely negative ones just one and a half years later. The dominant attitude among the Russian citizens has

become the perception that the West is hostile towards Russia, as reflected in the sanctions (55%) and information warfare (44%), while one of the prime drivers of this hostility is the perceived “desire of the West to access Russia’s natural resources“ (41%) (EU ISS 2016: 13–14). Several surveys done at the time showed a dramatic declining trend in EU’s image, not only among Russian citizens but also in the countries of the strategically important Eastern Partnership, where polls register a drop in support to EU integrations from over 80% (in late 2013) to 61% (in mid-2015). The downturn in EU’s popularity among the population of the RF, Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans was interpreted as a direct impact of the Russian propaganda activity.

The think-tank document entitled “EU strategic communications with a view to counteracting propaganda” presented to the European Parliament in 2016, identifies and juxtaposes Russian propaganda and the propaganda of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as the main sources of threats to the European democracy and the future. It assessed that, in recent years, the EU has been hit by destabilizing messages amounting to a “coherent hostile strategic communications campaign”², launched and orchestrated from Moscow (EU ISS 2016: 29). Russian strategic communications, aimed at shaping people’s perceptions of the EU in their interest zones, are described as complex, tailored to the target audience, effective, if not necessarily consistent (EU ISS 2016: 6). It identifies a network of media, non-governmental organizations, political parties and orthodox churches through which the so-called Russian soft power is exercised.

Researchers from the EU Institute for Security Studies assess that the crucial influence on the perception of the EU is exerted by several systematically promoted and targeted narratives of the Russian strategic communication, launched as an alarmed response to the so-called ‘Colour Revolutions’ in the neighbouring Georgia and Ukraine. In the focus of these narratives is the West as an aggressive and expansionist civilization, while the EU is portrayed as: a

- 2) The so-called strategic communications surpass the sphere of information policy, encompassing a broader set of measures, processes and coherent actions undertaken by relevant actors, ranging from marketing to policy and involving individuals and organisations who create and deliver information, as well as of researchers who study the interaction of media and society (Cornish, Lindley-French & Yorke 2011: 4).

hostile geopolitical project; a weak and crumbling entity, verging on collapse under the pressure of fiscal and migration crises; an unwieldy entity burdened with a wave of rapid enlargements to the east; morally decadent; threatened by the current Islamisation; a submissive partner of Washington, while the sanctions against Russia are presented as non-functional (EU ISS 2016: 8-10). According to Russia's official line, Ukrainian crisis is the West's fault, due to Yanukovych government's refusal to sign the agreement on the closer integration with the EU. The same approaches with local variations are present in the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, where the EU prospects are compared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which some former members had escaped from only to lose their freedom to a similar entity.

Numerous examples show that the above narratives of the Russian campaign gain vigorous support in some social groups across Europe, frustrated with the political and economic situation on the Old Continent, and strengthen similar orientations that have emerged within the EU itself (Makhashvili 2017; Šuplata, Nič 2016; Polyakova, Boyer 2017). It is therefore wrong to interpret the drop in the EU's popularity among the population of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans as a direct consequence of Russian propaganda and reduce it only to this cause. In the Resolution on the propaganda from Russia adopted on the basis of the French institute report, however, this reflection is not visible, but only self-criticism regarding the EU's insufficient engagement in counter-propaganda activities. Thus, in view of curbing Russian propaganda, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it projected a series of strategic communication actions. The plan foresees centralization of strategic communication actors at the EU level, the defining of communication activities based on a set of common narratives and the consolidation of the budget for their implementation. In order to improve the efficiency of the EU's common strategy, the creation of a dedicated instrument under the authority of the High Representative is considered, as well as the engagement of analysts and other specialised individual from the public and private sector, NGO's and academia, with the relevant linguistic skills and credibility for the implementation of the strategy at regional and local level (EU ISS 2016: 30–31). The rationale is a more cost-effective and optimised use of the social

media and local community hubs, along with the “discrete and sustained” support to independent media in the regions of Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans, distributed through the services of the EU delegations and missions (EU ISS 2016: 31). Within efforts to de-construct some hostile campaigns, the use of irony and satire is also recommended, but cultural sensitivities must be borne in mind. To optimize the overall EU strategic communications capabilities, stronger reliance on the StratCom office based in the Latvian capital, Riga, is foreseen. The Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence was founded by NATO and, judging by its website, it is self-defined as a tool for the achievement of both its political and military objectives.³ This institution entered the orbit of media interest in October 2017, when the EU High Representative confirmed that the eight EU member states, including all but one NATO member,⁴ requested that the European External Action Service expand its activities in combating misinformation from the Russian Federation and to strengthen StratCom’s capacity for the southern regions and the Western Balkans.

Conclusion

The information policy pursued in the EU towards the RF, in the year of introducing the sanctions due to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, was fairly homogeneous. Media presentations reflected the predominantly negative value orientation in addressing Russian topics, especially in reporting on the civil war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. These two events were identified as central in the European media agendas dedicated to Russian topics at the time, and, they were also indicated as formal reasons to punish the companies and individuals with ties to the Russian political elite by economic measures. If to that we add that the media analysis of the topic of sanctions showed a sizeable disproportion between the neutral and negative value orientation, then this correspondence points to the conclusion that European media, in reporting on Russian topics, mainly pursued the agenda of the political mainstream. Thus, dominant media articulated the priorities and interpretations

3) See: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us>

4) Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Great Britain.

of mediated information according to the matrix set by the major political actors. The shift in the media agendas of the leading EU countries towards Russia during 2015 was reflected in the monthly drop of media reports on Russian topics and notably, in the lowered percentage of the negative ones. The information policy which in 2014 lent legitimacy for the imposition of sanctions on the RF among the EU citizens, changed in 2015, in line with the needs of the emergin tactical alliances in Syria. The peak in information warfare passed in 2014 and its dynamic changed in intensity, consistent with the British mediologist Denis McQuail's thesis on the relationship between the media and society: mass communications are influenced by society as much as they influence it; the differences in the use of mass media depend on the ruling social structure, or on the characteristics of some particular system (Mek Kvejl 1976: 97).

When the question of the actual impact of the Russian campaign on the attitudes in European public opinions is raised, research and reliable data are scarce. This study pointed out that during the 2014-2015 information war between the EU and the RF, there was a mutual deterioration of their respective images among their citizens. Between EU citizens, those images are based on the historical stereotypes on Russia and Russians as aggressive, authoritarian and unpredictable. But, Russia did not come out of the war as a loser either, because its narratives reached out to the significant parts of the European intellectual and political elite, playing on the grievances within the EU. It was confirmed that the main losers in information warfare were the principles of objective and independent journalism, whose original public functions were subordinated to the security, geostrategic and military interests of states and military-political alliances.

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Theoretical frameworks for constructing a model for analysis of Islamic discourse on YouTube: one view from Serbia

Abstract

The starting point of this paper is an assumption that videos on the YouTube Internet portal relating to Islam produce intolerant and radical discourse that may be a factor of radicalization through their contents, the ways of the shaping of the content, and by their presentation modes. Thus, the aim of the study is to present theoretical frameworks and possible research tools needed to construct a model for the analysis of the Islamic discourse on YouTube. This paper draws on various theoretical approaches, indicates a large number of potential analytical concepts, sub-models, instruments and criteria. It argues in favour of theoretical pluralism, as well as a pluralistic approach and models, openness to accepting diverse methodological instruments, and stresses the need of multidisciplinary in the analysis. Consideration of the relationship between the concepts of politics, discourse and Islamic discourse led to a conclusion about the need of a particular emphasis on the use of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and political discourse analysis (PDA) settings. The results of the research indicate that Islamic discourse on YouTube in a large number of videos, with more or

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less open manipulative content (visible to the average viewer), aims at consolidating an unquestionable framework of understanding and knowledge of reality – as well as comprehending of the history. Designing a framework for understanding reality and through associated eschatology, the rules of everyday action, principles and limits of tolerance, and identity – especially through discursive strategies and argumentation and beliefs that establish enemies – Islamic discourse on YouTube interprets reality, constructs and impose the only possible reality, and the necessity of achieving the ideal universal Islamic perfection.

Key words: critical discourse analysis (CDA), political discourse analysis (PDA), politics, narrative(s), violent extremism, radicalization

Introduction

The theoretical framework of discourse analysis proposed in this paper, implies the need to explore the situational context of the discourse, that is, the concrete situation in which speech event occurs (in the videos posted on YouTube). However, the goal is to define the theoretical basis for researching cultural context – that frames the cognitive, value and orientation patterns strictly defined by doctrine, ethical norms, religious rules and principles of Islam. Also, bearing in mind the importance of violent extremism and processes of radicalizations. Cameron (2001) “emphasizes that there is a distinction between “an analysis of discourse that is itself a goal and an analysis of discourses as a way to reach another goal“...” (Živkovic 2014: 84). Hence this study concurs that: “The analysis of discourse, therefore, should focus on the process of understanding and production of discourse, and beyond, the role that discourse has in the creation and adoption of social knowledge, attitudes and ideology... analyzing the text in its social function“ (Vuković 2014b: 105). Therefore, this study focuses on the relationship between the concepts of politics, discourse and Islamic discourse.

Discourse is defined as the “specialized form of language” as a social process of creating meaning by the use of symbolic forms,

the form of expression / ideology or the way of exercising power, or as a speech act that seeks to gain a privileged approach to the spread of ideas (Prajs 2011: 71, 120-121, 274). Discourse is also grasped as the choice and way of designing the original material (Prajs 2011: 399) – in that case the analysis of discourse, we note, points to the level of the prudence of narrator and the emphasis on certain aspects of the story, as well as the effectiveness of achieving the goal of narration. Also, considering the hierarchy of discourse (in film), a discourse can refer to a group of beliefs / values / attitudes expressed by a combination of language, picture and sound, and which can create a hierarchy (Prajs 2011: 421). Also: “Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 87) define “discourse” as: • a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action; • socially constituted and socially constitutive; • related to a macrotopic; • linked to the argumentation about validity claims—for example to truth and normative validity, which involves several social actors with different points of view” (Wodak 2015:5)¹.

In this paper the discourse denotes the content frameworks, principles and forms of thought and speech, expressed within and / or about the certain sphere of social reality, shaped in the processes of social communication and in the interactions that create and define the boundaries, rules and directions of the engaging of individuals and social groups.

Politics is the sphere of reality, which includes activities aimed at regulating social processes through defining the scale of priority of development goals and ways to achieve them, as determined by the influence of actors involved in decision-making (their

1) Also: “Thus Reisigl and Wodak regard macrotopic relatedness, pluriperspectivity, and argumentativity as constitutive elements of a discourse... The boundaries of a “discourse”... are partly fluid. As an analytical construct, a “discourse” always depends on the discourse analyst’s perspective. As an object of investigation, a discourse is not a closed unit, but a dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation and continuation. Furthermore, Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 89) distinguish between “discourse” and “text”: Texts are parts of discourses. They make speech acts durable over time and thus bridge two dilated speech situations: the situation of speech production and the situation of speech reception. In other words, texts—be they visualized (and written) or oral—objectify linguistic actions. Texts are always assigned to genres. A “genre” may be characterized as a socially ratified way of using language in connection with particular types of social activity” (Wodak 2015: 5).

social and institutional position, as well as a measure of respect for the principle of power, tradition and the prevailing value patterns in society), then the fulfillment of the objectives of harmonization of conflicts arising from the diversity of actors' interests that are publicly and/or secretly implemented within, under the influence and in interaction with the broader (economic, social, cultural, religious) determinants, further changes of regulations and institutional frameworks for operationalization of decisions and the formulation of conceptual structures that require new solutions about the use and distribution of social resources in response to changes in social relations and/or the nature and extent of the influence of external factors (Pavličević 2014: 90).

Having in mind the character of Islam and Islamic discourse, above quoted definition is of significance for understanding the relationship between the concepts of politics, discourse and Islamic discourse.

One of the theoretician considers that “political communication can advance the agenda of PDA in at least three most essential aspects: deliberation, justice, and legitimacy” (Wang 2016: 2773). Concepts or topoi of justice and legitimacy certainly can be of help in discourse analysis that encompasses the subject frames of this paper². Theoreticians emphasize that the core characteristic of political texts is practical argumentation – especially deliberation as argumentative genre (Fairclough and Fairclough 2015: 3)³, also

2) “... justice in PDA is framed as one of the topoi (a unit in argumentation) in Wodak (2009), as value... PDA needs political theories on justice... to “demystify” its current practice of description, or interpretation at best. That is, justice should not be seen only as abstract topos or value in PDA”. Also: “Legitimacy has its semiotic counterpart in CDA: legitimation. van Leeuwen (2007), for example, discusses four resources of legitimation: authorization (legitimation by referring to authorities), moral evaluation (legitimation by referring to morality), rationalization (legitimation by referring to certain rhetoric strategies), and mythopoesis (legitimation conveyed through narratives on past successful experiences)” (Wang 2016: 2775-2776).

3) “What distinguishes political discourse from other types of discourse is that it involves deliberation over what ought to be done, in contexts of divergent interests and values, scarcity of resources, uncertainty and risk. Deliberation is an argumentative genre in which practical argumentation (argumentation about what ought to be done...) is the main argument scheme. Deliberation is oriented towards arriving at normative-practical judgments about what to do, and on this basis making decisions about what to do, which may lead to action based upon these decisions... This is not a reduction of political discourse to practical argumentation and deliberation.

writes that “political discourse is primarily a form of action, and representations are best analyzed as elements of actions (e.g. as premises of practical arguments). People do not represent social groups or processes for the sake of it (nor do they narrate or explain events as an end in itself), but do so in the course of producing an argument, or justifying or criticizing a standpoint, as a possible basis for decision and action” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2015: 4).

Discourse of Islam has the characteristics of political discourse if we recall: “... Searle’s view (2010: 164) of political power as ‘deontic power’, a matter of rights, obligations, duties, permissions, authorizations, prohibitions, conferred on individuals in the process whereby people create institutional reality” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 4). Theoretical setting that practical arguments “have the following elements: a Value premise, a Goal premise, a Circumstantial premise and a Means-Goal premise, attempting to support a Practical Claim (or Conclusion)” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 6-7) can certainly be an instrument for analyzing Islamic discourse⁴.

Political texts manifest other argument schemes and other non-argumentative genres, for example narrative and explanation. What tends to happen, however, is that other argument schemes and other genres are generally embedded within or in other ways connected to practical arguments within deliberative practice” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 3).

- 4) “The approach to practical argumentation developed in Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) is a normative one: arguments are evaluated as well as analysed. Following Walton (2007b), we distinguish three ways in which practical (policy) arguments can be critically evaluated: (a) criticism of the conclusion of the argument, which seeks to reject it (and the policy proposal) by arguing that pursuing the line of action advocated will have consequences which will undermine the stated goals or other goals which cannot be compromised; (b) criticism of the validity of the argument on the grounds that there are other better means than those advocated for achieving the goals, or other facts about the context action in view of which the conclusion no longer follows; (c) criticism of the rational acceptability (or truth) of premises, for example of the way in which existing states of affairs are represented, interpreted or ‘problematized’ (the circumstantial premise), criticism of the goal or value premise, or of the means-goal premise. The conclusion of the practical argument from goals, values and circumstances... can be tested by a pragmatic argument from consequence” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 7).

Methodology

“Discourse analysis investigates whether—in statements or texts—it is possible to establish any regularity in not only the objects that are discussed, the subjects designated as actors, and the causal relations claimed to exist between objects (explanans) and subjects (explanandum) but also the expected outcome of subjects trying to influence objects, the goal of their action, and finally the time dimension by which these relations are framed. Discourses thus comprise the underlying conditions for a statement to be interpreted as meaningful and rational. At the same time, discourse analysis is the study of rationality and how it is expressed in a particular historical context” (Pedersen 2011: 672).

One can estimate that an emphasis should be placed on the applications of critical discourse analysis (CDA)⁵ and political discourse analysis (PDA). In this regard, one can supported: “1 The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice, and practical application. 2 The approach is problem-oriented. 3 Various theories and methods are combined wherever integration leads to inadequate understanding and explanation of the research object... 5 The research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data ... 8 Categories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under investigation. 9 “Grand theories” often serve as a foundation. In the specific analyses, however, “middle-range theories” frequently supply a better theoretical basis. 10 The application of results is an important target” (Wodak 2015: 2)⁶. One

5) Huckin (2002) formulated ten characteristics, and it is of particular importance that a critical analysis of discourse: “1. deals with contemporary social issues, in an effort to uncover the manipulation of powerful groups through public discourse; 2. Special attention is paid to the factors of ideology, power and resistance; 3. Linking research of text, social practices and social context... by analyzing what is not explicitly given in the text, the implicatures, the presupposition, the ambiguity, and other similar features of discourse; 8. The analysis also takes place at the level of research on the interpersonal aspects of discourse, such as politeness, identity and ethos; 9.... the research is based on a detailed textual analysis (Vuković 2014b: 98)”.

6) “The DHA considers intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres, and discourses as well as extralinguistic social or sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames. While

can accept the approach which, starting from eight-stage program in discourse-historical analysis, have a following settings: “There are several strategies that deserve special attention when analyzing a specific discourse and related texts in relation to the discursive construction and representation of “us” and “them”. Heuristically, one could orient to five questions: 1 How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically? 2 What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events, and processes? 3 What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 4 From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed? 5 Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or mitigated? According to these five questions, five types of discursive strategies can be distinguished” (Wodak 2015: 12-13).

We also fully support the viewpoint: “Critical discourse analysis emphasizes the necessity of establishing methods for empirical investigation of relations between discursive and non-discursive practices... Discourses not only constitute social phenomena but are also constituted by social phenomena in the form of social (or political) practice. Any use of language (a communicative action) therefore consists of a discursive practice where discourses are produced or consumed and a social practice or an institutional context of which a communicative action is a part” (Pedersen 2011: 674). Also, having in mind the character, the specific form and the contents for which we present the theoretical basis for forming a model for discourse analysis, we support the following approach: “We understand ‘texts’ here in a broad way, to include written texts... – texts in the most obvious and commonplace sense – but also ‘multimodal’ texts which combine written language and other ‘semiotic modalities’ (including visual images), as well as texts in which the language is spoken, not written” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 1).

One of researchers (Fairclough 1996) made a difference between the linguistic analysis of the text – essentially descriptive

focusing on all these levels and layers of meaning, researchers explore how discourses, genres, and texts change in relation to sociopolitical change. Intertextuality means that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present” (Wodak 2015:5).

and intertextual analysis – which is interpretative and uses and interprets the evidence provided by linguistic analysis, and places the text in discursive practice. Thus, linguistic analysis gives objectivity. The problem is to achieve the balance of linguistic analysis and analysis of the social context. In addition follow the next correct statement: “Any text analysis may impose a different approach, depending on what the text offers. Likewise, one and the same text can be analyzed in several different ways“ (Lakić 2014: 72-73). Another researcher emphasizes close issues: “From the plurality of analytical concepts that are available in a critical approach to the text... critical analysis is characterized by a diverse methodology that varies from author to author and text to text” (Vuković 2014b: 101). Namely, the same researcher gives a critical overview of critical discourse analysis, pointing out that this approach is “a collective name for a set of close approaches”, and that “the general criticism is a lack of objectivity and methodological precision”, as well as “selectivity and the subjectivity of the selection of the linguistic elements analyzed”⁷. On the other side, “adapting the methodology... to the subject of research is a large advantage of this approach” – as one of the theoreticians (De Beaugrande 2006) correctly points out: “the analysis must be based on an authentic discourse and that the methodology must be inspired by the type of data being studied” (Vuković 2014b: 107-110).

However, it is necessary to draw attention to the following:

The study of the conversation from the philosophical point of view also gives a pragmatic approach that “examines the meaning of the statements or of the speaker / author and the way in which listeners / readers interpret those predications or statements”⁸. But:

7) The problem is “that analysts first identify the purpose of the text, and then select all those properties that confirm the initial assumption for the analysis, while possible opposed evidences “minimize or overtake them tacitly“ (Widdowson, 2004: 107)“ (Vuković 2014b: 109). We should certainly appreciate the significance of the previously quoted conclusion during the realization of the research. Of significance is also to indicate: “In the critical analysis of discourses, the individualism of the participants of communication is not sufficiently taken into account, so the whole communication process is viewed from the point of view of their social roles. A step towards correcting this failure of a critical discourse analysis was undertaken by Wodak (2007), which propagates the synthesis of critical and pragmatic methods” (Vuković 2014b: 109).

8) “Yule (1996: 3) cites four aspects that pragmatic deals with. First, pragmatic stud-

“... the pragmatic starts with determining the meaning of sentences that are placed in a particular context, and the discourse goes from the opposite direction, starting from the text and decomposing it into its constituent parts, to the level of the sentence, but also to the level of the clause, phrase, and word” (Lakić 2014: 63). It seems, however, that the aforementioned does not have to be an obstacle to the use of the some research instruments of the pragmatic approach, in the analysis of Islamic discourse. Thus, the principles that contribute to a coherent conversation can be a productive instrument for the analysis of Islamic discourse⁹.

Sociolinguistic approach includes “analysis of language in the social context and the way in which language varies according to contextual and cultural factors (Thornbury and Slade, 2006: 29)”, in other words, “ethnography of communication is a method by which the rules of communication, that are specific to certain communities, are investigated (Cameron, 2001: 55)” (Živković 2014: 79-80)¹⁰.

The socio-semiotic approach “focuses on research move from language to all types of representations that implement certain texts, either in spoken or written language (Kress, Leite-Garcia and van Leeuwen, 1997). Attention is dedicated to examining the semiotic resources used to transfer certain ideas in the context of

ies the meaning, and the meaning is closely connected with another factor, i.e. the context and the way the context influences on its interpretation. Thirdly, pragmatic also analyze the meaning of something is not said, but meant, or why has recognized something that is not said as an integral part of communication, therefore, something what pragmatists call implicatures. And the fourth field that this approach deals with is the notion of distance, whether social or physical, on which is based the assumption that on the degree of distance, or nearness, depends the number of statements that the speaker wants to share with the audience” (Živković 2014: 83).

- 9) Refers to Grice (1975) who considers that the conversation is based on the following principles of communication: 1. The Maxim of quantity: be short 2. Maxim of quality: Be honest 3. Maxim of relation: Be relevant 4. Maximize of manner: Be clear (Živković 2014: 83; Vuković 2014a: 227).
- 10) The subject matter of this approach are speech situation, speech event (the factors that determine speech event: “the place or environment, the participants, the goal of the speech event, the tone or manner of performance, serious or joking, genres or type of speech activity (Thornbury and Slade, 2006: 29)” and speech act. The mentioned factors are presented in the literature in linguistics in English with the initial letters of the word *speaking* - and form a descriptive framework which designates the components of the rules of communication (Živković 2014: 79-81).

certain social situations”. The key is to explore in this approach the “semiotic potential of semiotic resources from the point of view of how semiotic means are used in communication. One semiotic means can have many meanings, which depends on the context” (Živković 2014: 92).¹¹

Furthermore, it should be noted that: “The term political discourse is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, this term is understood as a discourse that is political in itself, and on the other, as a type of discourse belonging to one area of social activity (Wilson, 2003: 398)... Rare are authors who under the term political discourse comprehend all forms of discourse in which power and control are present”; “Political discourse includes an epideictic, i.e. ceremonial, and deliberative, i.e. debate appeal, which means that his role is to convince and achieve consensus”; “Political discourse is characterized by a number of lexical, grammatical, pragmatic and rhetorical specifics, as well as the special use of argumentative macro strategies” (Vuković 2014a: 213-214, 217).¹²

Violent extremism

In the study “How does the Internet facilitate radicalization” (2017:3) “radicalization into violent extremism, or violent radicalization, is defined as a process of gradually adopting extreme views and ideas inducing a growing “willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 798) to solve social and political conflicts”. In the context of this paper the more appropriate approach is “conceptualise violent radicalization as the

11) “So, here is the emphasis on pluralism of meaning. Van Leeuwen (2005: 120)... suggests that speech acts are called communicative acts, and that their analysis is accessed from a multi-modal standpoint, i.e. to take into consideration not only linguistic characteristics, but also non-linguistic, that is, for example, visual elements such as gaze or gesture, in order to achieve a certain communicative intention” (Živković 2014: 93).

12) “The study of political cognition refers to various aspects of the processing of “political information”... This is, in fact, the least studied in the analysis of political discourse, namely, the effect that different linguistic structures and strategies leave on the recipient of a political message... Van Dijk argues that a major role in the adoption of ideologies play discourse, and since ideologies organize attitudes (van Dijk, 2002: 223), it is of crucial importance to study the role of language in that process, i.e. linguistic strategies and structures” (Vuković 2014a: 216).

dynamic and complementary coexistence of at least three levels observable both in the real world and in cyberspace: * The individual person's search for fundamental meaning, origin and return to a root ideology; * The individual as part of a group's adoption of a violent form of expansion of root ideologies and related oppositionist objectives; * The polarization of the social space and the collective construction of a threatened ideal "us" against "them", where the others are dehumanized by a process of scapegoating" (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 8).

Theoretical frameworks for the investigation (inclusive of the causes) of violent extremism can be the basis for the analysis of Islamic discourse, for ascertaining of topoi, for the systematization of argumentation, even for the evaluating of attitudes in videos, contents with various characteristic which Islamic theorists and preachers, (Islamic) associations and organizations, and other supporters of Islamic posts on the YouTube portal¹³.

Study "How does the Internet facilitate radicalization" (2017: 4-6) classifies radicalization into violent extremism into three main affairs: (1) Background factors and 'activators,' (2) Issues of identity, and (3) Social network mechanisms. Study (2017:12) introduces an explanatory 'three-circles model' for Internet-facilitated radicalization into violent extremism (IF-RVE), set at the individual and level of the extremist group, where the Internet includes the following clusters:

I identity formation and social identification; insulation / filter bubble de-individuation¹⁴;

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- 13) For example, one can use the following hypothetical frames, let's say the following hypotheses: "Hypothesis 8: People with shared experiences of discrimination and exclusion are more susceptible to a legitimising 'single narrative' which binds together multiple sources of resentment and proposes a simple solution... Hypothesis 10: Failure of the state to provide security and justice, and people's experience of predatory and oppressive security sector institutions... 15: Where inequality and institutionalised discrimination coincide with religious or ethnic fault-lines, there is an increased likelihood of radicalisation and mobilization... Hypothesis 17: Events in Palestine, Iraq, etc, a perceived global attack on Islam, and a belief that Muslim nations are less prosperous than they should be (as a result of Western policies), give rise to widespread indignation and resentment which encourage support for extremist action" (Glazzard, Jespersion, Reddy-Tumu, Winterbotham. 2015: 4-8).
- 14) "Events which can trigger the radicalisation process are often related to identity issues (King and Taylor 2011, 611) and religious seeking (Wiktorowicz 2004b).

II targeted / broadened exposure (with links to the factors which influences at the individual level, and these are particularly deprivation, grievances, personal crisis and identity seeking) and

III virtual radical community (with links to the factors which influences on the level of the extremist group: group polarization and group-think).

Study “*Youth and violent extremism on social media: Mapping the research*” deal with “incitement to radicalization towards violent extremism” with approach that respect the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the Rabat Plan Plan of Action (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017).¹⁵ It’s important that “The Quilliam Report (2014) publishes a comprehensive analysis of the content of Islamist violent extremist videos published on YouTube. It describes how the content targets a sympathetic audience, and focuses on education and the praising of martyrs, with less overt violent content such as suicide bombings... Several researchers have conducted content analyses of YouTube and Facebook extremist discourses and video contents”

In the search for identity and community amongst the Muslim diaspora youth in Europe (Cilluffo et al. 2007, 9), radical Islam might provide an answer in the form of a coherent belief system and an ummah identity (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 800; CI 2008, 37). Positive identification with Islam has been found to offer stability in a time of uncertainty (Slootman and Tillie 2006, 54) and Precht (2007, 42) mentions how a Muslim identity crisis can lead to a shift to more radical interpretations of Islam” (“How does the Internet facilitate radicalization” 2017: 6).

- 15) “It cautions us against illegitimate restrictions of speech based on purported implementation of ICCPR standards... This approach suggests that restriction should only be considered in terms of an assessment of: (a) context of effect (the intent and likelihood), (b) the status of the speaker, (c) the specific content, (d) the reach of the expression, and (e) the actual imminent likelihood of resulting harm... Third... speech can be “offensive, shocking and disturbing”, without necessarily constituting a threat to national security, or hatred that incites harms, or propaganda for war. What all this means is that a delicate differentiation needs to be struck in regard to protecting freedom of expression” (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 1-2). In connection with this: “Radical beliefs, ideologies and narratives are not in themselves illegitimate and may evolve, shift and be adopted in many complex ways. Some narratives may be shared by those who reject terrorist acts and some individuals may hold what might be considered by some as radical beliefs, ideologies and narratives but do subscribe to the use of violent action” (“Studies into violent radicalization; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” 2008: 9).

(Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 16)¹⁶. Also that “more understanding has arisen about the numerous advantages of the Internet and social media for extremist groups using religion as part of a radicalization strategy... These include communication channels that are not bound to national jurisdictions and that are informal, large group, cheap, decentralized and anonymous (Hale, 2012; Neumann 2013)” (Alava, Frau-Meigs and Hassan 2017: 19-20)¹⁷.

Pavličević (2018)

Pavličević (Павлићевић 2018) analyzed the discourse of videos posted on YouTube – videos generated by Google.rs – in which the keyword is Islam, and whose title and then the content is recognized as such that it can answer the research questions: Which knowledge about Islam an interested viewer can receive through YouTube, in what way the above-mentioned contents are shaped, which is the function and goal of the content, and what kind of influence they can have on the viewer? The analysis focused on the investigation of political and security aspects in selected items and, among other things, the following conclusions were drawn

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- 16) “Studies that have focused on the rhetorical strategy of extremist groups show the multifaceted use of online resources by extremist groups. That is, they produce “hypermedia seduction” via the use of visual motifs that are familiar to young people online... These videos provide rich media messaging that combines nonverbal cues and vivid images of events that can evoke psychological and emotional responses as well as violent reactions (Salem, Reid & Chen, 2008). Terrorists capture their attacks on video and disseminate them through the Internet, communicating an image of effectiveness and success. Such videos in turn are used to mobilize and recruit members and sympathizers” (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 16).
- 17) “Infused with particular interpretations of Islam, these channels are used in several ways to: * Create appealing, interactive user-friendly platforms to attract younger audiences (Weimann, 2015); ... * Disseminate extremist, violent and criminal content, which would not be wellreceived offline; * Identify potential participants and provide them with information about ‘the cause’ and the groups involved in defending it (Busher, 2015); * Deliver massive publicity for acts of violence and enhancing a perception of strength (Wright, 2008); ... * Produce false information using the fact that all types of information on the Internet can be displayed on an equal footing, which can provide an illusion of credibility and legitimacy to extremist narratives (Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013); * Facilitate the further process of radicalization post-recruitment, through tactical learning, exploiting confirmation biases (which confirm and amplify people’s previous opinions), gathering data and planning attacks (Busher, 2015)” (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 19-20).

on the topics, contents, forms, orientation and goals of Islamic discourse on YouTube:

- Not only the discourse analysis of videos in which doctrinal questions are interpreted or videos in which on the doctrinal questions about Islam are answered, but also the analysis of the speech of other types of videos, expresses a good devised approach in constructing of their content – sometimes designed with un concealed arrogance. Videos are guidances for acceptance of Islam, point to basics and principles, pillars (obligations of believers) of Islam, effectively reminds believers of religious rules, direct and warn them not to adopt an unacceptable lifestyle to Islam;

- Demonstrating the exclusivity of Islam is one of the key (manipulative) topoi and mechanisms of Islamic discourse. The titles itself of some video materials clearly show the intent, of those who have set them up, to show and prove the excellence, superiority, unquestionability and unachievability of Islam. An inseparable part of the discourse is that “Islam is a religion of God”, the faith of truth and justice, (in the mode of publication) is perfect and “the only true faith... the last of God’s revelations preserved in unchanged form”, that Islam is the meaning of life, that “Islam means devoting life”; that, in contrast to other religions, Islam deals with the physical and spiritual aspects / needs of man, and that means “peace gained by obeying the Almighty God”; that the “Islamic system” is not human, but Allah’s law “which frees us from the limitations of our mind”. Therefore, Islam is “salvation”, “liberation” and “solution for mankind” – therefore mankind is called upon to observe the norms prescribed by the Qur’an¹⁸. It is therefore worth dying as a follower of the Islamic faith, as well as devoting a life to the spread of Islamic faith – and this is made by

18) Namely, the Qur’an is “... the most magnificent, the most positive book in the world, the word of God, the authentic and last announcement for the whole human race, the warning and instruction, the criterion of everything – given by the Creator, and therefore the source of the solution for the mankind”. The Qur’an is given from the omniscient Allah, and contains the data “from the creation of the universe to the creation of man” – therefore – the Qur’an is in front of science. It is “a book in which there is no doubt and which offers the answer to every question... If scientific discoveries agree with what is already discovered or mentioned in it, then this is only considered a confirmation of what is certainly true” (Pavličević 2018: 204-205, and elsewhere).

extraordinary individuals. Also, the prerequisite of morality is the acceptance of Islam;

- Islamic preachers and theorists on YouTube “prove” the necessity of global Islamic governance (for example, with the argument that Islam is “the best possible governance for humanity” – all other governments are obsessive, tyrannical and despotic, and “only”(!!) that “what the Ulema demands... is that Islam dominate the world again”). Argumentation implies a constant emphasis on the view that the outcome is certain (there are more and more converts, more and more Muslims, from various countries to various continents, this world will be Islamic)¹⁹;

- Deriving the merits of Islam is often performed as an antithesis to the settings of Christian dogmatism²⁰, and it implies sharp, sometimes inappropriate comments (ironic, cynical and sarcastic, and also offensive comments – but not only in these problem frames of discourse²¹) framed in the procedure of proving (logical, real, symbolic) absurdity of doctrinal settings of Christianity. Irony and cynicism expressed in some speeches of Islamic theorists referring to the paradoxes of Christian dogmas significantly exceed the measure of good taste, and generally cause the audience’s positive reactions – that proceeds from the power of attacking, intention-

19) Key components incorporated in the ideology of violent radicals are: Jihadism, Takfir (excommunication from the faith), The world as an abode of war (Dar-al-Harb), The principle of non-discrimination between civilian and military targets, Attacking the far enemy, Suicide bombing, The killing of other Muslims, The return of the caliphate (“Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” 2008: 4-5; 118-120). Most of the above mentioned concepts are registered in Pavličević (2018) research - though not equal, we will note those that are noticeable.

20) “... the macro-analysis analyzes the use of macro-strategies. This term, used by van Dijk in his works, actually refers to wider argumentative strategies that organize the use of previously mentioned linguistic and stylistic means in political discourse. The most explored strategy is the polarization strategy, which is combined with the strategy of positive self-representation and negative representation of others” (Vuković 2014a: 237-238).

21) “The use of irony implies the superiority of a speaker over a third person whose opinion or belief is rejected, disputed and calls into question, with the speaker having epistemic authority and calling the listener to share the same epistemic position (Dedać, 2005: 673)... Irony usually contains elements of humor, so the audience is paying more attention to the parts of the discourses that are being realized in that tone” (Vuković 2014a: 236).

al impoliteness and offensive manners. In this context, in order to support Islamic norms, assertions are derived and interpreted through value judgments with reference to historical, archaic and / or mythical elements of the conflict. The method of presenting arguments is often designed based on a comparative analysis of the Qur'an and the Bible. Antithesis towards Christianity is often at the moral level – so even the prophets in Christianity are thieves, cheaters, and harlots. The tendency is also to prove that the Bible is a doctrinal basis of genocidal attitudes and crimes committed against Palestinians and in modern times. The unfoundedness of the Christian dogma – that tend to be proven and is followed by the sarcastic comments – creates the basis for Qur'an to acquire the function of control and protection, to solely define “what is good and true”²²;

- The question of the relationship of Islam and violence is frequent²³, with consideration of the question: Is Islam a religion of violence? In the Islamic discourse this problem has been reformulated into the problem of violence against Islam. In considering the problem of Islamist terrorism, one may record almost regular efforts – along with its declarative condemnation – to link problem of terrorism to imperial history of the West (terrorists are just the states of western civilization). The flow of the argument is basically: the reason for the man's committing a crime is that he or she hasn't adopted Islam; Muslim-criminals have not been educated

22) It is pointed out that the Islamic concept of God (appealing to everyone) – since (unlike other religions) implies a “simple, logical and rational system of belief”, that only Islamic God is God, “the Islamic system is the system that's God has established”. The intent of the discourse (certain speech events) is to destroy the very foundations of a Christian religion by proving the absurdity and immorality of its settings in order to create an unlimited field of spreading Islam, as the only rational alternative. Previously mentioned means to prove: that the Qur'an is the original text – is not copying the Bible – since there is nothing in the Bible worthy to copy; the double morality of the Christian (even with the explicit assertion that the acceptance of the Bible refers to a crime); that the Qur'an answers what the Word of God is – while the Bible contains contradictory attitudes; that the Christian concept of God destroys God, invalidates its attributes, reduces the entire entity to “parody”. The symbolism of the Bible, in some interpretations of Islamic theorists, is naked (the Christian artworks vulgarized), and thereby reduced to terrestrial irrationality and stupidity (Pavličević 2018: 207-208, and elsewhere).

23) Look closer Pavličević (2018: 198-200, 202, and elsewhere), Cf. “Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” (2008: 79-80).

on the principles of Islamic faith; the faith of the Muslims is not the religion of terrorists, fundamentalists and extremists; Islam does not allow the killing of the innocent; Islam does not allow suicide – suicide bombers are brought to the point of madness (to desperation because of hopelessness); argumentation at the value level uses the term honor; Islam is open to interpretation, Islam extends grace but manipulating by Islam is often – Islam wrongly interpreting / Quran often wrong quoting; then the argumentation is increasingly involved in the political domain: that social inequality and poverty ruin the dignity of people²⁴. The topos of fear in these thematic frameworks of Islamic discourse is the most dangerous manipulative mechanism, aimed at enhancing solidarity, the cohesive identities of Muslims on a global level²⁵. Connections of Islamic terrorism with 11/9 are relativized or directly denied²⁶;

- When analysis used a frequent analytical model (“the problem–the solution” model, Hoey, 1991²⁷) characteristics of Islamic discourse (in most analyzed videos) are: the problem of every situation are the obstacles to the acceptance of Islam, the solution is the acceptance of Islam (Islam is the only and universal remedy – especially “if the Western world repents and accepts Islam”), while

- 24) Within this argumentation one can find the following claims: “... I do not justify what they do, nor Islam supports their activity! ... if you push some people into a position to be frustrated to the point where, between anger and frustration, they almost lose their mind“; “The history of this frustration, which some Muslims have compelled to act as terrorists, are as follows: 1) Colonialism 2)... repression and tyranny of Muslim rulers who became unbelievers... 3) Political domination and economic exploitation and the occupation of Muslim countries . This includes systemic killings and the closure of Islamic scientists, the choking of religious sentiments and the ban on Islamic movements”.
- 25) More narratives of very close content also formulated in another study: “...The interpretation that cultural pollution (accumulated cultural practices or innovation), moral decay and / or Muslim ‘sinfulness’ led to the end of the Golden Age. iii. A view that, since that time, Muslims have suffered repression, ethnic cleansing and ‘defeats’ ... iv. Behind these defeats are seen a United States, Israel and Britain / the EU united in a ‘Zionist / Crusader’ axis with Islam as the main enemy... v. The experience of defeats, seen as relevant to all Muslims as part of the global ‘Ummah’ (community), is combined with the perception of a ‘Westoxification’ of Muslim life” (“Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” 2008: 37-38).
- 26) We also find this topos in “Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” (2008: 54).
- 27) See Lakić (2014: 66).

the standpoint of evaluation is the perspective of the realization of Islam (because: in Islam the peace is achieved by harmony, and only Islam provides peace and a happy life). Individual identity is beyond discourse: the right to choice, freedom and tolerance. Identity is defined by one single principle – the purpose of life, and the life activity is completely predetermined – there is no need for individuals to try to understand reality, position themselves in it, freely adopt values and define own goals. The descriptive assertions lose their validity if they do not support the prescriptive presumptions – since there exists only one truth (the truth of Islam)²⁸;

- Videos shows that content of Islamic discourse on YouTube, which offers a simple and quick solution (salvation), can be an extremely effective means of manipulation, especially if the speech calls for and thus produces a vulgarized reality. Regardless of the topoi in speech, and the functions of video recordings, errors in the concluding and pseudo-argumentation (*petitio principii*, *Questio multiplex, non sequitur*) can frequently be detected in Islamic discourse, somewhat more frequent *argumentum ad baculum*. In the Islamic discourse on YouTube, the contents that can be the factors of radicalization are identified – with the remark that when contents moving exclusively within the framework of religious norms and when refer to axiological, ethical issues one perceive moderate discourse. The key characteristic of video content for children, that is, employed forms and themes, as well as goals of videos (*imprimis* building of Muslim identity) do not directly produce radicalization – but may create a basis for exclusivity, can result in intellectual tightness, generate the potential for intolerance, possibly raising the basis for social isolation and therefore prospects for the conflicts (Pavličević 2018: 211 and elsewhere)²⁹.

28) In another study, *inter alia*, for the jihadism, jihadi-salafism or the jihadist movement, states that “key emerging tenets of the ideology appear as follows: 1. Jihadists reject pluralism and want unity of thought; 2. The world is in a state of jahiliyya (ignorance) and in a state of war and therefore the war conditions of the Quran operate...” study (“Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives” 2008: 34).

29) That is compatible with the conclusions: “... there is insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a causal link between extremist propaganda or recruitment on social networks and the violent radicalization of young people. The synthesis of evidence shows, at its best, that social media is an environment that facilitates violent radicalization, rather than driving it... Actual violent radicalization entails the mediation of

It is pointed out that animated cartoons become Islamic animated cartoons (extremely simple graphics), in which: the names of the participants clearly show their religious identity, the story is an Islamic story and heroes are Islamic heroes, a miracle is a change in the course of events that defends Islamic identity and which warns that (horrible) punishment comes to infidelity; the themes are Islamic religious rules, the first basic - the pillars of Islam; the moral principles and lessons are Islamic principles, and then (with the poem of Allah's praise, the thanksgiving of Allah and the remembrance of the Qur'an), heroes act according to the names of a recognizable religious identity (Pavličević 2018: 206-207)³⁰.

Discussion

The success of the messenger to adequately assume the orientation and expectations of the auditorium, that is, make an appropriate choice of the attitudes and values appealing to the auditorium, enables manipulation. Beginning from the colloquial, through the formal, to the ultimate professional language (intended for a specific audience), the core characteristic of Islamic discourse is the expansion of Islam as a goal (doctrinal interpretation of Islam is not objective – it is a means to achieve the goal). Consideration of moral issues and vivid social questions through the value and orientation patterns of Islamic – from calling for common sense to the with emphasis on the high expertise of the message bearer of Islam – refer that Islamic discourse is clearly directed to the changing of practice. Previously, of course, is not surprising:

several complex processes, including more complex social-psychological processes and person-to-person communication in conjunction with other offline factors. Causal links between radicalization towards extremism, violent radicalization and the actual commission of acts of extreme violence are far from being established, notwithstanding the intentions and aims of relevant actors using social media to achieve some of these outcomes... The role of such social media should not be isolated but seen in the context of both other communicational platforms and significant social factors such as the political, social, cultural, economic and psychological causes" (Alava, Frau-Meigs, Hassan 2017: 6, 43, 50).

- 30) "Targeting of Youth (c.8 to 35); that narratives are developed specifically for youth and offer 'solutions' to many of the uncertainties and issues faced by this group in relation to how to be a 'good' Muslim in a Western context" ("Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives" 2008: 15).

Researchers emphasize: “Texts are (or are part of) forms of action, and they also provide representations (of people, objects, events) and are part of the enactment of identities... Texts are moreover multifunctional on various levels” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 2)³¹. However, the point at issue is an almost grotesque reduction of complexity of the discourse functionality, in which deliberation (certainly the negotiation) is lost, the discourse is with the only function to construct and protect a unique mindset directed to master the world. If our standpoint is correct, it is possible, then: “treating discourses as providing premises in practical arguments, and therefore as elements in the reasoning and actions of social actors” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 10)³².

One of theoreticians points out that the text is a unique and connected totality, which is ensured by its cohesion and coherence, whereby: “The analysis of written discourse aims to examine the structure of the text and what kind of interdependence exists between its constituents” (Lakić 2014: 64). The coherence of the text is crucial for his effectiveness, and, as the prime condition and function of the measure of influence on (the certain) auditorium, the discourse analyst must investigate³³. An effective message is

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- 31) “For example, argumentative texts can be analyzed simultaneously from a logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspective. Arguments are ‘dialectical’ in advancing particular standpoints in response to others, in measuring standpoints against each other and critically questioning them (as in deliberation), but they are simultaneously ‘rhetorical’ in seeking to persuade people to accept or reject standpoints... It is not enough for (political) textual analysis to analyse action/genres and representation/discourses and identity/styles; dialectic and rhetoric. It should analyse the relations between them, for example the way in which particular representations (discourses) can give agents reasons for action, and how this in turn can serve particular power interests” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 2).
- 32) “CPE ... concerned with how extra-semiotic as well as semiotic factors bear upon the selection and retention of certain strategies and imaginaries and rejection of others... Thus, relations between semiotic and extra-semiotic factors affecting selection of strategies are anticipated in action by social agents, and this is designed to achieve the selection of particular strategies and imaginaries and prevent the selection of others, or to revise action in progress... Conditions of possibility for the success of a particular strategy therefore include the quality of the argument itself, as well as structural and agentive selectivities” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2015: 11).
- 33) “Coherence is related to the functional interconnection of discourse, or whether the reader sees the text as a logical and connected totality. The prerequisite for this is the knowledge about the world that the reader includes while reading the text, the ideas it carries, and the conclusions that brings during reading the text. This wider

also determined with 1. recognized and reliable forms of discourse (that one easily may understand and recognize) – through speech (which calls for dedication, common sense and consent within the limits of available discourse) and by 2. the dominant discursive agendas on a particular subject (Prajs 2011: 142-151). Discourses create distinct frameworks for interpreting the reality, and construct the significance of the topics and / or the meaning of issues for the auditorium. Thus, when exploring Islamic discourse on YouTube, we can set a hypothesis: Content, rationality and the acceptable form of the message are always strictly defined and / or limited by the Qur'an. In analyzing Islamic videos on YouTube it is important to determine the degree of harmonization of intentions of speech events in the contexts ("situation and accepted mode of behavior in the situation", Prajs 2011: 142) – having in mind that (or since is) the intention of the speaker has been always to spread the Islam. Because of that, it is possible to seek and analyze only the specific goals, motives or intentions of the message carried within the speech³⁴. Taking into account: "Narratives, however, are much more than rhetorical devices. Far from being "just stories," they have deep roots: they are socially constructed. In other words, narratives arise from a specific constellation of relationships—a social network. It is possible, in fact, to say that where there is a narrative there must be a network" (Archetti 2015: 51)³⁵.

knowledge that the reader includes into the text fills those gaps that exist in the text itself, or what is not expressed in concrete words or sentences (Yule, 1996: 141). Coherence refers to implicit and assumed relationships in discourse... (Georgakopoulou and Goutsos, 2004: 15)" (Lakić 2014: 62).

- 34) "On the surface of discourse, we encounter signals that allow the reader or the listener to recognize the organization of discourse... McCarthy (1991: 29) mentions other relationships, such as phenomenon - reason, instrument - achievement. According to him, all these models can be classified under the generic name, based on logical sequence relations. Also, a common type of relationship between segments is when they are computed or contrasted. This type of relationship is called matching. Both types of relationships are transferred from the sentence level to the text, showing the relationship that segments of a text can have among themselves" (Lakić 2014: 65).
- 35) In other words: "The study of the beliefs, ideologies and narratives underpinned by an 'abusive interpretation of Islam' cannot be abstracted from the socio-economic and political context that the beliefs, ideologies and narratives have been both developed within, and seek to interpret" (Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and narratives 2008: 16).

It is necessary to investigate to what extent the forms (method of content interpretation) are adequately shaped, that is, whether the discourse in the certain speech events is conceived in a way to convince, to appeal, to impose and / or change attitudes, values and beliefs – whether the content of the message is adequately shaped so that it has the power to change the behaviour. The arrogance that can be perceived in the speeches of some preachers of Islamic learning, in video content posted on YouTube, points to the importance of research of the modality. Namely, in the system functional grammar modality “signify the position of a writer or speaker according to the presented proposition and / or conviction in the presented proposition (Lillian, 2008: 2)” (Vuković 2014: 224). Analysis of discourse of Islam has to pay attention to validity aspect (in the statements) of the Islamic preachers speak. Thus, it would be very productive to investigate whether assertive modality (high degree of validation – according to Simon-Vandenberg, 1997) characterize Islamic discourse, with emphasis on the following dimensions: to what degree is a present assertive modality, in which speaking shapes, whether is it a constant manner of speaking, or is not an speak pattern³⁶. A model of political discourse analysis formulated by Wodak (2015: 8), with a key concept of ‘discursive strategy’ (defined as linguistic choices) in this frame may be very analytically productive. As significant Archetti notes: “Any incoming information, including other actors’ narratives, will never be absorbed as it is but will be filtered and appropriated through the prism of the individual own narrative... Partly as a result of our action, partly as the outcome of the simultaneous action by all the actors within our networks, the relationships’ maps are constantly changing. This leads to our identity being continuously evolving, together with the way we interpret the world around us and the way we act” (Archetti 2015: 53)³⁷.

36) “The macromodality of political discourse (modalities at the level of the whole text) is usually in the tone of expressing self-confidence and security, since it is the task of politicians to project an image of reliability and well-informed persons (Simon-Vandenberg, 1997: 353)... The relation of the epistemic modality, which refers to validity and probability, and deontic, which denotes wishes, permissions and obligations, can provide insight into whether a particular text serves manipulative purposes” (Vuković 2014: 224-225).

37) Consequently: “There are also no messages, however perfectly crafted, that can, by themselves alone, neutralise violent extremism. However, in each single local

Theoreticians points to the importance of “systematic analysis and evaluation of argumentation” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 5). It is necessary to investigate which *topoi* have been put into the function of the arguments – whether the choice of topics (the formation of the agenda by a combination of events and available discourses) is adequate / in line with the desired presentation³⁸. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that “audiences are active both in the selection of the information they pay attention to – they do not consume all the information that is “out there” – and in the interpretation of media texts. This means that the availability of a message – for instance a jihadi video being online – does not necessarily equate reach, that is, such message actually being accessed and consumed” (Archetti 2015: 50)³⁹.

The compatibility of topics and symbolic forms on YouTube with the main message – specifically the message of Islam – leads to a research question: To what extent is the content of the evidence, framed or reduced to the doctrinal attitudes of Islam, in particular the quotations from the Qur’an? Or: To what extent is the choice and the way of interpretation of the topic solely focused on proving exclusivity in the truthfulness, fairness / ethics of Islam – and therefore the necessity of acting in accordance with Islamic rules? It is possible to explore: whether there is any theme or (political) problem in Islamic discourse that is not framed by the solutions prescribed by the Qur’an, or Islamic religious texts – more precisely, how this problem is resolved if it arises. In this case: What is the source of the argumentation and / or what is it intended to

context, through community-based approaches and long-term engagement, it is possible to gain an insight into the local narratives and the networks such narratives arise from... The establishment over time of radical and extremist identities through ideas and discourses can be detected” (Archetti 2015:56).

38) Conducted and modified based on: Prajs 2011: 156-161.

39) “In fact, watching a jihadi video might even increase a counterterrorist’s resolve against extremism—an opposite effect then originally intended by the producer of that message. In addition to this, strategic communication approaches to counterterrorism tend to demonize the Internet and social media needlessly... Such views are simplistic in their technological determinism – the belief that a technology, due to its mere existence, must produce certain effects. They overlook the fact that it is always humans (governments, citizens and extremists among them) who use technology as a tool to advance their own goals and that audiences, as already indicted, actively select and embrace—rather than merely absorb—messages they are interested in” (Archetti 2015: 50).

achieve? As a discursive environment basically excludes comments (the YouTube audience supports Islam and around the content of the Qur'an, the discussion is forbidden – regardless of whether exists a software possibility to leave comments on the posted content) the research question also can be: To what extent discourse expresses the trend of exclusivity in presenting the solution prescribed by the doctrine of Islam? Or: Is the trend of exclusion in discourse more visible in some or in all modes of speech events, in particular or in all forms of their transmission (on YouTube, for example, in the speeches of Islamic preachers, or in Islamic cartoons)?

Analysis of the participant's role in communication (Prajs 2011: 148) – when a discourse is designated as an Islamic discourse – includes research on the extent to which “the person who is speaking” and the “speaker” overlap in the speech event. That is, it is necessary to analyze whether the speaker (strikingly / directly / exclusively) calls for (the authority, holiness, irrefutable and unalterable character of) the Qur'an (transmit the words of Muhammad), or besides the Qur'an messages (its interpretation and / or its quotation) speaker expresses own attitudes too (there-withal addressing to the doctrinal setting of Islam). In this way, the distinctions of doctrinal, radical and extreme discourse can be determined (in statements of the speaker / in verbal events). Also, whether the above mentioned is changing (intensifying or decreasing) during time, to which speakers, or in what forms. Namely, having in mind some of the settings related to “discourse in narrative forms” (Prajs 2011: 395-398), when analyzing the Islamic discourse (on YouTube) the real author, the implicit author and the narrator almost may be compressed – because the narrator is strictly bound by the message of the Quran.

We agree with the assumption that “the analysis of written discourse takes into account not only verbal but also non-verbal activities of interlocutors and their interactions” (Lakić 2014: 64). Consequently, channels of communication in videos uploaded on YouTube by subjects that unreservedly support Islamic discourse can also be analyzed through the analytical model of the data transmission channel on the film, that is: picture, graphics display, speech, music and sound effects (Prajs 2011: 400-401).

The dimensions that ought to analyze, in relation to the use of the communication channel, in the mentioned contents can be:

- the frequency / dominance of the use of the channel (which can show individuality and measure of creativity in constructing of messages, expresses the competence of message encoders, and, more importantly, a broader trend can be established – characteristics of communication activity of all creators of discourse, and indirectly their intentions),
- the coherence of their effects (which can show outcomes and effectiveness in achieving the desired goals),
- direction and purpose (which can clearly show the presence of radical or extreme standpoints of the message encoder).

Certain videos on YouTube – when exploring Islamic discourse – one can analyze through a model that analyzes static and TV ads – through its content, form and context (Prajs 2011: 253-256), or determinants given in the analysis of animated cartoons on television (Prajs 2011: 676-680).

One modus of discourse analysis lies on linguistics that “include phonetic and phonological analysis of the sound patterns of talk, grammatical analysis of phrases, simple and complex sentences, and semantic analysis of the meanings of words and meaning relations between words (including metaphors, semantic fields, cognitive frames), and of larger units of text and talk” (Fairclough, Fairclough 2015: 1)⁴⁰. Other theoretician notice: “perspectivization, i.e. the process by which a speaker gives priority to one aspect of a linguistic phenomenon relative to another (Piper et al., 2005: 1061) is an important subject of research... (Fairclough, 1992: 183)” (Vuković 2014a: 223). One of the key concepts is the cohesion that

40) “CDA is essentially multidisciplinary... One major challenge is that CDA should not keep predominantly delving into grammatical analysis... however, is not to assert that grammar is useless in analysis. One contribution of CDA to social sciences is that it shows how language assumes a vital role in social and political processes. Grammar is a good way to bring precision to linguistic analysis. However, the preoccupation with grammatical analysis in all the processes of language use sometimes risks subjectively or excessively interpreting certain ideology, hegemony, and power that are in the analysts’ preferences. The very delicate grammatical categories, which are used by the analysts, may be a good way to dissect the linguistic units and reveal how the ideologies are embedded in language” (Wang 2016: 2771).

in speech “is achieved through explicit language resources” (Lakić 2014: 61)⁴¹. Also: “the problem of the connection of the totality exceeds the observations on the lexical and syntactic level. Velčić (Velčić, 1987: 15) think that the syntax should also be linked to the semantic side of the statement... Discourse is apparently manifested in the ways of making the meaningful relations between parts of the totality” (Lakić 2014: 64).

Conclusion

The aim of this paper is not to assess the basics of Islam and its doctrinal settings, in particular, nor the examination of the Islamic schools and the differences between them. The work departs from the previous research on Islamic discourse on YouTube, studies which investigate the radicalization into violent extremism, and from the previous research on the processes, and the limits of, radicalization through the Internet, specifically those concerned videos on YouTube portal.

Certain hypothetical frames from studies which investigate radicalization into violent extremism can serve as the basis for the systematization of the topoi and arguments of the bearer of Islamic discourse, and of the discourse strategies.

The above mentioned hypothetical frames also give the basis for identifying the links between the discourses and the social forces that produce them, more precisely, the forces (including Islamic organizations and institutions) whose attitudes to a great extent form the relevant discourse.

Such an analysis links the concept of discourse and social milieu, and hence assigns a social function to the discourse, at the same time providing the basis for checking, as well as the construction of the theory.

41) Namely, the sentences are linked grammatically, lexically and semantically. Those links are cohesive ties (they build the impression of the author’s ability to structure “what he wants to say”, and they are a factor in “judging whether something is well written” – according to Yule, 1996). One can investigate (according to Cutting, 2002) two types of cohesive relationships: grammatical connections (which include references, ellipsis, and substitutions) and lexical cohesion (which imply repetitions, synonyms, hypernyms, some general words - and discourse markers that contributes to cohesion) (Lakić 2014: 61-62).

Islam provides cognitive frames for understanding the reality, but it is also a construct that determines the principles of everyday perception, and which builds patterns of behavior. It is therefore of particular importance to identify the forms and contents of radical narratives, rhetorical and discursive strategies of Islamic videos on YouTube, and in particular radical interpretations of Islam. Analysis can therefore help in identifying and interpreting the link between the discourse and ideological frameworks, and the social and political forces that carry ideology. Determining of the rhetorical and discourse strategies, and analysis of them, is also a way to evaluate the effectiveness of certain discourse.

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Kosovo and Metohija or the European Union – a rhetorical dilemma in the Serbian political discourse

Abstract

As the loss of Kosovo has been *de facto* re-inflicted in recent years, the question should be raised as to how great an influence the Kosovo myth wields today. It is particularly interesting to consider the issue in the context of European integration and the fact that recognition of Kosovo and Metohija's self-proclaimed independence is usually stated as an essential condition and a key obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU. It is an undisputable fact that Kosovo and Metohija and the Kosovo myth are a part of culture, history, religion, and folklore of Serbian people, and it is without doubt difficult to renounce all that, even if personal and

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collective prosperity is offered in lieu of it, which is deemed by a certain portion of the Serbian public to come as a result of the accession to the EU. The aim of this paper is to establish which portion of public opinion is willing to make such a sacrifice in relation to the current attempts at resolution of the Kosovo question. It is the authors' ambition to answer the following question: To what extent does the position on the status of Kosovo and Metohija influence the public opinion on Serbia's membership in the European Union? With an intention of answering the research question the authors rely on the data acquired through empirical-quantitative study *The Notions of the EU and Russia in the Serbian Public 2018*, Institute of Social Sciences Belgrade, where a structured *on-line* questionnaire was used as a means of data collection. The study results clearly indicate the popular support for Serbia's accession to the EU while at the same time the method of resolution of the Kosovo question deeply impacts the public opinion on Serbia's membership in the EU. A conclusion can be drawn that, if the public is presented with the choice between Kosovo and the EU, the certainty of citizens opting for the EU will rapidly decline.

Key words: Kosovo and Metohija, national identity, national myth, the European Union, European integration

Introduction

The issue of social identities has proved itself to be an important factor in understanding political processes and events owing to a significant leverage of group identities over various aspects of collective behaviour (Vasović 2010: 75). Along with personal characteristics the identity of an individual is also conditioned by social aspects, which considerably affect his or her self-determination through diverse types of group affiliations. The role of collective identity is to aid an individual in self-defining their place in the existing system of social relations (Vasović 2010: 82).

Certainly, one of the most consequential types of social identity is national identity which, accompanied by nationalism, has been for almost two centuries "the primary inducement of Europe's fate" (Vasović 2015: 74). The national identity, predictably, was

and remains an essential subject matter for various social sciences. However, there is no universal and generally accepted definition of national identity and there is no general consensus over what the main factors and components of national identity are. In the literature, most frequently, language, religion, culture (music, folk oral lore), territory, common features and values, physical traits, etc. are underlined as defining components of national identity (Милошевић-Ђорђевић 2005: 125). The majority of authors assert the crucial role that a common language and culture, accompanied by national myths, had in national and political homogenisation and development of the sentiment of national belonging (Vasović 2015). One of the most eminent world theoreticians of nation and nationalism, Anthony Smith, indicates the close connection between national identity and mythology. He considers myths, along with memories, values, and symbols, to be the four pillars of the very core of ethnicity which he called *ethnie* (Vasović 2015: 72). With respect to the fact that the national mythology plays a significant role in strengthening national sentiment and sense of collective belonging, the authors of this paper start with three propositions. First, the national myths, as one of the determinants of national identity, are deeply embedded in the collective consciousness. Secondly, myths possess the ability of swift regeneration, adaptation and transformation. Those qualities become prominent in the occasion of national identity crisis, or being in danger for various reasons, when myths easily revitalise and evolve from the passive collective historical memory to active initiators and determinants of social processes. Thirdly, in this paper, national identity is not understood as some primordial, invariable, deeply rooted, and innate human attribute, but, on the contrary, the dynamic nature of this phenomenon is acknowledged (Суботић 2011: 2-3). Therefore, it is important to mention adoption of the assumption that identity, whether personal or collective, is formed in “a specific socio-cultural milieu which is susceptible to the dynamics and passage of historical time” (Стојадиновић 2018: 10).

As far as Serbia is concerned, such role is certainly attributed to the Kosovo myth, which can be regarded as one of the pillars of Serbian national identity and sovereignty. This myth has existed for centuries in the collective consciousness of Serbian people, and in view of historical events of the several past decades and the fact that

the issue of resolution of Kosovo and Metohija's status has been marked as the most urgent national concern; it is hardly surprising that the myth has acquired a new intensity and topicality. In the first part of this paper, the authors indicate historical genesis of the Kosovo myth and a special place that it holds in Serbian national tradition. The question of the Kosovo myth is deliberated in the current macropolitical and socio-cultural context where it is being manifested. In the second part of the paper, the authors endeavor to provide answers to research queries through analysis of the data acquired by the empirical study *The notions of the EU and Russia in the Serbian public in 2018* conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences – Centre for politicological research and public opinion, which concluded that the final resolution of the status of the southern Serbian province has large impact on the attitude of Serbian citizens towards a potential membership in the European Union.

The Kosovo myth

National myths represent psychocultural narratives based on collective conscious, and as such they greatly influence the dynamics of social and political processes within a community. In that respect, national myths constitute “a conglomerate of various historical, religious and political ideas” used to provide a broader culture-based legitimacy for daily political interests and objectives, i.e. they are offered as culturally sustained justifications for collective actions. (Vasović 2015: 67-68). These myths can for centuries, in their latent form, continuously coexist in the conscience of the folk with almost no change in contents or structure level. But, if for some reason ethnic or national entity, among whose members the myth dwells, experiences crisis or a situation of intergroup confrontation and conflict, those myths abruptly revitalise and evolve from the passive collective historical memory to active initiators and determinants of social and political processes (Vasović 2015: 75-76).

In the case of Serbia, that function is undoubtedly delegated to the Kosovo myth, which is one of the pillars of Serbian national identity and sovereignty. In the Serbian folk culture Kosovo figures as a sacred place – a space refined by the characteristics of social identity, “a spiritual collective toponym, the centre of collective

cultural conscious” (Бошковић 2014: 479). Precisely on account of the fact that such a standpoint is entrenched in a certain segment of the population, the Kosovo myth has got a great mobilisation potential which can be instrumentalised for political purposes, if there is a will and need among political actors.

This myth was conceived immediately after the Battle of Kosovo itself as a peculiar folk response to the endured historical trauma. Thereupon, tales and legends of that fateful battle started to be recorded and passed down. It could be said that even then the first phase of the Kosovo myth creation commenced. It has been continuously present in the conscience of the Serbian people, or at least certain segments of it, since as far back as the 14th century. The very core of the myth was built around historical facts, while a complex set of historical circumstances throughout the following centuries has resulted in historical facts, which were initially recorded and interpreted in church chronicles, further, as Pešić notices, “fictionalised in the folk oral lore and transposed into epic structures through a technique of oral mediation” (Pešić 2019: 361).

This complex and long-lasting process shaped the Kosovo myth through various stages of its existence. In time, the religious, literary and political discourses on Kosovo converged on and permeated one another (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 126). Although the Kosovo tradition was constantly present, only in the 19th century did it take form of a fully developed myth. It is the period of strengthening nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, an occurrence that did not bypass the Serbian people either (Čolović 2017: 7). The then popular leaders and ideologists of Serbian nationalism, started to use the evocation of the Battle of Kosovo for political purposes, thus providing the Kosovo tradition, which had been already ingrained in the folk oral storytelling, a new function.

National liberation function of the myth instilled strength of Kosovo heroes into rebels in their revolt against the Ottoman government from the First Serbian Uprising onwards. The most famous reproductions of the Kosovo myth should be definitely sought in the folk epic poetry of the period, which would be collected and published by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić several decades later (Čolović 2017: 8). Unquestionably, these epic poems hold a

special place in the national conscience, so that without their recognition it would be difficult to properly understand history and culture of the Serbian people (Čolović 2017: 21). Kosovo is, as Bakić-Hayden states, “a paradigm of collective self-awareness, a central metaphor in subsequent interpretations of the most important historical events of the 19th and 20th centuries” (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 134).

It is important to mention that the Kosovo myth reduced in its intensity after the struggle for liberation of Kosovo and other territories inhabited by Serbian population ended. Upon the ending of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the Kosovo myth simply could not retain the same role that it had in the previous century. Under new conditions, where the entire Serbian national corpus found itself in the same state and also unified with their other *South Slavic brethren*, the Kosovo myth underwent a certain transformation. Still, the Kosovo myth proved its multifarious applicability and perseverance by surviving and being evoked even in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, during the Second World War, both among Partisan and Chetnik fighters, and equally after the end of the war in the Second Yugoslavia. However, it was not until the eighties of the 20th century that the Kosovo myth experienced a true renaissance when it was made topical again amid growing nationalisms in the SFRY, ethnic tensions and crisis that sprung in Kosovo and Metohija and preparations for the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle, by which the myth practically reached its culmination (Базић 2012: 267-268). The tragic breakup of the SFRY, and later on NATO aggression along with the creation of an international protectorate in the Kosovo and Metohija, then the failure of peacekeeping troops to protect Serbian interests accompanied by the strengthening of the Albanian separatist movement which culminated in the declaration of independence in February 2008, with support of a part of the international community, have kept this myth vital in the years that followed.

The Serbian people once again experienced the tragic loss of Kosovo. In his extensive study *Kosovski kulturološki mit (Kosovo cultural myth)*, Bošković, discussing the first loss of Kosovo after the Ottoman invasion, characterises that painful experience of the

Serbian people as a loss of cultural landscape. Underlining “the strength of the collective cultural and national identity which transforms the abstraction of a geographic area into a space of cultural landscape, a concrete place within whose boundaries the national and cultural map of a collective is being drawn”. This myth has evolved over generations “as a collective work of art” that had a function of an imaginary space where for centuries, during Ottoman occupation, the Serbian people survived. The author concludes that the Kosovo myth is “a spiritual projection of historical-spacial dimension of the Serbian people’s existence” which compensates for the loss of the real territory.

In his study *O srpskom političkom obrascu (Serbian Political Pattern)* Milan Matić emphasises the “essential components of a specific understanding and approach to politics and political issues, inherent to the Serbian people” (Матић 2000: 8). He underlines justice and righteousness, love of freedom and Orthodoxy as defining components of a collective political pattern in the Serbian tradition, which is in his opinion verified by the medieval laws such as Nomocanon of Saint Sava and Dušan’s Code and recent history, respectively (Матић 2000: 123). The veracity of these claims is corroborated not only by the Serbian literature of the 19th and 20th centuries but also the works of authors, such as Jovan Cvijić and Vladimir Dvorniković who analytically examined the Serbian political tradition. It is precisely via Dvorniković’s deliberations, that Matić has found the roots of conscious self-sacrifice of the Kosovo heroes to the “grand idea of spirituality”, which, at the time of Kosovo tragedy, had already been deeply rooted among the common folk, dating back to the period of the Nemanjić dynasty. Under the circumstances where the Serbian people were assigned a role of European Christian civilisation defenders against the onslaught of Islam, that spirituality inspired Serbs to fight heroically, and, if necessary, die as martyrs (Матић 2000: 32-42). The historical vertical of the Kosovo myth, *that indigenous Serbian Kosovo cult as a specific variant of heroic Christianity*, originated from that religious cultural concept (Матић 2000: 37). The Kosovo myth therefore “originated in the conditions of utter peril for the people, under invasion of a cruel Asian conqueror and acute need for general mobilisation for the purpose of defence and survival” (Матић 2005: 390). Nevertheless, although it initially served as

a response to immediate needs, the Kosovo myth has endured for centuries and traditionally has an important role in formulation of the Serbian political pattern.

As the loss of Kosovo *de facto* has happened once again in the recent years, the question arises as to how great influence the Kosovo myth exerts today. It is particularly compelling to envisage the issue relating to the European integration and the fact that recognition of the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo and Metohija is often stated as an essential condition and a key obstacle to Serbia's accession to the European Union. When contemplating the situation, the following three facts should be taken into account. First, for the survival and reinforcement of the European Union, as well as its further expansion, it is important to establish and empower a common, even if very loosely defined, supranational European identity. That is obstructed by traditional understanding of the national identity widely spread in Serbia, which is based "on common cultural heritage, language, collective myths and memory, symbols and emotional kin ties", i.e. peculiarities that supranational identities do not possess. Such a traditional view of identity is often accompanied by a conviction that supranational identity endangers the national one and poses threat to its preservation (Vasović 2010: 84). Thus, the European identity is at times seen as a threat to the Serbian national identity. Secondly, the majority of EU countries supported, with the most powerful ones even actively lobbying for, the Kosovo declaration of independence, which is deemed by a large part of the Serbian public as nothing less than a hostile act directly aimed against interests of the Serbian people, i.e. the citizens of Serbia. Thirdly, it should be taken into consideration that one of the main morals of the Kosovo myth integral to its metaphysical-Christian segment and mainly used as a basis of the folk *ethics of Vidovdan* (Ђурић 1988), is the one of self-sacrifice that Knez Lazar opted for when he was forced to choose between earthly and heavenly kingdom, between transient and eternal life (Пешић 2018: 36). The question arises as to whether and how large a portion of the public in Serbia, consciously or not, draws parallels between a dichotomy EU-Kosovo, which is put in front of them, and the dilemma presented to the Knez Lazar? It is an irrefutable fact that Kosovo and Metohija along with the Kosovo myth are an inherent part of culture, history, religion and folklore

of the Serbian people, and, without doubt, it is not easy to renounce them, even if in return personal and collective prosperity is offered, which is deemed by a certain portion of Serbian public to be a potential benefit of the accession to the EU. In this paper we will endeavor to establish what percentage of the public is willing to make such a sacrifice regarding current attempt at a resolution of the Kosovo question.

The process of European integration and resolution of the Kosovo question as mutually conditioning processes

Upon the unilateral declaration of independence by self-government authorities in Kosovo and Metohija, the public had to tackle the following two issues. First, the traumatic exposure to the loss of a part of the territory which throughout centuries have been depicted as a “cradle of the Serbian people” and then acceptance of the fact that henceforth the process of negotiations over Serbia’s accession to the EU will be conditioned by resolution of *the Kosovo question*. Although, as previously stated on several occasions, in Serbian history the Kosovo myth has had a national liberation role, the role of the myth today is dubious and it is uncertain whether it will undergo yet another transformation in the process of the European integration.

Even though the saga of Serbia and the EU dates back to 2000, the first official step which marked the commencement of the negotiations was signing the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement (SAA) in Luxembourg, on April 29, 2008. As mentioned above, in the same year on February 17, the provisional self-government authorities in Kosovo and Metohija adopted the Declaration of Independence. This process of separation was supported by international community, first of all the USA and majority of EU states. The only outcome acceptable to Priština authorities is for Serbia to recognise Kosovo* as an independent, sovereign country.

Under these new circumstances, Serbia was coerced to accept European Union terms in order to make progress in the dialogue with the authorities in Priština. Thus Serbia gained the status of candidate country for the EU membership on March 2, 2012, only after the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština opened on

March 8, 2011.¹ The European Union took charge of the mediation in the negotiation process which was an obvious solution as both sides aspire to EU membership. The dilemma over whether Western powers intended to remove the United Nations from facilitation of the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, if ever present, was finally resolved. The first round of dialogue started at a technical level, but in 2012 was upgraded to a higher level under the auspices of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security and Vice-president of the European Commission. In March 2012, the Council of Europe granted Serbia a candidate status. The goal of *Brussels Agreement*² signed during the ninth round of the dialogue, held on April 19, 2013, in Brussels, is normalization of relations between Belgrade and Priština, and according to not only the Brussels officials but also Belgrade and Priština ones, represented a significant step ahead. By signing the Brussels Agreement in 2013 both Belgrade and Priština committed to not sabotaging the opposing side in the process of European integration.

The EU representatives aspire to find both the solution to Kosovo's* political status and relations between Belgrade and Priština within "a common European future", which both sides set as their strategic goals and objectives. There are two explanations as to the decision of policy makers in Brussels to adopt this approach. First of all, during the accession process, the EU exerts the maximum effort to prevent the "importation" of the ethnic conflicts that can be a threat to regional stability, and consequently to stability of the European Union itself. We will take the opportunity to briefly draw attention to the fact that the European Union insists on the candidate states resolving any contentious issues and mutual

- 1) In the *European Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for the membership of the European Union*, was a recommendation to the Council of Europe to grant Serbia a candidate status, the following is stated: "Serbia has considerably progressed towards fulfilling the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, as well as the conditions of the Stabilization and Association Process, provided that progress continues and that practical solutions are found to the problem with Kosovo." (Pregovaračka poglavlja – 35 koraka ka Evropskoj Uniji)
- 2) The official title of this document is *Prvi sporazum o principima koji regulišu normalizaciju odnosa*. As the main goals of the Agreement we can highlight the following: dissolution of the parallel institutions in northern Kosovo* and integration of civil servants in the Kosovo* institutional framework, and offer to Kosovo Serb of a certain level of self-government through an Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities.

disagreements during the negotiation process, specifically addressing territorial disputes. If we take this fact into account, Serbia's journey to the candidate status will take longer than with the other post-communist states. In other words, the process of European integration is in Serbia's case further burdened by traumatic loss of a part of the territory. Secondly, despite their numerous differences and confrontations, both Serbian and Albanian side agree on the European Union not having an alternative, at least it is what highest officials on both sides repeat ad nauseam in their public appearances. It seems that the European officials estimated that both sides would be more motivated to participate and achieve better results if these two processes were mutually conditioning. How accurate this estimate is time will tell, but, without doubt, in spite of numerous successes of the cohesion policies in the membership negotiations, approaching the European Union does not possess such magical power when it comes to resolving the political status of Kosovo*. In literature, there are countless interpretations of the dialogue aim, i.e. the current negotiations, and majority of them concur that it is seeking normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Priština. Through "full normalisation of the relations between two sides, achieved within EU membership negotiations, in the case of Serbia, and negotiations on SAA, and afterwards EU membership, in the case of Kosovo, the ultimate goal, common to both Belgrade and Priština is to be reached: the EU membership" (Janjić 2013: 11). It is the estimate of the authors of this paper that the progress towards the EU membership has proved to be an efficient means of creating advantageous circumstances for dialogue and negotiations continuation (Janjić 2013: 13). The other group of authors surmises that the whole process of the relations normalisation, especially if attitude and engagement of the international community and the EU are taken into account, happens at the expense of Serbia and conclude that "a crawling acknowledgement of the secession of the province through the EU accession negotiations is taking place" (Јовановић 2018: 8).

The conditioning policies in the EU membership negotiations are no novelty; however, Serbia's position is unique as a mechanism for monitoring agreements implementation is weaved into the one of the negotiation chapters as a part of the dialogue between

Belgrade and Priština.³ By acquiescing to this fact, the government representatives of Serbia provided an official confirmation that the process of European integration and resolution of Kosovo and Metohija's status are processes of mutual conditioning. On the other hand, it cannot be negated that citizens of Serbia are confronted, as judged by some authors, with a false and dangerous dilemma "Kosovo or Europe" (Ебегр & Митић 2005: 142). Therefore, the motivation of the authors of this paper to pose a research question: *To what extent the viewpoint of the political status of Kosovo and Metohija influences the public attitude to Serbia's EU membership?*

The analysis of the public opinion

Upon providing a broader insight into the significance and dynamics of the Kosovo myth topicalisation, and, ultimately, correlating the European integration process and resolution of the Kosovo question, the analysis of the empirical study results is performed with the aim of establishing whether the public is aware of this correlation and whether the dilemma Kosovo or the EU still figures as one of the major rhetorical questions in the political discourse of Serbia.

The Centre for politicological research and public opinion at the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade conducted a study entitled *The Notions of the EU and Russia in the Serbian Public*. The study is devoted to the viewpoints of Serbian citizens on international politics, and Serbia's relations with Russia and the European Union in particular. The quoted study relied on quantitative methodology, where a structured *on-line* questionnaire was used as a means of collecting the data. The respondents completed the questionnaire independently, on a computer, a smart phone or other device with Internet access. The questionnaire was made on pen-source platform LimeSurvey, installed on IDN server. The poll was conducted in October and November 2018. The respondents were asked to access the poll in two ways, so that the total sample consisted of two subsamples: email subsample and 'Snowball' subsample. The survey was done on a sample of 3,270 respondents in the Republic of Serbia.

3) The chapter in question is chapter 35 called "Other issues".


The underlying hypothesis, which was the basis of this paper, is that the question of Kosovo and Metohija affects the public opinion on Serbia's membership in the European Union. Therefore, this paper relies on the following propositions:

- The European integration process and the resolution of the Kosovo question are mutually conditioned;
- The prevailing public opinion is that Serbia is in favour of joining the EU;
- The Kosovo question has an impact on the public opinion on Serbia's EU membership;
- The EU support of Kosovo's secession affects negatively the public opinion on Serbia's EU membership.

The data are presented graphically and grouped according to the initial propositions.


The survey results indicate that Serbian citizens do not perceive a clear intention of the European Union to allow Serbia's accession. To the question: *What is the position of the European Union on Serbia's accession?*, the majority of the respondents replied that the EU is uncertain of its decision to accept Serbia as its member. Furthermore, 34% of the respondents believe that the EU has no intention of allowing for Serbia's accession. The smallest percentage of the respondents assumes that the EU wants that (24% of them) (Chart 1).

Chart 1: *Position of the European Union on Serbia's accession*



The proposition that the public opinion is that Serbia is in favour of joining the EU has been confirmed. The survey results show that in the event of a referendum on Serbia's accession to the European Union, a little above a half of the respondents (54%) would vote for, while 39% would vote against. Only 7% of the respondents would not vote in the referendum (Chart 2).


Chart 2: *Public opinion on Serbia's EU membership*



Similarly, 52% of respondents (29% of whom completely agree) view Serbia's accession to the European Union as a better solution than the preservation of status quo. Less than a half does not (40%), while 8% have no clear position on this issue.

It has become evident that 79% of respondents trust the EU policies on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija's independence seem of importance for the creation of their viewpoint of the EU, among whom more than a half (55%) thinks that it is of great importance. A fifth of the respondents (21%) believe that the EU policies on the issue of Kosovo and Metohija's independence have no impact on the creation of their viewpoint of the EU.

Chart 3: Significance of the issue of Kosovo and Metohija's independence




Along with the abovementioned, it should be emphasised that a perception of the current EU policies supporting the secession of Kosovo and Metohija – 94% of respondents endorses the proposition provided, 5% holds a neutral position, while merely 1% of the respondents states that the current policy is for Kosovo to remain within Serbia. These findings can be clear guidelines to all political actors that the process of European integration and resolution of the Kosovo question, i.e. negotiations on the relations normalisation, must not be presented as mutually exclusive categories. If the strategy of confronting the public with a choice between Kosovo and the EU is settled on, the level of uncertainty of citizens opting for the EU increases significantly. Thus, once more it is confirmed that EU membership is not a sufficient compensation for the recognition of Kosovo independence and that resolution of the Kosovo question still has potential to become “a blocking factor to a further process of consolidation of political situation” (Mojsilović 2010: 173) in the Republic of Serbia.

More than a half of the respondents (58%) have demonstrated resignation and belief that, no matter what is done concerning this

issue, Kosovo will become an independent state. It is disputable whether these findings can be interpreted as Serbian citizens' coming to terms with the situation and being aware of the fact that a predominant wish for Kosovo and Metohija to remain part of Serbia cannot be fulfilled, at least in the foreseeable future. None the less, a clear conclusion of this is that the citizens themselves are aware of the fact that Serbia is allowed very little room for manoeuvre in the negotiations on relations normalisation and that a return to a previous state of affairs is virtually impossible. Provided that Serbia recognised Kosovo's independence, it is highly debatable how drastic reactions of those most ardent opponents of Kosovo's independence would be.

The idea of partition of Kosovo and Metohija as a compensation for recognising Kosovo's independence has been publically proposed on several occasions by the high-ranking government officials, and during 2018 and 2019 such a partition has been anew put "in the ether" as one of the possible options. The respondents' answers indicate that division of Kosovo* into Serbian and Albanian parts is an acceptable solution to 38% of respondents. However, there is still a compelling majority (61% of them) which maintains that Kosovo and Metohija should remain part of Serbia (Chart 4).

Chart 4. *Public attitude towards the Kosovo question*



Through use of non-parametric method, *Chi-square* test (independent normally distributed data), a high correlation between the independence issue and EU membership has been established ($\Phi=0,669$).

Table 1: *Correlation between EU membership and the issue of Kosovo's independence*

Attitude towards Serbian membership in EU	Attitude towards accepting Kosovo independence		Total:
	Yes	No	
For Accession	67%	33%	100
Against accession	2%	98%	100
Total:	37%	63%	100%

Although the majority of respondents support Serbia's membership in the EU (54%), the situation changes if that membership is conditioned by the recognition of Kosovo's independence, with the percentage of those against joining the EU rising to 63%. A little more than a third of the respondents (37%) would support Serbia's accession to the EU even if the independence of Kosovo and Metohija was recognised. No less than a third of the respondents who would have voted for Serbia's accession to the EU (33% of them) would have abstained from voting in the referendum in case of it being conditioned by the recognition of Kosovo's independence, while two thirds (67%) would not have changed their mind even under these circumstances.

Conclusion

The study results have confirmed all four of the propositions provided. The first proposition of *the prevailing public opinion that Serbia is in favour of joining the EU* has been confirmed both in view of the fact that more than a half of the respondents would vote for accession and that the majority deems Serbia's EU membership to be better option than the preservation of status quo. The second proposition of *Kosovo's independence and Serbia's EU membership being mutually conditioned* has also been verified since there is a high correlation between these two positions. The third proposition of *the issue of Kosovo's independence having an impact on the public opinion on Serbia's EU membership* has been

also asserted by the fact that, when the public is confronted with a position that joining the European Union implies recognition of Kosovo and Metohija's independence, there is a significant drop in support for Serbia's EU membership. In support of this claim there are also findings that a third of the public, who would vote for the accession to the EU, would abstain from voting if the condition was recognition of Kosovo and Metohija's independence, which at the same time confirms the fourth proposition of *EU support of Kosovo's secession affecting negatively the public opinion on Serbia's EU membership*.

All of the above mentioned suggests that Kosovo and Metohija's status remains as an important factor in creating the public opinion on Serbia's EU membership. The results analysis has confirmed the underlying hypothesis that the Kosovo myth still figures as a determinant of Serbian citizens' political behaviour, particularly with regard to accession to the EU and the fact that final resolution of Kosovo and Metohija's political status and recognition of unilaterally declared independence are proffered as the key conditions for the long-awaited EU membership. These findings clearly indicate the policy of mutual conditioning, the EU or Kosovo and Metohija, will not speed the European integration process, but on the contrary it is more likely to significantly impede the process.

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Dilemmas about the scope of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence from a human rights perspective***

Abstract

The adoption of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence was driven by the creation of a more effective legal framework for the protection of victims of domestic violence, and, therefore, also by the alignment of the legal system of the Republic of Serbia with international obligations. The main novelties include multi-sectoral cooperation and primarily preventive nature of the law. However, from its very adoption, it has been pointed to its noticeably repressive character, as well as to provisions with potentially harmful impacts. Hence, this paper represents a contribution to the dis-

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discussion on the importance and scope of the solutions provided for in the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence. On the one hand, it points to major novelties intended to contribute to a more effective prevention of domestic violence. On the other hand, it questions the constitutionality and appropriateness of some of the legal solutions, arguing that, in particular respects, the lawmaker had to use a wiser and more subtle approach to conceptualising the provisions of this law.

Key words: violence, family, constitutionality, human rights, gender equality.

Introduction

Taking into account the already largely proven ineffectiveness of the previous legal framework, and the obligations assumed by acceding to the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the so-called Istanbul Convention)¹, the Republic of Serbia adopted the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence². This Act represents a *lex specialis* in relation to previous regulations governing this matter. From the envisaged legal solutions, it can be inferred that Serbia opted for the model most similar to the so-called legal-prosecutorial model existing in the US (Bugarski 2018: 99). As it provides for some novel, noticeably radical solutions, this Act has attracted much attention from its very outset, not just from professional community. While some have uncritically glorified it and mechanically speculated that the great number of imposed urgent measures indispensably means decrease in the rate of violence against women, others, on the other hand, have been warning of its harmful solutions and one-sided and primarily feminist approach to defining them (Ristivojević, Samardžić 2017). Divided opinions about the Act, more than one year of its

- 1) Serbia signed the Istanbul Convention in 2012, and on 31 October 2013, the National Parliament of Serbia adopted the law ratifying it (Act ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 2013; Official Gazette of RS, International Agreements 12-13).
- 2) Zakon o sprečavanju nasilja u porodici, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 94/2016. (*Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence, Official Gazette of RS, No 94/2016*).

application, and frequency of domestic violence reports, provide sufficient incentive for a comprehensive analysis of its provisions, particularly those concerning new powers of the police in preventing domestic violence. The need for analysis becomes even more important in light of the fact that in 2018, more than 30 women were victims of domestic violence (Lacmanović 2018). Statistics have shown that the number of murdered women has increased in comparison to 2017, and is close the number of feminicides in 2016 (Lacmanović 2017). These facts may lead to a conclusion that instead of being reduced, domestic violence has remained at its usual level, making therefore the concern about the efficiency and appropriateness of new solutions fully justified. However, another problematic aspect of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence that should also be examined is its constitutionality, because of the dilemma that some of its provisions comply neither with the Constitution, nor with international human rights protection standards (Tubić 2018).

Main features of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence

Major novelty introduced by the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence is establishment of ‘multi-sectoral cooperation’ that constitutes a necessary condition for ensuring a more effective protection of victims of domestic violence. It concerns the attempt to establish, by virtue of single law, certain new powers for multiple authorities and public services, or to establish legal coordination and cooperation among all subjects involved in domestic violence prevention, one without which the efficient and effective control of domestic violence is impossible. Public authorities whose conduct is regulated by this Act include the police, public prosecutor’s office, courts of general jurisdiction, misdemeanour courts and social work centres.

The second novelty is the primarily preventive nature of the Act. Prevention of domestic violence comprises a set of measures aimed at identifying the immediate threat of domestic violence and a set of measures to be taken once the immediate threat has been identified (Article 3). The Act specifies that the immediate threat of domestic violence exists when the behaviour of a potential perpetrator and other circumstances indicate that they are ready

either to commit for the first time or repeat domestic violence in the imminent future. The liability of the abuser thus moves ‘back’, before the criminal procedure or the violence protection procedures under the Family Act is instituted (Stajić 2017: 668). ‘With this focus of the Act, the focus of actions of the police and other domestic violence prevention authorities and institutions essentially shifts from traditionally preferred evidence gathering and clarification of violence committed – in the past (repressive action) to the preferred prevention of violence that might occur – in the future (preventive action)’ (Stevanović, Subošić, Kekić 2018a: 156; Stevanović, Subošić, Kekić 2018b: 131-146).

This novelty, while intended to ensure more effective protection of victims of domestic violence, also provokes serious criticism. Specifically, the criticisms are levelled at the legal formulation of immediate threat of domestic violence. Article 3, paragraph 2, states that: ‘Immediate threat of domestic violence shall exist in case when behaviour of a potential perpetrator and other circumstances indicate that he/she is ready either to commit for the first time or repeat domestic violence in the immediate upcoming period’. This definition of immediate threat carries many unknown meanings, in a conditional sense ‘what would happen if...’ (Jugović 2018: 965). The formulations ‘potential perpetrator’ and his ‘readiness to commit violence for the first time’ are nomotechnically problematic. Obviously, the lawmaker intended to emphasise the preventive nature of the Act and make it possible for the police to intervene and prevent violence even before it occurs. It just should have been formulated differently. As it is known, no law applies before facts are determined. A law enforcer always gives a particular factual situation (facts) a particular legal qualification. A formulation that could have been used here is one from the German police law - a kind of general clause vesting in the police the all-times authority to take measures to eliminate immediate threats to the safety of people and property. It simply reads: if facts justify the assumption of safety threat. Therefore, it could be predicted *de lege ferenda* that the immediate threat of domestic violence exists if facts exist that justify the assumption of immediate domestic violence, or that indicate the possibility of immediate violence. These facts must exist for the police to be able to intervene - their absence creates the opportunity for fraudulent reports and misuse

of the whole mechanism for the preventive protection against violence. Indeed, in its Article 15 (paragraph 1), the Act does require that all relevant facts be established before urgent measures are imposed, but omits to explicitly require them when it comes to determining the immediate threat of domestic violence, which is a failure by the lawmaker.

The Act provided an extensive definition of violence; hence, for its purposes, domestic violence means any act of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence. This wording makes the legal solution consistent with the Istanbul Convention (Article 3). Undoubtedly deserving affirmation is the legal definition of violence that explicitly includes the acts of sexual and economic violence, because in traditional and patriarchal environments, these forms of violence are often not recognised as an unlawful impairment of physical and psychological integrity of women. Understandably, the more extensive concept of violence can also raise some practical concerns. Unlike physical abuse, which is more easily established, psychological or economic violence is hard to identify. Another issue of particular concern is that in instances of economic violence, temporary separation of partners by means of urgent measure can give rise to new issues if partners are economically dependent on each other. Also to be borne in mind is that in relatively poor societies, such as Serbian, situations may be common where drawing clear lines between the necessary savings measures and rational family behaviour and the acts of economic violence is difficult or almost impossible.

This aspect can be criticised for inappropriately broad determination of family, which becomes a ‘shoreless ocean’ under this law. Specifically, the legal solution stipulates that domestic violence can be committed against a ‘person with whom the perpetrator is either presently or has previously been in a matrimonial relationship, common-law relationship or partner relationship, or with a person he/she is blood-related in the direct line, or side line up to the second degree or with whom he/she is in an in-law relationship up to the second degree or to whom he/she is an adoptive parent, adopted child, foster parent or foster child or with another person with whom he/she is living or has lived in a common household’ (Article 3, paragraph 3). Hence, the Act defines family

indirectly and too broadly, identifying that domestic violence can exist between former partners who lived (in the past) in the shared household, which is an anomaly. Therefore, family, in the traditional meaning of the word, “represents just one potential setting for ‘partners’ to meet and violence to emerge. Beside family founded on marriage, it may extend to a common-law marriage, and wider, to the so-called ‘partner relationship’” (Ristivojević, Samardžić 2017: 1445).

The Act provides for two types of urgent measures for protection against domestic violence: 1) temporary removal of the perpetrator from the place of residence; and 2) temporary prohibition for the perpetrator to contact or approach the victim of violence (Article 17). Thereby, an order may impose both measures at the same time. Undoubtedly, urgent measures should contribute to the attainment of the preventive function of the Act. However, the manner prescribed for doing so points to the extremely repressive nature of the law in respect of the potential perpetrator of domestic violence. Examination of the content of urgent measures, regardless of the title used as a guise, reveals that they are, in fact, criminal sanctions, (Ristivojević 2018: 142). They limit human rights (repressive) of the perpetrator, they are expected to have special preventive effect; they are imposed to protect some values (suppress crime), and they are instituted by law (*nula poena sine lege*) (*Ibid.*). Only lacking are the formal elements of a criminal sanction: procedure for issuance (criminal procedure) and issuing authority (court). Hence, in the substantive sense, they constitute criminal sanctions, but, given that our current criminal legislation already has a protection measure of *Prohibition of Approaching and Communicating with the Injured Party*, a dilemma remains why the lawmaker has prescribed conceptually the same criminal sanction twice (*Ibid.*).

One should not overlook the fact that the conceptual apparatus of the Act, or its definitions and institutions are not complementary with their respective counterparts from the legal system, provided primarily in the Family Act, Police Act, Criminal Procedure Act, and other acts. This condition to a certain extent disrupts the unity of the legal order (Article 4, para 1 of the Constitution of Serbia, and Article 194, para 1), which is (should be) safeguarded by the

Constitutional Court. When applying the above constitutional provisions on the single legal order, the Constitutional Court assesses mutual compatibility of individual laws from the perspective of uniformity of the legal system. Non-uniformity primarily refers to the lawmaker's tendency toward the issuance of urgent measures (in almost all cases) that run counter to the spirit of the Family Act, whose equivalent measures are strictly restrictively ordered by court. Next, there are legal definitions of family, immediate threat of violence, detention of the potential perpetrator of violence, etc. Although it is a separate law (special law), its institutions must conform to the spirit of their counterpart institutions from other laws, hence it should have only regulated the particularities, or features deviating from the general characteristics of legal concepts from other laws. The Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence is a *lex specialis* by virtue of its Article 5, which determines that, unless otherwise stipulated by this same Act, prevention of domestic violence in cases against perpetrators of criminal offences defined under this Act and protection and support to victims of domestic violence and victims of criminal offences defined under this Act will be subject to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Act, Civil Procedure Act, Family Act and Police Act. The Act, thus, has precedence over the stated acts in preventing domestic violence, in accordance with the maxim *lex specialis derogat legi generalis*. It applies as a primary law, and, beside or in conjunction with it, depending on the outcome of the specific case, other stated laws also apply (subsidiarily), including thus the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, if domestic violence qualifies at the same time as a criminal offence, the criminal law regime will apply accordingly, whilst it is a factual question whether or not urgent measures under the examined Act will be imposed first, whereby it is legally possible, given its preventive nature.

Dilemmas about constitutionality and appropriateness of particular provisions of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence

Considering that primacy is given to preventive action, the appropriateness of this Act should not be questionable. A simple and efficient mechanism for protection against domestic violence

has been put in place. However, at the same time, the mechanism is noticeably repressive in character with potential to also violate human rights.

With the provision for two types of urgent measures that meet all the substantive law criteria of criminal sanction, the question arises whether they will suffice for all domestic situations that only life itself can create. Repressive action and elimination of the potential abuser from family puts the very existence of the family at risk. Urgent measures should undeniably be used in combination with family law institutions, whose primary goal is reconciliation and overcoming of the existing conflict. Applying merely urgent measures can result in even greater conflict potential that, once the measure expires, can fuel even greater violence. Also, family must be enabled to recover from each conflict incident, which instance the solutions of the Act on Prevention of Domestic Violence fail to acknowledge. Hence, considering that Serbian Constitution provides for special protection for family (Article 66), it is clear that the lawmaker disregarded this constitutional guarantee, giving primacy to other values, and absolutely neglecting the interest of the family. Therefore, it is not an overstatement to theoretically claim that: 'Family, under this regulation, is not only unprotected, but also absolutely diluted in terms of form and structure' (Ristivojević, Samardžić 2017: 1447).

Despite that the most common victims of domestic violence are women (Turanjanin, Ćorović, Čvorović 2017: 76; Bugarski 2018: 96), from examining the legal solutions in general, it appears that the Act, although concerned with domestic violence, failed to provide for special protection of children in such situations. While intended to protect vulnerable family members, by omitting to address children and their particularities, the Act actually accords main protection to a woman as an individual instance (Ristivojević, Samardžić 2017: 1448). Given that the Constitution explicitly proclaims special protection for any child (Article 66), the Act seems to have failed to include solutions that would comprehensively protect all family members. Imposing urgent measures even in some more trivial instances of conflict that could be overcome by institutions of family law can, at the same time, mean irreversibly destructing the family, which can lead to a child being deprived

of a normal psycho-physical development, and, consequently, also economically threatened.

One particular failure of the lawmaker concerns the incomplete provisions on detention of persons. The only reference the Act makes to detention is found in the provisions relating to the maximum duration of detention of eight hours (Article 14, para 2) and to the constitutionally and legally guaranteed right of individuals to a defence counsel and legal assistance (Article 14, para 3). It makes no provision for a formal ruling or an act (decision, conclusion, etc.) ordering the detention; instead, the Act applies directly (without passing of an individual act). Thus, police detention was left unaccompanied by direct legal protection, that is, without the right to a legal remedy to review the lawfulness of the detention, or the judicial review, which is in contravention with the constitutional guarantee of the existence of a legal remedy against any decision on one's rights, obligations or lawful interest (Article 36, para 2 of the Constitution). Another issue is the appropriateness of detaining a person who is merely a possible perpetrator of domestic violence, and whose freedom of movement is restricted during the domestic violence risk assessment process. It concerns the provision allowing deprivation of liberty without offering adequate legal protection. According to the existing case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, being brought to the police station against one's will and being kept in custody amounts to deprivation of liberty, even if it lasts a short period of time and even if not being held in a cell, or not actually limited in movement or handcuffed (*Ostendorf v Germany* (2013)).

The Act leaves practically no possibility for nuances in the actions of police officers, thus making the envisaged solutions inconsistent with the principle of proportionality in restricting human rights (Simović, Stanković, Petrov 2018: 287-288; Simović, Petrov 2018: 120). Specifically, any restriction of human rights should be the minimum possible in given circumstances, and, certainly, not all situations will require keeping the potential abuser in custody for up to eight hours. Pursuant to the Constitution, 'when restricting human and minority rights, all public authorities, particularly the courts, shall be obliged to consider the substance of the restricted right, pertinence of restriction, nature and extent of

restriction, relation of restriction and its purpose and possibility to achieve the purpose of the restriction by less restrictive means' (Article 20, para 3).

Urgent measures are the key to the Act, and the number of measures imposed makes it appear that the Act was passed precisely for that purpose. Specifically, according to Biljana Popović Ivković, State Secretary of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MoI), in the period from June 1st, 2017 to July 15th, 2018, a total of 37,572 urgent measures were issued (Popović Ivković 2018)! This figure continues to rise progressively, not only undeniably reflecting the huge (increased) number of domestic violence reports, but also potentially indicating that the issuance of measures is driven by fear of liability, or by ensuring the so-called 'police coverage', in accordance with the lawmaker's intention from Article 15 of the Act. When imposing an urgent measure, a police officer is formally and legally less likely to make a mistake, while in instances of omitting to do so, where domestic violence results in a lethal or other consequences, the police officer will almost certainly be legally sanctioned for this omission. Hence such large number of issued measures. However, urgent measures should only be imposed in the event of immediate threat of domestic violence, hence, not in all instances and never without a proper thought. Nevertheless, expert legal drafters wanted to vest that striking instrument precisely in the hands of the police and they succeeded in that intention. Urgent measures are a complete novelty in our legal system, barely suitable for our conditions. Urgent measures ordered by the responsible police officer are effective 48 hours from the order being served on the perpetrator. Their extension is decided by an individual judge, without a hearing, therefore in a summary proceeding, and may last for 30 days. Additionally, there is no legal limitation on the number of extensions; the Act is not explicit about their being extendable just once, so they can be extended multiple times. The respective provisions are characterised by ambiguities, absence of mechanisms for their implementation, control and the like.

The practice of imposing urgent measures by police may interfere with some other constitutionally guaranteed human rights. The measure of temporary removal from the place of residence may also mean the restriction of property rights of the potential abus-

er. Depriving a person of the possibility to use own possessions, while not necessarily needed in some instances of imposing the measure of temporary removal, constitutes a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed peaceful enjoyment of property and other lawfully acquired property rights (Article 58, para 1). Moreover, if the person performs a business activity in own home, it can at the same time amount to the restriction of the right to work, potentially affecting not only the economic interests of the potential abuser, but also, existentially, the family itself as a whole.

Finally, another right that could be affected by imposing an urgent measure where no actual violence occurred is the parental right. The Constitution protects the right and duty of parents to support, provide upbringing and education to their children, recognising their being equal in doing so (Article 65, para 1). All or individual rights of either or both parents can be revoked or restricted merely by a court order, if it is in the best interest of the child, in accordance with law (Article 65, para 2). When an urgent measure is imposed, the restriction of parental rights of the potential abuser is inevitable, and it is a measure that is neither ordered by the court, nor does it considers the best interest of the child in the given situation.

Instead of conclusion

The attempt to create a more effective legal framework for public authorities' response to situations of domestic violence should be praised. The Act provides an extensive legal basis for imposing urgent measures, leaving the impression that it was the main intention of the lawmaker. Its application thus far undoubtedly proves this point. At the same time, this broadly defined legal basis for imposing urgent measures made this law a repressive mechanism, easily employed, even where not necessarily needed. The reverse side of simplicity and efficiency is high susceptibility to abuses. Undoubtedly necessary therefore are the solutions that will recognise more nuances of dealing with delicate family relationships so as to allow the taking of the most appropriate measures. Poor wording of the provisions on risk assessment disturbs the much-needed equilibrium which is the imperative of every legal system. Those provisions almost always lead either to the imposi-

tion of urgent measures or to the liability of police officers if they fail to impose them. Instead, the lawmaker should have provided for an objective assessment of domestic violence situation, using the nomotechnical diction of discretionary assessment, and only made it possible to impose urgent measures in instances of actual immediate threat of domestic violence.

It is fully justified to challenge the pretentious attempt of the lawmaker to make future criminal behaviour predictions possible and effective (Ristivojević 2017: 18). 'If these criteria are truly reliable in predicting future instances of domestic violence, why is the lawmaker not using them to predict all other criminal behaviours, or all other criminal offences?' Obviously, that is impossible, hence raising the issue of appropriateness of the Act's solutions as well.

The next issue arising is whether thus regulated urgent measures achieve the safety protection of victims of domestic violence. The answer seems to be negative, judging by violations of urgent measures and murders being committed while these measures are in effect. It is naïve to believe that a genuine abuser will adhere to the imposed measures. Measures can be effective with conscientious people, them being those who, as a rule, perform no violence. It means that legally conceptualised urgent measures, designed to meet the highest expectations, are, in fact, limited in scope.

In addition to the observed shortcomings primarily relating to the appropriateness of the legal solutions, the Act can also be challenged from the viewpoint of constitutionality. Hence, despite that a more efficient mechanism for the protection of victims of domestic violence has been in place, the lawmaker should have more wisely defined the solutions making sure that they do not at the same time violate fundamental human rights of persons who are merely potential perpetrators of violence. The Act should, therefore, be improved in such manner that will ensure its sustained effectiveness, and also avail the public authorities, primarily the police, with more measures that would, in a given situation, allow the choice of the optimal one against the potential abuser, which does not necessarily have to be repressive in nature.

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Strike And Power(Lessness) Of The Union

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify, on the basis of an analysis of the causes, the course and effects of strikes in Serbia over the last three decades, the mechanisms by which society and trade unions have moved from self-management mythology to the defense of whatever wages and “decent, dignified work” as the maximum goal. The drama of the decay of labor and trade unions, as well as the crisis of society, is presented in three chronologically related acts. The first one describes the process of decay concealed behind the call for patriotism, a kind of socialist-patriotic deception. The second one is the democratic introduction of capitalism through “predatory privatization”. The current, third act, illustrates how neoliberal populism seeks to pacify any resistance of employees and autonomous unions by creating their surrogates through political clientelism and party employment.

Keywords: strike, union, changes, class compromise, industrial relations

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Prologue: Strike – From the Revolutionary Myth to the Defensive Enforcement

In this paper, I proceed from a conflict theory of power and an understanding of industrial relations as a conflicting partnership between agents of labor and capital, trade unions and employers' associations, in which the state, itself an employer, creates a regulatory framework that reflects the established power relationship. I see the strike, its causes, course and effects, but also the very change in the rules of the game that regulate it, as a barometer of the current redistribution of influence and power (Stojiljković 2019a: 435).¹

The basic thesis I am trying to argue is that the analysis of strikes, but also the evolution of attitude towards it as a means of workers' struggle, helps us understand the road travelled from (1) revolutionary unionism and the myth of a general strike as an instrument of revolutionary change, through (2) "normalization" and regulation of strikes within the achieved class compromise expressed by the welfare state and pluralistic industrial relations and dialogue to (3) a current attempt to defend them, in which, within the disrupted distribution of power in favor of corporate capital in post-democratic or authoritarian-populist regimes, strike is regarded as the last, unwanted and enforced method of defending the interests of employees and trade unions.

Strike is a complex phenomenon that resists definition and causes many controversies². Notwithstanding all its numerous

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- 1) The high cost of a strike, as an open unregulated conflict, forces agents of labor, capital and political power to reach a compromise and its more or less developed institutionalization. Logically, an industrial relations crisis occurs when the system comes out of a relative balance – a balance of power in favor of a dominant actor and/or coalition. The message is, in fact, that the state of the conflicting partnership is "fluid", variable. It is determined, first of all, by the distribution of market power (control over the work process, chances in the labor market), and then by the political power (rating of a certain idea/concept and the number and influence of its social clientele on the political market). Penetration of turbo globalization practices, the process of digitization and precarization and flexibility of work, and the resulting domination of the corporate elite and the weakening of trade unions have the power of a paradigmatic example. Reduction of strikers' demands, as well as of collective bargaining and effective social dialogue practices are expected and intended consequences.

- 2) There are numerous forms of worker action aimed at harming the employer, which

developmental forms, it is indisputably a method of workers' or trade-union action, which implies interruption of work until certain requests are fulfilled. For example, the current law in Serbia defines a strike as an interruption of work organized by employees to protect their work-related professional and economic interests (Marinković 2001; Marinković 2012; Ivošević 2009).

Strike is a powerful activist tactic that has an immediate effect, since it represents a direct financial loss for employers and business owners. The result should be their strong interest in addressing the set requests, attracting the attention of the general public, as well as a clear demonstration of union unity and commitment to the needs of employees that cannot be ignored (Hadži-Kostić 2018: 9).

A "creative" contribution of the practice in Serbia and the reflection of the powerlessness of trade unions and employees are defensive strikes in companies where the volume of work has already been reduced or which have gone bankrupt or where such action is not a challenge for the entrepreneurs' business.

In terms of the quantitative criterion, that is, the extent and addressee of the request, a strike can be at a workplace, in a particular industry and a general strike.

As for the way the strike is carried out, we distinguish between warning strikes, circular and thrombosis strikes in which individual work processes are successively stopped, or the protest focuses on the most vulnerable place in the work process in order to achieve maximum effects with minimum cost, or sit-down or work-in strikes where a particular factory or institution is occupied.

From the point of union's rating, particularly interesting is a spontaneous ("wildcat") strike – a collective cessation of work that is not organized by the union or endorsed by the union during its duration. Underlying these strikes may be the clientelistic position of "yellow" unions towards employers and the state, the absence of communication between union structures and workers, as well

in theory are called strikes, although they are not, since they do not possess all the characteristics of a strike. These forms are: absenteeism from work (gray or white strike), work-to-rule, work-in where workers occupy the workplace and re-start production, and hunger strikes.

as the political instrumentalization of the strike, which is not supported by unions and the majority of employees.

Normative Regulation and Institutional Framework

During a heroic period in which unions and strikes were unrecognized, non-institutional factors, the myth of a general strike lay under the revolutionary trade unionists' and anarchists' idea of a radical change of the class society. Socialists assembled at the Second International also naively (or not sincerely) believed that a workers' general strike would, for example, end the First World War. By the way, both then, and in the case of war and breakup of the former Yugoslavia, it turned out that ethnic alignment of workers and trade unions had catastrophic consequences for themselves.

Within the class compromise achieved after the World War II, that is, within the concept of social partnership between labor and capital, labor-law standards recognize the right to strike, together with other collective labor rights, explicitly or implicitly, to all workers, regardless of the legal basis of their work for the employer. The right to strike is primarily prescribed by national constitutions and laws, but also by numerous international instruments. In the context of global sources of the right to strike, the documents adopted by the International Labor Organization are particularly significant. Although no recommendation or convention directly regulating the issue of strike has been adopted within the ILO, this right is considered to be implicitly recognized by the Freedom of Association Convention. The Resolution of 1970 on trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties invites the Governing Body and the Director-General of the International Labor Organization to take action in several directions to ensure full and universal respect for trade union rights in the broadest sense, including the right to strike (Gernigon et al. 2000).

As for the European concept of strike regulation, it is characterized by non-uniformity and numerous communitarian and

3) The term European non-communitarian labor law means documents produced under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the most important of which are: the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

non-communitarian sources of law (Warneck 2007)⁴. The case law itself plays a significant role (Bojić 2010; Kostić 2014).

The object of negotiation and the quest for an acceptable balance of power, therefore, now include not only the strike requests, but also the normative design and conditions for organizing a strike at an acceptable social cost: the manner of deciding to go on strike, the obligation to have a specific quorum and the obligation to vote on strike; the obligation to announce a strike; the obligation to resort to conciliation and/or voluntarily accepted arbitration before going on strike; the obligation to establish measures to ensure the protection of health and safety at work; the obligation to maintain a minimum service level; conditions regarding the representation and organization of the strike (strike committees), as well as limiting the lock-out and guaranteeing striker's rights⁵. A strike can, as a

Freedoms, the European Social Charter and the Revised European Social Charter. The right to take collective action is in most European countries guaranteed by the constitution, with the exception of Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In Germany and Finland this right arises from the freedom of association. The lack of precise legislation has imposed the need to regulate this topic through the developed case law. This is the case in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Greece and Ireland represent two countries where this topic is governed by both legal and precedent law, and this is somewhat true of France, at least in relation to the public sector.

- 4) The term European non-communitarian labor law means documents produced under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the most important of which are: the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Social Charter and the Revised European Social Charter. The right to take collective action is in most European countries guaranteed by the constitution, with the exception of Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In Germany and Finland this right arises from the freedom of association. The lack of precise legislation has imposed the need to regulate this topic through the developed case law. This is the case in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Greece and Ireland represent two countries where this topic is governed by both legal and precedent law, and this is somewhat true of France, at least in relation to the public sector.
- 5) LOCK-OUT – temporary closure of business premises by the employer or prohibition for a sufficiently large number of workers to access their workplaces, in order to put pressure on workers and the union to give up their demands. The types of lock-outs are: preventive or offensive (the employer decides to implement a lock-out before the strike), defensive (the employer decides to implement a lock-out after the strike in his company has started), ex-post or retaliatory (a decision on lock-out is made

rule, be prohibited only during war and in emergency situations, as well as in vital activities.

Regulatory Strategies to Make Strike Pointless or Marginalized

One of the reliable indicators of the power and political influence of trade unions is the “class struggle in the field of law“, especially the efforts of employers’ lobbies to weaken the position of trade unions through a strategy that toughens conditions and extends the deadlines for organizing strikes, thus, practically, preventing broader “political” and solidarity strikes.

Methods for organizing and holding a strike

Instead of negotiating with strikers how to overcome the problem, employers often use the time between the announcement and the beginning of strike to “persuade” the strikers to abandon the idea of strike. The methods of influence vary, from promising privileges to those who quit a strike, through “friendly advising” that what they do is unwise, to open threats and pressures (threat of dismissal, degradation, fines, withholding of assistance, etc.). The counter-strategy of the union is to seek to shorten the deadline for announcing a strike and to allow a spontaneous strike to be held in the event of a violation of basic labor rights (Miljković 2004a, 2004b).

A special strike regime

The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association stipulates that limiting the right to strike by a minimum service requirement is only allowed in essential public services. As an example of

by the employer after the strike ends) and solidarity lock-out. On the other hand, an employee participating in the strike exercises basic rights in employment, except for the right to wage, and social security rights – in accordance with social security regulations. During a strike organized under the conditions laid down by law, the employer may not employ “strikebreakers” of persons to replace the strike participants unless the security of persons and property is endangered, it is necessary to maintain a minimum of the process that ensures the security of property and persons or the fulfillment of international obligations.

essential services, the Committee lists: the hospital sector, water and electricity supply, air traffic control, the police and the armed forces, the fire-fighting services, prison services, the provision of food to pupils in schools and the cleaning of schools, the telephone services. With regard to civil servants, the right to strike may, in the opinion of the Committee, be restricted or prohibited only to civil servants acting on behalf of the public authorities (Kostić 2014)⁶.

Indicatively, there are many examples in Serbia of the established minimum service requirements that go beyond international law and practice. One of the most problematic is the minimum service level required by law for teachers and non-teaching professionals in primary and secondary schools, of 30 and 40 minutes per hour, respectively, within the daily schedule. This represents between 65% and nearly 90% of their regular hours, rendering the right to strike in these activities meaningless (Miljković 2006).

Therefore, the key problem in Serbia is the fact that activities that prohibit a strike are too broadly defined, and so are activities of general interest in which strike can be organized only if a unilaterally established and broadly defined minimum service requirement is ensured.

Political and solidarity strikes

A political strike is a strike the purpose of which is a request that cannot be directly fulfilled by the employer. The object of a political strike is a request of a labor-law nature, but its fulfillment is requested from the state or the legislator. In the view of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, purely political strikes do not fall within the scope of the principle of freedom of association, but unions should be able to have recourse to protest strikes, especially where aimed at criticizing a government's economic and social policies.

On the other hand, according to the Draft Strike Law of 2018, a solidarity strike in Serbia cannot be used to support strikers with another employer if that employer does not belong to the same

6) In Serbia, strike is not allowed for professional members of the Serbian Armed Forces, in medical institutions providing emergency medical care, for members of the Security Intelligence Agency.

industry and the same territory. The solidarity strike and support for strikers abroad are also excluded, while the duration of the strike is limited to one day only. Such restrictions largely make the solidarity strike pointless as a means of union action.

The draft Strike Law, compared to the current Strike Law adopted back in 1996, indeed brings about significant improvements. For example, it legalizes the practice that employees may strike outside the employer's business premises, that they are entitled to wages/salaries if the reasons for the strike are unpaid wages/salaries, that only the court can declare a strike unlawful, while the powers of the Labor Inspectorate have been strengthened.

However, the Strike Law is still not an umbrella law, since the Draft Law provides for the implementation of other special laws, by-laws and regulations already in force and restricts the right to strike in many activities (Stojiljković 2018).

A Short History of Serbian Employees' Experiences with Protest in the Period of Transition

In times of transition, workers' protests passed through three tides and ebbs. First, in the 1990s "years of lead", the newly aroused protests were replaced by rallying around ethnic causes – "people came to protest as workers and left as Serbs" (Nebojša Popov). After 1996/1997, workers have "awakened" and their resistance and withdrawal of support, such as the strike in the Kolubara mine, have significantly facilitated change. This was followed by a short honeymoon for citizens and new democratic authorities.

After 2002/2003, in response to failed privatizations, bankruptcies and dismissals, followed a new tide of protests. In an atmosphere of hopelessness, they sometimes assumed radical forms of hunger strike and occupation of premises.

The specific feature of current strikes in the age of populism is reflected in the (un)concealed support of the authorities to corporate capital and their own appointees at the helm of public enterprises, with a proven political formula – appeals to workers and citizens for their understanding and support to "authorities who are working in the long-term interest of the people".

The era of patriotic decay

The effect of the war adventure and the economic collapse of the country on workers is best seen through the wage movement: in December 1990, the average wage in Serbia was DEM 752, two years later it was DEM 132, in September 1993 DEM 34, and in December of that same year a “fascinating” amount of DEM 5-10 (Pavlović and Marković 2013: 319).

War and economic blockade was also the framework in which workers became deprived of their economic power, while translation of social ownership and group shareholding were fraudulently carried out by their nationalization. Without managerial responsibilities and risk, the socialist directors actually became managers and owners’ representatives. It is somewhat cynical that this operation took advantage of an amendment to the privatization law, proposed by the opposition, which sought to annul the “inflationary gain”, i.e. the share in ownership based on shares acquired under credit terms at the peak of inflation.

The logic of survival of this, by economic and social parameters failed government, that is, a successful substitution of a class identity with a threatened national identity, is best expressed by successfully implemented, unproductive “social marriage of convenience” established through the formula “no layoffs while sanctions last”. The point is that the government pacified workers by introducing the so-called forced leaves. Everyone who agreed to take the leave of absence received 80% of their earnings. They also retained all rights relating to employment. By the end of 1993, there were already about 600,000 workers on forced leave.

Yet workers did not quite give up strikes during the difficult 1990s. However, the most common causes for powerless strikes were irregular wage payments and a lack of staple food items. For example, employees in education and health care demanded flour, oil and sugar (items commonly termed BUŠ in those times, after their Serbian acronym).

With the aggravation of crisis, hyperinflation, but also widespread civil protests and an indication that a change of government is likely, there has been a new tide of strikes.

Public attention was particularly drawn to workers at the FOM foundry in Belgrade, who organized a hunger strike following a decision by the factory management to put about 2,500 workers on forced leave. In the spring of 1995, textile workers, leather workers and shoemakers rallied at the Union Hall to express their discontent at their demands being ignored. In the fall, workers in the Rakovica industrial complex, arms-makers in Kragujevac and Serbian Power Sector (EPS) resorted to strike. Teachers went on strike on 1 February 1996. They completely ceased work for 4 days. More than 10,000 teachers gathered with parents of their pupils outside the government building. Healthcare workers suspended their work for 9 days – 20-29 May.

In late summer 1997, a strike broke out in the Belgrade City Transport Company (GSP). After the opposition won elections in Belgrade, the state suspended subsidies for fuel, parts, as well as any other support for the GSP. A two-day strike reduced the number of vehicles on the streets to a third of the regular. For the first time in its 106-year long history, GSP vehicles remained in garages for six days.

However, what finally defeated Slobodan Milošević was a strike by the Kolubara mine workers. The strike officially began shortly after the elections, on 29 September 2000. A few days later, on 4 October, about 1,000 Ministry of the Interior specialists arrived at the mines. The main organizers of the strike faced arrest as they were suspected of endangering the security of the state. The next day the whole of Serbia was at Kolubara. It is the most beautiful event I have experienced in Serbia so far. Radio Lazarevac reported on everything that was happening there. With joint forces, the resistance was broken on the same day. The next day, hundreds of thousands of people from all over the country came to Belgrade (Rusovac and Jovetić 2002). The 12-year long rule of Slobodan Milošević ended thanks to strikes that eventually changed the balance of power.

The final milestone result of the first decade of pseudoprivatization is that the unreformed economy in such an environment operates in a kind of a twilight zone – the clash of lobbies and clans close to authorities over the distribution of monopoly rents and import-export quotas. With the support of political patronage,

it is necessarily directed-corrupt economy – a Balkan variant of Weber’s political capitalism and the transformation of political into economic power. But it is also the scene of a reverse process, the politically corrupt, even criminalized action of the “new” economic power-mongers.

The influence of politics was decisive, often extremely arbitrary and narrowly party-motivated to stay in power. Thus, in this period, a pattern of rule has been established that will continue to function in the following stages.

On the social stage, representatives of public authorities and a few large “capable” private businessmen favored by the government play the lead roles all the time. All the others – the vast majority of the population, employees and unions, but also market-oriented private entrepreneurs – are all extras and losers (Stojiljković 2011: 334).

An age of market enthusiasm and the imposition of capitalism

The revolutionary post-October euphoria and honeymoon of citizens and democratic authorities in 2000 was soon superseded by severe sobering. The ensuing wave of strikes was the result of a delayed reaction to the efforts of corporate capital, with the assistance of the authorities, “to seize, preserve and increase the most important sources of social power as soon as possible, with the least obstruction by the employed workers” (Novaković 2005: 310).

The new political elite has opted for privatization and labor and social legislation that, with the previous devastating effects of wars and destruction, further weakened workers’ position. The Privatization Law, adopted in 2001, was the first step in this direction. It was followed by an amendment to this law in 2003, which introduced a ban on bargaining of amendments to the provisions of a collective agreement in an enterprise undergoing privatization. This provision violates the European Union labor law, as well as numerous conventions that emphasize that there can be no violation or restriction of the right to collective bargaining (Stajić 2006: 25).

After the initial confusion of trade unions and reluctance to accept the role of a “disruptive factor and barrier to reforms”,

a wave of strikes began from 2005. Strikes occurred in Zastava in Kragujevac, JAT, Nisal, Župa in Kruševac, Autotransport in Kostolac. Miners also went on strike in RTB Bor and Kolubara. The strike by aviation mechanics at JAT airlines has caught media attention as workers on strike were threatened with dismissals and strikebreakers have been brought in from Tunisia.

Due to the unfavorable balance of powers, strikes after 5 October took a very specific form. Workers have replaced conventional work stoppages with more demanding and riskier forms of action, such as rallying outside government institutions and local parliaments, blocking roads and railways, hunger strikes, and even various forms of self-harm.

Establishment of a pattern: the case of Jugoremedija

The struggle of Jugoremedija's workers, which began before this wave of strikes, has attracted the greatest attention of the general public. Namely, while the 1997 Privatization Law was in force, a part of the workers managed to buy shares and thus became majority owners of the factory. Although the plant was doing well after the changes of 5 October, the new government decided in 2002 to sell its stake to entrepreneur Jovica Stefanović. After a few months, Stefanović managed to prove to the Commercial Court the debt of Jugoremedija to one of his companies, then to convert the debt into equity and to register with the court as the majority owner of Jugoremedija.

In order to draw public attention to these irregularities, in 2003 the trade union leader Vladimir Pecikoza and the representative of small shareholders Zdravko Deurić chained themselves to the factory gate to symbolically show their attachment to the factory. A few days later, a union at the factory declared a strike.

After a series of protests, the Privatization Agency finally decided in May 2004 to terminate the contract with Jovica Stefanović. The workers occupied the factory trying to save the machines, though no judgment concerning the ownership of the company was given. Stefanovic hired a private security company with the intention of regaining control of the factory. During the summer of that year, physical confrontations between workers and

security personnel engaged by management occurred on several occasions.

In August 2004, police in Zrenjanin arrested several workers after a physical confrontation between strikers and private security personnel. To support the arrested workers, fifteen of their colleagues went on a hunger strike out of solidarity, locking themselves in the city's union premises. In a conflict in which one co-owner has a private army in front of him, the government opted to hold the hands of the weaker one while the other beats him (B92 2004). The Anti-Corruption Council has warned the Government that small shareholders are being unjustifiably deprived of their protection, in violation of their right to private property. Workers remained persistent in their struggle. The protests continued for another three years and attracted the interest of the media and critically-minded intellectuals worldwide who signed a petition to support the Zrenjanin workers.

Such perseverance has not been demonstrated in any other case of workers' struggle. However, 14 years later, the state of Serbia has not yet investigated the case of the Zrenjanin pharmaceutical factory "Jugoremedija", although it is one of the 24 disputed privatizations whose review was requested by the European Union.

Strikes and crisis

After the World Economic Crisis of 2008, foreign investments drastically declined, while Serbia was required to repay billions of euros of increased debt on borrowings. Serbia was steps away from bankruptcy. The shock therapy chosen by reformers as the path of transformation of Serbia has led to an enormous increase in indebtedness and a re-increase in the unemployment rate. In a situation where employees were paralyzed by the crisis, workers from unsuccessfully privatized companies were pushed to the forefront of the fight against government policy. In 2007 and 2008, the unions organized May Day protests with about 50,000 participants. The most frequent requirements were: payment of wage arrears; meal allowances; return from forced leaves; cessation of dismissals; change of management; payment of contributions to maintain continuity of pensionable service; reviewing disputable

privatizations (Musić 2013: 43). Direct action has often been the result of a sense of hopelessness, isolation and frustration with the general disinterest in workers' problems rather than of the confidence in their own strength and faith in the attainability of strike goals (Musić 2013: 45).

Blockade of institutions

Businessman Đorđe Nicović bought the once successful textile factory Nitex in Niš. Its workforce of 2,400 was reduced to a third – only 800 employees, who received irregular wages below the minimum wage, until their payment stopped altogether in 2008. Nitex workers blocked city institutions in Niš several times, seeking urgent resolution of the problem.

The strike was officially announced in November 2008, but was only noticed by the media in the summer of 2009, when about 500 factory workers blocked entry to employees of the Niš City Hall, demanding payment of wage arrears, bridging the gaps in pensionable service and payment of contributions (Todorović 2009).

On that occasion, a group of workers climbed on the roof and threatened to jump unless the state resolved their problem. Following this strike, the Privatization Agency terminated the contract with Nicović. In 2011, the Italian fashion house Benetton bought it at a public auction at the Privatization Agency.

Hunger strike

The screw factory Gradac in Valjevo was privatized in 2006, when Dušan Sekulić bought it for 81 million dinars through one of his companies registered in Moscow. After privatization, production levels dropped from 300 to 14 tones of screw goods a month. Workers thought that production was reduced with an intention to shut down the company because of the attractive land on which the factory was located. As a result, they went on strike in April 2010. As the protest did not echo in public, seven workers occupied the factory and started a hunger strike, without contact with the outside world. Many feared for the health of the workers when the plant management shut off water supply in the part of the factory where the workers were on strike. The hunger strike lasted for a full month before negotiations resumed, with the intervention of the state.

During the strike, Dušan Sekulić threatened lawsuits against all those who support the workers on strike. After this strike, he abandoned the offered reorganization plan. Bankruptcy ensued, followed by the liquidation of the company and 260 workers lost their jobs.

The threat of collective suicide

Zastava elektro showed the greatest grit in this wave of strikes. The workers of this company managed to secure the support of citizens and persevere in the fight for respect of their rights despite the pressures. At an auction in 2006, Ranko Dejanović bought 70% of the factory's capital. On that occasion, he undertook to invest in fixed assets and production. However, except for not receiving wages for months, the workers could not get medical care because Dejanović did not pay health insurance contributions. Among other things, it turned out that Dejanović and his partners received more than 150 million dinars from the Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia to pay debts to workers. However, the money was gone and the debts were not repaid. In March 2009, workers went on strike with a request for payment of wage arrears. Over the coming months, they organized protests in front of the local city hall, the police station and the headquarters of the Privatization Agency in Belgrade. They also blocked the railroad by laying on the rails as a threat of collective suicide (Musić 2013: 47).

Under public pressure, in September 2009, Ranko Dejanović relinquished his ownership in favor of the Republic of Serbia. After the new owner, Yura, took over the factory, the workers opted to leave the factory with severance pay.

We could conclude that heroic but futile resistance is the result of the cumulative effect of: (1) the privatization process chosen, (2) the climate of dissemination of pro-market mantra as something that has no alternative, along with (3) the crisis of solidarity and the spread of fear of job loss, (4) parallel union pacification and targeted changing of labor legislation to the detriment of workers. The process of "imposing" capitalism has only become harsher and more visible as the economic crisis erupted.

The essence of the far-reaching transformation of power relations was very plastically expressed by Dragana Maletić. “Ever since economic experts overnight transformed socially-owned property into private property, and workers into miserables on standby, living on humanitarian aid, soup kitchens, occasional small-scale underground jobs and political promises that production is about to start, social revolt escalated, year after year. The escalation of the social revolt went hand in hand with the incompetent running of the companies and the managers’ arbitrariness to which the new labor laws, not very generous to the workers, offered many opportunities” (Maletić 2012: 42).

Strike in the (populist) “Jurassic” era

The fight against corruption and tycoons and, in this context, for the revision of “predatory privatizations”, has been the most promising pre-election hit for decades. During the 2012 campaign, the Serbian Progressive Party was the most vocal advocate for the revision of controversial privatizations, in which the state sustained damage amounting to millions of dinars. When he came to power, Aleksandar Vučić said that one of the Government’s priorities would be to examine privatizations which the European Commission assessed as controversial. However, the final outcome of the process is nowhere in sight.

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of stabilizing and consolidating the economy, as well as reducing the oversized public sector, a model of economy that in fact functions as a fusion of predatory, corporate and party capital and capitalism has been perfected.

At the same time, the level of precarization of labor increased through the use of: workforce leasing and temporary employment agencies, encouraging vulnerable and difficult (self-)employment, work in the informal sector with or without a contract, as well as the growth of the “gig economy” in the media and creative industries.

When strikes and widespread social protests occur despite the established safety net of party appointments and recruitment, the government either declares itself incompetent or discourages protests and finds their political background.

The payroll paid from the government funds and the amount of government subsidies to Fiat-Chrysler, as well as Prime Minister Brnabić's persistent and unfinished pursuit of the hidden political backdrop of the strike, are more than illustrative of the pattern of the established behavior. Previously, the Government, supporting the "practice" of the Italian employer not to bargain under the pressure of a strike, put pressure on the workers, demanding that its mediation be rewarded with a decision to suspend or "freeze" the strike. In the end, the strike ended with a Strike Cease Agreement which was treated as a business secret. This is obviously a creative practice that repeatedly violates one's own legislation.

The strikes thus speak about positions taken – the state acts as a second to corporate capital. The state fails to implement its own legislation to foreign owners and public companies occupied through the distribution of spoils – they are allowed not to pay taxes and contributions, insurance, health care for employees, and even utilities.

A state that cannot provide its citizens with a way to collect what they have honestly earned is a form of interest coalition of the rich and the powerful. Otherwise, it would not be possible for workers to file 12 criminal charges against those responsible in Goša, without any of them being prosecuted. The Criminal Code is otherwise clear: a criminal offense is defined in Article 163 – "Whoever deliberately fails to comply with the laws or other regulations, collective agreements and other general acts on labor rights and thereby deprives or restricts another person's right shall be punished with a fine or imprisonment of up to two years."

Instead, the state proposes bankruptcy for Goša, and at the same time assists the owner by rescheduling his debt to the state for unpaid taxes and contributions (although the debt relating to unpaid contributions is actually a debt to workers). Finally, in the midst of a crisis and strike, a company that owes about four million euros (500 million dinars) for taxes and contributions alone is being sold to another foreign company, with a dubious ownership structure, as it will turn out, and with the sole purpose of the Slovakian owner to get rid of its debts.

The Forgotten and the Despised: The Powerlessness of Unions as the Effect of a Widespread and Successful Anti-Union Strategy

Strikes are indicators of the imbalance of market and political power at the expense of trade unions and employees, but also of the peripheral position of Serbia.

Strikes in Goša and Fiat-Chrysler or the appeal “not to scare away foreign investors with hue and cry about Yura” are just a few examples. Any mention of dignified work sounds ironic and irritating to those faced with columns of young people leaving the country, wages and pensions nailed to the bottom in an otherwise poor region, despite reiterated political promises, examples of “humane” labor relationships such as Yura and the Geox. Otherwise, a right to decent work is a basic human right – meaning contracted, legal, safe and adequately paid work (Stojiljković 2019b).

As a consequence, two representative trade unions – the Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia and the Trade Union Confederation „Nezavisnost“ – decided in 2019 to withdraw from the work of the Social and Economic Council of Serbia until the problems of protecting employees and union members exposed to pressures and threats have been resolved. The months-long strike of the employees of the Republic Geodetic Authority (RGZ) and the repression that followed were practically the reason for this decision.

RGZ is an illustrative example, because it is an institution under the direct authority of the Ministry of Construction, that is, the executive power, with heavy investments made in its reorganization, modernization and digitization. It is indicative that such an organization has passed the way from pacifying employees by reducing their rights, through marginalization to open pressure and dictation against employees and unions when they have decided, after unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement and mediation by the Agency for Peaceful Dispute Resolution, to go on strike⁷.

7) The “revolutionary and unacceptable” demands of the strike referred to: (1) adjusting the salaries of employees to the decisions of the RS Government on the increase of bases in 2018 and 2019, as well as the increase based on seniority, which has been withheld since 2015; (2) the Government of the RS was requested by the unions

The fact that the slow work of the RGZ services is affecting the interests of businesses and citizens has been used throughout the strike to demonize the unions participating in it. The fact that the second, resumed strike was the result of the management's failure to observe the agreement, to which the Serbian Government was a co-signatory, also borders on incredible.

The government's awkward and uncoordinated reaction in the case of the RGZ justifiably raises the question of whether it also involves a coupling between interests and (hidden) business relationships and arrangements. How else can it be explained that the employer ignores two agreements signed by the Government representatives?

Dictation also includes threats of dismissal, relocation, pressure to withdraw from the membership of "unfit" unions with an intention of making them lose their representativeness, while supporting and directly forming their own „suitable“ unions. At the same time, one's own trade union clientele is created from the ranks of those who are about to be transferred from work under fixed-term contract to employment for an indefinite period.

When, with the involvement and solidarity of international union forums and their union centers, unions regained their representativeness "lost" during many days of counting and pressures, they were faced with hours-long interrogations of union representatives and visits by police who demand to see members' entry forms, statutes of the respective center or branch union and decisions on election of representatives.

to reconsider and endorse the proposals of the unions, which were agreed with the RGZ management and the Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure; (3) the unions requested from the RS Government and the Ministry of Finance to provide funds in the budget for the smooth operation of the RGZ, the remuneration of employees under the signed Agreement, as well as for the salaries of newly employed workers upon completion of the procedure for filling the announced vacancies. The conflict has escalated virtually from the first day of the strike when pressure from the management and requests to sign lists and statements from those who went on strike began. This attitude and behavior of the employer led to the decision to institute criminal charges against the director for gross violation of trade union freedoms, discrimination of employees and violation of the right to strike. At the same time, the unions also approached the Labor Inspectorate and asked for the review of the decisions made by the RGZ during the strike and against the participants in the strike.

As a result, Serbia has been rated 4 on the Global Trade Union Rights Index for many years, which indicates a systematic violation of trade union rights. It is not an arbitrary score but a complex, composite index consisting of 5 elements with 97 indicators. They refer to the collective rights of employees to: (1) civil liberties, (2) the right to establish or join a union, as well as the rights to (3) trade union activities, (4) collective bargaining and (5) strike.

Party appointments underlie this unconcealed political arrogance. Voting as ordered as well as being taken to attend party-state manifestations dangerously shifts labor relations into the field of involuntary political participation (Stojiljković 2019b).

The effect is the logic of self-preservation and pervasive apathy and indifference. As the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev (2013) wrote in the book with the indicative title “In Mistrust We Trust” – a state of internal and/or external emigration is emerging, encompassing the whole nation. The resultant powerlessness and mistrust of citizens toward e.g. the civil sector, the media or trade unions, is, of course, the result of, besides their own deficits, a conscious intention to destroy and deprive of meaning, or at least to put under firm control anything that is not already under controlled by the populist leader and his clientelistic network.

The analysis of workers’ strikes points to three possible lessons. Firstly, the government is on the side of employers (foreign capital) always, or as long as it is politically viable – in the case of requests for dismissal and responsibility of those it has previously appointed to managerial positions in the (quasi) public sector. The appointees, with an extensive system of protection, connections and deals, are often more powerful than (parts of) the Government.

Secondly, even when negotiating, the authorities do that in an untimely and ineffective manner so that protests last until such time when strikers, under the pressure of threats and/or negative reactions from the public affected by the non-provision of services, give in and accept minor concessions that do not change anything substantially.

Thirdly, even when concessions are made, this is interpreted as a sign of the responsible political leadership’s goodwill and


performed through contacts beyond any legitimate bargaining procedure. One of the examples of populist demagoguery at work is the agreement between “self-organized” postal workers with the “line” minister of police to change the collective bargaining agreement and to apply the principle of flat-rate wage increase, achieved by ignoring trade unions and bargaining procedure.

Consequently, the atmosphere in which only one in five citizens has confidence in trade unions and a clear pro-union identity, as shown by a survey, is perhaps best expressed by the finding of the same survey, showing that campaigns of solidarity with the degraded and disempowered are supported by less than half of citizens – 40% (Stojiljković 2019a: 368-370).

Against this background and having in view previous negative experiences, it is not surprising that protests and strikes for the vast majority of employees are justified and legitimate, but also a practically coerced tool that is implemented only when a solution acceptable to employees could not be reached through dialogue.

Trade unions’ activity to improve the position of employees, the unemployed and pensioners

In your opinion, what would trade unions have to do to improve the position of employees, but also of the unemployed and pensioners? What of the listed activities, in your opinion, would trade unions have to do?



Source: Stojiljković, 2019a.

Instead of an Epilogue

In a state of drastic imbalance of power and lack of effective solidarity and trade-union unity, conventional work stoppages were replaced by rallies outside government institutions and local parliaments, road and railroad blockades, and hunger strikes.

At the same time, the three main motives for participating in parallel broader civil protests are: violation of democratic freedoms and procedures, political clientelism and corruption, and growing social inequalities and precarious position – loss of job security and certainty.

The logical question is: Is it possible to have an alliance between the educated, middle-class with declining influence which forms the backbone of protests, and workers and trade unions who have been suppressed for decades? Provided we still have some genuine, upright workers and intelligentsia whose serious qualifications render them unsusceptible to be cheaply hired? My starting point is that this alliance is possible under two mutually linked assumptions. First, that the middle class shows more solidarity and is more socially inclusive. Secondly, that workers and unions fully realize that better labor and social legislation and higher wages and less inequality are not possible without the rule of law, free elections, autonomous media and open and independent institutions. The key problem is how to awaken and free from the regime's iron embrace the poorest ones who are held in obedience by occasional almsgiving.

I do not know whether this alliance of the working class and the middle class is currently operationally possible, but I know that it is necessary – indispensable for every democratic option and outcome. *United we stand! Divided we beg!* – a slogan coined in the US 150 years ago to promote worker association and solidarity, is more relevant in Serbia today than ever. The question of all questions is: Are changes that will be both democratic and socially sustainable and fair still possible in Serbia?

The analysis of “pre-revolutionary situations” shows that one must first delegitimize the existing system and create an image of a possible, different world, of Serbia as a framework for a desirable

future. Therefore, (1) belief in the existence of a realistic alternative to the existing situation, “Serbia in which I would like to live”, (2) competent actors who can be trusted and, (3) own activism and actual solidarity at work, are fundamental prerequisites for change.

Such changes are possible, provided there is a developed change strategy and unity of actors, but they are unlikely, at least for the time being. However, nothing can be more helpful to civil society, trade unions in particular, than the mobilizing image of unity in bargaining and/or protest. This is also the only way that “partners” can begin to respect them.

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
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 Book review

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Mitrović, Dragana. 2019.
From Socialist Modernization
to Chinese Dream. Belgrade:
Institute for Asian Studies,
306 p.**

The book *From Socialist Modernization to Chinese Dream* consists of five chapters, each of them containing scientific papers published domestically or abroad in the last three decades, conference proceedings and interviews by Professor Dragana Mitrović, PhD, thoughtfully arranged depending on the matter. This compilation book, as Mitrović calls it, was published in the year of her academic career jubilee, marking thirty years of its beginning.

The first chapter, *Reform and Opening up – Globalization Revisited* starts with a text dating back from 1995, which in many ways has remained relevant to this day. While the world was caught up with the “unipolar moment”, Mitrović showed deeper understanding of international politics, and anticipated a multipolar structure, shaped by the Chinese expanding influence or at least a global arena in which the People’s Republic of China is a significant competitor to the USA. However, her analysis has never been one-sided or

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biased, but has rather acknowledged the main problems China copes with. Accordingly, the text incorporated obstacles China faced at the time: uneven economic development of the regions and central government's authority weakening (pp. 11–12.) In conclusion, Mitrović emphasized Chinese specificity in comparison with other countries in the context of her opening up to various forms of communication in the setting of world interdependence.

The second paper in this chapter is dedicated to researching whether foreign direct investment can be viewed as the main contributing factor in the Chinese economic growth and development. Even though there's undeniable significance of FDI throughout the years of Chinese reforms, Mitrović's stance suggests it has been secondary to domestic investment and savings. She offers several indicators proving this argument, the world economic crisis being one of it.

The next text, presented at a conference, also has the world economic crisis at its focus. Having in mind the scope and depth of the crisis in the highly globalized world, the main question concerning many

scholars at the time was whether China would have been able to overcome the consequences and continue her economic growth. Once again Mitrović argues that China quickly had to shift from export to investment and domestic demand as growth engines (p. 40). However, in spite of the exacerbating external factors, as well as internal obstacles, she concludes that the overall economic growth of China hasn't been jeopardized.

After focusing on economic components of Chinese reforms in the changing context of global economy, Mitrović turns to the political aspects emerging out of this policy. The next paper presented in the first chapter is dedicated to China's border issues, which seem inevitable given the country's position and characteristics. One of the most important disputes to settle was obviously the border issue with USSR, and subsequently The Russian Federation. The reform and opening up policy served both as a goal and as a facilitating factor in this long and difficult process, showing that the need for economic transactions can be used as a mean for achieving political understanding. However, with ever-expanding economic ties alongside Chinese borders with

adjacent countries, the nontraditional security threats such as human trafficking, illegal trade and crossovers, epidemics and negative externalities, have also proliferated.

The concept of borders in a globalized world is discussed in the last text of the first chapter. Mitrović argues that borders are still quintessential in contemporary politics, even though regional and other forms of integration seemingly undermine their significance. According to Mitrović, we live in the “era of state sovereignty” (p. 69), which makes territorial and maritime sovereignty disputes as relevant as ever. Here Mitrović also underscores the importance of energy security as a geopolitical and national security issue.

The second chapter of the book, *Rising China and Global Governance*, encompasses five texts dating from 2005 to 2017. Mitrović, in a similar manner as in the first chapter, commences with a text which opens up a discussion on one of the most asked questions in the 21st century. Given the Chinese economic growth, and her becoming a global economic force, the question remains if China is going to pursue the status of a superpower. However, Mitro-

vić’s stance regarding China as a superpower at the time was that this country was “neither ideologically nor economically ready nor willing to waste its resources on a global military presence” (p. 78). As it turns out to be, Mitrović’s prediction on the matter remains appropriate to the present day. China has been gradually investing resources in her maritime power, nevertheless, this country has never tried to expand its military presence through numerous military bases or agreements, and she therefore still insists on a non-military way of achieving strategic interests.

When the time this text was written is taken into account, it’s not unusual that energy dependence was an important concern. In many ways, this is, even nowadays, one of the biggest issue areas in Chinese national security. Mitrović compares the Chinese security concept revolving around cooperation to the Western countries’ one in this text and emphasizes the Sino-American relations as a crucial point in Chinese security.

According to Mitrović, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization poses a challenge for American dominance in

Asia. Not only is this organization a great opportunity for China and other Asian countries economically, it also provides a framework for security issues. Some differences, seen as obstacles in the West, can be considered a basis for mutual understanding and building ties, in order for SCO to become a successful multinational actor.

Explaining the Chinese rise and its impact demands a wider approach, i.e. an overview of contemporary global political economy, which Mitrović provides in the next part of the second chapter. She underscores the importance of analyzing the global structure, actors and institutions as a broader context for explaining the role of China internationally. Mitrović mentions the consequences of declining American power and of the Eurozone crisis. In addition to that, she considers Chinese and Russian rise very important for the changing global structure. China's rise was very specific, since it hadn't followed the usual patterns of projecting military power and, particularly interesting, since it happened in a political system very different from the Western type. Seeing and portraying herself as a benevolent and non-challenging actor in the

international arena, and aligning with the Third World and developing countries, China adapted to the changing circumstances throughout history and gradually improved her position in the global order. Mitrović concludes this paper critiquing the unequal distribution of wealth, as one of the biggest problems of modern societies.

As stated in an interview for the Greek *Documento* by Mitrović, Donald Trump's policy towards the Indo-Pacific region differs from his predecessor's. The next paper in the chapter is dedicated to Trump's first presidential visit to Asia-Pacific, with every country along the way included. Most importantly, according to Mitrović, during Trump's visit to China, there was a sentiment of equality between two countries. The meeting of two presidents depicted the new Chinese role, the one based on her transition from a Third World, developing country to a significant international actor. However, the APEC Summit showed that two statesmen had very different approaches to regional dynamics.

The third chapter – *Chinese Dream and the Belt and Road Initiative* – consists of

two comprehensive papers on the ongoing Chinese initiative, its strategic goals, expected obstacles within the implementation, and attempts of making a new international economic order, more suitable one in the altering circumstances. Even though BRI is an extremely complex issue to grasp, Mitrović provides an impressive analysis of the matter in its entirety. She classifies the strategic goals behind the initiative into internal (such as finding another growth engine, finding a market for certain materials because of their overproduction and workforce surplus, renminbi yuan internationalization, and providing legitimacy for the Communist Party, as well as achieving a more balanced growth of the country throughout its regions) and external which mainly revolve around asserting Chinese economic and political power along the designated routes. However, no matter the scope of the initiative or the funding behind it, there's no guarantee it will have been such a success story by the time planned. As Mitrović points out, there are many challenges and risks along the way, some of which have already unfolded.

As for the financial institutions designed and created to

support the Initiative, Mitrović mentions The Silk Road Fund Co Ltd and The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Unlike the current international financial institutions dominated by the wealthiest western countries, China is trying to assemble a new institutional framework, which would provide more "structural power" (p. 168) for the emerging economies.

Finally, the third chapter ends with Mitrović's interview which in a way serves as an introduction to the next chapter, "*Sixteen plus One*" Platform for Cooperation. This chapter is particularly relevant not only for Serbian academics and researchers, but also for policy makers considering that Serbia is a participating country in the platform. Mitrović provides an overview of the Central and Eastern European countries cooperation with China within the established "16+1" framework, including substantial remarks regarding Serbia. She also estimates advantages and disadvantages from the Serbian involvement in this cooperation platform, especially when Serbia's EU candidate status is taken into consideration.

The geopolitical and geo-economical contexts of the

“16+1” framework are further examined in the last text within the fourth chapter, in the ambience of spreading Chinese influence across Europe, which isn’t always perceived as positive development. Also, in the same manner as in the papers on BRI, Mitrović detects various problems following the cooperation framework.

The last chapter in the book, *China and Serbia – Now and Then*, as the title suggests, focuses specifically to Sino-Serbian relations since their establishment in 1955 (Sino-Yugoslav relations at the time). The relations dynamic has changed through years, especially during certain crises on both sides, although the overall impression is that they can be described at least as lingering cooperation. Even though this text was written during the existence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the need for preservation and further development of friendly relations with China Mitrović accentuated, can serve as pertinent guidance for incumbent policy makers in Serbia.

The fifth chapter ends with three interviews with Mitrović, each about the Belt and Road Initiative in the context of Sino-Serbian relations. Mitrović

explains the potential for cooperation of Serbia and China in certain areas within the “16+1” framework and Belt and Road Initiative in general. Besides the economic cooperation, there are other forms of commitment between the two countries. According to Mitrović, China can also be considered a Serbian ally when the Chinese continuous support and respect for Serbian territorial integrity and sovereignty are taken into account (p. 274). As stated in the book several times, Chinese status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council contributes to its overall power, and along with the aforementioned support can be of significance for Serbia.

Having read the entire book, one can undeniably find systematic information on China in various aspects, meticulously divided into five chapters. This book covers extensive research Mitrović has done in the last thirty years on this subject gathered in one place, which is why it represents a very valuable piece of academic literature. It can serve both as a detailed knowledge base on Chinese economy, politics and security, and as a useful ground for further research. Mitrović has given us analysis based on objective factors, along with

her insights on the matter and certain well-informed predictions which have proven right in many ways. Ultimately, she has asked paramount questions and started many discussions with manuscripts presented in this book, which can therefore be considered an indispensable contribution to political science in Serbia and beyond.

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The Many Faces of Realism**

THE
 EDINBURGH
 COMPANION TO
**Political
 Realism**
 Edited by Robert Schuett and
 Miles Hollingworth



Robert Schuett and Miles Hollingworth (eds.) 2018. *The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 572 p.

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Issues related to realism and its various aspects have pervaded contemporary social science – and International Relations as its subfield – for decades. If we take into account the many predecessors of modern realism, spanning back to the antique times, then we can say that realist worldviews have figured prominently in history, politics, art, and social life in general from the very beginnings of recorded history.

Contemporary academic production has been developing accordingly: many notable authors, such as E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth N. Waltz, or John J. Mearsheimer, explicitly adopted realist frameworks for understanding the intricacies of international politics, while other authors – e.g. Robert Spegele in *Political Realism in International Theory* (1996), Michael C. Williams in *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (2005) or Allison McQueen in *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times* (2017) – aspired to grasp

the issue of political realism in a comprehensive manner, spanning through the long history of international political theory. (Concepts akin to political realism, such as *realpolitik*, have also been researched extensively – see John Bew’s *Realpolitik: A History* from 2015.)

Nevertheless, not many publications have been as all-embracing as the book edited by Robert Schuett and Miles Hollingworth, *The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism*. In their encyclopedic endeavor, the editors have convened a multidisciplinary lineup of over 40 authors, affiliated with various institutions around the world, each submitting a chapter on the topic of his/her expertise. The result is a collection of extraordinarily rich materials on political realism and the myriad ways it had been playing out through the history of mankind.

The fundamental presupposition of the volume, as outlined by the editors in the introduction (titled “Political Realism, liberal democracy and world politics”), is that “if there were only two people in the world and a rock, than Political Realism would already have all it needed for its fundamental belief, eve before those two

people had had a chance to open their mouths. The sheer existence of the rock would mean that one of them could be the first to pick it up and raise it over the other’s head.” (p. 1) But the main general framework is quite more complex: the research is designed in such a way that Political Realism is presented in a counter-position to liberal democracy and its various aspects, as an “antidote” to the “depressing picture” painted above.

The argument is presented thusly: “If the original democracy was the plan to stymie the would-be tyrant or mob with the irreproachable imposition of the impartial procedure, then the new liberal democracy was the acknowledgement of all that had happened in between [...]. That is to say, if pure, procedural democracy was a logical response to the problem of someone who would otherwise be able to muscle their way into a polity and rule for as long as that muscle lasted, it harboured a long-term problem, this being its accidental relationship to goodness and virtue. It was not of itself a way of determining who might be fittest to rule.” (*Ibid.*) Upon becoming equated with “all the good and virtuous things that it was said to

be bringing about” – despite its relations to virtue being to a large extent “accidental” – democracy got lost along the way in “gargantuan” post-WW2 social and political structures, designed to “cultivate an ultimate class of citizens”. Political realism plays a prominent role in this story simply because it is “a ‘negative’ doctrine – disengaged and aloof from this discourse of wisdom in the state”, and these exact qualifications “might now equip it to play a larger, more active, even more ‘positive’ role, given liberal democracy’s new and apparently perilous position in the West.” (p. 2)

Political Liberalism “*is* its logic”, and it is “a logic that holds only so long as its view of human nature holds.” (pp. 3, 2) It always “makes *you*, the reader, the ultimate proof of its appeal”, and when it manipulates you, “it manipulates you by means of your self-interest.” Obviously, the way in which the concept of self-interest plays out in the realm of international relations the concept of national interest. “In both cases, interest means ‘survival’, while your desire to survive at all costs is taken to be self-evident.” (p.3) At that level, Political Realism naturally prospers, “while at the same time being resented elsewhere for its

gloomy, almost gleeful reductionism.” In the field of theory and analysis, according to the editors, this proneness to reductions is what explains “Political Realism’s long term fascination with ‘systems’ and ‘structures’”. (*Ibid.*) Although the remark on ‘structures’, arguably, does not do too much justice to non-structural tenets of realism (classical and neoclassical), the focus on ‘interest’ and ‘survival’ is appropriately emphasized. The underlying logic of Political Realism, in the domain of international relations and beyond, is properly identified: it is elaborated in more than three dozen subsequent chapters.

Those are the general points that chapter authors aspire to illustrate and corroborate more than three dozen ensuing contributions. Basic structure of the book is three-fold: Part I deals with “Political Realism and the Political” (eight chapters); Part II covers “Political Realism and Political Thinking” (twenty-two chapters); while Part III deals with the pressing issues of “Political Realism and Foreign Policy” (fourteen chapters).

In the first section, chapter authors take on several important topics which are understood

as quintessentially political, and within which Political Realism features prominently. These topics include human nature (by Erica Benner), strategic theory (Samir Puri), *realpolitik* (by the aforementioned John Bew), civil-military relations (Lindsay P. Cohn), or the English School (Jodok Troy). In addition to these issues, traditionally connected to realism both as a theory and as a worldview, this part includes somewhat atypical matters, such as “Global Reform”, in an engaging chapter in which William E. Scheuerman attempts to identify a tenet of realist thought which wouldn’t be skeptical about possibilities of cosmopolitan reordering of the international system. His main idea behind this bold endeavor is that “retrieving Realism’s neglected reformist components is vital if we are to think creatively and productively about the political and intellectual challenges of the twenty-first century.” (p. 97) He proceeds to analyze the complex relations between realism and Kantian thought, arguing that “a fresh look at their (realists’) complicated relationship to the Kantian legacy helps counter the virtually universal consensus today that realism necessarily opposes significant

global reform. This view badly distorts a more complex and interesting intellectual history.” (p. 106)

Part II of the book, by far the most extensive, delves into the rich tradition of Political Realism in the history of political thought and political theory, covering the period since the ancient times up to post-World War Two intellectual debates. Many authors cover some of the most prominent predecessors of modern realism, while others contribute chapters on some of the doyens of contemporary political realism. As for the predecessors, among others, there are chapters on Thucydides (Neville Morley), Kautilya (Stuart Gray), Niccolò Machiavelli (Markus Fischer), and Thomas Hobbes (Kody W. Cooper). Among the most reputable modern realists – dominantly “first generation” ones – Walter Lippmann (Alan Chong); E. H. Carr (Konstantinos Kostagiannis); Herbert Butterfield (Kenneth B. McIntyre); Raymond Aron (Christopher Adair-Toteff); George F. Kennan (David A. Mayers), Hans J. Morgenthau (Felix Rösch), or John H. Herz (Peter M. R. Stirk).

What adds particular value to the section, and the vol-

ume in general, are chapters on prominent theorists and scholars from diverse disciplines, whose relations to realist thought is not considered as straightforward in most textbooks. In that sense, very innovative perspectives are offered in the chapters on William Shakespeare (Tim Spiekerman), Leo Strauss (Robert Howse); Hans Kelsen (Robert Schuett); Hannah Arendt (Douglas B. Klusmeyer); or Isaiah Berlin (Joshua L. Cherniss). Probably the main takeaway, based on the section as a whole, is the establishment of a clear correlation between political and scientific realism. An extraordinarily rich intellectual tradition, Political Realism thus proves to be exceptionally versatile: spanning through many centuries of social and political thought, covering a lot of theoretically and meta-theoretically relevant fields, and connecting numerous disciplines and areas of scientific and social life.

In Part III, which concludes the volume, key notions originating from the tradition of Political Realism are being applied to the burning issues of international political life. This is, arguably, the area in which political realists usually feel most at home. The section opens with a chapter on “Political Real-

ism and Threat Perception” by John Miller, in which the author argues, utilizing the Cold War struggle to contain communism, that inferring intent from capacities doesn’t necessarily work, as well as considers the ways in which unrealistic threat perceptions can be changed. Some of the contributions are territorially conceived: there are chapters on Russia (David Kerr), China (Derek M. C. Yuen), Iran (Marzieh Kouhi Eshafani), Israel (Uriel Abulof), India (Rashed Uz Zaman), Japan (Masashi Okuyama), as well as the general issue of regionalism (David Martin Jones); others are more problem-oriented, dealing with nationalism, religion, environment, internet, or terrorism. The chapter, and the entire volume, concludes with yet another atypical framework for understanding Political Realism: its relationship to the Open Society; essentially, Todd Breyfogle notices that “while the open society is distinct from political realism in its approach to power, it wrestles with the necessities of interest which form political realism’s backbone.” (p. 554) Thus, the story of Political Realism ends at the point of its inception: the notion of power.

The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism is not

a book for the wide audience; for the most part, it is not for undergraduate students either. Far from being an aspiring encyclopedia of propaedeutic nature, it presupposes certain familiarity with the general topic on the side of the reader. This in no way diminishes the quality of the volume; quite the contrary, it is exactly the type of source to which a social scientist should turn to in his/her yearning for the qualitative move of theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. It is very likely to remain one of the key resources for realist-based, or realist-oriented social research for generations to come.

AUTHOR GUIDELINES

Academic journal *Serbian Political Thought* welcomes articles reporting the latest results of both theoretical and empirical research in all fields of political science. Authors should refer mainly to the results of research published in academic journals, primarily in political science journals.

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The journal is published four times a year. The first three issues are published in Serbian, and the fourth issue is published in English. The deadlines for submitting the manuscripts for the Serbian issues are: February 1st, May 1st and August 1st, and the deadline for the English issue is October 1st.

Two consecutive issues cannot contain articles written by the same author, whether single-authored or co-authored.

Authors are obliged to submit a signed and scanned Statement alongside with the manuscript, declaring their manuscript hadn't previously been published, i.e. it's not plagiarism or auto-plagiarism. The Statement form can be downloaded from the web page of the journal: http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/magazines/politicka-misao/authors_directions/.

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Academic journal *Serbian Political Thought* adopts a modified version of Chicago citation style (17th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*), the author–date system of in-text parenthetical citation, with the list of references with full bibliographic information being placed at the end of the paper.

The bibliographic data in both the parenthetical citation and reference list should be cited in the original language of the source. The English translation of the reference title should be enclosed in square brackets after the original title. The references originally written in Cyrillic script should be transliterated into Latin script.

Below are the rules and examples of citing the bibliographic information in the reference list and in the text. For each type of source, a citation rule is given first, followed by an example of citation in the reference list and bibliographic parenthesis.

The bibliographic parenthesis, as a rule, is set off at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark. It contains the author’s surname, the year of publication and page numbers pointing to a specifically contextual page or range of pages, as in the following example: (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17).

Books

Books with one author

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

(Mearsheimer 2001)

Books with two or three authors

Surname, Name, and Name Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

(Brady and Collier 2010)

Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998)

Books with four or more authors

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, Name and Surname, and Name and Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Pollitt, Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

(Pollitt et al. 2005)

Editor(s) or translator(s) in place of the author(s)

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al. 2017)

Chapter in an edited book

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the chapter." In *Title*, ed. Name Surname, pages range. Place of publication: Publisher.

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. "Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism." In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23-46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Journal Articles

Regular issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Journal* Volume, if available (issue): page range. DOI.

Ellwood, David W. 2018. "Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?" *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5-14. doi: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018)

Special issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." In "Title of the special issue", ed. Name Surname, Special issue, *Journal*: page range. DOI.

Chin, Warren. 2019. "Technology, war and the state: past, present and future." In "Re-visioning war and the state in the twenty-first century." Special issue, *International Affairs* 95 (4): 765–783. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz106.

(Chin 2019)

Encyclopedias and dictionaries

When the author/editor is known

Surname, Name, Name Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Vol. Place of publication: Publisher.

Badie, Bertrand, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2011. *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Vol. 1. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

(Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino 2011)

When the author/editor is unknown

Title. Year of publication. Place of publication: Publisher.

Webster's Dictionary of English Usage. 1989. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc.

(*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* 1989)

PhD dissertation

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the dissertation." PhD diss. University.

Munger, Frank J. 1955. "Two-Party Politics in the State of Indiana." PhD diss. Harvard University.

(Munger 1955, 17–19)

Newspapers and magazines

Signed articles

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Newspaper/Magazine* Date: page range.

Clark, Phil. 2018. "Rwanda's Recovery: When Remembrance is Official Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2018: 35–41.

(Clark 2018)

Unsigned articles

Title of the newspaper/magazine. Year of publication. "Title of the article." Date: page range.

New York Times. 2002. "In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor." July 30, 2002.

(*New York Times* 2002)

Corporate author

Name of the corporate author [acronym if needed]. Year of publication. *Title of the publication.* Place of publication: Publisher.

International Organization for Standardization [ISO]. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015.* Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 2019) – *The first in-text citation*

(ISO 2019) – *Second and all subsequent citations*

Special cases of referencing

Citing edition other than the first

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*, edition number. Place of publication: Publisher.

Bull, Hedley. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.

(Bull 2012)

Multiple sources of the same author

- 1) *Multiple sources by the same author* should be arranged chronologically by year of publication in ascending order.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4): 381–396. doi: 10.1093/cjip/poq016.

- 2) *Multiple sources by the same author from the same year* should be alphabetized by title, with lowercase letters attached to the year. Those letters should be used in parenthetical citation as well.

Walt, Stephen M. 2018a. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

(Walt 2018a)

Walt, Stephen M. 2018b. "Rising Powers and the Risk of War: A Realist View of Sino-American Relations." In *Will China's Rise be Peaceful: Security, Stability and Legitimacy*, ed. Asle Toje. 13–32. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Walt 2018b)

- 3) *Single-authored sources precede multiauthored sources beginning with the same surname* or written by the same person.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. "Clarifying convergence. Striking similarities and durable differences in public management reform." *Public Management Review* 3 (4): 471–492. doi: 10.1080/14616670110071847.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

- 4) *Multiauthored sources with the same name and surname* of the first author should continue to be alphabetized by the second author's surname.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Special cases of parenthetical citation

Exceptions to the rule of placing the parenthetical citation at the end of a sentence

- 1) If the *author is mentioned in the text*, even if used in a possessive form, the year must follow in parenthesis, and page numbers should be put in the brackets at the end of the sentence.

For the assessment, see Kaltwasser *et al.* (2017) ... (112).

According to Ellwood (2018) ... (7).

- 2) When *quoting directly*, if the name of the author precedes the quotation, the year and page numbers must follow in parenthesis.

Mearsheimer (2001, 28) claims that: "..."

- 3) When *using the same source multiple times in one paragraph*, the parenthetical citation should be placed either after the last reference (or at the end of the paragraph, preceding the final period) if the same page (or page range) is cited more than once, or at the first reference, while the subsequent citations should only include page numbers.

Do not use *ibid* or *op. cit.* with repeated citations.

Using brief phrases such as “see”, “compare” etc.

Those phrases should be enclosed within the parenthesis.

(see Ellwood 2018)

Using secondary source

When using a secondary source, the original source should be cited in parenthesis, followed by “quoted in” and the secondary source. The reference list should only include the secondary source.

“Its authority was greatly expanded by the constitutional revision of 1988, and the Court of Arbitration can now be regarded as a ‘genuine constitutional court’” (De Winter and Dumont 2009, 109 cited in: Lijphart 2012, 39–40).

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd edition. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Multiple sources within the same parentheses

1) When *multiple sources* are cited, they should be separated by semicolons.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 34; Ellwood 2018, 7)

2) When *multiple sources by the same author*, but published in different years are cited, the name of the author is cited only the first time. The different years are separated by commas or by semicolon where page numbers are cited.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010) or (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17; 2010, 390)

3) When *different authors share the same surname*, include the first initial in the parenthesis.

(M. Chiti 2004, 40), (E. Chiti 2004, 223)

Chiti, Edoardo. 2004. “Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 219–236.

Chiti, Mario. 2004. “Forms of European Administrative Action.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 37–57.

Legal and Public Documents

Sections, articles or paragraphs can be cited in the parentheses. They should be appropriately abbreviated.

Constitutions and laws

The title of the legislative act [acronym if needed], “Official Gazette of the state” and the number of the official gazette, or the webpage and the date of last access.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 98/06.

(The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 33)

The Law on Foreign Affairs [LFA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 116/2007, 126/2007, and 41/2009.

(LFA 2009, Art. 17)

Succession Act [SA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia”, No. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, and 33/15 and 14/19.

(SA 2019, Art. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Government decisions and decisions of the institutions

The name of the government body or institution [acronym or abbreviation], the title and number of the decision, date of the decision passing, or the webpage and the date of the last access.

Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia [Protector of Citizens], Opinion No. 19–3635/11, 11 January 2012, https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/attachments/064_2104_Opinion%20HJC.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Protector of Citizens, 19–3635/11)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, <https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx>, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Legislative acts of the European Union

The title of the legislative act, the number of the official gazette, the publication date and the number of the page in the same format as on the *EUR-Lex* website: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Treaties

European Union founding treaties

Title of the treaty or title of the consolidated version of the treaty [acronym], information on the treaty retrieved from the official gazette in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.
(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45.
(TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.
(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Other treaties

Title of the treaty [acronym or abbreviation], date of conclusion, UNTS volume number and registration number on the *United Nations Treaty Collection* website: <https://treaties.un.org>.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.
(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], 19 December 1966, UNTS 999, I-14668.
(ICCPR 1966)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994, UNTS 2042, I-35325.
(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Decisions of international organizations

The name of the international organization and its body [acronym], the decision number, the title of the decision, the date of the decision passing.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999), Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.

(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc. 14326, Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April 2017), 29 May 2017.

(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Case law

Case law of the courts in the Republic of Serbia

The type of the act and the name of the court [acronym of the court], the case number with the date of the decision passing, the name and number of the official gazette where the decision is published – if available.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia [CCRS], IUa-2/2009 of 13 June 2012, “Official gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 68/2012.

(Decision of CCRS, IUa-2/2009)

Decision of the Appellate Court in Novi Sad [ACNS], Rzr–1/16 of 27 April 2016.

(Decision of ACNS, Rzr–1/16)

Case law of the International Court of Justice

The name of the court [acronym], *the case title*, type of the decision with the date of the decision passing, the name and number of I.C.J. Reports issue where the decision is published, page number.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.

(ICJ Judgment 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010)

Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The case title, the case number, type of the case with the date of the decision passing, ECLI.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

(*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union*, C-270/12) or (CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.

(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The case title, number of the application, type of the case with the date of the judgment passing, ECLI.

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court (Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina v. Ukraine* 63566/00, par. 20) or (ECHR, 63566/00, par. 20)

Case law of other international courts and tribunals

The name of the court [acronym], the case number, *the case title*, type of the decision with the date passing.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*. Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin. Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) or (ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Archive sources

Name of the repository [acronym], title or number of the fond [acronym], box number, folder number – if available, reference code, “title of the document” – or, if it is not available, provide a short description by answering the questions who? whom? what?, place and date – or n.d. if no date is provided.

Arhiv Srbije [AS], MID, K-T, f. 2, r93/1894, “Izveštaj Ministarstva inostranih dela o postavljanju konzula”, Beograd, 19. april 1888.

(AS, MID, K-T, f. 2)

(AS, MID, f. 2) – *When the folder number is known only*

Dalhousie University Archives [DUA], Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, “List of written judgements by Laskin,” n.d.

(DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Web sources

Surname, Name or name of the corporate author [acronym]. Year of publication or n.d. – if the year of publication cannot be determined. “The name of the web page.” *The name of the web site*. Date of creation, modification or the last access to the web page, if the date cannot be determined from the source. URL.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. “Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html>.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Institute for Political Studies [IPS]. n.d. “The 5th International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth.” *Institute for Political Studies*. Last accessed 7 December 7 2019. <http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/news/the-5th-international-economic-forum-on-reform-transition-and-growth/>.

(Institute for Political Studies [IPS], n.d.) – *First in-text citation*

(IPS, n.d.) – *Second and every subsequent citation*

Associated Press [AP]. 2019. “AP to present VoteCast results at AAPOR pooling conference.” May 14, 2019. <https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2019/ap-to-present-votecast-results-at-aapor-polling-conference>.

(AP 2019)

TEXT FORMATTING

General guidelines in writing the manuscript

The manuscript should be written in Word, in the following manner:

Paper size: A4;

Margins: Normal 2.54 cm;

Use roman font (plain letters) to write the text, unless specified otherwise;

Line spacing: 1.5;

Footnote line spacing: 1;

Title font size: 14 pt;

Subtitles font size: 12 pt;

Text font size: 12 pt;

Footnote font size: 10 pt;

Tables, charts and figures font size: 10 pt;

Use Paragraph/Special/First line at 1.27 cm;

Text alignment: Justify;

Font color: Automatic;

Page numbering: Arabian numerals in lower right corner;

Do not break the words manually by inserting hyphens;

Save the manuscript in the .doc format.

Research article manuscript preparation

The manuscript should be prepared in the following manner:

*Name and surname of the first author**

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Name and surname of the second author

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE PAPER**

** In the footnote: Optionally, include one of the following (or similar) information: 1) name and number of the project on which the paper was written; 2) the previous presentation of the paper on a scientific conference as an oral presentation under the same or similar name; or 3) the research presented in the paper was conducted while writing the PhD dissertation of the author.

Abstract

Abstract, within 100–250 words range, contains the subject, aim, theoretical and methodological approach, results and conclusions of the paper.

Keywords: Below the abstract, five to ten **key words** should be written. Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

The paper can have maximum of three levels of subtitles. **Subtitles** should not be numbered. They should be used in the following manner:

FIRST LEVEL SUBTITLE

Second level subtitle

Third level subtitle

Tables, charts and figures should be inserted in the following manner:

- Above the table/chart/figure, center the name of Table, Chart or Figure, an Arabic numeral, and the title in roman font;

- Below the table/chart/figure, the source should be cited in the following manner: 1) if the table/chart/figure is taken from another source, write down *Source*: and include the parenthetical citation information of the source; or 2) if the table/chart/figure is not taken from another source, write down *Source*: Processed by the author.

Use in-text references according to Citing and referencing.

Use the footnotes solely to provide remarks or broader explanations.

REFERENCES

References should be listed after the text of the paper, prior to the Resume in the following manner:

- the first line of each reference should be left intended, and the remaining lines should be placed as hanging by 1.27 cm using the option Paragraph/Special/Hanging;
- all the references should be listed together, without separating legal acts of archives;
- the references should not be numbered;
- list only the references used in the text.

After the reference list, write the name and surname of the author, the title of the paper and resume in Serbian in the following manner:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Име и презиме другог аутора

НАСЛОВ

Резиме

Resume (Резиме) up to 1/10 length of the paper contains the results and conclusions of the paper which are presented in greater scope than in the abstract.

Keywords (Кључне речи): Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

Authors who are not native Serbian speakers should contact the Editorial staff for assistance in translating the manuscript elements into Serbian.

Review preparation

A review should be prepared in the same manner as the research article, but leaving out abstract, keywords and resume.

Book review preparation

Book review should be prepared in the following manner:

Split the text into **two columns**.

*Name and surname of the author**

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE BOOK REVIEW

Below the title **place the image of the front cover**;

Below the image of the front cover list the book details according to the following rule:

Name and surname of the author. Year of publication.

Title of the book. Place of publication: Publisher, total number of pages.

The text of the book review should be prepared following the guidelines of the research article preparation.

УПУТСТВО ЗА АУТОРЕ

У часопису *Српска политичка мисао* објављују се радови који представљају резултат најновијих теоријских и емпиријских научних истраживања у области политичких наука. Аутори би приликом писања радова требало да се позивају претежно на резултате научних истраживања који су објављени у научним часописима, првенствено у часописима политиколошке тематике.

Радови се објављују на српском језику и ћириличком писму или енглеском, руском и француском језику.

Часопис се објављује четири пута годишње. Прва три броја су на српском језику, а четврти на енглеском језику. Рокови за слање радова су: 1. фебруар, 1. мај и 1. август за издања на српском језику и 1. октобар за издање на енглеском језику.

Исти аутор не може да објави рад у два узастопна броја часописа, без обзира да ли је реч о самосталном или коауторском раду.

Аутори су у обавези да приликом слања радова доставе потписану и скенирану изјаву да рад није претходно објављен, односно да није реч о аутоплагијату или плагијату. Образац изјаве може се преузети са интернет странице часописа: http://www.ips.ac.rs/rs/magazines/srpska-politicka-misao/authors_directions/.

Радове за издања часописа на српском језику слати на имејл-адресу: spm@ips.ac.rs.

Радове за издање часописа на енглеском језику слати на имејл-адресу: spt@ips.ac.rs.

Научни чланак може имати највише 40.000 карактера са размацима, укључујући фусноте. Приликом бројања карактера изоставити списак референци. Изузетно, монографска студија може бити већег обима у складу са одредбама *Правилника о поступку, начину вредновања и квантитативном исказивању научноистраживачких резултата истраживања*.

Осврт може имати највише 15.000 карактера са размацима.

Приказ књиге може имати највише 10.000 карактера са размацима.

Приликом провере броја карактера користити опцију *Review/Word Count/Character (with spaces)* уз активiranу опцију *Include textboxes, footnotes and endnotes*.

НАЧИН ЦИТИРАЊА

Часопис *Српска политичка мисао* користи делимично модификовани Чикаго стил цитирања (17. издање приручника *Chicago Manual of Style*), што подразумева навођење библиографске парентезе (заграде) по систему аутор–датум у тексту, као и списак референци са пуним библиографским подацима након текста рада.

Податке у библиографској парентези и списку референци навести на језику и писму на коме је референца објављена.

У наставку се налазе правила и примери навођења библиографских података у списку референци и у тексту. За сваку врсту референце прво је дато правило навођења, а затим пример навођења у списку референци и библиографској парентези.

Библиографска парентеза се по правилу наводи на крају реченице, пре интерпункцијског знака, и садржи презиме аутора, годину објављивања и одговарајући број страна, према следећем примеру: (Суботић 2010, 15–17).

Монографија

Један аутор

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Суботић, Момчило. 2010. *Политичка мисао србистике*. Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Суботић 2010)

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

(Mearsheimer 2001)

Два или три аутора

Презиме, име, и име презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Стојановић, Ђорђе, и Живојин Ђурић. 2012. *Анатомија савремене државе*. Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Стојановић и Ђурић 2012)

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchall, and Putman 1998)

Четири и више аутора

Презиме, име, име и презиме, име и презиме, и име презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

Милисављевић, Бојан, Саша Варинац, Александра Литричин, Андријана Јовановић, и Бранимир Благојевић. 2017. *Коментар Закона о јавно-приватном партнерству и концесијама: према стању законодавства од 7. јануара 2017. године*. Београд: Службени гласник; Правни факултет.

(Милисављевић и др. 2017)

Уредник/приређивач/преводиоцац уместо аутора

Након навођења имена, ставити зарез, па након тога одговарајућу скраћеницу на језику и писму референце, нпр. „ур.“, „прев.“ „prir.“, „ed.“, „eds.“

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al. 2017)

Поглавље у зборнику

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов поглавља.” У *Наслов*, ур. име презиме, број страна на којима се налази поглавље. Место издања: издавач.

Степић, Миломир. 2015. „Позиција Србије пред почетак Великог рата са становишта Првог и Другог закона геополитике.” У *Србија и геополитичке прилике у Европи 1914. године*, ур. Миломир Степић и Љубодраг П. Ристић, 55–78. Лајковац: Градска библиотека; Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

(Степић 2015)

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. “Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism.” In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23-46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Чланак у научном часопису

Чланак у редовном броју

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка.” *Наслов часописа* волумен (број): број страна на којима се налази чланак. DOI број.

Ђурић, Живојин, и Миша Стојадиновић. 2018. „Држава и неолиберални модели урушавања националних политичких институција.” *Српска политичка мисао* 62 (4): 41–57. doi: 10.22182/spm.6242018.2.

(Ђурић и Стојадиновић 2018, 46–48)

Ellwood, David W. 2018. “Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?” *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5–14. doi: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018, 11)

Чланак у посебном броју

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка.” У „Наслов посебног броја”, ур. име презиме уредника, напомена о посебном издању, *Наслов часописа*: број страна на којима се налази чланак. DOI број.

Стојановић, Ђорђе. 2016. „Постмодернизам у друштвеним наукама: стање парадигме.” У „Постмодернизација српске науке: политика постмодерне / политика после постмодерне”, ур. Ђорђе Стојановић и Мишко Шуваковић, посебно издање, *Српска политичка мисао*: 5–35. doi: 10.22182/spm.specijal2016.1.

(Стојановић 2016, 27)

Енциклопедије и речници

Наведен је аутор/уредник

Презиме, име, име и презиме, ур. Година издања. *Наслов*. Том. Место издања: издавач.

Jerkov, Aleksandar, ур. 2010. *Velika opšta ilustrovana enciklopedija Larrouse: dopunjeno srpsko izdanje*. Том V (S–Ž). Београд:

Mono i Manjana.

(Jerkov 2010)

Није наведен аутор/уредник

Наслов. Година издања. Место издања: издавач.

Webster's Dictionary of English Usage. 1989. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc.

(*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* 1989)

Докторска дисертација

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов докторске дисертације.”

Докторска дисертација. Назив универзитета: назив факултета.

Бурсаћ, Дејан. 2019. „Утицај идеологије политичких партија на јавну потрошњу у бившим социјалистичким државама.” Докторска дисертација. Универзитет у Београду: Факултет политичких наука.

(Бурсаћ 2019, 145–147)

Wallace, Desmond D. 2019. “The diffusion of representation.” PhD diss. University of Iowa.

(Wallace 2019, 27, 81–83)

Чланак у дневним новинама или периодичним часописима

Наведен је аутор

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка.” *Назив новине или часописа* годиште: број стране на којој се налази чланак.

Авакумовић, Маријана. 2019. „Платни разреди – 2021. године.” *Политика*, 8. децембар: 9.

(Авакумовић 2019)

Није наведен аутор

Назив новине или часописа. Година издања. „Наслов чланка.” Годиште: број стране на којој се налази чланак.

New York Times. 2002. “In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor.” July 30, 2002.

(*New York Times* 2002)

Референца са корпоративним аутором

Назив аутора [акроним, по потреби]. Година издања. *Наслов издања*. Место издања: издавач.

Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије [МЕИРС]. 2018. *Водич за коришћење ЕУ фондова у Србији*. Београд: Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије.

(Министарство за европске интеграције Републике Србије [МЕИРС] 2018) – *прво навођење*

(МЕИРС 2018) – *свако следеће навођење*

International Organization for Standardization [ISO]. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015*. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 2019) – *прво навођење*

(ISO 2019) – *свако следеће навођење*

Репринт издања

Презиме, име. [Година првог издања] Година репринт издања. *Наслов*. Место првог издања: издавач првог издања. Напомена „Репринт“ на језику и писму референце, место издања репринт издања: издавач. Напомена одакле су цитати у тексту преузети.

Михалцић, Стеван. [1937] 1992. *Барања: од најстаријих времена до данас*, треће издање. Нови Сад: Фототипско издање. Репринт, Београд: Библиотека града Београда. Цитати се односе на фототипско издање.

(Михалцић [1937] 1992)

Посебни случајеви навођења референци

Навођење другог и сваког следећег издања

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*, напомена о издању. Место издања: издавач.

Гађиновић, Радослав. 2018. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Euro Book.

Више референци истог аутора

- 1) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Ређати према години издања, почевши од најраније.

Степић, Миломир. 2012. „Србија као регионална држава: реинтеграциони геополитички приступ.” *Национални интерес* 14 (2): 9–39. doi: 10.22182/ni.1422012.1.

Степић, Миломир. 2015. „Позиција Србије пред почетак Великог рата са становишта Првог и Другог закона геополитике.” У *Србија и геополитичке прилике у Европи 1914. године*, ур. Миломир Степић и Љубодраг П. Ристић, 55–78. Лајковац: Градска библиотека; Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

- 2) *Исти аутор, иста година* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу почетног слова назива референце. Поред године објављивања ставити почетна слова азбуке или абецеде која се користе и у библиографској парентези.

Гађиновић, Радослав. 2018а. „Војна неутралност и будућност Србије.” *Политика националне безбедности* 14 (1): 23–38. doi: 10.22182/pnb.1412018.2.

Гађиновић, Радослав. 2018б. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Euro Book.

(Гађиновић 2018а, 25), (Гађиновић 2018б)

- 3) *Исти аутор као самостални аутор и као коаутор* – Прво навести референце у којима је самостални аутор, а затим оне у којима је коаутор.

Стојановић, Ђорђе. 2016. „Постмодернизам у друштвеним наукама: стање парадигме.” У „Постмодернизација српске науке: политика постмодерне / политика после постмодерне”, ур. Ђорђе Стојановић и Мишко Шуваковић, посебно издање, *Српска политичка мисао*: 5–35. doi: 10.22182/spm.specijal2016.1.

Стојановић, Ђорђе, и Живојин Ђурић. 2012. *Анатомија савремене државе*. Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

- 4) *Исти аутор као први коаутор у више различитих референци* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу презимена другог коаутора.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Посебни случајеви навођења библиографске парентезе

Изузеци од навођења библиографске парентезе на крају реченице

1) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице* – Годину издања ставити у заграду након навођења презимена, а број стране на крају реченице у заграду. За референцу на латиници или страном језику у загради навести и презиме аутора.

„Према мишљењу Суботића (2010), ...” (30).

„Бокслер (Bochsler 2018) у својој књизи тврди...”

2) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице пре цитата из референце* – Након навођења презимена, у библиографској парентези навести годину и број стране, а затим навести цитат.

Као што Суботић (2010, 45) наводи: „ ... ”

Миршајмер (Mearsheimer 2001, 57) изричито тврди: „ ... ”

3) *Навођење исте референце више пута у једном пасусу* – Ако се наводи иста страна или опсег страна, унети библиографску парентезу приликом последњег навођења или на крају пасуса пре интерпункцијског знака. Ако се наводе различите стране, референцу навести приликом првог позивања на одређену страну, а затим до краја пасуса у заграду стављати само различите бројеве страна.

Не користити „исто”, „*ibid*”, или „*op. cit.*” за вишеструко навођење референце.

Навођење израза „видети”, „упоредити” и сл.

Изразе унети у библиографску парентезу.

(видети Кнежевић 2014, 153)

(Степић 2015; упоредити Кнежевић 2014)

Секундарна референца

У библиографској парентези прво навести презиме аутора, годину и број стране примарне референце, затим „цитирано у:” и презиме аутора, годину и број стране секундарне референце. У списку референци навести само секундарну референцу.

„Том приликом неолиберализам се од стране највећег броја његових протагониста најчешће одређује као политика слободног тржишта која охрабрује приватне фирме и побољшава избор потрошачима, разарајући при том ’неспособну, бирократску и паразитску владу која никада не може урадити ништа добро, без обзира на њене добре намере’” (Chomsky 1999, 7 цитирано у: Ђурић и Стојадиновић 2018, 47).

Ђурић, Живојин, и Миша Стојадиновић. 2018. „Држава и неолиберални модели урушавања националних политичких институција.” *Српска политичка мисао* 62 (4): 41–57. doi:10.22182/spm.6242018.2.

Иста библиографска парентеза, више референци

1) *Различити аутори* – Референце одвојити тачком и зарезом.

(Степић 2015, 61; Кнежевић 2014, 158)

2) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Навести презиме аутора, а затим године издања различитих референци по редоследу од најраније до најновије и одвојити их зарезом, односно тачком и зарезом када се наводи број страна.

(Степић 2012, 2015) или (Степић 2012, 30; 2015, 69)

3) *Различити аутори, исто презиме* – Иницијал имена. Презиме аутора. Година издања.

(Д. Суботић 2010, 97), (М. Суботић 2010, 302)

Суботић, Драган. 2010. „Нови јавни менаџмент у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 91–114. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.5.

Суботић, Момчило. 2010. „Војводина у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 289–310. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.15.

Правни акти

У библиографској парентези навести члан, став и тачку или параграф коришћењем скраћеница „чл.”, „ст.”, „тач.”, „Art.”, „para.” и сл.

Устави и закони

Назив акта [акроним, по потреби], „Назив службеног гласила” и број, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Устав Републике Србије, „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 98/06.

(Устав Републике Србије 2006, чл. 33)

Закон о основама система образовања и васпитања [ЗОСОВ], „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 88/2017, 27/2018 – др. закон, 10/2019 и 27/2018 – др. закон.

(ЗОСОВ 2019, чл. 17, ст. 4)

Закон о наслеђивању [ZN], „Narodne novine“, br. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, i 33/15 i 14/19.

(ZN 2019, čl. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, последњи приступ 20. децембра 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Одлуке државних органа и институција

Назив органа [акроним или скраћени назив], Назив акта и број предмета, датум доношења акта, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Заштитник грађана Републике Србије [Заштитник грађана], Мишљење бр. 15–3314/12, 22. октобар 2012, https://www.osobesainvaliditetom.rs/attachments/083_misljenje%20ZG%20DZ.pdf, последњи приступ 20. децембра 2019.

(Заштитник грађана, 15–3314/12)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, <https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx>, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Законодавни акти Европске уније

Назив акта, подаци из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States

of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Међународни уговори

Оснивачки уговори Европске уније

Назив уговора или консолидоване верзије [акроним], подаци о коришћеној верзији уговора из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.

(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45.

(TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.

(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Остали међународни уговори

Назив уговора [акроним или скраћени назив], датум закључивања, регистрација у Уједињеним нацијама – UNTS број, регистрациони број са сајта *United Nations Treaty Collection*: <https://treaties.un.org>.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.

(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

Convention on Cluster Munitions [CCM], 30 May 2008, UNTS 2688, I-47713.

(CCM 2008)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994, UNTS 2042, I-35325.

(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Одлуке међународних организација

Назив међународне организације и надлежног органа [акроним], број одлуке, Назив одлуке, датум усвајања.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999), Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.

(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc. 14326, Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April 2017), 29 May 2017.

(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Судска пракса

Судска пракса у Републици Србији

Врста акта и назив суда [акроним суда], број предмета са датумом доношења, назив и број службеног гласника или друге публикације у коме је пресуда објављена – ако је доступно.

Одлука Уставног суда Републике Србије [УСРС], IУа-2/2009 од 13. јуна 2012. године, „Службени гласник РС”, бр. 68/2012.

(Одлука УСРС, IУа-2/2009)

Решење Апелационог суда у Новом Саду [АСНС], Ржр–1/16 од 27. априла 2016. године.

(Решење АСНС, Ржр–1/16)

Судска пракса Међународног суда правде

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, врста одлуке са датумом доношења, назив и број гласила у коме је пресуда објављена, број стране.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.

(ICJ Judgment, 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.

(ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2010)

Судска пракса Суда правде Европске уније

Назив случаја, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (ECLI).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

(*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union*, C-270/12) или (CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.

(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Судска пракса Европског суда за људска права

Назив случаја, број представке, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (ECLI).

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court (Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina v. Ukraine*, 63566/00, par. 20) или (ECHR, 63566/00, par. 20)

Судска пракса других међународних судова и трибунала

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) или (ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Архивски извори

Назив установе [акроним или скраћени назив], назив или број фонда [акроним или скраћени назив], кутија, фасцикла (уколико постоји), сигнатура, „Назив документа” (ако нема назива, дати кратак опис одговарањем на питања: ко? коме? шта?), место и датум документа или н.д. ако није наведен датум.

Архив Србије [АС], МИД, К-Т, ф. 2, r93/1894, „Извештај Министарства иностраних дела о постављању конзула”, Београд, 19. април 1888.

(АС, МИД, К-Т, ф. 2)

(АС, МИД, ф. 2) – ако је позната само фасцикла, а не и кутија
Dalhousie University Archives [DUA], Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, “List of written judgements by Laskin,” n.d.

(DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Извори са интернета

Презиме, име или назив корпоративног аутора [акроним]. Година објављивања или н.д. – ако не може да се утврди година објављивања. „Наслов секције или стране унутар сајта.” *Назив сајта*. Датум креирања, модификовања или последњег приступа страници, ако не може да се утврди на основу извора. Интернет адреса.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. “Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html>.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Институт за политичке студије [ИПС]. н.д. „Предавање др Фридриха Ромига.” *Институт за политичке студије*. Последњи приступ 10. октобар 2018. <http://www.ips.ac.rs/rs/news/predavanje-dr-fridriha-romiga/>.

(Институт за политичке студије [ИПС], н.д.) – *прво навођење*

(ИПС, н.д.) – *свако следеће навођење*

Танјуг. 2019. „Европска свемирска агенција повећава фондове.” 28. новембар 2019. <http://www.tanjug.rs/full-view1.aspx?izb=522182>.

(Танјуг 2019)

ФОРМАТИРАЊЕ ТЕКСТА

Опште смернице о обради текста

Текст рада обрадити у програму *Word*, на следећи начин:

величина странице: А4;

маргине: *Normal* 2,54 cm;

текст писати курентом (обичним словима), осим ако није другачије предвиђено;

проред између редова у тексту: 1,5;

проред између редова у фуснотама: 1;

величина слова у наслову: 14 pt;

величина слова у поднасловима: 12 pt;

величина слова у тексту: 12 pt;

величина слова у фуснотама: 10 pt;

величина слова за табеле, графиконе и слике: 10 pt;

увлачење првог реда пасуса: 1,27 cm (опција: *Paragraph/Special/First line*);

поравнање текста: *Justify*;

боја текста: *Automatic*;

нумерација страна: арапски бројеви у доњем десном углу;

не преламати речи ручно уношењем цртица за наставак речи у наредном реду;

сачувати рад у формату .doc.

Примена правописних правила

Радове ускладити са *Правописом српског језика* у издању Матице српске из 2010. године или из каснијих издања.

Посебну пажњу обратити на следеће:

Приликом првог навођења **транскрибованих страних имена и израза** у облој загради поред навести и њихове облике на изворном језику у курзиву (*italic*), нпр: Франкфуртер алгемајне цајтунг (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*), Џон Ролс (*John Rawls*), Алексеј Тупољев (*Алексей Туполев*).

Поједине **општепознате стране изразе** писати само на изворном језику у курзиву, нпр. *de iure, de facto, a priori, a posteriori, sui generis* итд.

Реченицу не почињати акронимом, скраћеницом или бројем.

Текст у фуснотама увек завршавати тачком.

За навођење израза или **цитирања на српском језику** користити наводнике који су својствени српском језику према важећем правопису („ ”), а за навођење или **цитирање на енглеском или другом страном језику** користити наводнике који су својствени том језику (“ ”, « »).

Угластом заградом [] означавати: 1) сопствени текст који се умеће у туђи текст; или 2) текст који се умеће у текст који је већ омеђен облом заградом.

Црту писати са размаком пре и после или без размака, никако са размаком само пре или само после. Између бројева, укључујући бројеве страна, користити примакнуту црту (–), а не цртицу (-).

За **наглашавање појединих речи** не користити подебљана слова (**bold**), нити подвучена слова (underline) већ искључиво курзив (*italic*) или наводнике и полунаводнике (’ ’ на српском језику или ‘ ’ на енглеском језику).

Форматирање научног чланка

Научни чланак форматирати на следећи начин:

*Име и презиме првог аутора**

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

Име и презиме другог аутора

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ РАДА**

** Фуснота: по потреби, навести један од следећих (или сличних) података: 1) назив и број пројекта у оквиру кога је чланак написан; 2) да је рад претходно изложен на научном скупу у виду усменог саопштења под истим или сличним називом; или 3) да је истраживање које је представљено у раду спроведено за потребе израде докторске дисертације аутора.

Сажетак

Сажетак, обима од 100 до 250 речи, садржи предмет, циљ, коришћени теоријско-методолошки приступ, резултате и закључке рада.

Кључне речи: Испод текста сажетка навести од пет до десет **кључних речи**. Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

У тексту је могуће користити највише три нивоа поднаслова. **Поднаслов** навести без нумерације, на следећи начин:

ПОДНАСЛОВ ПРВОГ НИВОА

Поднаслов другог нивоа

Поднаслов трећег нивоа

Табеле, графиконе и слике уносити на следећи начин:

- изнад табеле/графикона/слике центрирано написати: Табела/Графикон/Слика, редни број и назив;
- испод табеле/графикона/слике навести извор на следећи начин: 1) уколико су табела/графикон/слика преузети,

написати *Извор*: и навести референцу на исти начин као што се наводи у библиографској парентези; 2) уколико нису преузети, написати *Извор*: Обрада аутора.

Референце наводити у тексту према Начину цитирања.

Фусноте користити искључиво за давање напомена или ширих објашњења.

РЕФЕРЕНЦЕ

Списак референци навести након текста рада, а пре резимеа, на следећи начин:

- прво навести референце на ћирилици по азбучном реду;
- затим навести референце на латиници и страним језицима по абecedном реду;
- прву линију сваке референце поравнати на левој маргини, а остале увући за 1,27 cm, користећи опцију *Paragraph/Special/Hanging*;
- све референце наводити заједно, без издвојених делова за правне акте или архивску грађу;
- референце не нумерисати;
- наводити искључиво оне референце које су коришћене у тексту.

Након списка референци навести име и презиме аутора, наслов рада и резиме на енглеском језику на следећи начин:

First Author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Second Author

Affiliation

TITLE

Resume

Резиме, обима до 1/10 дужине чланка, садржи резултате и закључке рада који су образложени опширније него у сажетку.

Keywords: Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

Уколико је **рад написан на страном језику**, након списка референци, име и презиме аутора, наслов, резиме и кључне речи навести на српском језику.

Форматирање осврта

Осврт форматирати на исти начин као научни чланак, без навођења сажетка, кључних речи и резимеа.

Форматирање приказа

Приказ књиге форматирати на следећи начин:

Текст поделити у **две колоне**.

*Име и презиме аутора**

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора:
Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ ПРИКАЗА

Испод наслова **поставити слику предње корице**;

Испод слике предње корице навести податке о књизи према следећем правилу:

Име и презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*.

Место издања: издавач, број страна.

Текст приказа обрадити у складу са општим смерницама о обради текста.

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