



SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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ПОЛИТИЧКА
СРПСКА



Institute for Political Studies

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Editorial

In November of 2016, in Kopaonik, Serbia, Institute for Political Studies has had the pleasure to participate at the 10th Regional Seminar of Political Scientists, as an academic partner institution. The seminar is one of the largest events of that kind in Europe, and this year's topic was particularly relevant: the election of the 45th President of the United States of America.

The event took place at the conference premises of the beautiful MK Mountain Resort – Grand Hotel, and was organized by Center for Social Dialogue and Regional Initiatives (CSDRI), with the support of University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Sciences, which is, as of recently, one of the most important partner institutions of our Institute. Many distinguished authors, professors, researchers, government and NGO representatives, and journalists, took part in the Seminar over three days of intensive work in several panels.

It is our particular pleasure to be able to open this issue of *Serbian Political Thought* to some of the most important works and papers presented at the seminar, coming from the esteemed authors from both the USA and Serbia. We believe that the issue will provide a valuable contribution to the debate of one of the most important and complex phenomena of our times: the American electoral process of 2016 and the eventual deep changes that it has brought about.

At the same time, we would like to thank the authors for their efforts, as well as the academic audiences in Serbia, the USA, and beyond, for their prospective comments and feedback. We are also looking forward to enhancing the established academic cooperation with the Faculty of Political Sciences and CSDRI in the years to come.

December, 2016
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Reflections on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Few polls or pundits predicted Donald Trump's victory over Hillary Clinton. Trump won anyway, or at least he won the electoral vote, despite polling more than two million fewer votes than Clinton in the nationwide popular vote.

Trump won because he appealed to a half of America that lies mostly hidden from media gaze, an America that lives in declining rustbelt cities and towns that used to be thrived factory centers, a more rural, small town America that feels deeply estranged from the increasing ethnic diversity it sees encroaching on its more traditional world, an America' that feels left behind by the new financialized economy that has brought oases of gentrification and affluence to cities like Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle. Those cities are all found on America's east and west coasts. Trump's victory margin was built in the interior states where votes are weighted more heavily by the peculiarities of the American electoral system.

Yet Barack Obama twice won many of these same interior states handily, in 2008 and 2012. They went to Trump this time because the Democrats ran a candidate without Obama's popular appeal, a candidate perceived as standing for the status quo in a year the voters wanted change. They wanted change not so much because economic conditions in America were getting worse. They weren't. But this was the election

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cycle in which the American electorate concluded that the end of the Great Recession was not going to mean an end to the new economy of precarious jobs, increasing health care costs and stagnant earnings. They were not looking for technocrats who knew how to manage the new economy. They were looking for a wrecking crew to smash the new economy in the hope that the old economy would then come back.

That was what Donald Trump said he would do. And that persuaded enough former Democratic voters to switch parties and elect him to be the next president. Will he live up to those campaign pledges? Did he mean them? Is restoring the old economy even possible? We shall soon see. Trump cannot afford to walk away from those voters he wooed because doing so would leave him politically hostage to the leaders of the congressional Republican Party, people he does not care much for and who do not care much for him.

Meanwhile, if the Democrats hope to make a comeback in the congressional elections of 2018 and the presidential election of 2020, they need to understand why they fell short this time around and what they can do to recover. They did not fall all that short in 2016. They won the national popular vote and gained seats in both houses of Congress. For the past 25 years or so, the Democrats have been the majority party in America, if not in the American government. They have won the popular vote in six of the past seven presidential elections and have often outpolled the Republicans nationally in congressional contests.

But that will not be enough to bring them back to government. America's skewed electoral system is not going to change. To come back, the Democrats will need to swing back their way the roughly one percent of the vote in the key rustbelt states of the American Midwest, like Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania, that they won with Obama but lost to Trump. Had Clinton won those three states that she narrowly lost, she would have won the presidency.

To win back those states, and other rust belt bastions like Ohio (won twice by Obama but lost by Clinton by a more decisive margin), the Democrats will have to reshape their national electoral coalition. Right now that is a "rainbow coalition," offering strengthened legal protections to women, immigrants, Latinos, African-Americans, gays and other vulnerable groups. And while those groups, if they voted 100 percent Democrat, would add up to a majority of the U.S. electorate, they never have and never will vote 100 percent Democrat. The U.S. is too politically diverse for that. To come back from this defeat the Demo-

crats will have to win back support from one very large group which is not part of their present rainbow coalition but whose votes they have won before and could win again – the white working class. Characterizing these voters, as Clinton did, as a “basket of deplorables,” is not a promising way to win back their votes. Addressing the economic issues that affect these voters, from the outsourcing of jobs, to mortgage relief to the cost of health insurance and college tuition might. That would certainly ruffle feathers among big Democratic donors on Wall Street. But ultimately political parties can only prosper by winning elections. So the Democrats now face a tough choice on which direction, and how far, they will go.

Meanwhile, Americans, and the world, face the uncertain and potentially dangerous specter of a Trump presidency. Rarely has an American president taken office so unprepared by experience and by character, to govern the United States and direct its global policies. Trump’s initial choices for cabinet officers and key White House advisors show little promise of compensating for these deficits.

The problem is not so much that Trump promises a radical change in America’s long dominant economic policy and foreign policy paradigms. The same could have been said about Franklin D. Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan. The problem is that Trump’s promised changes seem not to have been coherently thought out nor their larger implications fully understood.

Take, for example, economic policy. Broadly, Trump has been talking about pushing working class real wages upward by a combination of deficit spending on infrastructure projects, and tightening labor markets by expelling illegal immigrants. He has also hinted at protectionism by means of ripping up existing trade agreements and imposing punishing tariffs on Chinese and other imports. But his cabinet choices and Republican congressional allies are mainly people who want to weaken unions and keep wages down. Even if Trump succeeds in reemploying rustbelt workers at higher wages through infrastructure projects and immigration enforcement, if those workers then spend their fatter paychecks at Walmart buying imported goods,, most of that deficit spending stimulus will not be recaptured by the U.S. tax system and those initial wage gains could be lost to inflation or higher interest rates. And if China wants to push back on Trumpian protectionism (or Taiwan policies) it has a formidable weapons for doing so in the roughly \$1.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt now held by Beijing. By selling off that

debt, China could sharply push up U.S. interest rates and stall the U.S. economy.

Now look at foreign policy. Trump is an America-Firster, a nationalist and a unilateralist. Fine. Maybe the U.S. is a little over-extended anyway and committed to defending more foreign allies than it needs or can afford. Maybe some cold war era alliances no longer serve American interests. Maybe, as Trump says, they cost more than they are worth.

But what happens when Trump hints that the U.S. no longer considers Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty as a U.S. pledge to defend any NATO member country subjected to outside aggression? That tells countries like Estonia and Poland, who feel threatened by Russia, to shop for security guarantees elsewhere. One place they might shop is Germany. Does Trump or America really want to see an armed Russian-German rivalry over the future of central and Eastern Europe? We have all seen where that has led in the not so distant past. And once again, I need not remind readers of this journal, the geopolitical fault line would run right through the Balkans. NATO was originally conceived to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.” Devaluing America’s NATO security guarantees could easily lead to easing the American out, the Russians in and the Germans up.

Similar destabilizing prospects loom in East Asia. Trump has suggested that rich countries like Japan and South Korea should take charge of their own security, even to the extent of developing their own nuclear bombs.

Twenty-five years after the cold war, and following the fiascos of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya there is ample reason for the United States to scale back its global interventionism and commitments. But in a world grown used to an American security blanket, any scaling back must be handled with skill and care. Looking around Donald Trump’s national security team in formation, it is hard to see who might supply those essential qualities.

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The 2016 Presidential Election in the United States and the Resurgence of “American Nationalism” in Foreign Policy Decision-making

Abstract

The author analyzes the resurgence of “American Nationalism” in the context of Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2016. He argues that elections of 2016 have underscored that the United States may be charting a course in which it increasingly pursues its national interests autonomously from the global networks and relationships that had characterized U.S. foreign and national security policies since the conclusion of World War II. In this view, U.S. foreign policy should become an extension of domestic politics and should be assessed primarily in what it delivers to Americans, not to the world community or to the neoliberal internationalist order. For the American public, the high expectations for America that they associated with the ethos of the exceptional nation clashed with the perceived loss of international stature and strength following the cold war and dissemination of the neoliberal internationalist order. From this perspective, America’s allies were no longer reliable friends, our position in the world was deteriorating, our communities were falling apart, the world was becoming increasingly hostile, and our future promised more of the same. In essence, presidential candidate Donald Trump found a ready audience in his arguments that U.S. foreign policy was a complete failure, that integration in the world was a loss for the country, that America was disrespected in the world, and that it was imperative for the country to turn itself around. President-elect Trump’s vision of an American Nationalist foreign policy, suggests that the United States will be devising different rules, pursuing different objectives, and employing different tools than in the past.

Key words: United States of America, foreign policy, nationalism, exceptionalism, international order.

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Introduction

The election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States promises to have significant implications on how the United States conducts its foreign policy and how the U.S. defines and prioritizes its national interests to respond to changes in the global environment. The elections of 2016 have underscored that the United States may be charting a course in which it increasingly pursues its national interests autonomously from the global networks and relationships that had characterized U.S. foreign and national security policies since the conclusion of World War II.

This new self-conceptualization of America's role in the world, increasingly referred to "American Nationalism", did not suddenly appear fully formed in 2016. In fact, this movement towards jettisoning America's internationalist foreign policy had been steadily strengthening among voters since the election of President Bush in 2000. While the administration of Barack Obama endorsed and promoted the retention of the post-war international order, pressures from the American public to reassert American power and disentangle the U.S. from international controls intensified during his years in office. For example, recent public controversies in the U.S. over the government's policy on climate change, the Iran nuclear deal, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, responses to terrorism in Syria and Iraq, refugee policy, the Trans Pacific Partnership, cyber attacks, and drone strikes indicated the extent to which public resistance to the continuance of America's self-defined global leadership role had strengthened.

In 2016, Donald Trump's candidacy unabashedly rejected the tenets of American internationalist foreign policy and dramatically expanded the scope of the U.S. public's dissatisfaction with America's role in the world. It gave voice and legitimacy to those who argued for an abandonment of the post-war internationalist order that had been painstakingly constructed over the last half century. Without warning and with incredible force, much of the foundation of U.S. foreign policy was under siege (Brands and Feaver 2016). This included questioning of continued U.S. support for the global network of alliances, such as NATO; compliance with various multi-lateral trade agreements, such as NAFTA; participation with multi-lateral organizations, such as the UN and International Monetary Fund; international standards of behavior in the

conduct of war such as torture and treatment of foreign nationals; and the long-term dependability of U.S. promises and treaty obligations to foreign governments. Surprisingly to both the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the world community, large sectors of the American public, if not the majority of the public, endorsed these “extreme” positions as necessary and desirable ways to protect and promote American’s national interests on the way to make America great again.

While it is highly unlikely that the United States under President Trump will abrogate its alliance treaty commitments, precipitously exit from multi-lateral trade agreements, or abandon its international obligations, it is clear that the period of expansion of global connectivity is over and that questions of U.S. sovereignty and short-term national interest will take a more prominent role in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. To an unprecedented degree since the end of World War II, the American public has expressed a willingness to try something new in world affairs by reasserting the primacy of America’s national interests separate and apart from its international obligations, responsibilities, and constraints.

In this article, I explore why the American public apparently turned against the internationalism that defined U.S. foreign policy for the last seventy years. I also discuss the implications that Mr. Trump’s American nationalist foreign policy and accompanying public support for his new vision will mean for the United States and for much of the current world order, including the Western Balkans.

An End to the Post-War Foreign Policy Model

Since the end of World War II, U.S. foreign policy has characterized itself as the global leader rallying the world’s democracies to create and nurture a political and economic world order in which the U.S. undertakes significant global commercial and security guarantees and responsibilities (Mead 2001). In 2016, however, Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency demonstrated that the American public’s understanding and foreign policy preferences had turned against the prevailing internationalist order in a number of significant ways, and that support by the public for traditional internationalist U.S. foreign policy had largely evaporated:

- First, in contrast to the opinion of most U.S. foreign policy professionals, many Americans perceived that U.S. foreign policy was in crisis; that the last two decades were a time of failure and lost opportunities; and that the nation needed to act immediately and vigorously to correct and compensate for these losses.
- Second, the American public's experience with globalization and other economic changes in the world were perceived to have worked against America's interests and particularly against the interests of the common man in America.
- Third, the American public distrusted the motives and values of U.S. foreign policy "experts" or "establishment" and believed that they had injured the interests of ordinary Americans by pursuing their internationalist agenda.
- Fourth, the public believed that the priorities of U.S. foreign policy decisions should move away from carrying the burdens and responsibilities of world leadership to promoting and defending more immediate and domestic American interests (Pew Research Center 2016a: 3).

Trump's campaign of American nationalism did much to legitimize this perspective and changed the terms of the debate on foreign policy decision-making in the United States. In this view, U.S. foreign policy should become an extension of domestic politics and should be assessed primarily in what it delivers to Americans, not to the world community or to the neoliberal internationalist order. Rather than promoting the traditional position of the U.S. as a leader of the free world with responsibilities to its allies and friends and with a goal to democratize the world, American Nationalism puts America first. Interstate agreements and cooperation, for example, must work to America's advantage first, and ideological affinity to the U.S. democracy should not necessarily confer substantial foreign policy concessions by the U.S.

The Legacy of Cold War Thinking and the New American Nationalism

Although the American public recognizes that the cold war is over, many have never abandoned the half century way of thinking which the cold war engendered. Many Americans still see the world through the prism of a struggle between two superpowers, a world which was

easy to comprehend, a world which was divided between the “good” and the “bad,” and a world in which the United States and its friends were on the side of freedom and justice, while its opponents stood for all that was corrupt and evil. It was a world in which the U.S. faced an existential threat that justified national mobilization and a unified foreign policy, along with accommodations to the needs of allies and a disproportionate contribution to the collective defense of the free world. For the American public, the construct of the bipolar world of the cold war made foreign policy decision-making relatively simple and clear – America’s primary national interest was to weaken and contain the world communist movement led by the Soviet Union.

Today, twenty-five years after the fall of the Soviet Union, much of the American public still prefers to view the world in the same bipolar way; namely, a world composed of those who support the U.S. in its struggles, and those who are against the U.S. and represent an existential threat to America. At times, the antagonists are terrorists. At times it is Iran, or Russia, or China. The expected, but risky, response, of course, is to resuscitate the logic of the cold war and to call for action that isolates and contains the threat and rallies the democracies for unquestioning support of the U.S. position (Stavridis 2016).

While the United States public continued to embrace the logic of the cold war and its existential threat to the country, much of the remainder of the world, including many of the U.S. closest allies, have moved on and pursued their own national interests separately and autonomously from the agenda of the United States. The grand coalitions invoked by the United States against Al Qaida terrorism in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Kaddafi in Libya, the Islamic State in Syria, and the proponents of hybrid warfare in the Ukraine generated less and less enthusiasm and support for the U.S. position from America’s allies. At times, significant U.S. allies opposed the U.S. position or stood apart from it (e.g. France and Germany during the Iraq invasion). Meanwhile, in America, many viewed this lack of commitment or opposition by our close allies as a betrayal of trust and a confirmation that the U.S. had no alternative but to stand tall and alone to defend America’s national interest in an increasingly chaotic and hostile world (Pew Research Center 2016: 47-54).

In addition to finding itself increasingly isolated in the world, the United States in the post cold war period discovered that it could act alone, without allied support, and still succeed. In contrast to the cold

war era during which both sides had been restrained and worked to limit the scope of military action or challenges to the status quo, the post cold war experience engendered few such limitations. During the cold war, the logic of mutually assured destruction forced both sides to control their allies and to avoid actions that may lead to war. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the existential threat that it posed, the United States found itself able to engage in military action against much weaker foes without fear of escalation or significant loss of life. It also found that it was able to conduct military action at its discretion without significant constraints from allies or potential adversaries.

The first Gulf War, the civil war in Bosnia, NATO action against Yugoslavia, and Iraq War demonstrated to Americans that the United States could successfully conduct war without relying upon counsel or support from allies and without significant costs in blood or treasure. Military action for the U.S. had few negative incentives; and, in fact, the U.S. learned that it could conduct these operations more efficiently without allies who often acted as a brake rather than a facilitator in these activities.

Inadvertently, the United States military actions after the Cold War created an impression among broad sectors of the American public and political leadership that the United States alone was responsible in carrying the burden of collective defense and in behaving as the guarantor of world order. The impression grew in the U.S. that our allies were “free riders” who profited from the benefits of the defense umbrella provided by the U.S., without contributing proportionately to its maintenance (Hudson 2016). Among much of the American public and many political leaders, there was an expectation that U.S. allies ought not count upon America’s protection if they continued to shirk their financial responsibilities. This was a point that Mr. Trump capitalized upon when he offered only tepid support for NATO and Article V collective defense, and explicitly linked the U.S. guarantee for collective security to an ally’s defense expenditures and financial commitments to the Alliance.

The Stress of Globalization and the Spread of American Nationalism

While the breakup of the post cold war era solidarity contributed to the spread of American Nationalism in the 2016 presidential election, it was the process of globalization and its local dislocations that convinced wide swaths of the American public that the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and its international networks were working against both their personal and community's interests and were directly responsible to their decline. Globalization, as viewed by many Americans, did not bring prosperity to all. In many locales, globalization led to deindustrialization, heightened social tensions, increases in income inequality, unemployment, and the destruction of local communities. More significantly, the consequences of globalization were ignored by the political leadership and large numbers of people felt abandoned by their government and leaders (Poushter 2016).

Despite the promises of universal prosperity from globalization, average Americans saw their factories close and their jobs exported to Asia or Mexico. The public perceived that the country was transitioning to a nation that exported raw materials and imported finished goods. Average real incomes continued to fall, and the jobs that remained paid lower wages and provided fewer benefits. Growth in productivity and income went disproportionately to the very wealthy and those with high technical skills, and the prospects for social advancement for those at the lower rungs of the social ladder steadily declined. For the first time ever, many Americans feared that their children would face a harder life than that of their parents (Lieven 2016: 15).

The distress felt by many Americans was not fully recognized or appreciated by the political leadership. Since 1990, the U.S. Presidents and Congresses have supported globalization legislation, particularly in the forms of multinational trade agreements and the abandonment of protection of home industries. Deregulation and other features of the emerging neoliberal order allowed capital and wealth to move freely across national boundaries in pursuit of lower labor costs and higher profits.

While the export of U.S. jobs and manufacturing capacity to Asia, particularly China, was promoted as a social good and linked to the promise of democratization and international stability, many Ameri-

cans felt that their interests and futures had been bargained away for these ethereal goals. Increasingly, Americans perceived that their economy was in precipitous decline and that China was a major beneficiary of this decline. Since 2011, for example, U.S. public opinion polls recorded that a majority of Americans believed China to be the dominant economic power in the world and that China's economy had surpassed that of the United States (Saad 2016).

In short, the stresses associated with globalization in the United States and the defense of globalization by political leaders as a necessary part of the new international order only served to undercut any support that much of the public felt towards the framework of U.S. foreign policy. Pending proposals such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) further highlighted the chasm between the interests of the average American and those of the political leadership. The TPP, in particular, demonstrated to the public that their government and leaders were not only out of touch, but that they were also committed to a foreign policy that they believed weakened America and worked against their community and personal interests.

The Ethos of the Exceptional Nation and the Growth of American Nationalism

America's perceived growing isolation in maintaining global security and the public's sense of abandonment of their interests by the foreign policy decision-makers combined to create an understanding that U.S. foreign policy was flawed and needed to be replaced. In the place of the internationalist foreign policy logic that had dominated U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II, many Americans gravitated to the American popular mythology of the United States as the exceptional nation with a special mission to set an example for the world.

In this political framework of America's global role, the United States is not just one of many nations, and it does not defer to others. Rather America stands alone and answers to no one. It is the exceptional nation without peer and which unquestionably leads the world. In a 2010 Gallup poll, for example, eighty percent of Americans agreed that the United States had a unique character to be the greatest country in the world, and sixty-six percent agreed that the United States has a special responsibility to be the leading nation in world affairs (Jones 2010).

Among the elements that define America's stature and relationship with the world are the following:

- As a nation, America is number one in the world; it is better than others; and it stands out from others.
- International politics is a zero sum game in which there are those who are winners and those who are losers, and the United States must always be in the ranks of the winners.
- America need not accept criticism from others, and it is not subject to the same failings as others.
- As the exceptional nation, we are the envy of the world's nations and entitled to deference them.

For the American public, the high expectations for America that they associated with the ethos of the exceptional nation clashed with the perceived loss of international stature and strength following the cold war and dissemination of the neoliberal internationalist order. From this perspective, America's allies were no longer reliable friends, our position in the world was deteriorating, our communities were falling apart, the world was becoming increasingly hostile, and our future promised more of the same. In essence, presidential candidate Donald Trump found a ready audience in his arguments that U.S. foreign policy was a complete failure, that integration in the world was a loss for the country, that America was disrespected in the world, and that it was imperative for the country to turn itself around.

Public opinion polls underscored the levels of dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy and America's stature in the world. In 2015, Gallup had reported that only 37% of Americans were satisfied with the position of the U.S. in the world while 61% were dissatisfied. In addition, 58% of Americans believed that President Obama was not a respected leader in the world community (Jones 2015). By late 2015, 57% of Americans disapproved of President Obama's foreign policy, and only 41% approved (CNN/ORC Poll 2015).

Transitioning from Internationalist Neo-liberalism to American Nationalism

For the American electorate, the world situation and America's role in it has been a disaster. America supposedly emerged from the cold war as the victor, the U.S. has accumulated scores of new allies, and it has a military unmatched in the world. Nevertheless, America's armed forces

in 2016 are engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and the nation feels under threat in places ranging from Libya to the Ukraine to the South China Sea. U.S. political leaders promised victory in a global campaign against terror, but the terrorist organizations and theatres of conflict have multiplied beyond recognition. All in all, for many Americans, no end to the chaos is in sight.

U.S. leaders also promised an era of prosperity through globalization and the eradication of trade barriers. However, the results, as seen by the public, have been a flood of imports, a precipitous decline in U.S. manufacturing employment, declining real incomes, and a rush of U.S. businesses leaving the country. Rather than address these concerns, the America's leaders have promoted even more sweeping trade deals in Asia with the TPP and in Europe with the TTIP. These leaders have appeared to be either unaware or unconcerned about public resistance to globalization and the dislocations that it has caused.

Taken together, U.S. foreign policy internationalism and neo-liberal policies created a political climate in which Mr. Trump's populist message could easily take root. For decades, Democrat and Republican administrations advocated essentially identical foreign policies and visions of how the United States should interact with the world. Despite public concerns, they did not question the continued appropriateness of America's internationalist foreign policy, and they paid little attention to the growing popular consternation about it. Mr. Trump, however, applied a new standard – nationalism – a principle which resonated with voters and gave voice to their public concerns. In brief, Mr. Trump has left no doubt that he considers U.S. participation and leadership in the global network that regulates state interactions to be a complete failure and contrary to America's interests, a perspective that is shared by many Americans as well.

The Trump campaign, while not advocating specific policy changes, questioned many of the foreign policy assumptions that guided the nation since the end of World War II. He asked whether alliances such as NATO were still worthwhile and in America's interest. He appeared willing to consider examining if the U.S. could benefit from working with Russia in places such as Syria, and whether it was necessary for the U.S. to challenge Russia's claim to its near abroad. He demonstrated little patience with diplomacy, including acceptance of international protocols and adherence to international law. He rejected limitations on torture when they conflicted with U.S. national interests; and, as in the

Iran deal, he rejected the role of the United States as a world actor that needed to align its interests with those of the world community or its allies. He also appeared to reject the utility of foreign assistance funding, soft power, and anti-nuclear proliferation. He appeared willing to work with and support authoritarian leaders and not be encumbered by concerns over democratization. Simultaneously, he advocated a foreign policy approach that freed the United States from international constraints and which encouraged other nations to chart their own path. Above all, he praised his unpredictability as a virtue and strength in foreign affairs.

The Framework of the New American Nationalism in Foreign Policy

At this point, it is not possible to project what will be the specific foreign policy initiatives of the Trump administration or what will be its priorities. It is possible, however, to suggest that a basic framework has emerged, a framework that is deeply nationalist and with American characteristics.

First, Mr. Trump's has a predilection to conceptualize foreign policy in transactional terms which imply that the Trump foreign policy approach will not be constrained by past diplomatic precedents (Kitfield 2016). Mr. Trump celebrates his unpredictability and believes that his negotiating strength is enhanced by creating uncertainty among those with whom he is negotiating. In negotiations, he will convey a willingness to walk away from an agreement or to seek other partners for an agreement if it suits his goals and objectives. As in a business deal, there is no advantage to be gained by communicating one's preferred position or final deal in advance. For example, while discussions with Mexico regarding border controls or NAFTA are unlikely to result in a wall that Mexico pays for or in the abandonment of the free trade market, the Trump administration may believe that the Mexican authorities would be more likely to agree to substantial concessions that will be more to the U.S. advantage.

Second, Mr. Trump may not feel committed to stand by long-term agreements and treaties that the U.S. has ratified in the past if, in his estimation, they were not in the current interest of the United States or not to the U.S. advantage. In this framework, negotiating from strength, extracting the best deal, and abandoning the static and rule-based in-

ternational system forms the core of President-elect Trump's American Nationalist foreign policy. His apparent willingness to challenge China on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty despite forty years of precedent, and his openness regarding the collective security guarantees of NATO illustrate that tendency.

Third, Trump diplomacy is likely to view foreign policy decision-making from the perspective of business contacts and to make decisions based upon "gut feeling" rather than a detailed strategic plan. His appointment of General James Mattis as his nominee for Secretary of Defense was ascribed to the favourable first impression that the general made in his initial interview with the President-elect.

Fourth, Mr. Trump tends to have a short-term and segmented perspective, and is most interested in quick and positive results. For example, if Russia's President Putin can be helpful in resolving the terrorist situation in Syria, then Mr. Trump is likely to engage with Mr. Putin on that issue. Nevertheless, cooperation with Russia in Syria does not obligate the U.S. to engage with Russia on other issues where the interests of the United States and Russian Federation do not coincide.

Fifth, a Trump foreign policy is likely to withdraw from a global leadership role on peripheral issues, but to be engaged forcefully when the U.S. is directly impacted or directly threatened. Described as part of the "Jacksonian Tradition," this approach implies a foreign policy with a relatively more limited set of national priorities, but with a more robust response if the national interest or the reputation of the United States is involved (Mead 2016). For example, neither nation building nor the protection of endangered foreign populations is likely to be a priority in the Trump administration. President Trump, unlike his predecessors, is unlikely to invest in complex multilateral partnerships or deep U.S. engagement abroad. Finally, the pursuit of the U.S. national interest will not take a secondary role to the needs of alliances or multilateral organizations.

None of these tendencies for the incoming Trump administration should be considered predictive for how specific U.S. foreign policy will be executed in the coming years. In the real world, unforeseen events happen, leaders change, new priorities emerge, economies evolve, and crises occur. President-elect Trump's vision of an American Nationalist foreign policy, however, suggests that the United States will be devising different rules, pursuing different objectives, and employing different tools than in the past. United States foreign policy, in brief, will become less predictable, and global affairs more risky (Drezner 2016).

On issues related to the Western Balkans, there are some broad-based policy predictions about a Trump administration that we can make based on his comments during the electoral campaign:

- It is open to a fresh start with Russia and President Putin, and he may not worry about limiting any increased business interactions by Russia (e.g. natural gas) in the region.
- It is not committed to further NATO expansion, and is unlikely to push Serbia towards membership in the Alliance, or to invest heavily in Bosnia's potential membership.
- On Kosovo, it is unlikely to push for broadening of Kosovo's sovereignty, as this would unnecessarily antagonize Russia whose support is needed in other sectors.
- It is unlikely to be supportive of continued linking U.S. regional policy to the European Union, or in promoting more trade agreements with them.
- Barring major civil disorder in the Western Balkans, he is unlikely to become heavily engaged in the region or to provide much foreign assistance.

The bottom line is that the Western Balkans is unlikely to be a high foreign policy priority for the Trump administration. There are no critical U.S. national interests involved or threatened in the region, and there is no rationale for a substantive change in U.S. policy. At the same time, Mr. Trump has made no commitment to continue to follow current policy in the region; and, if unforeseen difficulties erupt, he may react to regional events in unpredictable ways. In brief, we just cannot predict what changes, if any, Mr. Trump would bring to the region.

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The Economic Consequences of Mr. Trump³

Abstract

The paper analyzes Trump's economic program. The overall impression is that this program echoes what has already been tried out during the Reagan era. In its philosophy it is reminiscent of Reagan's "supply side" economics with its three major features: tax cuts and tax reform, massive deficit financing and finally, protectionism. Copying Reagan's policies in a radically different environment in which the United States economy operates today is in itself dangerous. Considering that many economists see the Reagan economic legacy as highly flawed makes the perception of Trump's proposals as even more risky. The belief that old policies can be used in situations that only superficially bear resemblance to past experiences is dangerous and leads to uncertainty and possible dire consequences for the global economy. This is even more accentuated with threats of tariff hikes, the scrapping of TPP and the renegotiation of NAFTA.

Key words: Trump, economic policies, international trade, supply side economics, US dollar

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Introduction

The title of this paper is obviously inspired by the title of Keynes's essay of 1925 (Keynes 1925), in which he criticized Winston Churchill, then the Minister of the Exchequer, for restoring the British pound to the gold standard at the pre-World War I parity. Keynes' forecast that this would make the economy less competitive and lead to unemployment. Keynes himself had borrowed from the title of his own book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* which made him globally famous and in which he predicted that the extremely high reparations imposed on Germany at Versailles would lead to inflation and the radicalization of politics, proposing instead a set of measures that to a large extent resemble the institutional setup of the EU. He also proposed a soft loan by the US to Europe to jumpstart the economy that bears a striking similarity to the Marshall plan. The point of both of these works was that restoration of economic performance and prosperity would have to be achieved through new economic and institutional approaches rather than reverting to the old. This is in stark contrast to what have emerged as contours of a program on the part of Donald Trump in the course of his campaign that won him the presidency of the United States.

Back to the Future

Populist movements inspired by economic hardships have occurred before in American history. Solutions from the relatively near past were then proposed. The analogy that seems most appropriate in considering the present moment in American history is the populist movement that led to the nomination of William Jennings Bryan for president in 1896. In the period following the 1880's, median income had fallen due to a fall in agricultural prices. The gold standard that had done so much for the boost in trade and foreign investment had also opened the path to the first modern globalization. With the dollar fixed to gold and new agricultural exporting countries like Canada, Argentina and Australia entering the market, the fall in agricultural prices was a result of a boost in supply. The solution was seen in the return to a bimetallic standard with the hope that the use of silver would bring prices up. This did not occur. Prices were restored, but this was due to the expansion of the supply of gold as a result of the discovery and exploitation of new gold mines.

Today, in the United States we are witnessing a new resistance to globalization caused by the stagnation or fall in median incomes in real terms over a prolonged period for those that do not belong to the rich, the loss of jobs in manufacturing sectors and generally a feeling that economic circumstances will not get better in the foreseeable future. Globalization, outsourcing, the rise of Asia and especially China with its extraordinary growth of manufactured exports are seen as the main culprits for the economic predicament of many in the United States. Just as in the days of Bryan, the moneyed classes are seen to be indifferent to the plight of those left behind. The feeling of resentment held by a broad specter of the population, but mostly concentrated among the white-male and white - blue collar have swung the election to Donald Trump who will be inaugurated in January, 2017.

There are many explanations for one of the largest electoral upsets in American history. Almost all of them, however, point to a general mood among the described disenfranchised voters rather than to a program or major proposals by the candidates. Now that the election is over, perhaps some attention should be given to what could be reconstructed as Trump's economic program that served only as decorum during the campaign. The major points of the program are presented on the Trump website (Trump 2016).

The overall impression is that this program echoes what has already been tried out in the past. In its philosophy it is reminiscent of Reagan's "supply side" economics. In some of its proposals on huge spending on infrastructure that would create large deficits, it resembles Reagan's military spending driven by his "star wars" project. In this regard there are two fundamental questions that need to be addressed. The first is: how successful were Reagan's economic policies and reforms ("Reaganomics")? The second question boils down to the following: can there be any analogy between the current moment and the Reagan era regardless of the answer to the first question?

An assessment of "Reaganomics" should take into account not only the results, but also, Reagan's campaign proposals and their implementation. A detailed account along these lines certainly surpasses the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that economists widely differ in their appraisal of the Reagan years. Some studies (Boskin 1987) have gone into detail but have not come up with a final verdict. From the libertarian perspective, there have been contradictory assessments. The Cato Institute analysis (Niskanen, Moore 1996) paints a favorable

picture asserting that the Reagan years showed better performance on eight of ten key economic variables as compared to the years preceding his term in office, as well as the ones following it. On the other hand the Mises Institute (Rothbard 1988) found that Reagan's legacy was flawed and that the results were in stark contrast to the proclaimed goals.

What is certain, however, is that there were three major features of "Reaganomics": tax cuts and tax reform, massive deficit financing of the military buildup and finally, protectionism. These were accompanied by deregulation that was already on its way under Carter, that we will not go into. Let us look at each in turn.

Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, had consciously produced a recession in order to curb inflation through instruments of tight monetary with soaring interest rates. In such circumstances, after Volcker decided to turn to monetary expansion, deficit spending accompanied by tax-cuts produced a "Keynesian" expansion. With idle capacity this produced a booming comeback. The expansion was demand driven rather than supply driven, although it was dubbed "supply side economics" a term dear to the right wing. What, however, was new is that deficit spending continued in spite of high growth rates. This is something that even the most diehard Keynesians would not do. The central contention of supply side economics – that an across the board cut in taxes would lead to increasing output and consequently tax revenue, thus easing the budget deficit in part, simply did not materialize. Instead there was a sharp rise in government debt. This is the standard mainstream Keynesian interpretation. Needless to say, it has been (and still is) contested by the Republican Party which made Reagan a hero bordering on the "cult of personality". Without denying that Reagan had vast deficit spending that the Republicans voted for in spite of their balanced budget principles, they still hold that the tax cuts provided incentives and created a supply response that was not Keynesian demand driven.

It goes without saying that the tax reform did bring benefits to the more affluent. The top one percent benefited more than any other group from the tax cuts. This was reflected in their post-tax income and was the beginning of growing inequality in the United States after the 1980's (CBO 2016). Corporate taxes and investment income taxes were reduced. In the next three decades the increase of the effective tax rate did fall on the top 1% of the income distribution, but the increase was not even close to the Reagan cuts. Whether the tax cuts under Reagan boosted the economy through "supply side" incentives or did the econ-

omy boom through demand driven deficit spending will remain open to debate? What is certain is that income inequality in the United States is now much higher than it was at the time when Reagan took office. The cumulative growth of average inflation-adjusted after-tax income by before-tax income group between 1979 and 2013 shows the income of the top one percent rising by 192 percent and the highest quintile by 70 percent. At the same time, income of the middle three quintiles rose by 46 percent and the lowest quintile by 41 percent (CBO 2016: fig.13). In other words, the Reagan tax cuts came at a time when income distribution was more equal and there was more faith in the effects of “trickle down” economics. Given that one of the perceived reasons for Trump’s triumph in the election is disenchantment with the political and economic elite and faith in the unregulated market, it is difficult to see how a vast decrease in taxes of the wealthy will be enacted and sold to the public at large. This can probably only be done through aggressive protectionism as promised by Trump and somewhat implemented by Reagan.

Here, a distinction must be made between protectionism in the 1980’s and the protectionism advocated by Trump in the campaign. As tax cuts were implemented the boost in domestic demand also created a sharp increase in imports. This led to a rise in the current account deficits that reached 3.5 % of GDP. The twin deficits (budget and current account) were financed from abroad, mainly Germany and Japan. The United States became a net international debtor with debt rising from \$ 440 billion to \$ 2 trillion by 1989 (Oatley 2012: 229). The inflow was caused by high US interest rates which in turn led to an appreciation of the dollar. Measured on a trade-weighted basis the dollar had appreciated 50 percent by 1985. This in turn led to higher current account deficits as imports became cheaper. This led to the Plaza accord of 1985 according to which five nations committed to intervene so that the dollar would not appreciate further. Furthermore, threats of a rise in tariffs led to voluntary import restrictions of Japanese cars. This in turn, over time, led to Japanese investment into producing Japanese cars in the United States.

The contours of Trump’s economic program were made to resemble the experience of the Reagan years.

The first major characteristic of the Reagan era consists of budget deficits even during economic expansion with public debt rising by 20% of GDP, from \$ 2.1 trillion to \$ 4.2 trillion by the fourth quarter of 1988.

(FRED 2016). This was certainly inconsistent to say the least, with Republican mainstream view on budget deficits and government debt. If the Republican majority goes along with this type of combination that Trump is proposing, it will be just a repetition of hypocritical behavior (done once again under George W. Bush) and will show how there are no true beliefs underlining the Republican philosophy of government, except for giving tax breaks to the affluent.

The tax cuts proposed by Trump would occur in a totally different setting than in the Reagan years. Not only is the public debt much larger, but the proposed tax cuts would not have the same effects. The tax cuts for the affluent will probably lead to lesser investment than in the 1980's due to the fact that top marginal tax rates are much lower than at the beginning of Reagan's first term. Secondly, cutting tax rates for the wealthy would only exacerbate the level of high inequality that has already reached historical highs. Inequality is certainly much higher than in the 1980's when its new rise began. A further increase in that respect could produce a strong political backlash that may erode the Republican majority. Furthermore, it could lead to the perception that the United States is run by an oligarchy that perpetuates a dysfunctional political system for its own benefit.

Furthermore, the problem is that tax cuts would be implemented at a point in time in which the public debt of the United States is far larger than in the Reagan years, as it stood at 105 % of GDP at the end of 2015. The estimated tax cuts and budget deficits would increase the cumulative debt after macroeconomic feedback by another 12 % of GDP by the end of his first term and by seven trillion dollars after the first ten years if the tax cuts remained intact, leading to a cumulative debt increase of 25% (Nunns et al. 2016). This would surpass the debt to GDP ratio that the United States had after World War II.

All of this, after a period of a boost in growth thanks to tax cuts and tax reforms. Furthermore, once the economy gets overheated through extra public spending on infrastructure, one should expect a rise in inflation towards the end of Trump's first term. Heavy government borrowing to finance the budget deficits and infrastructure projects should lead to higher interest rates and the crowding out of private investment. This had already occurred in the Reagan years leading to the mentioned appreciation of the dollar. The hike in the exchange rate should be expected to lead to higher current account deficits just as it did in the Reagan years.

The problem is that the dollar has already appreciated by 40% since its low in 2011 (Economist, Dec 3, 2016: 9), The appreciation of the dollar had led to increasing problems for governments and private firms which had accumulated dollar debts in a period of low interest rates. This has already led to potential default scenarios and a fall in demand on a global scale just as had occurred in the Reagan years. A further rise in the dollar could create a dangerous situation in this regard. One should be aware that it may be American banks and hedge funds that may be crippled by such a turn of events, since they are the main creditors and have invested heavily in sovereign debt of emerging economies. Finally, a stronger dollar would certainly lead to higher current account deficits which would hit manufacturing jobs in the United States. This will in turn make Trump's stance in regards to free trade more aggressive.

Trump has shown anti-free trade rhetoric and a significant tendency to protectionism. In general, it is possible to identify two main elements of his trade policy: dissatisfaction with existing trade agreements and the dysfunctional trade relationship with China. In contrast to traditional Republicans who embraced free trade as a key part of a broader concept of free-market capitalism, he often stated that NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and possible ratification and implementation of TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) would hurt American manufacturing industry by sending its jobs overseas, increase US trade deficit and reducing its growth. According to his chief economic advisors Peter Navarro⁴ and Dan diMicco⁵, trade pacts and unfair trade practices (especially since China's entry into WTO in 2001) have been the main causes of the slowdown of the US economy since the beginning of the 2000's. In his first video address after the presidential victory, Trump mentioned trade as the first issue in his plans for the first 100 days in office which emphasized the significance of this particular policy area for his future administration.

Trade – the End of Multilateralism?

The president-elect promised to issue a notification of intent to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to begin the process of reforming NAFTA. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 12-nations free

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trade deal between the countries of the Pacific Rim has been the most ambitious regional trade deal in history (covering about 40% of the global economy).⁶ On the campaign trails Trump called it “the potential disaster for our country” and sharply criticized Hillary Clinton for her previous support for its creation (Trump 2016).

In a sense, economists have been divided about the estimations of economic effects of this agreement. Some of them (Broadbent, Pinkert et al. 2016; Petri, Plummer 2016) think that the conclusion and implementation of TPP could have a positive impact on the US economy and would generate growth for all. The US Trade Commission report suggests that until 2032, the US annual real income would rise by \$57.3 billion (0.23%), real GDP would be \$42.7 billion (0.15%) higher and annual exports would be \$27.2 billion (1.0%) higher relative to a projection that doesn't include TPP (Broadbent, Pinker et al. 2016: 21). According to more optimistic predictions, until 2030, TPP could lead to an increase of annual real incomes in the United States by \$131 billion (0.5% of GDP), and annual exports by \$357 billion (9.1%) relative to the baseline (without TPP) predictions (Petri, Plummer 2016: 9-10). On the other hand, some studies claim that TPP could damage US economy and have a negative impact on employment (Capaldo and Izurieta with Sundaram 2016; Baker 2016; Beachy 2015). According to some of these negative predictions, by 2025, TPP would reduce US income by 0.5 percent, increase income inequality and reduce employment by 448.000 (Capaldo, Izurieta with Sundaram 2016: 16-17). Although many pundits have been deeply involved in the debate about the appropriateness of the used models (Lawrence 2016, Rodrik 2016), the credibility of these studies will not be tested in practice, at least for a while, if the promises of the president-elect are fulfilled.

Beside serious economic effects, Trump's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership could have significant strategic consequences (Green, Goodman 2016; Williams, Dolven et al. 2016). One of the TPP's main geopolitical features was to economically isolate and contain China in the environment of growing Asian-Pacific economies by reducing their trade dependence from China and bringing them closer to the United States. The other important goal is America's intention to “write global trade rules” (Obama 2015) in order to preserve a dominant role in shaping the political and economic

6 Signatories of TPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore United States, and Vietnam.

order in this region whose norms and standards would be taken into account by all important actors and which China couldn't ignore. Being the largest trading economy and the second global largest economy (by nominal GDP) China expanded its trade and investment portfolio by concluding trade and investment initiatives in the region and by making its own version of a regional economic model. The US abandonment of TPP opens the door for easier implementation of China's economic programs such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road („One Belt, One Road“ initiative) and potential conclusion of a mega-regional trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).⁷ The possible void caused by the collapse of TPP will certainly facilitate China's intention to establish economic leadership in the region.

On the top of Trump's wish list is a renegotiation or “abortion” of the North American Free Trade Agreement or “the worst trade deal in history” as he called it. It hasn't been long since Ronald Reagan in his remarks announcing his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1979, called for reduction of obstacles for “people's commerce” between countries in the North American region and stated that Americans were capable of “dreaming up fantastic deeds and bringing them off to the surprise of an unbelieving world” (Reagan 1979). Another Republican president, George H. W. Bush signed this agreement in 1992.⁸ For more than 20 years of implementation, this arrangement (between Canada, Mexico and United States) substantially eliminated most of the tariffs among its signatories and created a trade boom among them. This wave of trade liberalization included the automobile industry, agriculture, textile products but also intellectual property issues and the potential harmonization of labor and environmental standards. NAFTA has also been a predecessor of a new generation of free trade agreements which are more comprehensive because in addition to standard issues of trade in goods it included basic liberalization of trade in services and the harmonization of regulations of labor and environmental standards.

7 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Agreement is being negotiated between ten ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and their six FTA partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea).

8 George H.W. Bush's administration negotiated the deal and President Bush signed it (with his counterparts from Mexico and Canada) in three separate ceremonies on December 17, 1992. After the adoption by the Congress, President Clinton signed NAFTA into law on December 8, 1994.

Also, NAFTA was unique because it connected two wealthy developed countries with one developing, low-income country. In general, it seems that NAFTA has benefited all countries in the region. Regional trade has increased significantly from \$290 billion in 1993 to \$1.1 trillion in 2016 (Mc Bride, Aly Sergie 2016). The assessments regarding its broader economic effects are diverse. Political controversies that accompanied the initial proposal and the negotiation process more than 20 years ago are still present. Proponents of the agreement stated that NAFTA would have positive effects for economic growth of its signatories, that it would create thousands of new jobs and improve labor and environmental regulations. For example, President Clinton claimed that NAFTA would create about 200 000 jobs in the first two years of its implementation and near 1 million jobs in its first five years (Clinton 1993). On the other hand, the opponents of NAFTA spoke about its giant negative impact on labor markets (especially in the United States) because of rising trade deficits and the potential dislocation of domestic production from the US to the other countries with abundant cheaper labor. Accordingly, less-skilled workers in the US would become the largest casualties of the agreement.

As we can see, more than twenty years after, results are mixed and the debate on the effects of North American Free Trade Agreement is still on. It seems that both positive and negative estimates have been overstated. According to some critics of NAFTA, there have been significant losses in the US workforce due to increased competition from Mexico's and Canada's exports. Until 2010, about 43.000 US jobs per year have been lost or displaced because of the trade deficit with Mexico, as has been stated by often cited data from the Economic Policy Institute (Scott 2011). This is a much lower number in comparison with the predictions of Ross Perot⁹ and Pat Choate (opponents of NAFTA) who projected that job losses in the US due to enforcement of NAFTA would go up to 5.9 million (Huffbauer, Schott 2005: 40). However, NAFTA helped US manufacturing industries, especially the automotive industry to become competitive on the global stage and more profitable, because of development of various cross-border supply chains. An important fragment of the US-Mexico merchandise trade is result of industry specialization and a fact that large number of American factories have moved to Mexico due to lower labor costs and expected gains in

9 During his unsuccessful presidential bid in 1992, Perot made his famous claim about "giant sucking sound" of US jobs and capital flying to Mexico.

achieving economics of scale. Also, the US-Mexico cross-border investment has increased significantly. The stock of US direct investment in Mexico increased from \$17 billion in 1994 to \$92.8 billion in 2015 (Villarreal 2016). As it seems, Mexico has been the greatest beneficiary of NAFTA but the economic effects on the other parties of the agreement are not negligible. According to a 2014 report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the GDP of the United States per year had increased by \$127 billion due to trade fostered by NAFTA while Mexico and Canada became wealthier by \$170 billion and \$50 billion, respectively (Hufbauer, Cimino, and Moran 2014: 23).

The establishment of NAFTA has significantly transformed economic relations in the North American region. It accelerated agricultural exports and job creation (especially in the auto manufacturing industry) in Mexico but didn't contribute to wage convergence among US and Mexican workers, as has been expected (Clemens 2015). Trade between Canada and the US has increased significantly (in agricultural products, in particular) but the productivity gap between these economies hasn't essentially been reduced (Villarreal and Fergusson 2015). The US trade with Mexico and Canada has increased at a higher rate than its trade with the rest of the world what made these countries the most important destinations for American exports (Hufbauer, Cimino, and Moran 2014: 7). Important economic downsides that have been linked with NAFTA, like the widening trade deficit, job losses and wage stagnation in the US remain open issues for a thorough debate with a multitude of conflicting views.¹⁰

Trump's intention "to renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from the deal under Article 2205" could have serious consequences for the American economy (Trump 2016a).¹¹ The other parties of the agreement (Canada and Mexico) would have no obligation to give US products and companies any preferential treatment which would break existing supply chains, increase their costs and potentially jeopardize their businesses in Canadian and Mexican markets. The possible increase of tariffs for American goods could lead to trade wars with negative effects for all

10 For basic positive and negative opinions regarding these issues, for example, see: NY Times, The Opinion Pages: Room for Debate, What We've Learned from NAFTA (NYT 2013)

11 According to memo from Trump's transition team, he plans to form a team for the study of possible renegotiation or withdrawal from the NAFTA. Article 2205 allows withdrawal „six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties“ (NAFTA 1993)

parties involved. The opening of new talks requires consent of the other parties to come to the table and renegotiate NAFTA. According to their statements, Mexican leaders do not wish to renegotiate but have expressed a readiness for dialogue while their Canadian counterparts are willing to renegotiate the deal (BBC 2016). It is important to emphasize the fact that potential renegotiation would happen in a completely different economic and political framework in comparison with the 1990's when the US was the only global superpower with higher bargaining power than today.

Next to the rising trade skepticism in the United States, trade specialists mostly agree that is almost impossible to separate potential negative effects of these agreements (NAFTA and TPP) from other factors, like technological improvement, rising global import competition and especially competition from China.

Trump vs. China

The bumpy economic relationship with China has been the other main point that marked Trump's presidential campaign and will probably be one of the most significant issues for the next administration. According to Trump, China has been engaged in unfair trade practices (currency manipulation, unfair subsidies of its exports, disrespect of intellectual property rights, poor environmental and labor standards, etc.) so any American action that would be aimed towards the elimination of existing distortions would be completely justified (Trump 2016b). One of the often mentioned retaliation measures could be the imposition of a 45% tariff on all American imports from China. The other proposed instrument is bringing trade cases against China before the domestic courts and panels of the WTO. The implementation of these measures could lead to the outbreak of a trade war between two countries with many casualties on both sides due to economic interconnections between them. In 2015, China was the largest trading partner in goods of the United States with total trade amounting to \$598.1 billion (16% of total US trade). The US goods trade deficit with China was \$368 billion and the US services trade surplus was about \$30 billion which lead to an overall US deficit in trade between these countries.¹²

¹² All data are from Office of the United States Trade Representative and the United States Census Bureau, [online]. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/>

By appointing Iowa Governor Terry Branstad as US ambassador to China, Trump has been sending positive signals about his intentions regarding future relations between the United States and China.¹³ But various recent events like receiving a phone call from the president of Taiwan (the first publicly known communication between two leaders in near 40 years) and the statement about questionable US support for the “One China” policy tend to complicate future bilateral relations.¹⁴

Trump’s most frequent accusation against China concerns currency manipulation through which it makes domestic exports cheaper and potentially harms American companies due to their inability to compete with lower costs of Chinese products. This has been the hot topic of US-China economic relations for more than 20 years. From 1994 until 2005, China kept its currency undervalued and pegged to the American dollar with the intention to maintain its stability. In 2005 China made the Yuan (Renminbi) exchange rate adjustable through a policy of “managed float” which led to a 19% appreciation of the Chinese currency. Economists have been divided about this issue. In his call to “confront the dragon”, Trump’s economic advisor Peter Navarro stated that “China’s manipulation of its currency, the Yuan, is the tap root of everything wrong with the US-China trade relationship” and that China’s artificial “peg makes it impossible for the US to ever balance its trade through the normal kind of currency adjustments that are the hallmark of mutually beneficial free and fair trade” (Navarro, Autry 2011: 67; Navarro 2012). On the other hand, the US Treasury Department and some prominent economists claim that China isn’t a currency manipulator and due to present economic indicators the free float of the Renminbi would probably result in a “depreciation that would boost China’s international competitiveness” (Frankel 2015; US Department of the Treasury 2016). Some of them even state that China is actually manipulating its currency up, not downwards (Worstell 2016).

The story about China’s unfair trade practices continues.
Trump’s claims of unfair advantages for Chinese corporations

china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china or <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1512yr.html> [Accessed 10 December 2016].

13 Governor Branstad has been named „an old friend of Chinese people“ by China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang (MFA of PRC 2016).

14 The United States recognized Taiwan as part of China on January 1, 1979. From then United States and Taiwan maintained unofficial relations according to Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on April 10, 1979.

over American companies and proposed actions aimed at correcting these alleged distortions could provoke a trade war between these two countries. It seems that in this kind of conflict China could lose more because of the value of its exports to the US in comparison with its imports from America. The top three US export goods to China have been transportation equipment (aircraft parts and equipment, for example), soybeans and cars (US-China Business Council 2016; United States Census Bureau 2016). However, the United States mainly imports consumer electronics (laptops, mobile phones/iPhones, tablets, etc.), machinery and clothing from China. Because of its position of the largest global producer of these products, a unilateral imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports would mostly harm American consumers (it would basically be a tax on consumer goods). Furthermore, a substantial part of American imports are semi-finished products or raw materials that US based multinational companies send to their subsidiaries for the assembly of the final product at lower prices. Therefore, raising tariffs would substantially reduce revenues of American companies. China's economy would also suffer because some of its sectors are dependent of American exports and in time of slower growth, millions of workers could lose their jobs. A possible trade war with China would harm not only their own economies but could cause collateral damage in European economies whose companies assemble their own products in China (Siemens, Bosch, Louis Vuitton, Bayer, L'Oreal, etc.). This kind of development would also harm corporations from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries that have their plants in China as part of widespread supply chains.

Trump Card or Dud Cards

In conclusion, it is difficult to foresee what will actually occur as there is ample time for modification of Trump's proposals. It has been mentioned that some of his threats concerning trade may just be a bargaining chip in negotiations with other actors. Furthermore, there are internal constraints on certain policies that are institutional.

Nevertheless, the abandonment of the TPP will certainly lead to geopolitical shifts even if bilateral negotiations are seen as easier for the

advancement of American interests. The scrapping of this deal will certainly lead to the perception that the United States is an unreliable partner. A multilateral agreement has more weight than any series of bilateral agreements. This will redefine the position of China in the Pacific. Combined with the threat of tariffs and retribution for American companies investing overseas will further alienate China and other emerging markets in which American companies were present. The possible shift of outsourcing from China to Mexico would be confronted with unpredictable results of the renegotiation of NAFTA. The losers in all of this are many, but among them not least American firms that have complex supply chains and had spearheaded globalization that benefited both them in terms of profits and American consumers in terms of low prices. A possible outcome is the laying off of employees of these firms which would be a result that directly contradicts the proclaimed goals of these policies.

The coming possible surge of the dollar will not only lead to greater trade and current account deficits, but would in combination with high budget deficits and a growing and probably all-time peak in public debt, provoke a possible erosion of confidence in the dollar as a world currency. The role of the dollar has already been questioned by many, not least of all China which is building a separate payment system.

Finally, the belief that old policies can be used in situations that only superficially bear resemblance to past experiences is dangerous and leads to uncertainty and possible dire consequences for the global economy. Copying Reagan's policies in a radically different environment in which the United States economy operates is in itself dangerous. Considering that many economists see the Reagan economic legacy as highly flawed makes the perception of Trump's proposals as even more risky. If we combine the aforementioned with Trump's erratic style, the impression of almost complete uncertainty is strengthened. This cannot be good for the economy. As Keynes observed in times of uncertainty investment is the first victim. Large scale investment is what the global economy needs and it is difficult to see how the disarray created by the Trump proposals could lead to a positive outcome in this regard. It seems likely that the implementation of Trump's proposals would lead to serious negative consequences for the American economy, the world economy and would undermine the leadership position of the United States in establishing international trade rules and standards.

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Donald Trump's 2016 Presidential Campaign in the Light of the U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions

Abstract

This paper aims to classify foreign policy attitudes and stances of Donald Trump in his 2016 presidential campaign according to the U.S. foreign policy traditions. In the first part of the paper, we analyze speeches of Donald Trump since the moment he became the Republican Presidential Nominee. The analysis is based on digest reports of Trump's speeches, published on his official website in the period from the Republican National Convention (June 18 – 21) until the Election Day (November 8). We present his main foreign policy messages pointing to foreign policy determinants, instruments and goals towards particular actors (such as China, Mexico or Russia).

In the second part of paper we present main ideas of distinctive foreign policy traditions classified by Walter Russell Mead (2001) – Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian – and compare them with the most important foreign policy stances of Donald Trump. The main argument of this paper is that Trump's foreign policy concept incorporates elements of different traditions. His stances mostly reflect the elements of Jacksonian foreign policy tradition. However, due to its overwhelming emphasis on the economic issues, it seems that Trump's positions are closer to Hamiltonian thought in terms of foreign policy determinants, while some aspects of Jeffersonian thought are also present in Trump's articulation of foreign policy issues.

Key words: Donald Trump, foreign policy, 2016 presidential campaign, United States of America, Jacksonian tradition, Hamiltonian tradition

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Introduction

The election of Donald Trump for the 45th president of the United States of America (U.S.) is thought to be one of the most important and unexpected events in 2016. The main reason why analysts gave significant importance to the election's outcome lays in the controversies which Donald Trump raised during the campaign. Main controversies contained details from Trump's private life. However, significant number of these controversies derived from his stances towards the foreign policy issues. Probably the mostly mentioned one was famous "build the wall with Mexico" message (Kopan 2016). Another major controversy was his continuous respect towards Vladimir Putin. This was often addressed by his critics and opponents. (Hemmings 2016).

What will be foreign policy of Donald Trump? Is he going to make significant changes in comparison to his predecessor (Collina 2016), or actually to continue Obama's path (Boot 2016)? Authors and analysts offer different answers on these questions. We find all of these issues globally very relevant. It is clear that we cannot judge Trump's foreign policy before he enters the White House in January 2017. However, we can try to classify his foreign policy stances, attitudes, and plans into the existing patterns of U.S. foreign policy traditions. Therefore, the question that this paper aims to answer is: which school of foreign policy thought in the U.S. Donald Trump belongs to, based on his articulation of foreign policy topics in the Presidential Election Campaign 2016?

In the first part of this paper, we analyze speeches of Donald Trump from the Republican National Convention until the Election Day. We extract his foreign policy messages and present them in the following order: a) determinants of foreign policy (what is the most important driving force for the U.S. foreign policy?); b) instruments of foreign policy (which instruments should be used in foreign policy and when?); c) goals and stances in relations with relevant international actors (vision of current problems and perspectives for future relations with other states and international organizations). In the second part of paper we expose main ideas of distinctive foreign policy schools and traditions exposed by Walter Russell Mead (2001) – Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian. Finally, we compare them with the most important foreign policy stances of Donald Trump.

After the election, in one short text Mead (2016b) offered explanation of an unexpected outcome based on the premise that Trump's strongest

supporters – 21st century Jacksonians, were the most decisive factor for his win. Mead's (2016a) earlier text from the early phase of campaign for Primaries, has classified Donald Trump as a representative of Jacksonian thought. According to Mead (2016b), Trump has managed to position himself as an above-party leader, and an American nationalist who is dedicated to the middle class (Mead 2016a). It is very relevant to test this conclusion that Trump belongs to Jacksonian thought based on Trump's messages in the late phase of the campaign. Our starting thesis is, however, a bit different than Mead's. We assume that there are elements of different schools in Trump's foreign policy concept. We agree that it is possible to extract the most similar, and that is dominantly Jacksonian thought in terms of stance towards foreign policy instruments, dedication to middle class and workers interest in foreign policy, and attitude towards refugees. However, due to its overwhelming accent on the economic issues, it seems to us that in the terms of determinants of foreign policy Trump's positions are closer to Hamiltonian thought, even though his position differs from Hamiltonians in foreign policy prescriptions.

Foreign policy in speeches of Donald Trump

This section aims to analyze Trump's foreign policy stances from speeches that he made during campaign.. Different methodological ways to approach this task are possible. Presidential election campaign comprises different phases and lasts for a year at least, but even longer for the majority of main parties' candidates.² Candidates have robust campaign teams with many members in charge of giving official statements. Their teams organize numerous rallies throughout campaign and issue statements on regular basis, especially before the key elections in Primaries and during the last two months afore to the Election Day. Moreover, the main candidates are supported by campaigns of several large Political Action Committees (Super PACs) which are formally separated from their own campaigns, but have the same task in practice. Due to the mentioned facts it is quite hard to comprehensively follow and evaluate statements of a certain candidate in campaign since there is a huge variety of sources which require attention. In order to avoid methodological fallacies, it is important to narrow the scope of

2 Donald Trump announced his candidacy in June 2015 (Trump, 2015a) and Hillary Clinton in April 2015 (Chozick, 2015)

analysis. It is equally important to do it in a careful manner, by selection representative and reliable sources based on clear and neutral criteria in order to avoid “cherry-picking” among numerous different sources.

This paper analyzes digests of all Trump’s official speeches published on his official web-site³ in the period from the Republican National Convention (June 18 – 21) until the Election Day. Firstly, such a selection guarantees reliability of sources since this web-site is an official one and therefore undoubtedly represents Trump’s attitudes. Secondly, this period is chosen as a time-frame of research since it covers the main two-candidate campaign phase, from the Trump’s formal nomination as a Republican candidate, until the very end of the election campaign. The fact that all available content in this time-frame is analyzed contributes to the consistency of the analysis. Finally, we acknowledge that the finding of the analysis might have been more detailed if the entire speeches were available to us.⁴ Nevertheless digest were produced by the Trump’s campaign editorial team, and therefore indeed represent the core of candidate’s foreign policy attitudes. Hence, we believe that the validity and relevance of the findings are not essentially compromised.

In the following passages, we present results of our analysis. We tried to quantitatively measure the presence of a particular foreign policy topic⁵ in the score of all topics with foreign policy relevance in analyzed speeches.⁶ Results of quantitative analysis are as well available in Table 1 in appendix. Then, we will qualitatively analyze its articulation. Firstly we will present general attitudes towards foreign policy determinants, principles and tools which Donald Trump articulate. Then, we will present main stances and goals in relation with particular states mentioned in his speeches.

3 Speeches are archived in a particular section of the web-site: <https://www.donald-jtrump.com/media/category/speeches>

4 Only some of the speeches contain a full-time video attached on the web-site with the written speech report. We want to avoid the inconsistency of analyzing some speeches fully, while analyzing only digests for the other speeches, which are majority.

5 We consider immigration as essentially domestic issue, and we consider that references of Ms. Clinton’s use of private e-mail server while in the post of State Secretary as essentially domestic political issue of corruption as well. Therefore, despite the fact that both these topics contain some foreign elements, we will not analyze them as foreign policy topics.

6 Findings of our analysis show that there are 43 digest reports in the analyzed time-frame which contain foreign policy topics.

a) Foreign policy determinants

The most important determinant in Trump's public articulation of his foreign policy concept is **the national interest** of the United States. This is not surprising, since it is usual that all presidential candidates justify their foreign policy conceptions with "the national interest" label. However, many candidates go beyond and involve the interest of North America, Western civilization, or the whole World. In the analyzed sources, Donald Trump does not use any other principle as a guideline for his foreign policy, but the national interest of the U.S.⁷ The most important concept in his articulation of determinants of foreign policy is definitely "America first".⁸ This word is used explicitly in 16,28% of his foreign policy related speeches, but it is implicitly present in almost all of his speeches.

This claim is even more emphasized if we take into account the fact that Trump advocates in his speeches for some acts which he claims that are in national interest, but would present the breaking of responsibilities America already took in multilateral arena. Abandoning of economic or energetic international deals which he perceived to be against the national interests was one of the hot words of the campaign – abandoning TPP and the need to lift any bans on energy were mentioned in 25,58% of speeches. Finally, maybe the most radical move in this direction is an attitude towards the need to prevent refugees⁹ from Syria and "terrorist-producing" countries to come to U.S., which might be considered as well as discrimination and a derogation of international law (Trump 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f). These examples show that multilateral engagements, and even international law in some cases, are not considered as at least "a boundary" determinant and that the national

7 The only partial use of a boarder interest was during his visit to Mexico, when he mentioned shared interest of these two countries to preserve wealth in the Western Hemisphere, but even this claim was articulated in the form of national interest of two countries, and not in the form of continental interest (Trump 2016b)

8 The use of this concept was characterized as controversial by many mainstream media (Dunn 2016) due to analogy with America First Committee which advocated for American neutrality in late 1930s and early 1940s. However, this movement was wide and diverse and there are different interpretations of its character (Fine 2006).

9 Despite the fact that we consider immigration as domestic issue, we qualify the treatment of refugees as an issue of foreign policy, due to the fact that refugees are category protected by the norms of International Law.

interest is definitely the most powerful variable in his conception of foreign policy.

However, since the national interest is a wide concept, it is important to deepen the scope of analysis and to clarify which aspect of the national interest is stated as the most important in speeches of Donald Trump. Our analysis shows that it is definitely **the economic interest**. The biggest part of his statements actually focus on economic issues, and primarily on issues of international trade, which are mentioned in 58% of his speeches. In addition, in 12% of his speeches energetic issues are mentioned, which are of foreign policy relevance due to the international regulations dealing with the emission of CO₂ and other aspects of pollution.¹⁰ If we go further and try to conclude which group's economic interest he mainly focuses on, the most precise answer would be **the interest of workers and the middle class**. Trump mentions that the purpose of his new approach to international trade would be to keep the jobs, or to bring them back to the U.S. (Trump 2016aa, 2016ab, 2016c-2016e, 2016g-2016z) and lift restrictions imposed on energy industries with the aim of reindustrializing America (Trump 2016ac-2016ae, 2016n-2016p, 2016u, 2016v). Moreover, in his Remarks on Hillary Clinton's foreign policy failures made on September 9, Donald Trump explicitly states the "interest of American workers first" (Trump 2016af). He even suggests establishment of the American Desk inside the Department of Commerce with the mission to "protect the economic interest of American worker and the national interests of the United States" (Trump 2016aj). Geographically speaking, the most precise group whose interests were targeted in public were workers in the so-called "Rust-belt", a region in which globalization brought more deindustrialization. Therefore, Trump emphasizes the interest of "Detroit and Baltimore and the inner cities of North California" (Trump 2016ag), Pennsylvania (Trump 2016t) or Michigan (Trump 2016e) as an important determinant of foreign commercial policy.

The second and comparatively less used, but still very precisely articulated aspect of the national interest is **the national security**. Among analyzed units, 39,53% of them contain attitudes towards military. The reason for the emphasis on military issues is not always clearly articulated in the manner of concrete foreign policy determinant or goal. However, some Trump's speeches reference to the armed threats for the

¹⁰ In earlier stages of campaign Trump claimed that global farming is a myth (Dennis 2016).

security of the U.S. and its citizens from aboard, almost entirely focusing on **the threat of terrorism**. Presence of the ISIS as the topic in 41,56% of all analyzed digests supports this claim. Critics would even narrow this focus and claim that the main referent object on which Trump is focused is societal security of the white Christian Americans, and not of all of the citizens (Foran 2016). The reason for that might be found in his mentioned statements against the influx of refugees from Muslim states. However, Trump insists that the threat for physical security of all U.S. citizens is determinant of his skepticism towards accepting Muslim refugees, and not any fear of potential threat for American identity. Since we are focusing only on what was said, and not analyzing the coherence of these claims, we will not further discuss this issue and we will accept his claims as relevant. Finally, in one of his speeches, **cyber security** of America is mentioned as a determinant of his future relations with other states (Trump 2016ah).

Finally, there is only one speech which puts a light on **ideology and regime type** as a determinant of foreign policy. While neglecting the potential for success of state-building and nation-building process (Trump 2016c, 2016i), designed to spread democracy outside of the U.S., Trump states that he “will stand with the Cuban people in their battle against communist oppression and with Venezuela in their fight for freedom” (Trump, 2016ai). There are no references in the context of democratic deficits of Russia, or communism of China as an important determinant of his relations with these actors. Besides that, he claims that he will “stop the policy of regime change overseas” (Trump 2016c, 2016k 2016aj) while referencing on the mistakes, such as in Libya (Trump 2016c) or in the Middle East, where her “disruption (...) has led to the terrorist regimes” (Trump 2016af). This shows that this determinant is not constant and that is limited to what he perceives as “undemocratic” or “communist” regimes in the Western Hemisphere, which might lead us to a conclusion that geopolitical thought of Monroe Doctrine is as well to a certain degree a determinant of his foreign policy, but we will not claim this, since it was never officially stated.

b) Foreign policy instruments

Public speeches of Donald Trump contain many references on the foreign policy tools and instruments. There were less concrete proposals how to use them in order to achieve the most important proclaimed

goals. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, among four main groups of foreign policy instruments: 1) diplomatic; 2) economic; 3) military; 4) cultural (Hill 2003), Trump's focus is on the first two groups, while the third is present as well, but in a peculiar articulation. The fourth group is hardly mentioned, which indicates that Trump gives more credit to hard power – economic and military power to coerce – than to soft power – power to co-opt (Nye, 2003). The only case in which something what could be qualified as a cultural tool of foreign policy is mentioned is the emphasis on the need to use “ideological warfare”, besides military, cyber and financial warfare in fight against ISIS and terrorism (Trump 2016f).

The most important word in Trump's articulation of foreign policy plans is “to negotiate” or “to renegotiate”. These words are mentioned in 67,44% of all analyzed speeches, together with mentioning of trade deals. Since negotiations are one of the main functions of diplomacy (Berridge 2008: 25-26), there are no doubts that this means focus on the use of **diplomatic instruments** of foreign policy. In his Military Readiness Remarks from September 7 Trump (2016f) emphasizes that “he will be diplomatic with his foreign policy, rather than taking the destructive route that Hillary took”. Even the mentioned skepticism towards existing multilateral agreements does not mean that Trump is generally opposing multilateral agreements. He just does not think that they are good enough, but he is willing to renegotiate them and convinced that he can make better, new “great trade deals” (Trump 2016ak).

However, the main focus is on one peculiar type of diplomacy – economic and commercial diplomacy, some of which aspects could be qualified as well as **economic instruments** of foreign policy. Use of coercive economic instruments is as well on agenda in the case of Iran – where Trump (2016al) favors economic pressure rather than implementation of the Iran-P5+1 deal from 2016. However, it seems that one important aspect of the use of economic instruments is underestimated in comparison to earlier U.S. presidents – economic aid.¹¹ Trump underlined that any kind of nation-building abroad in which America would spend plenty of resources to build a sustainable democracy is a doomed to complete failure (Trump 2016c, 2016i).

11 It is important to emphasize that there are important messages out of the scope of our analysis which are dealing with economic aspect of military engagements and military aid, especially in relation to NATO (Richter 2016) and Japan (Johnson 2016). It is interesting that such thing was never mentioned in a relation to Israel.

“Rebuilding of military” is the second mostly used message when it comes to foreign policy instruments, since this phrase was used in 39,53% of speeches. This clearly indicates Trump’s dedication to enlarge the scope and power of **military instruments** of foreign policy. However, at the same time, Trump expresses his desire not to use military instruments, until it is of vast necessity (Trump 2016c). Republican candidate is often criticizing his opponent for having “interventionist approach” (Trump 2016aj, 2016f). He claims that his preferable solution is “peace through strength” (Trump 2016af), which indicates that military is ought to be used as deterrence for threats and as a helpful supplement tool for diplomacy. However, it is not very clear where are the limits of the “vital national interest” for which it is justifiable to use the military force. Therefore, it seems that Trump leaves enough places to use military means in key issues of international relations in future.

C) Goals and stances towards relevant international actors

As it was mentioned in introduction, building the wall on the border with Mexico was one of the most important messages Trump sent during the Republican Primaries campaign. Following his election, it seems that relations with China are becoming the most important issue.¹² Therefore, it is not surprising that in analyzed material references on the U.S. relations with these two countries are the most frequent. On the other hand, it is a bit surprising that Russia was not mentioned too many times in the analyzed material, having in mind the tensions between Kremlin and the White House, as well as the fact that Hillary Clinton addressed issues with Russia and Vladimir Putin on many occasions.¹³ It is as well very indicative that mentioned actors are articulated mostly in negative manner, as potential competitors or challengers, while there is very little mentioning in the purpose of partnership praise. This is especially important when it comes to the U.S.-EU, or U.S.-Japan traditional relations. This might be additional signal that

12 Phone call between Donald Trump and president of Taiwan Tsai Ing-Wen raised a lot of controversies in the U.S.-China relations, having in mind that America does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and accepts “One China” approach. Many analysts framed this situation as a first crisis of Trump’s presidency (Bandow 2016, Graham 2016)

13 Clinton’s campaign mentioned Russia many times not only in the pre-election phase, but as well after the results were announced, when they claimed that cyber fraud was organized by Russians in the purpose of supporting Trump’s election win (Steinhauer et. al. 2016)

Trump does not believe in everlasting partnerships based on common values, but evaluates them from cost-benefit point of view case-by-case, and therefore avoids praising “eternal partnerships”.

China, as the biggest American competitor in the world economic affairs, is mentioned in 23,26% of analyzed units. Having in mind that economy is the main determinant of Trump’s foreign policy concept it is not surprising that China’s image in his speeches is dominantly negative. China is presented as a main economic foe of the U.S., which profits from its membership in World Trade Organization (Trump 2016ag, 2016e, 2016z) steals intellectual property (Trump 2016am, 2016af) and money from the U.S. with dumping and monetary manipulation (Trump 2016y; Trump 2016z). China is even presented as a threat for cyber-security (Trump 2016ah) and as mailer “of drugs to users and dealers in the U.S.” (Trump 2016q). Trump’s goal is therefore to make trade deals with China which would provide more benefits for the U.S., as well as to prevent China from “monetary cheating” and other practices harmful for the U.S. economy in the future. His main instrument is negotiation, but it seems unclear if he is suggesting military building up in the purpose of additional pressure on China regarding the opened questions, or not.

Neighboring state of **Mexico** is directly by name mentioned only in three analyzed digest. However, if we would add indirect mentioning (digest in which building of the famous wall on the border between Mexico and the USA is mentioned)¹⁴ then we can see that bilateral issues with Mexico are present in 23,26% of analyzed materials. Implicit mentioning of Mexico in the context of multilateral economic relations is even wider present, through insistence on renegotiation of NAFTA treaty (mentioned in 51,16% of analyzed units) which Trump sees as harmful to the U.S. economy and beneficiary to Mexico. Interestingly, the only visit to a foreign country in the analyzed period was Trump’s visit to Mexico, where he met Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto. These fac-

¹⁴ We decided to count mentioning of the wall in the Mexico category as well. Despite the fact that building the wall is generally domestic issue which belongs to immigration policy, the fact that Trump’s claims that Mexico will pay for it qualifies it directly in the bilateral foreign policy issues with this country. However, due to more precise overview of this distinction, all of digests in which the wall is mentioned without direct reference to Mexico are labeled with an asterix (*) in Table 1 in appendix of this paper. We have decided not to qualify NAFTA in the same manner as the wall issue, since NAFTA is multilateral agreement, which is relevant not only for the U.S.-Mexico relations.

tors additionally emphasize the importance of Mexico in Trump's foreign policy concept. Image of Mexico in his articulation is as well generally negative, since it is presented either as a place where business might run to from the U.S. (Trump 2016w), or as a source of threats for U.S. citizens due to criminals and drug smugglers which illegally enter America (Trump 2016af). However, Mexican image is less negative than Chinese, since there are no claims that Mexico harms or cheats U.S. intentionally, as it is in the case of China. Tone in visit to Mexico City is quite friendly and opened, mentioning importance of cooperation and cordial relations for pursuing common interests, mostly in the economical domain (Trump 2016b). His main goal in relations with Mexico is clearly exposed: a) to stop illegal immigration from Mexico; b) to protect the U.S. economy. The main instrument for the first goal is the famous wall on the border "which Mexico would pay for" (Trump 2016af), and for the second it is making Mexico to accept changes of NAFTA trade deal which would better suit American interests.

An important foreign policy issue mentioned in Trump's speeches is the ongoing crisis in **Syria**. However, Syria is treated more as an object of foreign policy challenges, than as a subject. Syria is directly mentioned in 9,3% of analyzed units, but the **Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)** is mentioned more frequently – in 23,26% of analyzed units. Trump's first goal in relations with Syria (and Iraq) is to defeat ISIS (Trump 2016c, 2016g, 2016i, 2016k, 2016g, 2016ae, 2016aj, 2016aq, 2016ao). However, it is not clearly articulated which instruments Trump plans to use to defeat ISIS. In the context of his intention to "destroy ISIS" he even mentioned military build-up. (Trump 2016k). Having in mind that, as we have seen, direct American interventionism is many times qualified as problematic, it seems that direct American intervention would not be a preferable solution, but more likely military help and alliance. Trump (2016k) accepts coalition with actors which oppose ISIS, meaning that Russia and Assad's regime are acceptable partners. Second goal is to prevent "spillover of terrorism" from Syria to the U.S., and suggested instrument is abandonment of Syrian Refugee Program (Trump 2016c-2016f). It is important to mention that reasons for this abandonment are justified not only with security reasons, but as well with an argument of economic cost (Trump 2016e).

Besides Syria, other **Middle East**¹⁵ countries along with Libya and Egypt are mentioned as an example of bad American interventionism or

15 The finding that the analyzed material contains no single mentioning of Israel sur-

support for rebels that led to chaos and rise of Islamism (Trump 2016f). This indicates that Trump's main goal in the Middle East policy is stability and that he is not interested in support for democratization of the region. He prefers support strong leaders with democratic deficits as long as they are preventing spread of radical Islamism and terrorism. The most problematic Middle East state for Trump appears to be the **Islamic Republic of Iran**. Iran is mentioned only in 6,98% of all analyzed units, but in a clearly negative manner. Trump consider the signing of nuclear deal with Iran as a "humiliation" for the U.S. (Trump 2016al). According to Trump's (2016aj) critique of Clinton's foreign policy which allowed some states "to take nuclear path" it seems that his first goal in relation to Iran is to certainly prevent its development of nuclear arms and that he is willing to re-impose economic sanctions until a more reliable deal with Iran is reached.

Despite the fact that relations between Trump and Putin are pretty much in the focus of media, relations with **Russian Federation** are much less discussed in comparison to relations with the previously mentioned actors. Trump actually never in analyzed material articulates Russia really positively, but he neither does it in a quite negative manner, which is big distinction to the campaign of his democratic counterpart and even many Republicans during the Primaries. Russia is directly mentioned only in 9,30% of analyzed units. When it comes to content, half of mentions are actually only a reference to Clinton's fault for giving Russia 20% of the U.S. uranium (Trump 2016ak, 2016ap). There is one aspect in which Russia was presented as a potential threat, and that is cyber security (Trump 2016ah).¹⁶ However, Russian power (especially power of its leader) is acknowledged with the claim that, due to Obama's and Clinton's policies, America had to negotiate with Russia "from the place of weakness" (Trump 2016af). Although he does not mention Russia directly, it is obvious that he is ready to make a coalition with Russia

prises us a lot. However, this certainly does not mean that Trump has never mentioned this topic in the campaign. Quite contrary – in earlier phases of campaign, debates of Republican candidates, as well as in certain media appearance of Trump and members of his team (especially Donald Friedman) clearly articulated their pro-Israeli foreign policy (Cortellesa 2016). One aspect of this policy visible in this analysis is strong attitude towards Iran, which is perceived by Israel as a potential biggest threat.

16 This finding might be perceived as ironic, since Trump later doubted that Russia endangered cyber-security of the USA with hack attacks during the elections, what CIA and FBI claimed to be the case (Sanger 2016).

against ISIS in Syria, based on the existence of common enemy (Trump 2016aj). The fact that Trump does not address Ukrainian crisis indicates that this issue is not placed high on his agenda and that he might withdraw sanctions if he reaches deal with Putin on Syria and other common enemies. Although it is never stated in analyzed material, some authors (Banks, 2016) think that Trumps goal in cooperation with Russia is actually to balance an actor which seems as a bigger threat to the U.S. from his point of view – China. It is better to have Russia on your side, than in close relations with your biggest challenger.

Finally, some other actors from various regions are mentioned as well. In Asia, trade deal with the **Republic of Korea** is labeled as bad for the U.S. (Trump 2016o, 2016p), which means that probable goal in relation with this state would be to make a new framework for commercial cooperation. Similar goal is obvious in relation to ASEAN countries, such as **Japan, Vietnam** etc. since in more than a quarter (25,58%) of analyzed material Trump emphasizes that he will not accept Transpacific Trade Partnership (TPP) with these states. **People's Republic of Korea** is labeled as a cyber security threat (Trump 2016ah), and its continuation in development of nuclear program as a failure of democratic administration (Trump 2016aj), which means that countering threats for the U.S. national security coming from these two aspects would probably be his main goal in a relation to this pariah state. Finally, in Central and South America, besides Mexico, **Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela** are mentioned once in the sense of support to political opposition to regimes (Trump 2016ai) in Venezuela and Cuba. This is an exception to general attitude against regime-change operations, but it still does not mean that, even if his long-term goal is regime change in the last instance, he will use financial and/or military help to opposition in order to implement it.

Which foreign policy tradition Trump belongs to?

Theoretical and empirical literature on the U.S. foreign policy is very comprehensive. Numerous authors have conceptualized different coherent models of the U.S. foreign policy with the aim to help us explain, compare and evaluate policies of different administrations. We should distinguish between two different types of such models: 1) process models; 2) policy models. Process models focus on explanation of policy-

making and they are trying to define different variables that are influencing foreign policy decision making and implementation. Purpose of policy models is different and they do not tend to explain determinants of foreign policy and offer causal explanations, but to compare different approaches towards what are and what should be the main goals, priorities, and instruments of the U.S. foreign policy. The focus of this paper is on the second approach, since our goal is to place Donald Trump's foreign policy stances announced during his presidential election campaign into a certain pattern of the U.S. foreign policy thought.

Media, as well as many analysts and academics, often use the dichotomy "isolationism-internationalism" as the most important difference in articulation of different U.S. foreign policy approaches (Crothers 2011: 22-24). Another dichotomy widely used in public and academia is between hawks and doves (Russett 1990: 515), or a famous Kissinger's (Kisindžer 2008: 15-37) dichotomy between Realists, such as Theodor Roosevelt and Idealists, such as Woodrow Wilson. Intervention of United States in Iraq in 2003 put an emphasis on the dichotomy between unilateralism and multilateralism. There are as well many multi-element models of U.S. foreign policy approaches. For example, Bremmer (Bremer 2015) outlines three different paths of international engagement available to the U.S. president – 1) Indispensable America; 2) Moneyball America; 3) Independent America. Kaufmann's (Kaufman 2010) four element model is as well built on combination of different factors, which outlay the key characteristic in the name of approach: 1) Isolationism; 2) Unilateralism; 3) Neutrality; 4) Engagement.

This paper accepts model of U.S. foreign policy traditions developed by Walter Russell Mead (2001) in his brilliant study of the U.S. political history. We find this model very comprehensive and we want to test Mead's (2016b) claim from the beginning of Primaries that Donald Trump is a representative of Jacksonian thought. His model distinguishes between four different foreign policy schools of thought in the U.S. foreign policy: *Hamiltonian*, *Wilsonian*, *Jeffersonian* and *Jacksonian*. The author identifies them with important politicians which were the most prominent pursuers of the distinguished approaches. Mead acknowledges that these four traditions shifted over time in accordance with relevant internal and international developments, but emphasizes that they still preserve their core ideas and postulates. In the following paragraphs, we will present their main characteristics and compare the finding from previous chapter on Trump's foreign policy positions with the most important traits of each tradition.

Hamiltonian school of thought presents an approach which focuses on economy and trade as the most important determinant of foreign policy. As Mead (2001: 102) emphasizes “the importance of trade would determine the Hamiltonian definitions of U.S. security interest”. Therefore, Hamiltonian first goal would be to provide adequate international circumstances for the implementation of U.S. vital economic need – trade access to important foreign markets. Underlying assumption of Hamiltonian thought is that international commerce can operate on win-win logic (Mead 2001: 103), therefore the focus is on absolute gains in this process, and not on relative, as it is usual in the field of military might which produces security dilemma. For this thought, the character of regimes with which they cooperate is not of big importance, as long as they behave in a manner which does not pose obstacles to their commercial interests. The Hamiltonian diplomacy is therefore focused on commerce, while they do not completely neglect the importance of military tools. However, these tools should not have their own purpose beside protecting the integrity of the state, and fighting threats for American trade abroad. The second “interventionist” purpose is balanced with cost-benefit calculation, which means that not every threat for U.S. commercial interest would be an incentive for the use of force, but only the most vital ones.

Trump's foreign policy messages in analyzed material share the perception of national economic interests as the most important determinant. Moreover, they show an understanding that good trade deals and successful commercial diplomacy are the most important instrument for the assurance of national economic interests. In this aspect, his policy is dominantly Hamiltonian. It seems that Trump perceives world around him in this manner – his biggest adversary is China, often seen as the main U.S. economic opponent. On the other hand, many American challengers in military, or ideology, such as Russia, are not perceived as enemies per se. However, when it comes to what are the national economic interest and how should these deals be tailored – his perception is completely opposite of Hamiltonian. Trump opposes the concept that the growing of the free market in the world is in American interest and suggest quite opposite – measures that would assure protection of American market from harmful foreign influences. His main claim is that these measures will bring jobs back to the United States. Finally, Trump's approach towards military means is similar to Hamiltonian – he finds it sometimes necessary, when national interest is threatened, but avoids using it when it is not necessary. Nevertheless,

Trump insists so much on rebuilding military capacities in advance, without considering its costs, that in this approach he differs from typical Hamiltonian thought. However, since he is skeptical towards costly international military commitments, it seems that he is not completely abandoning cost-benefit calculation in defense sector.

Wilsonian school of thought, on the other hand, is much more idealistic and goes beyond Hamiltonian cost-benefit logic, but without completely neglecting it. Willsonian thought favors “export” of democracy to other states, but justifies it not only with its moral superiority, but as well with the attitude that democratic countries are more reliable partners to trade and cooperate with (Mead 2001: 162-165). However, export by the means of force is not preferable solution for this school of thought¹⁷, since its important assumption is that the war should be prevented as far as possible (Mead 2001: 165) However, even the use of force against dictators by their own people are, at the last instance, allowable solution (Mead 2001: 173). Proponents of this school also advocate the use of economic and propaganda instruments with the purpose to help democratization and combat dictatorships and authoritarianism around the globe (Mead 2001: 173). Wilsonian foreign policy generally believes in the power of international law and multilateral international institutions and diplomacy. Therefore, Wilsonian presidents would resort to use force only if it is evident that they are fighting the substantial threat for international law and humanity. The underlying idea of Wilsonian understanding of international relations is Democratic Peace theory, and American role as a promoter and even provider of democracy and the rule for the rest of the world.

This approach differs significantly from Trump’s foreign policy positions. As we have mentioned, Trump is strongly against the regime-change and state-building projects, claiming that they cost a lot and are proven to be inefficient. However, as we have seen, there is one exception – Donald Trump favors what he perceives to be democratic and anti-authoritarian movements in the Western Hemisphere, such as the

17 Other authors have various opinions regarding the relation between Wilsonianism and interventions in the name of democratization. For example, Smith (2009) argues that Wilsonians believe American duty should be to spread democracy around the globe, and that therefore even military intervention of Bush Iraq 2003 derives from this tradition. On the other hand, Knock (2009) and Slaughter (2009) do not share this opinion. They emphasize that Wilsonianism is essentially multilateral and orientated towards deal making, and that therefore Iraq War 2003 cannot be descendant of this tradition due to its aggressive unilateralism.

ones in Cuba and Venezuela. However, it is unclear would he be prepared to give significant resources to help efforts of regime opponents in these countries, as a Wilsonian would do. Still, even in that case, it would not be enough to call him Wilsonian, since his logic of international relations is much more focused on national interests, competition and cooperation, tolerance towards authoritarianism if it preserves stability and saving of American resources instead of spending on building foreign institutions. Neither of these is acceptable for Wilsonian thought.

Jeffersonian school of thought, as Mead claims (2001: 175), looks favorable to global peace in a democratic world. However, this is hardly realistic according to Jeffersonian thought, and the United States should avoid spending its resources for that mission. In addition, it opposes spending resources for the protection of U.S.-led global commercial system, what the Hamiltonian school would advocate for (Mead 2001: 184). Jeffersonian school of thought disfavors active foreign policy due to the fear of threats for unique American democracy that are potentially coming from international engagement (Mead 2001: 184-185). Jeffersonian presidents especially avoid military means of foreign policy: they find war too expensive for citizens and potentially threatening for the U.S. democracy, what is in opposition with their perception of foremost goal of foreign policy - preservation of internal liberty and democracy. They think that the war should be only a last resort, and even then, they would try to avoid it as long as possible, or to gradually approach it if necessary (Mead 2001: 190). Jeffersonians are genuinely feared from the rise of "emergency state" (Unger 2015) in which intelligence and military elites would dominate internal politics and potentially undermine democracy with the justification of national security (foreign policy) needs. They are skeptic towards international commitments as well, but they still find the diplomacy as the best foreign policy instrument.

There is a limited similarity between this school and Trump's position. Namely, Trump wants to avoid unnecessary activity in the world, especially costly wars. He prefers diplomacy as an instrument and thinks that too much involvement in international affairs might have negative consequences. However, he perceives these threats mostly as of economic nature, and then as threats for democracy and liberty. This means that in the sense of the most important value he is more Hamiltonian (national economic interest) than Jeffersonian (protection of democracy at home), although he sometimes labels certain issues (such as inflow of refugees from Muslim countries) as a threat for the U.S.

democracy and political system as well. Unlike Jeffersonians, Trump supports preventive military spending, and is not feared of “emergency state”. Quite contrary, Trump’s skepticism to international commitments is limited – he is ready to abandon some of current international obligations, since he finds them harmful for the U.S. interests, but he will not avoid making new commitments if they suit American interest. He is much more focused on renegotiating and fixing existing system, than on abandoning it.

Jacksonian school of thought shares skepticism of the previous school for foreign engagement in the name of humanity or preservation of global commercial system, as well as their general skepticism towards international commitments and international law (Mead 2001: 175). Jacksonian school of thought is even more skeptical towards diplomacy without strength than Jeffersonian and it gives much more attention towards military means. Central value for Jacksonians is American national honor, and they think that the role of foreign policy is to ensure that this honor is protected abroad (Mead 2001: 231). They believe in principle of self-reliance in international relations and therefore advocate for stronger military forces which would be capable to protect integrity of the state from possible invaders and honor of the state aboard, but they are very cautious not to run into unnecessary wars and interventions in the name of humanity or spread of democracy. Instead of being “the World Policeman”, their approach is “live and let other live” (Mead 2016b). Jacksonians are afraid of all social groups that do not belong to “American folk community” and which might disturb their way of living (Mead 2001: 236). This means that they are especially opposing any kind of integration through international economic treaties which would anyhow restrict limitations on immigration or harm interests of the American middle and working class. Unlike Hamiltonians, they take interest of these groups primarily into account in their approach toward foreign commercial policy.

Trump’s foreign policy articulation has plenty of things in common with Jacksonian school of thought. He believes that peace could be achieved through strength and that successful diplomacy needs powerful military force behind it. He does not trust military alliances and is in favor of rebuilding of American military power. However, this power should be used only in the purpose of protecting U.S. interest He also claims that it is important to protect interests of middle class and workers, and his skepticism towards refugees from Muslim countries is obvi-

ously connected with his desire to protect the way of life of “American folk community”, although it is not directly articulated in that manner. Trump even recognizes importance of protecting American national honor abroad (Trump 2016; Trump 2016). However, main determinant of foreign policy for him is national economy, where he is closer to Hamiltonian thought, than national honor of Jacksonians.

When it comes to other foreign actors, his attitude towards Iran might seem genuinely Jacksonian, but logic of his relations with China and Russia seems more Hamiltonian. His main opponent is not Russia, a symbolical “other” to many Americans, and in the military sense the strongest counterpart, which challenged to a certain extent American honor in the Middle East by its unilateral intervention in Syria, but rising economical and commercial challenger - China. However, in the societal sense (focus on middle and working class) and in the sense of stance towards the instruments of foreign policy, it seems that Trump is on the very similar path as representatives of this school.

Conclusion

Donald Trump articulated numerous foreign policy messages during the presidential election campaign. Our analysis of his speeches shows that his main concerns are economic and commercial issues (especially those relevant for middle and working class), and that he is very cautious regarding the use of force. Nevertheless, Trump believes in a concept military through strength and therefore advocates military rebuilding. He is strongly against regime-change operations or expensive and inefficient state-building projects. His main opponent is China, and he puts emphasis on the bad consequences for the U.S. of existing trade deals as well as of current state of relations with Mexico. His attitude towards Russia opens possibility for rapprochement, even though Russia is not positively articulated in his speeches. His foreign policy positions contain elements of different schools of thoughts, but they have the most in common with the Jacksonian tradition. However, in some important aspect they are more similar with Hamiltonian tradition as well, especially in terms of foreign policy determinants.

At the very end, it is of vast importance to additionally emphasize that these were only messages sent during campaign, and that they can substantially differ from the actual foreign policy when Donald Trump takes his post in the White House. Indeed, some differences are to be ex-

pected, given the uncertainty of international context. However, making U-turns would likely bear costs for Trump's political image. Therefore, we consider that the findings of this paper will be a good indicator for general directions of Trump's foreign policy. Positive comments that are coming from Russia, as well as rising tension with China, that took place before his formal inauguration, are already following this path. Nevertheless, future research papers should compare his actual foreign policy with the findings of this paper and therefore test whether his campaign messages were only propaganda, or articulation of his actual foreign policy agenda.

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APPENDIX – TABLE 1

Date	Speech	China	Mexico	Iran	N. Korea	Russia	Cuba	Venezuela	Haiti	Syria	ISIS	Terrorism**	Use of force	Refugees	State-building	Military	Energy	Free Trade Agreements	NAFTA	TPP
6-Nov	1 IN MINNESOTA, TRUMP OFFERS VOTERS CHANCE TO TAKE GOVERNMENT BACK FROM THE CORRUPT POLITICAL CLASS		YES*											YES		YES				
5-Nov	IN NORTH CAROLINA, TRUMP DELIVERS POSITIVE VISION FOR AMERICA		YES*															YES	YES	YES
3-Nov	UMP JOINS MILITARY LEADERS, MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS, TO OUTLINE PLAN TO REBUILD MILITARY AND SUPPO			YES						YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		YES	YES	YES
3-Nov	DONALD TRUMP SLAMS HILLARY'S CRIMINAL PAY FOR PLAY CORRUPTION UNDER FBI INVESTIGATION		YES*							YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	YES	YES
1-Nov	DONALD J. TRUMP PLEDGES TO IMMEDIATELY REPEAL AND REPLACE OBAMACARE	YES																YES	YES	
31-Oct	IN MICHIGAN, DONALD TRUMP OUTLINES HIS URBAN RENEWAL AGENDA & PROMISES TO BRING BACK JOBS	YES	YES*							YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	YES	YES
30-Oct	IN NEVADA, TRUMP PROMISES REAL CHANGE THAT WILL BRING BACK JOBS & SECURITY	YES												YES		YES		YES	YES	YES
29-Oct	IN ARIZONA, TRUMP VOWS TO MAKE AMERICA JUST AGAIN	YES												YES		YES		YES	YES	YES
27-Oct	IN OHIO, TRUMP SLAMS OBAMACARE AND PROPOSES REAL CHANGE		YES									YES						YES	YES	
26-Oct	IN CHARLOTTE, TRUMP PROPOSES URBAN RENEWAL AGENDA FOR AMERICA'S INNER CITIES	YES																YES	YES	YES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	1	17	18	19	20
25-Oct	1	IN FLORIDA, TRUMP BLASTS OBAMACARE AND PROPOSES REAL CHANGE THAT WILL PUT AMERICA FIRST														YES	YES	YES		
23-Oct		IN FLORIDA, TRUMP BLASTS HILLARY FOR EMBOLDENING IRAN AND HUMILIATING U.S.		YES							YES									
21-Oct		DONALD J. TRUMP OUTLINES PLAN TO BRING MANUFACTURING BACK TO NORTH CAROLINA														YES	YES	YES	YES	
21-Oct		DONALD J. TRUMP OUTLINES PLAN TO BUILD 350 SHIP NAVY AND REVITALIZE AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE	YES*													YES	YES	YES		
20-Oct		TRUMP: REMARKS ON PROTECTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AMERICA'S WORKERS ON TRADE																	YES	YES
18-Oct		DONALD J. TRUMP: REMARKS ON DRAINING THE SWAMP AND CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS									YES			YES		YES	YES	YES	YES	
17-Oct		TRUMP DETAILS HIS ETHICS REFORM PLAN														YES		YES		
15-Oct		DONALD J. TRUMP: REMARKS ON ENDING THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN AMERICA	YES*													YES		YES	YES	
13-Oct		TRUMP'S REMARKS ON CLINTON CAMPAIGN OF DESTRUCTION									YES	YES								
5-Oct		TRUMP'S REMARKS ON PROTECTING RIGHTS IN NEVADA															YES	YES	YES	YES
5-Oct		TRUMP'S REMARKS ON MAKING AMERICA WEALTHY AGAIN											YES				YES	YES	YES	YES
4-Oct		TRUMP REMARKS: CLINTON YESTERDAY, WE'RE TOMORROW															YES	YES	YES	YES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	1	17	18	19	20
3-Oct	TRUMP REMARKS IN PUEBLO, COLORADO: AMERICA NEEDS A COMEBACK											YES				YES				
3-Oct	TRUMP'S REMARKS ON CYBERSECURITY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION	YES			YES															
30-Sep	TRUMP'S REMARKS ON HILLARY'S TPP DESTROYING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING																	YES		YES
28-Sep	TRUMP REMARKS IN COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA: FOLLOW THE MONEY				YES													YES		
28-Sep	TRUMP REMARKS IN WAUKESHA, WISCONSIN: FOLLOW THE MONEY				YES												YES	YES		
24-Sep	TRUMP REMARKS ON TAKING ON BIG BUSINESS, BIG DONORS, AND BIG MEDIA																	YES		YES
20-Sep	NORTH CAROLINA REMARKS ON CLINTON LACK OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY										YES	YES				YES		YES		
17-Sep	COLORADO REMARKS ON TAX RELIEF FOR WORKING AND MIDDLE CLASS FAMILIES	YES	YES*								YES	YES								
16-Sep	DONALD TRUMP TALKS HAITI, CUBA, VENEZUELA IN FLORIDA SWING						YES	YES	YES			YES								
15-Sep	REMARKS ON ECONOMIC OUTLINE AT NEW YORK ECONOMIC CLUB																YES			
14-Sep	REMARKS IN OHIO																YES	YES	YES	
13-Sep	REMARKS ON CHILD CARE PLAN															YES				
13-Sep	REMARKS ON CLINTON E-MAIL TEAM TAKING THE FIFTH										YES	YES	YES				YES	YES		

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	1	17	18	19	20
9-Sep	REMARKS ON FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES OF HILLARY CLINTON	YES	YES			YES					YES	YES							YES	YES
9-Sep	REMARKS ON CALL FOR INNER CITY SCHOOL CHOICE TO VALUES VOTERS	YES		YES							YES	YES						YES	YES	
7-Sep	MILITARY READINESS REMARKS									YES		YES	YES							
31-Aug	REMARKS IN MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		YES																	
24-Aug	REMARKS IN TAMPA, FLORIDA										YES	YES				YES				
18-Aug	REMARKS ON BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN FUTURE										YES	YES			YES			YES	YES	
16-Aug	REMARKS ON CREATING A NEW AND BETTER FUTURE FOR AMERICAS INNER CITIES																	YES	YES	
26-Jul	REMARKS AT THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS NATIONAL CONVENTION										YES	YES		YES		YES		YES		
TOTAL	43	10	10	3	1	4	1	1	1	4	10	18	3	9	2	17	11	29	22	11
% of total	100.00	23.26	23.26	6.98	2.33	9.30	2.33	2.33	2.33	9.30	23.26	41.86	6.98	20.93	4.65	39.53	25.58	67.44	51.16	25.58



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US Presidential Election 2016: How Trump Beat Demographics

Abstract

The United States presidential election, the most important political election in the world, resulted in Donald Trump's victory. This year's election was, for many reasons, historical. For the first time ever, one of the major parties' candidates was a woman, and the winner was the person that collected half the funds the other candidate did, and that has almost no political experience whatsoever. It seems that Donald Trump faced more problems and resistance than any other presidential candidate before him, and was basically written off at the very beginning of the election. He took on other candidates, the Republican Party, the media, political analysts, but also his own nature and character. Later on, he faced the Democratic machinery led by Hillary Clinton. It is hard to even list all the challenges he experienced. However, the biggest one seems to be American demographics – the unfavorable demographic trends Republicans have been dealing with for decades. Trump was narrowing his potential electorate by making harsh and offensive statements about women and minorities, and it seemed it was demographics that would stand in the way of his victory. However, come November 9th, these expectations turned out to be unjustified. In this paper, we will try to answer how Donald Trump, despite almost all predictions, managed to overcome the “demographic problem” and win the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and we aim to do this by analyzing social and party line divisions, demographic trends and election strategies.

Key words: presidential election, demographics, demographic trends, Donald Trump, Republican Party.

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Introduction

Every four years, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, the most important political process in the world takes place. Some authors even call the event the “reborn of the political system” (Azari and Hetherington 2016). On this day, American citizens go to the voting stations and cast a vote for their future president. It is always hard to label a political process as the most important one, seeing as there are no common criteria for such a statement. Still, the fact remains that on this day Americans vote for the future leader of the most influential military and economic power in the world. Additionally, it is undebatable that election outcomes in one country affect the entire mankind. This year’s presidential election seem to have confirmed this assumption – at least judging by the degree of public interest in the U.S. future role in the world, their trade arrangements with other states and organizations, the future of Euro-Atlantic relations, their relations with Russia, China etc. Due to all the things listed, it makes sense that no other electoral process, apart from each state’s respective domestic elections, receives more attention in all the countries of the world, regardless of their economic, military or political power, or the degree to which they are connected with the United States.

It is no secret that each U.S. presidential election is considered a key determinant of the country’s future, due to the fact that parties and candidates present it as such (Volle 2016). It is also no secret that the 2016 election were historical and specific in many ways. First of all, one of the two major parties had, for the first time in history, a woman win the primaries, thus becoming the first female Democratic presidential candidate ever. After having an African American president, it seemed the electoral process was due for another step forward. Also, the first presidential debate on television was watched by 84 million U.S. citizens, making it the most popular debate in history. Second, United States were facing an ever expanding political and social gap, and they needed candidates that would bring about its reduction. Third, whether we are talking about “the rise of the rest” (Amsden 2001; Zakaria 2009) or the “decline of American power” (Wallerstein 2003; Lachmann 2014), one thing is clear: United States’ position and their ability to influence global processes has, to say the least, been altered. American citizens needed a candidate who would successfully lead the country through global political and economic turbulence, who would maintain American prima-

cy in the world, but would also bring foreign military involvement down to the bare minimum. Today, most citizens think that “it would be better if the U.S. just dealt with its own problems and let other countries deal with their own problems as best they can” (Pew 2016). We are yet to see whether these expectation will be met, but it is certain that it will be the newly elected president Donald J. Trump dealing with them.

It is hard to explain the disbelief the world was experiencing when the first results came in. One by one, Ohio, North Carolina and Florida were hinting, and then Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan confirmed one of the biggest surprises ever in regards to American presidential elections. Candidates with fewer electoral votes than Donald Trump have won in the past, as have those with popular vote margins of 0.09%, or even those with a lower popular vote³, but there has not been a case in recent history where a candidate who was written off by almost everyone won the election. Twenty out of twenty-four polling results presented on November 7th and 8th said Hillary Clinton was in the lead, while various specialized portals gave her a 60% to 97% chance of her winning. Even the betting odds were off. There are very few analysts such as political historian Allan Lichtman⁴ who accurately predicted Trump’s victory.

Be as it may, Donald Trump was elected president, and the United States and the world are about to learn to “absorb the impossible” (Dowd 2016). Also, political scientists, historians and other social scientists will make effort to explain a victory they were not able to predict. What caused Trump’s sway over Hillary Clinton? Was it her baggage or character, his excellent election strategy, anger towards party establishments, FBI Director James Comey, foreign governments or something else? Seeing as there are no definite answers (yet), further efforts to explain Donald Trump’s success are quite justified.

Trump’s victory came after a long period of battling in the trenches – he took on other candidates, the Republican Party Establishment, media, political analysts, and his own nature and character as well. He was not only an outsider in his race against Hillary Clinton, but in every single “battle” starting from June 15th 2015 when he announced he would run for the Republican nomination, up until November 8th 2016.

3 John Quincy Adams (1824), Rutherford Hayes (1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), George W. Bush (2000) and Donald Trump (2016) have won the election despite having a lower popular vote.

4 Even Lichtman was a little off – he predicted a much higher popular vote for Trump

At first, his candidacy was dubbed a mere insatiable thirst for attention coming from a spoiled billionaire. Truth be told, Trump himself did contribute to such an image. His political views can be labeled as “business pragmatism”. In two previous instances, he was a supporter, even a financier, of the Democratic Party (prior to 1987, and from 2001 to 2009), he also supported the Republicans three times (1987-1989, 2009-2011, 2012 – present), and he ran in the primaries as a Reform Party candidate in 2000. “The Outsider”, however, scored numerous victories in 2016. First, he won the primaries by a landslide, leaving behind Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio, John Kasich, Ted Cruz and others, and then he went on to defeat Hillary Clinton in the general election. It should be noted that Trump is the first American presidential candidate ever to be elected without having previous adequate political experience or military service, and the first to win with a significantly smaller amount of funds raised⁵ – almost half as much as Hillary collected during her campaign (Allison 2016). Contrary to most expectations, and in spite of extremely harsh statements during the campaign, according to exit polls, Trump managed to acquire 28-29% of the Latin American votes, more than Mitt Romney in 2012, or Bob Doll in 1996. He managed to get a lot of non-college-educated whites to go out and vote, while Romney failed to attract voters from this category in 2012. Also, despite his billionaire status, a significant number of those with annual incomes below 50.000\$ decided to give him their votes.

Donald Trump was sort of a “black swan” – both for the Republicans and his country’s political system. He did not play by the rules and he tried to, in any way possible, “shake up politics as usual” (Ramakrishan 2016). It seems no other candidate in the past faced that many problems and such strong resistance. He barely had any support from his party during the campaign. Some of the most renowned Republicans, such as John McCain, Jeb Bush, Mitt Romney and Lindsey Graham, publicly declared they would not support Trump. Some went even further, like Colin Powell announcing he would vote for Hillary Clinton. Trump himself made little effort to help his campaign. His stances were often on the verge of discrimination and demagoguery, sometimes even crossing that line. He narrowed down his potential electorate by directing harsh and offensive statements toward women and minorities. He was often

5 Since the 1960 presidential election until today, only two candidates managed to win in spite of raising less money – Kennedy in 1960 (he raised 9.8 million dollars, while Nixon raised 10.1 million), and Carter in 1976 (33.4 million, and Ford raised 35.7 million).

compared to George Wallace and Pat Buchanan regarding the amount of “populist bigotry and xenophobia” (Jacobson 2016: 234). His politics could be defined as “5A”: anti-immigrant, anti-Mexican, anti-Muslim, anti-Obama and anti-globalization (Jacobson 2016).

Truth be told, it was not just Trump causing problems for the Grand Old Party – Republicans have lost four out of the last six presidential elections from 1992 to 2012, and in five of those they had fewer popular votes than the Democrats. After Romney’s defeat in 2012, they sought to, using the Growth & Opportunity Project (Barbour et al 2012) which was an autopsy of some sort, gain a realistic perspective of the current situation, locate the causes of their loss and design recommendations for more successful future actions. One of their main conclusions was that “America looks different”, more precisely, that “The nation’s demographic changes add to the urgency of recognizing how precarious our position has become (...) America is changing demographically, and unless Republicans are able to grow our appeal the way GOP governors have done, the changes tilt the playing field even more in the Democratic direction” (Barbour et al. 2012: 7).

The demographic issue has been properly identified, but not much has been done to address it. It is now a major problem, but not a new one. Ever since the 1970s, United States have had constant, unchanged demographic tendencies, and the lines of political division that we see today were created in that exact time period. Since 1964, when the ultra-conservative Barry Goldwater ran as the Republican presidential candidate, and 1963 when Kennedy presented his Civil Rights Bill (came into force as the Civil Rights Act in 1964), minorities have been supporting and voting for the Democrats much more than the Republicans. The majority of currently present social divisions were created back in the 1970s, and according to them, minorities, women, college-educated, urban population, less religious, and young people tend to vote Democrat, while white males, non-college-educated, rural, more religious, and older people vote Republican. Considering the fact that the minorities’ share in the total U.S. population is growing, and that there are more and more college-educated, urban and young people, it is obvious which side is benefitting from such demographic tendencies.

If the electoral system is still able to “protect” Republicans in Congress and Senate elections, this is no longer true for the presidential ones – as we have seen in the past two decades. Authors believe demographics and demographic tendencies to be one of the main problems Trump

had to go against, and that the answer to how he won the election lies in the answer to how he managed to beat demographics. In the following paper, we will first try to analyze key party division lines and demographic tendencies in the United States of America, proceeding with a research of estimates and expectations prior to the 2016 election, and finally aim to identify the strategy that helped Donald Trump triumph over the existing (for the Republicans – unfavorable) demographic tendencies.

Elections and Social Divisions in the U.S.

Social and political divisions are a component of every political community. They are inseparable from American history and their present. Over time, division lines have changed, and none of the administrations – neither Lincoln’s, nor Wilson’s, Roosevelt’s, Kennedy’s or Obama’s, have remained immune to political or social polarization. Issues like slavery abolition, abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, entering World War Two or racial segregation did not only cause divisions within parties, but within the society as a whole. These divisions are still around today. In fact, the American electorate “has over the past several decades grown increasingly divided along party lines, by political attitudes, social values, basic demographics and even beliefs about reality” (Jacobson 2016: 226). Sometimes, it seems the differences are so big that there is no consensus around a shared founding story and shared values (Woodard 2011). Some authors even point at four (Fisher 1989), nine (Garreau 1981) or even eleven (Woodard 2011) different and nations quite divided in North America.

Although U.S. political and party divisions have always followed social ones, it seems the correlation between the two has never been higher. Parties⁶ have begun to, more and more, articulate social divisions and build their ideological stances along their lines. As time passed, the ideological gap was getting deeper and wider in content. For example, in the past few years, the gap among voters with political preferences has increased significantly, and research data shows that “99 percent of politically engaged Republicans are more conservative than the median Democrat, while 98 percent of engaged Democrats are more liberal than the median Republican. That’s up from 88 and 84 percent, respectively, in 2004” (Cohn, 2014). The gap is particularly obvious among

6 By „parties“ we mean two major American parties – the Republican and the Democratic Party.

party elites, but “...ordinary Americans have also become increasingly polarized by party, and the more active they are politically, the more their divisions echo those of elected leaders” (Jacobson 2016: 228). This has especially been clear since the 1970s – that is, since the last major ideological shift in America’s political life occurred – when two main parties gained ideological outlines within which they have, for the most part, remained until today.

The degree of these division is best exemplified by the fact that Republicans and Democrats today disagree even about whether the country is headed in the right direction or not (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2016). The discontent with the rival parties is becoming bigger, often even turning into hatred. What is especially alarming is that party differences are spilling over into everyday life. Research has shown that partisans are worried their children might marry an opposing party supporter, and they are prepared to discriminate the other side quite a lot (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2016). Another notable indicator of party divisions is the ever growing coherence of each group of voters. The number of voters prepared to vote against their party’s candidate is lower than 10%, which is less than in previous periods of time. Their ideological leanings and party identities “have become more consistent internally and more divergent from those of rival partisans” (Jacobson 2016: 228).

Electoral Demographics in the United States

We have previously stated that the party divisions established in the 1970s are still present today. Alongside said divisions, electoral demographics is starting to gin new outlines. Minorities have, to a great extent, started voting for Democrats, as have women and urban population. Likewise, the demographic structure of the United States themselves has begun changing drastically. In the nineteen seventies, there were large waves of Latino and Asian immigrants, and trends of rural population moving to urban and suburban areas – also, ever since then, less people have been identifying as religious, and there have been more college-educated citizens (Taxeira, 2008).

These changes in the demographic structure have greatly influenced the electoral process. In the following section, we will try to demonstrate the shifts in American demographics between the 1960s and today, as well as point out key demographic tendencies.

Race and ethnicity

Table 1 – Voting structure by race in 1960, 1968, 1988 and 2012 presidential elections

Election year/ Candidates	1960		1968		1988		2012	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Humphrey	Nixon	Dukakis	Bush	Obama	Romney
Whites	49%	51%	38%	47%	41%	59%	43%	57%
Non-whites	68%	32%	85%	12%	82%	18%	82%	18%

Source: Gallup, *Election Polls – Presidential Vote by Group*, Gallup.com, available on: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.aspx>

Table 2 – Race and ethnicity of the US electorate

Race/ethnicity	1960	1980	2000	2016
Non-Hispanic White	85,4%	79,6%	69,1%	61%
Black	10,5%	11,7%	12,3%	12%
Hispanic	3,2%	6,4%	12,5%	18%
Asian	0,5%	1,5%	3,8%	6%

Source: Census.gov, <https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.pdf>

Minorities voting for Democrats, and whites voting Republican, is a trend that began in the 1960s and as persisted to this very day. The only exception within the white population occurred when Bill Clinton received 46%, and Bob Dole 45% of this group's votes (Gallup 2012). A continuing decline in white population's total share in the electorate represents a problem for Republicans. In 50 years, their percentage in U.S population has dropped by over 25%, and predictions say that by 2040 there will no longer be a majority group in America.

Education

Table 3 – Voting structure by education on presidential elections 1960, 1968, 1988 and 2012

Election year/ Can- didates	1960		1968		1988		2012	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Humphrey	Nixon	Dukakis	Bush	Obama	Romney
College	39%	61%	37%	54%	42%	58%	53%	47%
High School	52%	48%	42%	43%	46%	54%	54%	45%
Grade school	55%	45%	52%	33%	55%	45%	48%	52%
Post grad	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	62%	38%

College only stuoonly	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	46%	54%
Some college	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	58%	42%
HS or less	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	53%	47%

Source: Gallup, *Election Polls – Presidential Vote by Group*, Gallup.com, available on: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.aspx>

There are constant changes in regards to education. Non-college-educated people used to predominantly vote for Democrats, but have been supporting Republicans more and more in the last few years. High school-educated or less voted for Trump with a margin higher than 5%. On the other side, highly educated people have recently been voting more for Democrats.

Gender structure

Table 4 – Voting structure by gender on presidential elections
 1960, 1968, 1988 and 2012

Election year/ Candidates	1960		1968		1992		2012	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Humphrey	Nixon	Clinton	Bush	Obama	Romney
Men	52%	48%	41%	43%	44%	56%	47%	53%
Women	49%	51%	45%	43%	46%	38%	57%	43%

Source: Gallup, *Election Polls – Presidential Vote by Group*, Gallup.com, available on: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.aspx>

Since the before-mentioned 1964 and the Republican turn, women have been supporting Democrats more than they used to. The 1980s were an exception – there was a so-called “mini swing” among women, but they have been voting Democrat from 1992 to today.

Religion

Table 5 – Voting structure by religion on presidential elections
 1960, 1968, 1988 and 2012

Election year/ Candidates	1960		1968		1988		2012	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Humphrey	Nixon	Dukakis	Bush	Obama	Romney
Protestants	38%	62%	35%	49%	42%	58%	45%	55%
Catholics	78%	22%	59%	33%	51%	49%	56%	44%

Source: Gallup, *Election Polls – Presidential Vote by Group*, Gallup.com, available on: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.aspx>

Table 6 – Religious and Non-religious population in US
in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010

Year	1980	1990	2000	2010
Religious population	97%	92,5%	86,8%	82,6%
Non-religious population	3%	7,5%	13,2%	17,4%

Source: *The Latin American Socio-Religious Studies Program / Programa Latinoamericano de Estudios Sociorreligiosos (PROLADES)*, available on: <http://www.prolades.com/cra/regions/nam/usa/usa-rel2.htm>

It is an unwritten rule that the more religious population votes for Republican candidates. Another rule, though broken numerous times over the years, says that Protestants support Republicans, while Catholics, other religious groups, atheists, and agnostics support Democrats. Ever since 1952, there was only one case of Protestants voting mostly for Democrats, and this was in (many times mentioned) 1964. On the other hand, Catholics have supported Republicans several times since 1960: in 1972, 1980, 1984, and 2016. It is interesting that Republicans won in every one of these instances when they had the Catholics' support. Their problem in the future may be the continuous trend of a decline in religion practicing population.

Age structure

Table 7 – Voting structure by age on presidential elections 1960, 1968, 1988 and 2012

Election year/ Candidates	1960		1968		1992		2012	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Humphrey	Nixon	Clinton	Bush	Obama	Romney
Under 30	54%	45%	47%	38%	40%	37%	62%	38%
30 to 49	54%	46%	44%	41%	42%	37%	53%	47%
50 and older	46%	54%	41%	47%	46%	39%	50%	50%

Source: *Gallup, Election Polls – Presidential Vote by Group*, Gallup.com, available on: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.aspx>

Young people usually vote for Democratic candidates. Naturally, this rule has had its exceptions, such as Eisenhower beating Stevenson in 1956, Nixon winning against McGovern in 1972, and Reagan's victories over Carter and Mondale in 1980 and 1988 respectively. However, the margin was never as high as it was this year. In 2008, it was 22%, 24% in 2012, and 18% in 2016. Additionally, the last three election cycles saw an increase in older population's support for Republicans.

Urban/rural population

Table 8 – Urban, suburban and rural population of the US in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010

Year	1980	1990	2000	2010
Urban population	73,7%	75,3%	79,1%	82,3%
Rural population	26,3%	24,7%	20,9%	17,7%

Source: *Trading Economics*, available on: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/rural-population-percent-of-total-population-wb-data.html>

American rural population has been in a constant decline from the beginning of the 20th century up until today. It is quite likely that this trend will go on, and that more and more people will be moving to urban areas. A decreasing rural America is another problem for the Republican Party, seeing as they mostly lose in urban areas with an average margin of about 10%.

Donald Trump and Demographic Conditions

All indicators regarding current demographics, first of all those decennial tendencies that remain unabated, show that Republicans are not in an enviable position. Despite his victory, Donald Trump failed to bring in more non-white voters, women, those with higher education, urban population, or young people, than John McCain or Mitt Romney managed to. Republican candidates in general have ended up with less popular votes in the last six out of seven election cycles (1992-2016). Trump's victory, as well as their successful Congress and Senate elections, will merely allow the Republicans to catch their breath. Of course, it is far from easy or simple to, all of a sudden, completely change their strategy, seeing as it was based on "...party's emphasis on concern for 'the other' over the past 50 years – whether that 'other' is black, immigrant, gay, Muslim, feminist and so on" (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). However, if they fail to change their strategy, and the demographic tendencies remain the same, we can quite certainly expect an era of Democratic rule.

We can easily conclude that Trump did not have a favorable demographic basis in the 2016 election. Did he do anything to make it

better? It does not seem so. Although he stated multiple times during the campaign that he would be the kind of president that would make minorities proud, his rather harsh stances on illegal migration distanced him from a large segment of the Hispanic community. Deporting a million people, building a wall on the Mexican border, and calling Mexicans “rapists and criminals” did not sound appealing to Hispanics. His efforts to prove Obama was not a “natural born US citizen”, or that he was the “founder of ISIS”, did not bode well with African American citizens. Most of them stood up for Obama and strove to protect him. If we add that to the fact that, in previous four elections, African Americans – between 93 and 99 percent of them – voted Democrat (Gallup 2012), Trump could not have hoped for their larger support. Additionally, he had a, to say the least, strange attitude towards women, who make 51.6% of the electorate today. According to the Telegraph, Trump has made offensive comments directed at women over 40 times in his life so far (Cohen 2016). He did not hesitate to do so during the campaign, with sexist comments addressed to Carly Fiorina, Megyn Kelly, and Hillary Clinton, to name a few that stood out. Regarding urban population, it appears he did not try hard enough to win their votes, and most of his messages were predominantly aimed at rural areas and the American heartland.

All of the above indicated Trump would not improve upon the Republicans’ “demographic bloodstream”, and that he would, in fact, do much worse than McCain and Romney. Different scenarios predicted Trump would need between 35% and 52% of the Hispanic votes (Damore and Barreto 2015), while research showed a maximum support of 19% (Mascano 2016). Votes within this community are even more relevant if we have in mind that Hispanic Americans mostly inhabit states that traditionally decide the winner. Hispanic Americans make up 24% of Florida’s population, 48% of New Mexico, 29% of Nevada, 21% of Colorado etc.

Trump’s support among African Americans was estimated to be between 0.5% and 6%, and between 14% and 15% among Asian Americans. Having in mind that African Americans make up most of North Carolina’s population, 20% of Virginia, 12% of Ohio, and 11% of Pennsylvania, and that all of these are swing states, it is clear just how important these votes are. Research also showed a considerable advantage that Hillary Clinton had among women. Estimates went so far that some authors even stated “Donald Trump is facing an apocalyptic elec-

tion scenario, thanks to women voters” (Bump 2016), and that he would have less than 30% of all female votes. Just for reference, McCain and Romney, in 2008 and 2012, got 43% of women’s total votes. Similar to all previous demographic categories, Trump failed to improve Republican support in urban areas and among college-educated citizens.

After everything stated above, the question arises: how did Donald Trump, despite all unfavorable circumstances, manage to surpass the demographic problem and win the 2016 presidential election?

How Did Trump Deal with Unfavorable Demographics?

“What I got wrong about the election” (Plouffe 2016) – this is the question David Plouffe, Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign manager, asked himself after the results came in. The same question puzzles numerous political analysts, historians, and citizens around the world. Could the polls have been that wrong? Who is responsible for Hillary Clinton’s defeat? Who voted for Trump? How did he win despite losing Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada? How did he conquer “unbeatable” demographics?

All of these questions are quite justified, they have no obvious answers and demand detailed analyses. The forecasts were not only wrong because of Donald Trump’s silent voters. As much as Democrats tried to make their point, Hillary Clinton did not lose only due to “cyber espionage”, nor did Trump win simply because more white citizens came out to vote. As with other questions, explaining just how Trump managed to surpass the demographic problem and win the election is a complex endeavor. Still, authors of this paper believe that Trump’s success could be explained through a number of different aspects: a) On election day, Trump gained the support of “silent voters” who would not state their preferences prior to that, and this trend was especially present among minorities and women; b) he achieved unprecedented results among rural population, religious, and non-college-educated citizens; c) he took advantage of the American electoral system reducing demographic effects; d) negative demographic effects were reduced by Hillary Clinton herself; and e) most importantly, he managed to “work past” demographics by winning traditionally Democratic states with majority white populations.

Exit polls results show that Trump had much better results with minorities and women than was prognosed before the election.

Table 9: Hispano Americans, Afro Americans, Asian Americans and Woman on US Presidential Election 2016

Donald Trump polls and exit polls 2016	Hispano Americans	Afro Americans	Asian Americans	Woman
Preelection polls	19-23%	0,5 - 6%	14-15%	32-34%
Exit polls	28-29%	8%	27-29%	41-42%

Sources: CNN Politics: available at <http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/>; The New York Times available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html>

Trump was more successful among Hispanic Americans than Bob Dole who, in 1996, had 21% of their votes, or Mitt Romney with 27% in 2012. At first, such results do seem surprising, especially having in mind Trump's stances on immigration – regarding Mexicans in particular, who make up about 63% of all Hispanics in U.S.A. The reasons behind this outcome are numerous. First of all, the Hispanic American community is not a monolithic one – within it are different interests, preferences, and expectations. Just like other communities, they have felt the consequences of both the economic and the political crises in the United States. Perhaps the best explanation for Trump's success are the following factors: a) Hispanics did not trust Hillary, with 61% of the electorate stating she was not “honest and trustworthy” (CNN 2016); b) they had a sort of disdain and resentment towards the party establishment, and perceived Hillary as key representative of the establishment elite; c) not all of Trump's ideas were distant to them – the Hispanic community also deals with immigration issues, specifically regarding jobs; d) most of them did not identify with the “Mexican criminal portrait” that Trump pointed out on various occasions (Navarrette 2016). Hispanics did, however, help Hillary win in New Mexico, Colorado, and Nevada, but that was not enough for a total victory, seeing as Trump had won in Florida and Arizona where Hispanics make up 24% and 31% of the entire population, respectively. A significant imbalance between election results and almost all polls indicates that a lot of Trump's silent voters came from this specific group. He did not manage to achieve a “mini swing” like Bush Jr. in 2004⁷, but he did win a lot more Latin

7 George W. Bush won 41% of Hispanic American votes in 2004 – the most any Republican has ever won. This migration of Hispanic votes is referred to as the ‘mini swing’ because it only lasted one election cycle. In the following election, a significantly smaller percentage of this community voted for Republicans.

American votes than was predicted. It should also be noted that the voter turnout was quite lower within this population than, for example, African Americans or white citizens.

African Americans voting for Democrats in numbers as high as over 90% is a trend that continued on in 2016. Truth be told, Trump did end up with much better results than was originally expected, but voter turnout was 58% - almost nine percent lower than in 2012. A lower turnout was not favorable for Clinton who failed to follow in Obama's footsteps and get more African Americans to go out and vote. She did not do well with Asian Americans either - they gave her 65% of their votes, which is 9% less than with Obama in 2012.

Elizabeth Warren, Democratic senator from Massachusetts, predicted "nasty women" would be the end of Trump in terms of ending his political career. She was wrong. It is well known that women have, with the exception of Ronald Reagan's terms, generally always voted Democrat. Donald Trump collected 41% of total women votes (CNN 2016), only 2% less than McCain and Romney and 2% more than Bob Dole (Gallup 2012). Exit polls have shown that he even got more white women votes than Hillary Clinton (CNN 2016). Also, it appears estimates and predictions were far from precise, and that Trump had silent voters within this group as well, those that did not state their preferences prior to Election Day.

Even though the trend of a declining rural population in the United States continues on, Trump had some unprecedented results - he collected 62% of this category's total vote, which is 3% more than Romney and 9% more than McCain (Kurtzleben 2016). Regarding urban and suburban population, he maintained the Republican constant of 35% and 50% respectively. The example of the urban/suburban/rural divisions shows us just how successful Trump's campaign really was. He accomplished historical results within rural population, which was key target group during most campaign speeches. Rural residents in America identified most with his campaign slogan "Make America Great Again", and Trump precisely targeted them during presidential debates by labeling them as "the biggest losers to democratic rule". As was the case with Brexit, the periphery came out as the ultimate winner.

Over time, there has been a gradual decline in American residents who practice religion. In early 1960s, atheists, agnostics, and people that do not practice any form of religion amounted to less than 2% of the total population, while today, that number has gone up to about 20%. During this time period, the number of Christians in America has de-

creased from 93% to 77% - this being mostly Protestants, seeing as the number of Catholics has pretty much remained the same. Having in mind that most Republican voters are predominantly religious Protestants, it is easy to tell that their electorate has drastically decreased in this way as well. However, Trump managed to gather a large amount of Protestant and Catholic votes. As many as 56% American Protestants cast their votes for Trump, which is significantly more than Romney got in 2012, McCain in 2008, Bush Jr. in 2000, Dole in 1996, or Bush Sr. in 1992. Only Bush Jr. was more successful in this regard in 2004 (Gallup 2012; CNN 2016). It should be noted that Trump won 81% of white born-again or evangelical Christians (Huang et al. 2016). This was also the first time after Reagan that a Republican has won more Catholic votes than the Democratic candidate – 50% compared to Hillary Clinton’s 46%. Most of the Christians that voted for Trump regularly attend religious ceremonies. Seeing as they overlooked his three marriages and rare religious service attendance, they must have perceived him as the only acceptable option in 2016 election.

Voters with only a high school education or less, and those with some college education, mostly voted for Trump, while Hillary gained the support of college graduate and postgraduate voters (CNN 2016). Trump achieved better results than Romney or McCain in all four categories, and he was more successful with high school educated voters than Bush Junior. He did not reverse demographic trends – college-educated people still vote for Democrats as they did in 2008 and 2012 – but he did significantly decrease the margin within this group, and he increased the level of support for Republicans among less educated citizens. Due to his “bringing business back into the U.S.” policy, creating new jobs, repealing environmental measures that were inhibiting business, a kind of a reindustrialization, plans to renew the infrastructure, and, most importantly, bringing back the “American Dream” – blue collar workers gave him his undivided support. The margin between blue collar white workers was almost 40%. Many believe that Trump’s victory was made possible by the very coalition between blue collar workers (mostly high school-educated or less) and college-educated citizens, which is quite a difficult alliance to make.

Trump’s campaign team understood the American electoral system very well, with all of its advantages and disadvantages. Since 2005, there have been more citizens identifying as Democrats than as Republicans. Today, 29% of the voters lean towards the Democratic Party, while 26% feel closer to the Republicans. Thanks to their larger share in the elector-

ate, along with other factors, Democrats have been winning more popular votes in the last six out of seven presidential elections from 1992 to 2016. However, despite the popular vote statistics, they won “only” four election cycles in that period. Why is that? When the American political and electoral system was originally established, the idea was to not allow for a few strong states to dominate the rest. Republicans greatly benefit from such a system in the last decades, and we can easily say that they have enough space to catch their breath every once in a while as they go up against unfavorable demographic trends.

The ever growing ethnic homogeneity in congressional districts, and the fact that “heartland” areas are still primarily rural and settled with white population, make it easier for Republicans to assure victories in states “from the Appalachian ridges to the Rocky Mountains” (Barone 2016). Having in mind that most states are located right in this area, Democrats are “left” with just the coasts. Surely, a large percentage of Americans do live on the coast – but that is not where most states are. We will use the example of California and New York to demonstrate how the electoral system currently works in favor of the Republican Party. California is the first, and New York the fourth most populated state, and both have continuously been voting for Democrats in the past few decades. Combined, they have about 60 million citizens which makes up 20% of the entire U.S. population. On the other hand, together these two have only 84 electoral votes, which amounts to 15.6% of the Electoral College. If we add this to the fact that Hillary Clinton won California with a 30.1% margin and 4 million more votes than Donald Trump, and that she won New York with a 16.5% margin and something under 2 million more votes, it is clear that Democrats do not exactly benefit from a system that wastes votes in this manner. Just like Bush Junior in 2000, Trump made sure to make the most of all the benefits this system carries, and win the presidential election.

“Why, oh why, did it have to be Hillary Clinton” (Frank 2016). This question was publicly raised by Thomas Frank, American political analysts and a major critic of the Republican Party. This, however, was a question that most Democrats asked as well, both before and after the election. Whether it is true or not, most believed her candidacy to be a result of a deal and a show of gratitude from President Obama who received a lot of support from her husband while he was not doing so well during the 2012 campaign. There is not enough space in this paper to analyze, or even mention, every single scandal Hillary’s team had to

cover up. We will only deal with affairs concerning her private email server, unreported money that the Clinton Foundation received while Hillary was State Secretary, and mocking women who were victims of abuse. While some criticized her politics, other believed her character to be a bigger issue than ideology (Jacobson 2016: 234). Mentioned affairs were one of the major causes of her poor results in the 2016 election, but they are definitely not the only one. Hillary Clinton failed to repeat Barack Obama's results in all categories – whether we look at women, minorities, or people under 40 years old. We previously pointed out that 61% of the electorate did not see her as trustworthy – she simply was not a candidate whom people could have faith in. In 2008 and 2012, Americans voted for Obama because they wanted a change. They wanted a change this year as well, but Hillary Clinton had nothing to offer. While America was changing, Hillary was a person of continuity – and continuity of the party establishment, corporative America and an elite that awoke anger and rage among citizens. It was this very sentiment that brought forth a candidate like Donald Trump.

The last, and probably the crucial piece of the puzzle that was conquering demographics, was Trump's strategy. Often during the campaign, both he and his team were highly underestimated. Surely, Trump had an unusual political style, many outbursts, and frequently displayed ungentlemanly (to say the least) manners, patience of a five-year-old, and the temperament of a teenager. Many failed to understand that he was coming from the world of business where he had to solve problems using his negotiating skills, persuasion and money. Trump's main issue was that, in the political process, he was met by actors trying to spoil his negotiations; he did not have enough time for persuading, and he had significantly smaller amounts of money than the other side.

We already listed projections made by political analysts regarding results Trump would have to achieve within various groups, primarily Hispanic Americans, in order to win the election. He was far from winning 35-52% of Hispanic votes, and he lost Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico – states he needed, according to all analyses, in order to attain the 270 electoral votes. His strategy was flawed, but it brought forth the biggest surprise in contemporary American presidential election history. How did he do it? Trump did not have any illusions that he would accomplish a “mini swing” with Hispanic Americans like George W. Bush did in 2004. He also did not believe he would have anything special to offer to African Americans who have been voting Democrat (over 90%

of them) since 2000, nor to Asian Americans, seeing as half of them live in California or New York. Naturally, he wanted to score well among all racial and ethnic groups, but his strategy was not primarily targeted at them. He knew very well he could not beat negative demographic conditions by competing a Democrat. Rather than that, he decided to apply the only strategy possible – going around the demographic statistics, and he did that in two ways: first of all, by focusing on disappointed voters, predominantly whites that McCain and Romney failed to attract in 2008 and 2012, and second, by targeting white Democrats, precisely blue collar voters and union members from the rust belt states.

Trump fulfilled his intentions. According to exit polls, he acquired a total of 58% of all votes within white population, the same percentage as Mitt Romney in 2012, but this year, the margin between top two candidates was 7% bigger because Hillary won a mere 37% of votes in this category (Huang et al. 2016). He managed to find the “missing white voters” (Trende 2016), disappointed and angry with the establishment and the elite, voters who were ambivalent in the past regarding Democrats or Republicans they did not prefer winning.

Like most political parties, Republicans have various fractions: moderate conservatives (25-30%), somewhat conservative (35-40%), evangelist (20%), and very conservative secular voters (5-10%) (Olsen and Scala 2016). Despite all his troubles during the campaign⁸, Trump managed to build a solid coalition between these fractions, offering each of them a reason to support him, even though they are on different points of the ideological scale. For example, he won over evangelicals by having firm stances on abortion, gay marriage and opposing the NAFTA agreement, while he sided with moderates by proposing lower taxes policies, a balanced budget and deregulation. Also, regardless of expectations, there were no major republican migrations to the opposing Democratic side. A mere 8% of Republicans that voted decided to give their support to Hillary Clinton – which is the same percentage of Democrats that voted for Trump (CNN 2016).

Other than successfully building a republican coalition, Trump also acquired a significant amount of support from the independents. Almost one third of all voters in the 2016 presidential election were independents, and exit polls show that Trump won in this category with a

⁸ A large percentage of the Republican establishment decided not to support Trump – some abandoned him during the campaign, and some publicly stated they would vote for Hillary Clinton.

6-8% margin (CNN 2016; Huang et al. 2016). Considering the decreasing trend of partisan commitment, and the earlier mentioned “negative” demographics, this very category – the independents – will be of great, if not crucial, importance for the Republican Party in the future.

The election outcome was ultimately decided by states in the north: Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. They gave Trump 46 electoral votes out of the total 306 that he won. They are, at the same time, the biggest surprise of this election, and probably the most brilliant part of his campaign. Trump’s promises to tear down the “blue Democratic wall”, much like political analyst warning that Hillary Clinton “focused her time and money primarily on swing and Republican-leaning states” (Brownstein, 2016), were not taken seriously. It seems, however, that Donald Trump’s campaign team understood that a Republican candidate has “potential to attract parts of the Democratic coalition, including manual laborers and union members in the all-important Rust belt states” (Azari and Hetherington 2016: 106) such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, that have not voted Republican since the 1988 presidential election, or Wisconsin, that has not been “red” since 1984.

Campaigning in these three states may have been the biggest mistake Hillary and her campaign team made in the 2016 election. They were so sure of winning that Hillary did not visit Wisconsin once during the campaign. Trump, on the other hand, spent four days there, working with Republican Governor Scott Walker, and ended up winning in Wisconsin. Hillary did not go to Michigan until the last Friday before Election Day, while Trump dedicated a lot of his time and resources to this state. For example, Mike Pence spent an entire day visiting Macomb County, the third biggest county in Michigan, famous for its “Reagan Democrats”. In the end, Trump won not only in this county, but Michigan as a whole by a little over 20.000 votes (for reference, about 5 million people voted in Michigan). There is a famous saying that “The devil is in the details”. It seems that Hillary Clinton is not a person of detail, contrary to the billionaire from New York. This is another thing that should be added to the “Why Hillary Clinton lost the already won 2016 election” list.

Conclusion

Election results were followed by a series of violent and non-violent protests and accusations of Russian hackers influencing the final outcome. Electors were pressured to not vote for Trump and give the Electoral College its original purpose – one that Alexander Hamilton initially had in mind – which is now being interpreted as preventing “incompetent and unqualified people from leading the White House”, or responding to “Russia’s influence in the election”. Still, the chances of electors changing the election outcome and the will of U.S. citizens are quite low, and would probably lead to some form of a civil war. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which Donald Trump would not, come January 20th 2017, become the 45th President of the United States.

Even though Donald Trump won in the 2016 presidential election, demographic trends in America have not changed drastically, and neither has vote structure within demographic groups. There are more and more minorities and those living in urban areas, while the number of religious people is decreasing. Minorities, urban population, less religious people, college-educated, women and young people still predominantly vote for Democrats, while Republicans can count on the support of white voters, rural population, highly religious, male and older people. It does not take a lot of wisdom to conclude that “as the proportions of racial and ethnic minorities in population and in electorate grow, the competitive balance between an increasingly diverse Democratic Party and an aging, mostly white Republican Party, will inevitably shift in favor of the former” (Bartels 2016: 41). Unless Republicans manage to change their voter structure, they are in for years of uncertainty, and eventually – quite certain defeat.

Donald Trump managed to “go around” unfavorable demographics and catch one of the last trains to Republican victory with the existing voter structure. His ally in this process was the electoral system – one that allows for a candidate with almost 3 million popular votes less to win the election. The strategy of taking down the “blue Democratic wall”, something not even Bush Jr. could do in 2000 or 2004, proved to be extraordinary, for it was that very “wall” coming down that won the election for Trump. Many saw his strategy as insane and impossible to achieve, but the results speak for themselves – and they say that Donald Trump became president by going around American demographics.

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The Past, Present and Future of the U.S. Electoral College²

Abstract

Author aims to explain the institutional framework of the United States presidential election. One of the unique features of American political system is the Electoral College – an indirect mechanism of voting in which the citizens' votes are aggregated and weighted in relation to their federal entity (i.e. fifty states and one federal district). Throughout the paper, author will not only present historical genesis and basic settings of this electoral mechanism, but also examine the effects and consequences of the system through history, including a number of controversies contributing to the rising criticism and frequent calls to reform. In that sense, the main arguments in favor and against the reform of Electoral College will also be analyzed. Finally, the paper will conclude with a brief examination of system's effects on strategies of presidential candidates and voting results in the outcome of 2016 election.

Key words: United States, presidential election, Electoral College, electors, swing states

Historical Evolution and Constitutional Definition

The President of the United States of America is indirectly elected by the people through the mechanism known as the Electoral College, to a

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four year term. Along with the Vice President, who is chosen during the same procedure, it is one of only two nationally elected federal officials in the United States. Mechanism of voting is established by the Article Two of U.S. Constitution and is as such one of the oldest electoral systems still in use today (U.S. Constitution, Art. II). However, in comparison with the most electoral methods used worldwide, national popular vote is not the basis for electing the head of state. Citizens of United States elect the President indirectly, voting in the general election in order to choose a number of electors from their home state, who then proceed to cast their vote for one of presidential candidates. A number of electors is fixed at 538 and is distributed among states depending on their respective populations.

The U.S. Constitution prescribes that each state appoints, in a manner their legislature may direct, a number of electors corresponding the number of Senators and members of House of Representatives entitled to that state in Congress (U.S. Constitution, Art. II). Document further explains that the electors shall meet upon their appointment in each state, and cast the ballots for both President and Vice President, addressing the results to the U.S. Senate. A candidate who receives a majority of electors' votes will be appointed President. In the unlikely event of an equal number of electoral votes, members of the House of Representatives (lower chamber of the U.S. Congress) will choose the President. Furthermore, during that process the House members will be divided in state delegations, with each delegations having only one vote. Correspondingly, the Senate will elect the Vice President, with each of one hundred Senators having one vote (U.S. Constitution, Art. XII).

As seen in previous paragraphs, the procedure gives great importance to individual states – not just in weighing of electoral votes, but also when comes to voting in Congress in an event of a tie (or absence of majority, albeit that happened most recently in 1824). The whole procedure emphasizes the federal character of the United States. Creators of the Constitution established the Electoral College as a compromise, not just between voting for President in the representative body and election by a popular vote; but also between the Union and member states (Madison 2001: 194-199). Indeed, original plan suggested the election of President by the Congress. However, Constitution makers presumed that could not only lead to formation of “cliques” – small groups of powerful politicians with a decisive impact on election; but also could endanger the independence of the presidency in relation to

Congress (Madison 2008). One of the explanations for the emergence of Electoral College stipulates that Constitution makers of the late 18th century could not imagine how national popular election would work, especially in the large and incoherent territory of the early United States - which, in 1787, consisted of thirteen very diverse former colonies, still not sufficiently linked by common institutions, media or even powerful personalities. In short, both the electorate and the politicians of the 18th century were much more state-oriented than nation-oriented in their political thinking, resulting in turn in the creation of a state-based electoral system (Black 2012).

Constitution originally cited that the candidate receiving second most electoral votes would become the Vice President. However, that solution, combined with the formation of early political parties, resulted in administrations in which the President and Vice President came from different party. Furthermore, the lack of distinction between the votes casted for President and Vice President caused additional problems, especially in 1800 election, when the House of Representatives had to decide the vote. As a response to this confusion, the Congress ratified the new amendment to the Constitution (U.S. Constitution, Amendment XII), prescribing separate ballots casted by the electors for two major offices. Finally, in mid-19th century, parties started to introduce the electors who pledged their support to the specified candidates beforehand - thus gradually eliminating the free electors, and laying foundations of a general ticket of party-sanctioned electors, which is still used today.

Electoral College Today

Contrary to the popular belief, the term “Electoral College” itself is not sanctioned by the Constitution. It is simply a practical and publicly adopted term referring to the body of electors (Bromwich 2016). Typically, these electors are nominated by political parties in their respective states. The nomination takes place either at the party convention or through the party caucuses, depending on internal regulations and varying by state. It usually happens in the spring of the electoral year (federal Election Day is always set at first Tuesday following the first Monday in November). The Constitution prescribes who is eligible to be an elector: it excludes Senators, members of the House of Representatives, and any person holding an “office of trust or profit under the Unit-

ed States” – that is, all employees of United States government. Electors are usually chosen based on their service and loyalty to the political party (Neale 2016: 3-4).

All states are now choosing the electors through popular vote. In most of them, voters pick a slate of electors proposed by one of the running parties, with only eight states listing the individual electors’ names (Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee). In practice, voters cast only one vote for the group of electors, who are nominated by the party and pledged to support certain candidates. General election ballots simplify the voting, presenting joint candidacies for President and Vice President of each party. (Neale 2016: 5-7).

The Electoral College never meets together as a single body. Electors gather in their state capitals in mid-December following the Election Day to cast the electoral votes. These votes are then counted in joint session of Congress in the beginning of January, while the new President – the candidate with the majority of electoral votes – is sworn on January 20th or 21st, when he officially takes the Office. However, after the Election Day in November, the process is largely a technical procedure – depending on the presumed sum of electoral votes received, the future President is usually known hours after the polling stations have closed. The fact is even demonstrated in the custom of forming the so-called “transitional teams” right after general election, facilitating the smooth transfer of power and introducing the President-elect and his future administration to the office and its duties.

Electors are not constitutionally obligated or sanctioned by federal law to honor their previous obligation to the candidate. Those electors, who either cast their votes for candidates different than to whom they pledged, or those who abstain from voting, are called faithless electors. Although thirty states have prescribed laws to sanction faithless electors, none have ever been enforced. There have been very few occasions of an elector voting contrary to the previous commitment: until 2016, it happened only nine times in the last hundred years. Some of them voted differently out of honest mistake, some of them choose to switch the vote out of protest, or because of personal preferences – but they have never changed the outcome of an election. Simply put, most of the electors hold leadership positions and have high loyalty to their party, resulting in very low chances of reversing the outcome of the election (Bromwich 2016).

There are 538 electors in total, corresponding to the combined number of members of House of Representatives (435), number of Senators (100), and additional three electors allocated to the District of Columbia (Washington D.C. – which has no representatives in Congress). Number of electors granted to each state hence equals to the combined number of its Congressmen and Senators. This number is based on respective populations, and is recalculated every ten years. Most populous states, such as California, Texas, New York and Florida, carry the larger number of electors; while the states with seven smallest populations have three electors each: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.

Table 1: Current allocation of electoral votes among states

State(s)	Electoral Votes
California	55
Texas	38
Florida, New York	29
Illinois, Pennsylvania	20
Ohio	18
Georgia, Michigan	16
North Carolina	15
New Jersey	14
Virginia	13
Washington	12
Arizona, Indiana, Massachusetts, Tennessee	11
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Wisconsin	10
Alabama, Colorado, South Carolina	9
Kentucky, Louisiana	8
Connecticut, Oklahoma, Oregon	7
Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, Utah	6
Nebraska, New Mexico, West Virginia	5
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island	4
Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming	3

Increased importance of certain states is apparent, and that is becoming more evident when method of awarding the electoral votes to candidates is considered. Namely, 48 states and Washington D.C. implement the “winner takes all” voting system, awarding all electoral votes from their respective state to a winning candidate. In practice, state’s electoral

votes are awarded to the presidential candidate with plurality of popular vote in the state, introducing a phrase “winning a state” into American political discourse and political strategy alike. Only two states, Maine (since 1972) and Nebraska (since 1996), use the alternative, congressional district method to distribute their electoral votes: they are electing one elector from each congressional district in the state (two in Maine, three in Nebraska), and additional two electors at-large are awarded to the winner of a statewide popular vote.

As it takes a majority of 538 electors to win the presidency, pursue to the 270 votes dictates the “electoral mathematics” in the United States. The parties and their candidates create strategies on how to win a sufficient number of states combining to 270 votes, allocating their resources to the most important states, and often neglecting the smaller ones, especially those worth three or four electoral votes.

Degree of partisan stability of several states between electoral cycles also plays an important role in electoral mathematics of prospective candidates. It is noted that citizens in a certain number of states tend to vote for same parties during the longer periods of time, resulting in stable support and directing the attention of both candidates and media to the other, indecisive and more unpredictable states. Popular and academic terminology has since referred to the states who predominantly vote for democratic candidates as “blue states”, while those who tend to support the republican nominees are referred to as “red states”. This perception is popularized in the media during the 2000 presidential election, largely due to the colored maps used to depict voters’ preferences among states (Rutchick, Smyth, Konrath 2009: 269-270). Ever since, the perception is reinforced through the election results: between 2000 and 2016 election, 38 states have repeatedly voted for the same party. The term has even been expanded in order to describe states as more liberal or more conservative. In turn, the voters in those noncompetitive states seem to have less power and less influence (Brams, Kilgour 2016: 99-101) on the outcome of elections than their fellow citizens in the battleground states.

Battleground or “swing” state refers to a state that could be won by either of the candidates of two major parties. Due to the “winner takes all” system and uneven allocation of electoral votes, candidates often direct their campaigns only to these states. Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin have been described as “perenni-

al” swing states that have been contested over the last five presidential campaigns (Silver 2016). In total, these twelve states carry a sum of 156 electoral votes, which is incentive enough for the candidates to focus on them and to try to find the right combination which will provide them with the winning 270. Nevertheless, disproportional focus of candidates and their campaigns on swing states is the focal point of many critics of the Electoral College.

Support, Criticism and Reform Proposals

Apart from historical reasons, one of the main arguments in favour of the Electoral College is that it reflects the federal character and formal federal structure of the United States, representing each state’s popular choice for President. Proponents of the current system also claim that it contributes to the cohesiveness of the country, forcing the parties and candidates alike to make a wider national effort and pay more attention to sparsely populated states, instead of campaigning only in heavily inhabited urban areas, most likely in the large cities in the Northeast and on the West Coast of the United States. In that way, the Electoral College prevents majorization of vast rural areas by large metropolitan centers. American media, academic community, government and political donors are already concentrated in big cities, so there is a consequent fear that the abolition of Electoral College could further centralize the political power and decision making in these centers, largely at the expense of the rest of America (Gregg 2012).

For third parties, independent candidates, new political forces and minor political parties, it is extremely difficult to win enough votes in substantial number of states in order to gain respectable number of electors and have a chance to win the presidency. Distribution of voting rights and electoral votes clearly countervail the creation of multiple factions and keep the stability of the two-party system. “First past the post” system generally tends to produce party systems with two major actors, while the smaller parties are usually kept out of representation and decision making of any kind (Sartori 2003: 48-50). Proponents consider this effect to be beneficial. Two-party system provides stability of government and opposition; it eliminates obsolete veto players in the party system and the need for fragmented ruling coalitions; furthermore, it protects the office of the President from minority influence and bar-

gaining with multitude of institutionalized political actors. It also keeps the extremists out of mainstream politics and forces two large parties to pose as broad coalitions of compromise interests, contributing to the more moderate tone of politics.

Finally, the fact that the electors are chosen from the people for the single purpose of electing the President is also considered a benefit. This solution prevents the creation of powerful permanent body vested with party or external interests, which could permanently influence the presidential election and draw the uncontrolled amount of political power from its presumed role (Hamilton 2001: 352-354).

On the other hand, one of the most important criticisms of Electoral College is that it is violating the principle of equality of vote. Allocation of votes among states gives a certain advantage to the least populous states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming), each of them having three electoral votes – in accordance with their number of seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Population of these states is overrepresented in the Electoral College when compared to more populous states (Collin 2016).

Because of the imperfect distribution of electoral votes in relation to states' population, in combination with the "winner takes all" rule, the American presidential elections are not decided by the "one person – one vote" principle (Williams 2011: 184-185). This caused several situations in which the Electoral College winner, that is, the President-elect, did not receive a majority of national popular vote. Prior to the 2016 election, there were four historical occurrences of that situation. In 1824, Andrew Jackson won the popular vote, but lost the presidency to John Quincy Adams. The election was decided by the House of Representatives, since neither of two candidates managed to gain a majority of electoral votes. In 1876, republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was elected President with more electors by his side, although democratic nominee Samuel Tilden won the popular vote. Similar happened in 1888 election, when incumbent democratic President Grover Cleveland lost to republican Benjamin Harrison, despite winning the popular vote. Finally, in one of the most contested and disputed election in history, republican candidate George W. Bush defeated democrat Al Gore in the year 2000, although Gore received around half of million votes more. In very close race, Bush managed to secure 271 electoral votes (in comparison to Gore's 266), by winning the key swing states of Ohio and Florida. Vote count in Florida (state carrying 25 electoral votes at the time, and

subsequently providing Bush with a narrow victory) is still a subject of numerous controversies – with U.S. Supreme Court decision to end the recount and award Florida’s electors to the republican candidate, effectively granting him the presidency (Bush v. Gore 2000).

Similar situation – in which the Electoral College winner did not receive a majority of national vote also happen in 2016 – is to be discussed in the final chapter. Currently, the debate can be concluded by saying that disproportion between number of votes received and electoral votes (or, in other political systems, parliamentary seats) won is not uncommon in the majority election systems with more than one electoral constituency – which is what U.S. Electoral college in its essence represents. Primal concern of these systems is territorial representativeness, not equality of vote.

However, distribution of electoral votes among states, along with “winner takes all” system and established patterns of party support, causes the candidates to focus their campaigns on several swing states, while largely ignoring the rest of the country. Twelve perennial swing states named in previous chapter receive majority of campaign visits, events, debates, advertising, media attention and party activities. According to one analysis, two thirds (273 out of 399) of the general campaign public events in 2016 election happened in just six states (Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, carrying 111 electoral votes between them). According to the same source (National Popular Vote 2016), twelve perennial swing states received 94% of campaign events – 375 out of 399; while the 24 states and District of Columbia (carrying in total 176 votes) did not host a single public general election campaign event. Among them are for example New York (29 electoral votes) or New Jersey (14 electoral votes) – large, populous and important states, who are, nevertheless, democratic strongholds which candidate Hillary Clinton would presumably win even without campaigning. Same goes for the republican, “red states”, such as Tennessee (11 votes), South Carolina (9 votes) or Alabama (also 9 electoral votes). Furthermore, two of the most populous U.S. states, California (38 million residents – 55 electoral votes) and Texas (27 million residents – 38 electoral votes) received only one major public event each. Argument further states that this setup discourages participation and voter turnout – except in battleground states. In permanently red or blue states, entrenched party dominations provide no incentives for voting, especially for those voters who support the presumably losing side in their respective state.

On the other hand, that does not mean that these states are ignored in the national politics as a whole, or that people don't have any incentive for political involvement. While the presidential candidates allocate majority of their resources to swing states in order to maximize the probability of winning, the voting for President is not the only election happening in the United States in 2016. On Election Day this November, U.S. citizens voted not only for President and Vice President, but also for all 435 members of the House of Representatives, as well as for one third (34) of Senate members, and, in many states, for various local officials. For example, legislative elections were held in total 44 states, while people also voted for governors (in twelve states), and other numerous elected officials across America, such as attorney generals, judges, mayors, members of city councils etc.

Finally, the side effect of territorial vastness of the United States, with the voting conducted in fifty states along six different time zones, is the difference in closing times of polling stations between states. Major TV networks and media outlets tend to publish results of exit polls and their predictions of first results shortly after the closing of polling stations in certain states (namely in the East of the country), while the voting is still in progress (in Western states). This could distort the electoral results through discouragement of voters of, at that moment, presumably losing candidate. However, this is a weak argument. Winners in most of the Western states who are possibly affected by the early results from the East are already decided: majority of voters already casted their votes by the time of the first polling announcements. Moreover, majority of Western states fall in the category of party entrenched red or blue states. Nevada, with its six electoral votes, is only perennial swing state in the Pacific Time Zone.

Electoral system of the United States received a number of reform proposals during the years, but none of them managed to garner substantial support in order to pass the Congress and be considered as a possible Constitutional amendment. Some of the common proposals include introduction of direct election – that is, national popular vote without any intermediaries (electors) between voters and presidential candidates; abolition of “winner takes all” system and introduction of proportional allocation of state's electoral votes among candidates; or congressional district method, similar to the votes allocation currently in effect in Maine and Nebraska. Some of these ideas combine direct popular vote with Electoral College, in order to alleviate the apparent

anomalies of current system, most notably to eliminate the situations in which the winner of popular vote is not elected President. One of these initiatives received much support: namely, since 2006, ten states and District of Columbia adopted the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an agreement to award all their respective electoral votes to a presidential candidate who wins national popular vote, regardless of their party or electoral votes tally. Similar legislation is introduced in legislative bodies of all U.S. states and is currently in consideration. However, the prospect of adoption is low in the swing states, because it could reduce their influence in nationwide politics (Silver 2014). As of 2016, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington (total of 165 electoral votes) have adopted the Compact as part of their legislation. However, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is unlikely to make impact in 2016 election, although the losing candidate (Hillary Clinton) won the popular vote by a margin of almost 3 million. Namely, Clinton already managed to win the electors from the eleven current signatories of Compact, having in mind that all of them are considered blue states. The situation implies that the Compact, although it could mitigate the controversies of electoral system without jeopardizing federal character of the country, is largely unusable unless ratified by majority of states from all three categories of presumed party support – red, blue or battleground.

Electoral College at the 2016 Presidential Election

As considered, the prospective candidates often build their strategies (i.e. combination of states) needed to win the presidency in relation to the current configuration of party support among states, in order to gain 270 electoral votes. Prior to 2016 Election Day, trends were clearly in favour of democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. When considering the states continuously won by democratic candidates in the last four electoral cycles (Gore in 2000, Kerry in 2004, Obama in 2008 and 2012), Clinton could count in advance on the support of no less than 242 electors, mostly from more urban and heavily populated states in the Northeast and the West Coast, but also in the Great Lakes region (Map 1). In theory, democrats would have won the election if they had managed to preserve the previously stable support, and garner additional 28

electors: either by winning the largest battleground state of Florida (29 electors), or by some other combination of swing states victories.

Map 1: Blue states 2000 – 2012



On the other hand, republican candidate Donald Trump adopted different strategy. His continuous conflict with republican elites meant that he could not rely only on traditional support of that party. Moreover, even if the republican support would shift to Trump (which eventually happened), he could only count on 175 electoral votes from red states: mostly from the Deep South and a several Western and Midwestern states (Map 2). From that starting position, Trump needed to gain an additional 95 electoral votes in order to ensure the victory. His strategy did not just consider winning the swing states, but also had to calculate gains in some of the states with more traditional democratic support. Due to his populist appeal to the mostly white blue collar working families, the choice fell to the states of the so-called Rust Belt – once an industrial region spreading through Northeastern United States, Great Lakes region and Midwest, covering the large parts of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin. While Trump did not always geographically direct his campaign to these areas (Kirkland 2016), his message found a strong appeal with the population of Rust Belt: especially white, urban, industrial workers (Frum 2016).

Map 2: Red states 2000 - 2012



Despite many predictions of Clinton victory (Katz 2016), results incoming in the election night revealed that Trump performed surprisingly well in all battleground states: he has managed to win Florida, Ohio and North Carolina (total of 62 electoral votes). Moreover, Rust Belt states of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan also switched to Trump, voting for a republican candidate for the first time since the election of George H. W. Bush in 1988. In effect, these three states deducted 46 electoral votes from the Clinton tally and brought it to Trump. In comparison to the previous 2012 election, when they voted for Barack Obama, six states (Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), along with one congressional district in Maine (the state has split its vote for the first time), switched to the republican candidate. Apart from one congressional district in Maine, Clinton managed to win the Northeast, the Pacific Coast including the most populous state of California, and also swing states such as Colorado, Minnesota, and Nevada. However, the loss of support in the Rust Belt, along with inability to make gains in any of the more populous swing states (namely Florida, Ohio or North Carolina), caused Clinton's subsequent defeat. In final count of the Election Day, Donald Trump presumably won 306 electoral votes, while Clinton managed to win 232 (Map 3).

in Texas, while five democrats broke ranks from Clinton in Washington and Hawaii, casting their vote for third candidates. Two electors in Colorado and Minnesota were replaced in accordance to states' laws after trying to vote for democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders instead of Clinton, while second vote was conducted in Maine after one democrat originally also tried to vote for Sanders (Detrow 2016). Interestingly, despite calls for defection directed at Trump's electors, more faithless electors were recorded among democrats. At the end, Trump received 304 electoral votes, compared to Clinton's 227.

Notwithstanding the record number of faithless electors and rising criticism encouraged by the results of popular vote, the Electoral College once again proved a functioning system, providing clear winner within the set institutional framework. The calls to mend the system, such as National Popular Vote Interstate Compact and other initiatives aimed at fixing the anomalies of the electoral vote, are likely to gain additional attention and support after the 2016 election; but the basic features of the Electoral College, responsible for the long term political stability and strengthening the federal character of the United States, are surely here to stay.

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
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What Is the Obama Doctrine, and Has There Ever Been One?



Colin Dueck:
*The Obama Doctrine. American
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Introduction

The last year of President Obama's second term was strongly marked by the bizarre presidential election campaign and highly unexpected electoral results. This has mostly overshadowed Mr. Obama's own foreign policy legacy, his views and actions. Of course, the foreign policy of the two Obama administrations was regularly brought up and harshly criticized by the republican candidate, and current president-elect, Donald J. Trump. Likewise, Mr. Obama himself had the opportunity to defend his legacy while actively campaigning for Ms. Clinton. But campaign rants and quarrels are, more often than not, far away from rational delib-

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eration and cold-minded analysis. For these reasons, some successful attempts to grasp the complex issue of Barrack H. Obama's foreign policy doctrine and its legacy are all the more appreciated.

During the presidential campaign, as well as first days of governing, Donald Trump has presented himself and his foreign policy agenda as radically opposed to Obama's, in virtually every way and aspect. Whether the legacy is considered mostly positive or negative, there is no doubt that the new administration will, for some time, have to function within the context shaped by the policy of the last eight years. It is, therefore, particularly important to assess this said legacy, and analyze whether it represents a result of a thought-through and systematically applied foreign policy doctrine.

Various authors put forward different assessments and evaluations of foreign policy actions and legacy of two administrations led by Barack Obama. For Harvard's Stephen Walt, Obama's foreign policy record can be labeled as nothing short of a failure. Colin Dueck (2015) would largely agree. On the other hand, David Unger (2016) from Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Bologna, gives a lot more credit to President Obama regarding foreign policy achieve-

ments. Either way, it is instrumental to analyze what has been done (or failed to be done) and what way it's been done: strategically, tactically, or *ad hoc*.

This author's views regarding this issues are pretty grim. Although there were some indisputable achievements (most notably, multilateral deal with Iran regarding the country's nuclear program), it is without a doubt that international ambient left by Barack Obama is significantly more perilous than the one left behind by George W. Bush – which would have been rather hard to imagine at the time. Furthermore, it can be stated, with a strong confidence, that no such thing as “the Obama doctrine” will be remembered by foreign policy experts or international relations historians: think of Monroe, Wilson, Reagan or Bush Jr. in this context, regardless of particular doctrine's success. Rather, there has not been but a rudimentary and/or eclectic grand strategy during Obama's two administrations. It would not be unreasonable to regard his foreign policy failures as a consequence of lack of strategic thought. All this in spite of the large number of experienced foreign policy public servants around the president – or sometimes, it might also very well be argued, precisely because of them.

Doctrine, commission and omission

The notion of a president's foreign policy doctrine usually represents a succinct formulation regarding main international objectives and means for their achievement, while implying the reasoning behind the doctrine's adoption. In foreign policy and national security practice, as well as academic literature, doctrine is embodied in the grand strategy, or "a calculated relationship on the part of a country's leaders of ends and means in the face of potential international opponents" (Dueck 2016: 14). Functions of a grand strategy are threefold: to specify certain national goals, ends and interests; to identify existing challenges to those interests, and to select and recommend the particular policy instruments or means by which challenges are met and national goals pursued (*Ibid.*).

Grand strategy is not to be confused with National Security Strategy, which is a formal document usually adopted once per administration and represents a technical verbalization of the Government's strategic beliefs and choices. It is also not to be confused with particular types of foreign policy strategies, although it is, by definition, put to life and conducted through them. There is, of course, no single, globally

adopted list or classification of strategy types. Before proceeding to analyze Obama's grand strategy, Dueck presents six specific types of foreign policy strategies: retrenchment, containment, regime change/rollback, engagement (in the form of either integration or bargaining), accommodation (i.e. appeasement) and offshore balancing. Areas of interest, where the strategy (or rather, strategies) was to be conducted, according to Dueck, are: 1) counterterrorism; 2) nuclear proliferation, including Iran and North Korea relations; 3) great power competitors, most notably China and Russia; 4) complexities of, and relations with, the Arab World, and 5) relationship between US alliance commitments, defense spending and the new American posture overseas. Various types of strategies have naturally been used in regard to different key areas.

There has, for the most part, not been a rigorous and coherent doctrine or grand strategy under President Obama. External reason of such development is, of course, to be found in almost chaotically complex global environment that Obama's administration had inherited from Bush's. It was, in that sense, perhaps prudent not to formulate a strategy too rigorous or too narrow to grasp the many controversies of international politics. On the other hand, one internal factor has represented a particu-

larly strong constraint for the foreign policy of Barack Obama: his own tendency to treat foreign policy as secondary to domestic; in other words, to disengage from international issues in order to “free up national energy and resources to revive the US economy and pursue progressive domestic reforms” (Dueck 2015: 35-36).

This approach, along with some indisputable achievements like handling the international financial crisis, taking down Osama bin Laden or negotiating the New START treaty with Russia, seemed reasonable and successful, and granted Obama reelection in 2012. But overall, strategic failures have been much more far-ranging than occasional accomplishments. Mishandling of the Arab spring, especially regarding Egypt, Libya (with the use of overt rollback strategy) and Syria, along with incompetent military retreat from Iraq (which was planned in advance, but could and should have been postponed by Obama), gave room to a new adversary, far more dangerous than Al Qaeda: the so called Islamic State, while strengthening hostile elements of the presumably moderate Islamic opposition in Middle Eastern countries. Buildup of troops in Afghanistan didn't just compromise the President's announcements of ending the Afghan war, it was also unsuccessful and still allowed Al Qaeda

and the Taliban to regroup and be on the rise at the end of Obama's second term.

Although designed as predominantly accommodating strategy of strategic retrenchment, occasionally more coercive approaches gave results: apart from the bin Laden episode, “strategically patient” containment of North Korea and Iran seemed to work at times; however, the Iranian issue has not moved forward until engagement in P5+1 was applied. North Korean nuclear test in September 2016, on the other hand, has once again demonstrated that this country can hardly, if at all, be constructively dealt with in the absence of Chinese cooperation.

China itself has, according to Dueck (2016: 72) been subjected to a mixture of strategies, including engagement, integration and accommodation on the cooperative side of the strategic spectrum, as well as containment, balancing and deterrence (e.g. in maritime disputes) on the competitive side. Overall strategy towards China was not, however, coherent enough: so called Pivot to Asia, for example, was pompously announced as an innovative strategic shift, but, along with the TPP trade agreement, achieved virtually nothing. Deep economic interdependence thus remains the main factor that objectively suppresses the potential for a more

open conflict between the US and China.

Regarding Russia, Obama's first term has begun with aspirations towards the reset of relations; although some progress was made (including the New START and continued Russian support regarding US efforts in Afghanistan), relations have deteriorated significantly with the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Strategically speaking, there were hardly any reasons for America to meddle in Ukrainian politics, supporting pro-Western forces against the pro-Russian government, thus provoking strong Russian response. Once again, the combination of engagement and accommodation gave way to a smoldering conflict, degrading US-Russian relations to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

Clear, coherent and disciplined doctrine was never developed during Obama's two administrations. Foreign policy moves have mostly been coerced reaction, and often not particularly successful. What started as "A.B.B." (Anything but Bush) policy in 2009, soon became known as "*Don't Do Stupid S**t*", as numerous reliable sources report that Obama has called his strategy in an off-the-record conversation with a group of journalists. As noble and prudent as such an intention is, however,

it is hardly a strategy, even if you abide by it.

Legacy

For Professor David Unger, President Obama's foreign policy legacy is "mixed but positive". Unger rightfully emphasizes the internal constraints (such as hostile legislature) that prevented the President from fulfilling many of his plans and promises, while admitting that, as the highest elected Democrat, Obama had to share the blame for such development (Unger 2016: 3). The administration has "fallen short" on many occasions and issues, but the legacy is also comprised of some "impressive successes" (*Ibid*: 4-5). It is now up to external analysts to ponder the positive and negative elements of Barack Obama's foreign policy record.

The deal that re-established international control over Iran's nuclear program is, undoubtedly, an achievement that the administration can be proud of – even though there are signals that it might be jeopardized by the incoming administration's actions. Normalization of relations with Cuba, not as much: while it is certainly a generally positive development, it is still unclear what the actual logic behind this move is;

or, to put it differently, normalization of relations between any two actors is hardly an achievement *per se*.

Turn away from the Middle East and towards East and South-East Asia has mostly failed, in spite of the administration's significant efforts. Relations with Russia have worsened dramatically, in comparison with the Clinton and Bush era; and, what is worse, without a clear reason for such an outcome on America's behalf. Although Professor Unger disagrees (2016: 15), it is highly debatable whether Obama has actually left the international Arena in better shape than he himself has inherited: virtually none of the major, transformational goals have been achieved, initiatives on big international trade deals (TTIP and TPP) have by now been completely abandoned, great power relations are dangerously fragile and critical regions such as the Middle East and South-East Asia are even more turbulent than at the end of Bush's time.

Such a grim perspective is, of course, far from being exclusively Obama's fault. His lack of strategic thinking and, occasionally, dubious choices regarding foreign policy and national security staff have,

naturally, had their impact. But the world had already taken an unusual and uncertain turn with the end of "the unipolar moment", making it particularly hard for a statesman, even the US President, to steer the wheel of global politics in a simple manner. After all, after the rampant interventionism of the previous administration, it may be regarded as a significant success that Obama has not drawn the US in another full scale, all-in conflict, with boots on the ground and no endgame in sight. Consequences of his foreign policy choices will definitely be visible in the years and perhaps decades to come, and like with Bush and Obama earlier, it is now up to the new administration to try and make the most of the global environment it inherited. Otherwise, there are always enough possibilities to make things worse, however bad the starting position. The record of Obama's foreign policy will, thus, inevitably be judged only in the context of Trump's.



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Analysis of the EU Measures Adopted in Response to Migrant Crisis: Principle of Institutional Balance and Typology of Legal Acts in the EU Revisited²

Abstract

This article analyses measures that European Union adopted in response to migrant crisis, with a special emphasis on Decision 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. As Slovakia and Hungary filed actions for annulment of this Decision before Court of Justice of the European Union, their claims are taken as a starting point for the analysis. Therefore, this Decision is analyzed in the framework of the principle of institutional balance and the typology of legal acts in the EU. After the presentation of principle of institutional balance, research is focused on relation between the Council and European Council and European Parliament in the process of adoption of this Decision. It is concluded that the sole possible encroach upon the principle of institutional balance can be found in the Council's neglect to reconsult the EP after the change in the initial content of the Decision (deletion of Hungary). As for the typology of acts in the EU, having in mind the process of evolution of the division between legislative and non-legislative acts, it is concluded that the main criteria for the differentiation between these two acts is the procedure in which the act is adopted and not its content, as Slovakia and Hungary claim.

Key words: Decision 2015/1601, principle of institutional balance, Council, European Parliament, typology of acts, Court of Justice of the European Union

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Introduction

Migrant crisis that the European Union (EU, Union) has been facing for more than a year now have instigated the EU to adopt new measures in order to address this challenge. The first set of the adopted measures includes instruments regarding the relocation and resettlement of people seeking international protection. The most relevant documents are two Council Decisions about the relocation and resettlement of 160 000 persons in total. The next step is the Commission proposal for the amendments to the “Dublin Regulation” paving the way for the so called third phase in the establishment of the Common European Asylum System.³

This article will be particularly focused on the analysis of one of the adopted measures - Decision 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Several concerns were raised after the adoption of this Decision, and two states - Slovakia and Hungary - even filed action for annulment of this Decision before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Their claims included diverse legal basis for the annulment of the Decision, but of particular importance for this article will be claims about the disrespect of the principle of institutional balance in the EU and the claim about the wrongful determination of the type of legal act that was adopted. Even though they seem far apart, these two claims are connected. As Hofmann pointed out when analyzing the typology of acts in the context of Constitutional Treaty “[a] reform of the typology of acts will also almost automatically have effects to ... the ‘institutional balance’ between the Union’s institutions. The definition of the different forms of action, by definition of their reach and the applicable decision-making procedure, will have implications on the weight of each institution in the political process from rule making to rule implementation.” (Hofmann 2003: 4) Especially in this case, where the typology of the adopted act is in question, the respect of the principle of institutional balance is also at stake. Claims of Slovakia and Hungary suggest the strong linkage between the institutional balance and typology of acts in the EU as will be shown later in the text.

3 See: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM (2016) 270 final

In first part of the Article we will briefly present the Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601, both regarding their procedure of adoption and substance. Special emphasis will be put to differentiate these two Decisions as well as to the reaction to the adoption of the second Decision. In the second part of the Article we will present the principle of institutional balance in the EU in general terms and then apply it to the circumstances of the adoption of the Decision 2015/1601. The third part will address the issue of typology of legal acts in the EU by presenting a short description of the historical circumstances in which this typology was introduced in the founding treaties and then by reviewing the typology of the Decision in question. Conclusions will be presented in the last part of the Article.

Measures Adopted in Response to Migrant Crisis

The current migrant crisis is so serious and of such an intensity that it triggered the first ever application of Article 78 (3) (Hofmann 2003: 4). It means that this migrant crisis is defined as an emergency situation requiring the adoption of provisional measures in order to help Member States faced with the sudden influx of nationals of third countries. This Article envisions the procedure that should be followed in the adoption of these measures: The Commission should give a proposal and the Council should adopt a relevant measure after consulting the European Parliament (EP, Parliament). In May 2015 Commission published legislative proposal for the establishment of “provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece in order to enable them to deal in an effective manner with the current significant inflow of third country nationals in their territories, putting their asylum systems under strain” (COM(2015) 286 final: 4). After consulting the Parliament, the Council adopted Decision 2015/1523 on September 14th 2015. The envisaged temporary solution was the relocation of those who seek international protection, from Greece and Italy to other Member States. The personal scope of application is limited to those applicants who a) lodge application for international protection in Italy or Greece and these states should have otherwise been responsible pursuant to the Dublin III criteria and b) are *prima facie* person in need of international protection.⁴ According to the Eurostat data from fourth

4 “2. Relocation pursuant to this Decision shall only be applied in respect of an applicant belonging to a nationality for which the proportion of decisions granting

quarter of 2015 these are citizens of the following states: Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Central African Republic, Yemen, Burundi, Maldives, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Dominica, Saint Vincent and Grenadine, Turkmenistan.⁵ As for the number of allocations it is settled that 40 000 persons in total will be relocated (24 000 applicants from Italy and 16 000 from Greece) to the territories of other Member States (Article 4). The acceptance of the allocated persons is to be done on voluntary basis – Member States should indicate the number of applicants who they can accept for relocation and any other relevant information. (Article 5 (2)) Those Member States “shall receive a lump sum of EUR 6 000 for each relocated person pursuant to this Decision” (Article 10). Finally, this measure is of temporary nature since it is applied until September 17th 2017 and is applicable to all applicants who are on the territory of Italy and Greece from August 15th 2015 (Article 13 (3)).

Faced with the new migratory pressure, and especially the formation of the Western Balkan route towards Hungary, Commission decided to submit another legislative proposal on September 9th 2015, this time regarding three states – Italy, Greece and Hungary. Main differences regarding the previous decision were: inclusion of Hungary in the system for the relief regarding the migratory pressures, increase in the number of persons to be allocated and mandatory distribution key for the relocation. Parliament approved the Commission proposal without making any amendments on September 17th 2015.

The Commission’s proposal was to relocate 120 000 applicants in these proportions: 15 600 from Italy, 50 400 from Greece and 54 000 from Hungary. Distribution key is based upon objective criteria: “a) the size of the population (40 % weighting), b) the total of the GDP (40 % weighting), c) the average number of asylum applications per one million inhabitants over the period 2010-2014 (10 % weighting), and d) the unemployment rate (10 % weighting).” (COM(2015) 451 final: 2) However, since Hungary did not consider itself to be a ‘frontline’ Member State and did not want to be included as the beneficiary of this re-

international protection among decisions taken at first instance on applications for international protection as referred to in Chapter III of Directive 2013/32/EU is, according to the latest available updated quarterly Union-wide average Eurostat data, 75 % or higher.”

5 See: <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do> However, these numbers vary. Compare with data in other quarters. In Q3 those were the citizens from following states: Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago.

location scheme, the act that the Council adopted on September 22nd differed from the Commission's proposal.⁶ Council Decision 2015/1601 provided that the remaining 54 000 applicants will be, as of September 26th 2016 either a) relocated proportionally from Italy and Greece or b) relocated from another Member State which is confronted with the sudden inflow of third country nationals. The decision also envisaged the possibility that Member States in emergency situations may be suspended of the participation in the relocation (Article 9), as well as the "temporary safeguard clause" – that until December 26th 2015 Member State "may notify the Council and the Commission that it is temporarily unable to take part in the relocation process of up to 30 % of applicants allocated to it" (Article 4 (5)). This decision was adopted by a qualified majority vote – Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary voted against it, and Finland abstained.

The opposition and abstention in voting prove that the Decision was not deprived of controversies and it became apparent from the outset that its implementation will be difficult. Difficulties were twofold: a) Directive was challenged before the Court of Justice of the EU (Slovakia and Hungary) and b) emergency and safeguard clauses were soon called upon (Sweden, Austria).⁷

On December 2nd Slovakia filed the action for annulment of the Directive 2015/1601⁸, and Hungary did the same the next day.⁹ However, it is important to note that "these actions do not have suspensive effect and the Member States thus remain obliged to relocate under the decision in question" (COM(2016) 165 final: 3). To some extent, claims of Slovakia and Hungary overlap, even though they are presented in a different manner. The outline of their positions is the following: by adopting the contested Decision the Council went beyond the conclusions reached by the European Council at its meeting on 25th and 26th June 2015; the

6 There is also a claim that Hungary did not accept this solution as it included the deployment of European Asylum Support Office and FRONTEX on its territory and a presentation to the Commission of the roadmap of the compliance with EU *acquis* in the area of asylum and migration. (Editorial Comments 2015: 1444)

7 Austria availed itself of the Article 4 (5) and by the Council Implementing Decision of March 10th 2016 „the relocation to Austria of 1 065 of the applicants allocated to that Member State under Decision (EU) 2015/1601 shall be suspended until 11 March 2017.” Sweden triggered the application of Article 9, the Commission submitted a proposal for the decision and the procedure is currently pending.

8 See: Case C-643/15.

9 ee: Case C-647/15.

legal basis for the adoption of such Decision is wrong – in the view of the content of the Decision it constitutes a legislative act while Article 78 (3) only provides for the adoption of non-legislative acts, therefore the right of national parliaments to participate in the process, as well as the right of EP to engage in the co-decision were not respected; even if the legal basis is correct, Article 293 (1) TFEU is breached since the Council did not act unanimously when departing from the Commission’s proposal and the EP was not properly consulted, since it was not consulted once again after a substantial change in the proposal (exclusion of Hungary from the beneficiary states); the Decision is contrary to the principle of proportionality. Hungary further claimed that “contested decision infringes the principles of legal certainty and legislative clarity, since it fails to explain various aspects of how its provisions are to be applied and what relation those provisions are to have to the provisions of Regulation No 604/2013” (Case C-647/15, Application) while Slovakia is of stance that the conditions for the application of Article 78 (3) (temporary nature of the measures and the existence of an emergency situation) are not fulfilled.

Even though we find all the above mentioned claims important, our analysis will focus on the claims that question the proper application of principle of institutional balance and those that challenge the proper qualification of legal act in question.

Principle of Institutional Balance

The principle of institutional balance is yet another design of the Court of Justice of the European Union; it cannot be found in the Treaties and therefore causes difficulties when it should be defined. On the other side, in order to be and to function as a genuine principle it should be understood and applied uniformly. The simplest definition of this principle is the following: “From a legal point of view, the principle of institutional balance is one manifestation of the rule that the institutions have to act within the limits of their competences.”¹⁰ (Jacqué 2004: 383)

10 ee also Case 70/88, *Parliament v. Council*, [1990] ECR I-2041, paras. 21–22. Jacqu e also finds that the principle of institutional balance can be analyzed from the political point of view and in that sense it can be “envisaged as a means of describing the way the relationship between the institutions is organized.” Ibidem. Smulders and Eisele define the principle in political sense “as a dynamic one that explains the relative

Defined in this way the principle is strongly related to the question of separation of power in the EU. Some authors even claim that when the CJEU first inaugurated it, in the *Meroni* case it represented a substitute for the principle of separation of powers (Jacqué 2004: 384). Others claim that both principles are relevant for the functioning of the EU, but that they operate on different levels¹¹ (Chamon 2015: 372-374). There are those who believe that the principle of separation of powers cannot be applied to a *polity* such is the EU and therefore these two notions are strictly separated (Chamon 2015: 372). This belief is often demonstrated by quoting the Vice-President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Amato who stated that: “Montesquieu has never visited Brussels.” On the other hand, there are those who find that these conclusions stem from “false mental preconceptions ... that this principle [of separation of power] can only be ... effectuated by a strict division of legislative, executive and judicial powers exercised by specific institution...” (Ramirez 2013: 427).

Be that as it may, it seems that for our analysis more important relation is the one between the institutional balance and the principle of conferral. Even though the principle of institutional balance is formulated in the jurisprudence of the CJEU,¹² the expression of its substance can be found in the Treaties. Even though institutional balance is not directly mentioned as such,¹³ Article 13 (2) states that: “Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them.” For Chevallier-Govers this is just one aspect of the principle of conferral, the other being contained in Articles 4 (1), 5 (1) and (2) of the Treaty on EU. These two aspects – the horizontal one, regarding the relation between the institutions and the vertical one, regarding the relation of institutions and Member States – form a comprehensive principle of conferral of which the principle of institutional balance is only a part (Chevallier-Govers 2013: 557-559).

Both Slovakia’s and Hungary’s claim suggest that the principle of institutional balance was breached and that the Council in various ways

power positions of the EU institutions in respect to one another throughout the European integration process...”, (Smulders and Eisele 2012: 3)

11 However Chamon question whether institutional balance truly functions as a principle in the EU legal order. (Chamon 2015: 375-389)

12 For most important cases in this regard see: Jacqué, 2004: 384-387.

13 For Chevallier-Govers it is therefore unwritten principle and it is not constitutionalised. (Chevallier-Govers, 2013: 557)

encroached on the rights on European Council, European Parliament, Commission as well as national parliaments.

As for the claim that the Council did not act in accordance with conclusions of the European Council from the meeting of 25th and 26th June¹⁴ it is questionable whether these guidelines are relevant for the Decision in question. In fact, European Council conclusions are moot on 120 000 people to whom the Decision applies. Those conclusions regard only 60 000 people, of which 40 000 is to be relocated and 20 000 resettled. It is important to notice that these conclusions were reached only after the Commission already filed the legislative initiative for relocation of 40 000 asylum seekers (on May 27th) and after it gave recommendation for the European resettlement scheme – to resettle 20 000 people in need of international protection. (C(2015) 3560 final) The actions and numbers that appear in the European Council’s conclusion only restate what is already being done, on the Commission’s initiative. Maybe more appropriate than it would be to reconsider another document of the European Council – statement after the special meeting on April 23rd 2015. Then it was decided, *inter alia*, to “increase emergency aid to frontline Member States and consider options for organising emergency relocation between all Member States *on a voluntary basis*” (emphasis added) and to “set up a first *voluntary* pilot project on resettlement across the EU, offering places to persons qualifying for protection.” (emphasis added) (Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement) What could seem contrary to the Decision 2015/1601 is the notion “voluntary”. Since this Decision provide for mandatory relocation scheme, it can seem at odds with the said statement. On the other hand, European Council seem to have abandoned the “voluntary basis” criteria in its conclusions of 25-26th June, since it stated that all Member States (without prejudice to the specific situation of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) need to participate in the allocation and that they need to agree on the distribution of these persons. Taken the two statements of the European Council together, it does not seem that the Council decision is contrary to will of the European Council.

However, we find that the real question at stake here is the tension that may exist between the agenda-setting role of the European Council

¹⁴ Slovakian claim does not explicitly state which conclusion of the European Council are in question, but it can be concluded that those are the same conclusions that Hungary calls upon.

and the Commission, and in fact real institutional balance that might be distorted is the one between Commission and European Council. While through the history of European Integration Commission was seen as motor of integration and relevant institution to set the agenda, with the steady institutionalization of the European Council things have changed. It is often debated what is the relation between the Commission and the European Council regarding the agenda-setting (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2013; Allerkamp 2010). For the first time Lisbon treaty defined functions of the European Council which included providing the “necessary impetus for the development [of the Union]” and definition “of the general political directions and priorities thereof.” (Article 15 (1) TEU) However, TEU explicitly excludes legislative functions from the ambit of European Council’s action. Namely, this is the dividing line between the Commission’s and European Council’s functions (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014: 90; Bocquillon and Dobbels 2013: 21). Commission is the EU institution that has almost exclusive right to legislative initiative: “Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. Other acts shall be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal where the Treaties so provide.” (Article 17 (2) TEU) In the case of the adoption of the contested Decision, the relevant Article 78 (3) envisaged a procedure in which the Commission should propose adequate measure.

In line with the Article 17 (1) TEU, to “promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end” on May 13th 2015 the Commission presented the European Agenda for Migration (COM(2015) 240 final). In fact that was the relevant document that guided her in further steps to be taken for the “swift and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean” (COM(2015) 240 final: 3). In the Agenda it was stated that the Article 78 (3) will be triggered and that the temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection will be proposed. Also it was envisaged that the Commission will give Recommendation to resettle 20 000 people in need of international protection in all Member States based on the distribution criteria enlisted in the Annex of the Agenda. Commission was of the opinion that “[t]he European Council statement of 23 April 2015 and the European Parliament Resolution a few days later, illustrated the consensus for rapid action to save lives and to step up EU action” (COM(2015) 240 final: 3). Having all said in mind it can be concluded that the Commission in fact primarily acted based on its own motion and not on the impetus of the European Council.

Lastly, the question may be raised whether this Decision need to be in conformity with any of the European Council's decisions having in mind that it is adopted based on Article 78 (3). Special feature of this article is that it entails measures adopted as a reaction to a special emergency situation – characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries. In that case, it would be impossible to expect that the guidelines of the European Council on the issue exist by all means when taking into account the frequency of the encounters of the members of the European Council. Even if some guidelines of the European Council exist it can be expected that they do not reflect the real position of the European Council on the matter, having in mind the extraordinary nature of the situation.

Another issue related to the institutional balance in the Slovakia's and Hungary's claims is that the Council should have acted unanimously, since it departed from the Commission's proposal. The main rule for voting in Council is that it "shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise" (Article 16 (3) TEU).¹⁵ In this case, since Article 78 (3) doesn't contain any rule about the system of voting in the Council, the Council should vote by qualified majority. However, another rule is at stake here. Article 293 (1) TFEU states that when the "Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, it may amend that proposal only by acting unanimously..." (Article 293 (1) TFEU). The explanation of this Article is that the unanimity in the Council is requested when "the Commission is unable to agree to the amendments made to its proposal." (Council of the European Union, Voting System) In this case, the Council did change the Commission's original proposal, because of the Hungary's objection to be included as a beneficiary state. However, it is not known whether Commission had any objections to this change. Having in mind that the need for the change was necessary and objective, it is safe to assume that the Commission did back it up, leaving the voting procedure required unchanged.

The most important and we would say the most obvious example of the disturbance to the institutional balance is reflected in the claims that European Parliament was not properly consulted. The procedure for the adoption of the Decision envisaged consultation of the EP, and EP gave its positive opinion promptly, only 8 days after the Commission's proposal. EP did not submit any amendments and on September 17th

¹⁵ Note however that in the area of common foreign and security policy decisions in the Council and European Council are to be taken unanimously. See Article 31 TEU.

adopted resolution in which it approved the Commission's proposal but also emphasized that the Council should notify it "if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament" as well as to "consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal" (COM(2015)0451 – C8-0271/2015 – 2015/0209(NLE)). It was obvious that the EP was aware of the change that is about to be included regarding the Hungary. In the plenary debate the representative of the Council did point out that the Hungary will be excluded from the beneficiary system and he advised EP to take this into consideration when deciding upon the matter (European Parliament Press Release European Parliament Press Release, Plenary sessions, Immigration [17-09-2015 - 11:04]). However, from the text of the EP resolution it is obvious that this matter was not taken into consideration and EP explicitly asked the Council to consult it if the change is to occur. However, the Council did not consult EP once again and when adopting the decision it referred to the EP opinion of September 17th as the relevant one.

The role of the EP in the consultation procedure is important, even though the EP is involved in the decision-making to a lesser extent than in the ordinary legislative procedure and consent procedure. According to Chalmers, Davies and Monti "at the very least, Parliamentary hearings bring greater transparency to the process and provide an arena for actors, whose voice might otherwise have been excluded, to express their views" (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2014: 125). Also, the CJEU in the *Roquette Frères* case expressed its view that: "The consultation ... is the means which allows the Parliament to play an actual part in the legislative process of the Community, such power represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty" (ECLI:EU:C:1980:249). Another obligation stemming from jurisprudence of the CJEU is the obligation of the Council to reconsult the EP (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011: 675). The Council cannot even say that "it was not required to reconsult that institution provided that ... the Council was sufficiently well informed as to the opinion of the Parliament on the essential points at issue" (ECLI:EU:C:1995:220). The only exceptions to the duty to consult the Parliament again are: a) "the amended proposal as a whole corresponds essentially to the original proposal" or b) "where the amendments made modified the proposal essentially in the manner indicated by the Parliament" (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011: 675 and the case law cited). If the Council fails to consult EP in appropriate manner the act in question can be annulled. Having

in mind the circumstances of this case it is not likely that the conditions for exceptions are fulfilled. The amended proposal was changed in substance, not in some technical aspect, and therefore does not correspond to the original proposal. Also, EP did not indicate in which way to modify the proposal and it even stated that it should be consulted again if the change is to occur. However, some authors claim that the redress in this case is procedural – the Council will consult the EP once again, and the outcome will be the same, while the contested Decision will stay in force in the meantime (Peers, 2015; Vikarska 2015).

Typology of the Adopted Legal Acts

Large part of Slovakia's and Hungary's claim rely on the argument that the contested Decision is in fact legislative act in its substance and that it should have been adopted in the legislative procedure. Hungary claims that the Decision 2015/1601 is legislative act since it represents an exception in respect of Regulation No 604/2013. Hungary is of the view that exceptions to legislative acts can only be done by a legislative act. It follows that non-legislative act cannot change provisions of the legislative act. Slovakia did not go into detail when expressing this claim, it only stated that the Decision has the character of legislative act seen in the light of its content. This is a peculiar statement and it requires analysis of the typology of acts in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty.

The first question that needs to be addressed is the criteria upon which one legal act is to be characterised as legislative or non-legislative. This division arose during the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe in the ambit of Working Group (IX) on simplification of legislative procedures and instruments. During the hearing of the experts, Lenaerts expressed his view that “a distinction between legislation and non-legislation should be the starting point for any work on simplification of instruments” (Bering Liisberg 2006: 15-16). The idea was to make a difference between the legislative and executive functions of the EU institutions and to correlate best suited procedures for those two types of functions. The type of legal act will then depend on the procedure in which it was adopted. Final report of this working group contained the following division of acts: legislative acts, delegated regulations, implementing acts as well as non-legislative acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty (CONV 424/02: 9-13). Then, it should have been decided in each area what are the powers of the institution involved in the decision mak-

ing process and which procedure to assign. Three assumptions emerged: 1) all powers of the Council when acting in co-decision procedure (that was to be renamed to ordinary legislative procedure) are of legislative nature; 2) all the existing regulatory powers of the Commission were labeled as non-legislative; 3) when the Council is acting on its own it had to be decided in which capacity it adopted decisions: as a legislative or executive body? (Bering Liisberg 2006: 26-27) The difference to be made is based on criteria whether the decisions are political choices that include rules on essential elements (legislative acts) or the decisions are adopted to develop the already existing policy choices (executive acts) (Bering Liisberg 2006: 27).

Even though the Constitution for Europe was not adopted and Lisbon Treaty did not incorporate all of its solutions, the division between legislative and non-legislative acts remained (11177/1/07 REV 1, ANNEX I). Article 289 TFEU states that “legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts.” By implication, acts adopted in non-legislative procedure shall constitute non-legislative acts. Therefore, it is obvious that the main and only criterion that the Lisbon Treaty uses to classify legal acts is based on procedure in which the act is adopted. Therefore, its content and qualitative characteristic does not matter when deciding about its typology. The procedure in which the act is adopted reflects the function of the institution that participates in its adoption – whether that institution acts in the capacity of legislator or executive body. Therefore, claims of Slovakia and Hungary about the nature of the contested Decision cannot be upheld since they are based on the inside-out line of argumentation. These two states firstly decide upon the type of the act, and then conclude in which procedure and according to which legal basis the act was to be adopted. This line of reasoning is directly opposed to the division of legal acts in the EU.

However, these claims indicate something else; they express concern about the decisions of treaty makers in assigning relevant decision making procedures in different areas. This issue can be summarized as follows: What criteria guided the treaty makers when they were deciding about the decision making procedures for the adoption of legal acts? According to the drafting history it is safe to presume that the relevant criterion was a preliminary clear-cut separation of powers between the EU institutions. “The Treaty rather employs a competence-based definition: a legislative act is a binding legal act based on a Treaty provision that is explicitly tagged as providing a legislative competence” (Bast 2012: 893). But some authors claim that the Lisbon Treaty concept of legislation “may also be called a voluntaristic concept reflecting the will

of the Treaty drafters” and they ask “how enlightened was that collective will?” (Bast 2012: 894) The main question that arises is whether the aforementioned presumptions about the capacity in which EU institutions act are correct. Therefore, authors usually point out that it is not clear whether the exclusion of Competition and Common Foreign and Security Policy from the ambit of areas in which the legislative acts are adopted was a justified decision (Bering Liisberg 2006: 27-32; Bast 2012: 896-897).

Also, it is not certain how the difference between Council’s legislative and executive powers is reflected in the procedure by which it adopts legal acts, since it is actually the same procedure, only named slightly different. (Dogan 2008: 647-648) As put by some authors: “The distinction [between the procedures] lies mainly in wording rather than any material dissimilarity between the procedures” (Curtin and Manucharayan 2015: 120). Namely, special legislative procedure (in which legislative acts are adopted) according to the Lisbon treaty can be in one of the following forms: Council consults EP and Council asks for the consent of the EP.¹⁶ Procedure by which Council is acting in the non-legislative procedure is again the consultation or consent of the EP. Because of this fact there are some authors who believe that in every case where the Council is acting with any involvement of the EP that should represent a legislative procedure with legislative acts stemming from it. However, this is not accepted view. According to the practice, the dividing line between the procedure in which the legislative and non-legislative acts are adopted is semantic one – when the Treaty explicitly refers to legislation procedure, the legislative acts are to be adopted; when the same procedure is followed but not marked as legislative, non-legislative acts are to be adopted. This solution is underpinned by the wording of Article 289 (2) TFEU which states that the special legislative procedure is to be used in the “specific cases provided for by the Treaties.” The Article 78 (3) based on which the contested Decision is adopted is a good example of this case. Even though the Council acts on the proposal of the Commission and after the consulting EP, the term “legislative” is not mentioned nowhere in the article, therefore, it is yet another confirmation that the Decision in question is non-legislative act.

16 It is also possible that EP adopts a legal act after obtaining the consent of the Council, but this case is not relevant in the context of this analysis.

Conclusion

Even though it can be questioned whether the EU is actually facing a crisis (Gilbert 2015: 531-535), as well as whether it would be more appropriate to call this crisis a refugee crisis, rather than a migrant one, it is inevitable to conclude that this situation required an adequate Union response.¹⁷ This article analyzed whether the part of that response was truly satisfactory, from the point of view of relevant legal requirements. Actions brought before the CJEU by Slovakia and Hungary are taken as a starting point for the analysis. After the analysis of the selected claims from Slovakia's and Hungary's action for annulment it can be concluded that the judgment of CJEU in these cases will be of great importance, both for the future development of the Common European Asylum System and for validity of future stance in this area by these two states. However, it does not seem likely that the judgment will present any new and groundbreaking conclusions.

CJEU already had a chance to address the issue of difference between legislative and non-legislative acts. In the *Inuit* case CJEU implicitly tackled this issue when deciding on the correct interpretation of the notion "regulatory act" from the Article 263 (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this case the question was whether only non-legislative act can be regulatory act or can legislative acts also be a regulatory act. CJEU only implicitly addressed the issue of the criteria based on which the distinction between legislative and non-legislative act is to be made, (ECLI:EU:T:2011:419, para 65) and it was Advocate-General Kokott in her Opinion to explicitly conclude that "distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts now has mainly procedural significance..." (ECLI:EU:C:2013:21, para 42.).

As for the principle of institutional balance, the Court has considerable case-law to build upon.¹⁸ However, it will be important to see how deep the Court will go into the analysis and which aspects of the possible breach of the principle of institutional balance will it include in its analysis.

However, it is important to notice that the claims of Slovakia and Hungary bring under spotlight issues that until now were mostly un-

¹⁷ For the overall assessment of the EU response to crisis see: Den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer 2016: 607-642.

¹⁸ For the relevant case law see: Jacqué, 2004: 384-387.

disputed. These actions question some basic concepts of the EU legal system, such as institutional balance and the typology of acts. Especially important will be the Court's ruling on the typology of legal acts, since this is a question that the CJEU did not tackle before and that is left to the diverging opinions in doctrine. For example, there are authors who claim that from the perspective of democratic legitimacy an act adopted by Council with mere consultation of the Parliament cannot be considered truly legislative¹⁹ (Curtin and Manucharyan 2015: 110, 122). Implicit claim of the Hungary is that exceptions to the legislative act can only be made by the act of the same nature. This question further opens the debate about the hierarchy of acts in the European Union. On the other side, the questions about the proper typology of acts are intertwined with the issue of institutional balance and some would say the separation of powers in the EU. A proper procedure for the adoption of proper legal acts needs to be undertaken by the proper institutions. But which one is a starting point for the assessment of the adequacy of the adopted measures? It seems that the answer is pretty straightforward, having in mind the state of law as it is now in the Union – procedure as envisaged in the Treaties is a benchmark. However, we need to wait for the CJEU to give its final ruling on the matter in accordance with his role to “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed” (Article 19 TEU).

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Parliamentary control of public administration integrity: Post-industrial polyarchies and Serbia²

Abstract

The paper examines the extent to which parliaments are capable of an effective monitoring the ethical dimension of public administration performance, and to encourage indirectly strict compliance with ethical standards. The author analyses the competences, powers and practices of parliaments with the aim to examine to what extent the legislative branch is an effective external control mechanism of the public servants' performance when it comes to the issue of ethics management. In addition, the author identifies the structural weaknesses of the parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms. The scope of the analysis is limited to a selected sample of post-industrial polyarchies with the parliamentary system of government, and Serbia as a sample of post-communist country in the process of setting up the ethical standards and practices in its public sector in the last decade. The research findings show that, in the period 2001–2015, the National Assembly has not used to the full extent its scrutiny powers to examine responsibility of cabinet ministers and public managers regarding the issue of improving the quality of ethics management in public administration. The author concludes that the effectiveness of scrutiny powers of the Serbian parliament has been oftentimes hampered by the political will to maintain fragile coalition governments at all costs, which means that the parliamentary majorities have had no real interest in a consistent oversight of (un)

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ethical performance of the executive.

Key words: parliamentary oversight, public administration integrity, democratic control, accountability, post-industrial poliarchies, Serbia.

Parliamentary Oversight over the Public Administration Integrity

The impact of the contemporary state and its public management on the growing complexity of social relations is pervasive in the early 21st century. Diverse aspects of human life—birth, child-care, education, work, retirement, and the moment of death—are regulated and supervised by the plethora of public institutions and their bureaucratic procedures (Lane 2009: 2–3). Since the delivery of public goods and services is at the core of public management, the citizens' perception of the success of public policies is rather based on the performance level of bureaucrats they face every day than on the quality of legislation. German historian Barthold Niebuhr noticed in the 19th century that freedom is much more dependent on the administration than on the constitution (Wilson 2007: 22–23). In other words, how citizens live and enjoy fundamental freedoms and rights is to a greater extent determined by the effectiveness of administrative mechanisms and procedures—i.e. by the outcome of policy implementation—than by sheer existence of the constitutional guarantees and laws. It is thus vital for public servants to perform entrusted public duties in the morally right way as to provide that the adopted regulations and policies are properly transferred into effective actions responsive to the needs of a society. Yet, delegation of executive powers is always inherently risky and it needs to be coupled with mechanisms of accountability, by which those with public responsibilities can be checked and controlled, and if necessary removed—if their behaviour or performance is unsatisfactory (Müller *et al.* 2006: 4).

The success of the implementation of public policies might be measured by the progress made in achieving particular policy goals which are aggregated in the public interest as a whole. The hierarchical model of democratic political system seems to provide a sound theoretical framework for the external scrutiny of elected government and to hold it accountable for the outcome of the implemented public policies (Drejmanis 2008: 155–207). Accountability is one of the tenets of democratic governance, both as a normative concept and as mechanism of control that is working on a daily basis within political system. Despite being a

much debated and contested notion, accountability can be understood as an obligation to explain and justify the ways of fulfilling specific responsibilities and the achieved results on the basis of the established relationship with a body of authority (Thomas 1998: 348–350; Muncey 2004: 2–3; Bovens 2007; Brandsma and Schillemans 2013: 954–957). In the wake of the etymological meaning of the term *accountability*, external scrutiny can be seen literally as reporting either on the decision making or on taking an action (Gregory 2009: 68). Thomas holds that an accountability relationship includes four components: 1) the assignment of responsibilities to perform a task; 2) an obligation to answer questions about how the task is being performed; 3) surveillance of performance to ensure compliance with directions given; and 4) possible sanctions for non-performance and rewards for successful performance (1998: 352).

The concept of democratic accountability includes the idea that the legislature embodied by parliament should oversee the functioning of the executive (besides the judiciary). Hence, parliaments are usually seen as a primary accountability mechanism where prime minister and cabinet ministers are questioned on their actions, their policies are debated, and in particular, their management of the implementation of public policies closely examined (Riggs 2009: 94–95). In democratic political system, relationship between the elected and appointed office holders is usually described by the principal–agent model (Peters 1999: 50–51). Principal–agent model typically focuses on two factors that are essential to democratic accountability: the extent to which the principal is informed about his agent’s behaviour and the positive or negative incentives the principal can impose on the agent (Brandsma and Schillemans 2013: 956–957; Justice & Miller 2007: 298–299). As Lupia puts it, “the ideal-typical delegation chain resembles a straight line and includes a link: that attaches voters to members of Parliament; a link that attaches members of Parliament to the government; a link that attaches the government to individual ministers; and a link that attaches ministers to civil servants” (2006: 36).

Public administration represents a “chain of delegation,” consisting of a myriad of relationships between those who delegate (the principals) and those to whom is delegated (the agents). This is why an approach to preserving and strengthening the public administration integrity should not be narrowed only to internal measures such as: a sound human resource management, the adoption and implementation of code

of ethics, the set up of internal control mechanisms, the enforcement of disciplinary policy and procedures, and the promotion of transparency. The internal measures and mechanisms are not sufficient to achieve the objectives of sound ethical behaviour; they have to be extended with the addition of an independent external control. Therefore, a well-designed integrity strategy and policy requires a system of public institutions which is to create a working environment conducive to a sound ethical decision-making on how to discharge the entrusted public duties and to perform daily assignments. The system of public institutions should implement anti-corruption measures in a coherent way as well as strengthen the compliance of public servants with ethical standards in their decision-making (OECD 2000: 66).

I hold that the notion of moral agency is substantial to how the public administration as a part of the executive is implementing government policies, because it is substantial for public trust to achieve good policy outcome in the ethically sound way. The idea of serving the common good emphasises that it is not important what is done at the end of the day, but how is it done—is it done in the morally right way (Wildavsky, 1989). The source of public administration's moral agency is its collective power to act, because all of its decisions, whether ethical or not, affect the society as a whole. Any policy goal attained in ways that override moral concerns can undermine public trust in the long run, even if the outcome benefits the majority of targeted group. A moral agent acts in a manner that expresses concern for moral values as final ends; to be a moral agent means to be capable of acting with reference to right and wrong—making ethical decisions and putting them into action (Garofalo & Geuras, 2006: 1–5). Although moral agency is in the metaphysical sense primarily attributed to human individuals, an organisation as the collective of individuals can also be the proper subject of moral responsibility attributions, and, thus, held responsible for the predictable results of its actions.³

3 I do not intend to involve myself here in the long debate over whether organisation moral responsibility attributions are legitimate or not. I assume that the ability to intend an action, the ability to carry out an intentional action, and the ability to choose an intentional action autonomously are necessary conditions for moral agency. An organisation possesses certain necessary characteristics for moral agency in a manner that is distinct from its human members. This does not mean that the organisation can perform any actions without its members, but it does mean that the organisation can be morally responsible as a unit that is considered distinct from its members.

In this analysis I will explore the competences, powers and practices of parliaments comparatively with the aim to determine to what extent the legislative branch is an effective external control mechanism of the public servants' performance when it comes to the issue of ethics management. I maintain that the success of parliamentary scrutiny of public administration's compliance to ethical standards can be indicated by the ways of how MPs use control tools available to them, such as: regular reporting of the executive, parliamentary questions, interpellations, investigations, public hearings, motion of no confidence, etc. In addition, I intend to identify the structural weaknesses of the parliamentary control mechanisms. The analysis focuses on a selected sample of post-industrial polyarchies with the parliamentary system, and Serbia as a sample of post-communist country in the process of setting up the ethical standards and practices in its public sector.

Parliamentary Scrutiny of Policy Implementation

Parliamentary oversight prerogative is aimed at scrutinising whether government follows the spirit of the constitution and adopted legislation, and whether implemented departmental policies, programmes, and action plans are in accordance with the laws and have the desired impact on society. On the other hand, parliament affects indirectly the public administration integrity by its legislative function as it shapes the normative landscape that favours the development of the good practice of compliance with high ethical standards. Whether a parliament will adopt laws and establish institutional mechanisms necessary for sound ethical climate in public administration depends largely on the political will of a parliamentary majority. Today, the international anti-corruption conventions and guidelines give an additional impetus to the legislative role of national parliaments in the case of the lack of political consensus on the creation of the working environment in public administration responsive to sound ethical decision-making.

Due to increased public awareness of the harmful effects of the deepening administrative deficit on the quality of life and exercising fundamental rights and freedoms, the national parliaments as the supreme legislative authorities in post-industrial polyarchies have increased the scrutiny over governments in the past decade hoping to balance the growing role of public administration in creation of the overwhelming

body of the secondary legislation (Peters 2009: 280). Although regulations are a necessary step towards the practical implementation of public policies goals—as they elaborate general provisions in details and thus enable their application to particular cases through administrative procedures—they can seamlessly deviate from the original goals of a public policy as adopted by the parliamentary majority. That is why, for example, the Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations of the Parliament of Canada has adopted an elaborate set of criteria for reviewing the matters of legality and the procedural aspects of regulations i.e. their compliance to the legislating power that Parliament delegated to public administration to adopt secondary legislation. Here are the criteria that are important for parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation in the context of public administration integrity:

- if for any reason infringe the rule of law;
- if trespasses unduly on rights and liberties;
- if makes the rights and liberties of the person unduly dependent on administrative discretion or is not consistent with the rules of natural justice;
- if makes some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the enabling legislation;
- if amounts to the exercise of a substantive legislative power properly the subject of direct parliamentary enactment (Marleau & Montpetit 2000).

The ministries and various organisational units of public administration are obliged by the law to submit periodic reports to the parliament (annually, semi-annually, quarterly, etc.) on the updated status of the implementation of laws, regulations, and policy programmes. These reports are to provide the basic information which constitute factual basis for numerous parliamentary committees to assess properly the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the performance of public managers and servants (Yamamoto 2007: 17–18). Parliamentarians study reports in detail throughout the year and compare the provided information and facts with the actual situation, either by obtaining information from diverse political and social actors (stakeholders) interested in monitoring sectoral policies or by the on-the-spot inspection of a policy implementation. For instance, the standing committees of the National Assembly of the Republic of France appoint one or several of its members to monitor and analyse the effects of the implementation of a particular law (Yamamoto 2007: 24).

The Riksdag (Swedish parliament) has significant powers regarding control of the implementation of departmental policies, which go beyond the typical characteristics of the concept of ministerial responsibility—understood as a cabinet minister’s ultimate responsibility for the actions of her/his ministry or department (Arter 2008). The Constitutional Committee of the Riksdag examines regularly whether the government implemented its policies in accordance with the constitution and laws, and delivers the report to parliament every spring, which serves as a basis for the annual debate on the government performance. The purpose of the annual report on the control of the government and public administration is to draw the attention of the Prime Minister and his cabinet where to reconsider the administrative procedures in order to avoid the omissions and maladministration in future. Although it has the power to undertake criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court against a member of the Government who has allegedly committed a criminal offense, the Constitutional Committee has not done so in the last few decades. Members of the Riksdag have the right to report improper conduct of ministers and senior public servants to the Constitutional Committee, which then examines the submitted reports and assesses whether there really was a violation of regulations and ethical standards (The Committee on the Constitution). In determining whether the allegations from a received report are founded, the Constitutional Committee has the right to access all documents in the possession of the executive branch—even the classified ones if necessary—and to hold a public hearing at which ministers and senior ranks of public administration appear and answer questions as a part of the inquiry. Another avenue of the Constitutional Committee’s control prerogative regarding the implementation of public policies is the analysis of the official documents of the Government Offices and around 250 government authorities—including even meeting minutes (The Committee on the Constitution).

Benton and Russell’s quantitative analysis (2013) showed that the UK government took up many select committee recommendations that had called for review of a policy or significant changes to policy—with the overall success rate of recommendations up to 50%. The seven select committees produce 50 reports of inquiries per year on average, and the most of them call for reviewing government progress, examining new government proposals or responding to perceived government failures (Benton & Russell 2013: 778). The real impact of oversight committees is in exposing the government’s decision-making to rigorous tests and

in encouraging more careful consideration of policy options by posing a threat of future evidence sessions and inquiries.

Parliamentary Inquiry, Public Hearing and Questions

The most important legislators' powers in scrutinising the discretion of public administrators performance is examining the cases of serious breaches of ethical standards, in which violation or arbitrary interpretation and implementation of the constitutional provisions and laws might drastically jeopardize fundamental human and civil rights. This form of parliamentary scrutiny takes place in a range of simple questions to ask ministers during the regular session, through holding public hearings of responsible high-rank public servants, to launch extensive investigations by establishing special *ad hoc* parliamentary committees, or by appointing a special parliamentary investigator (Thomas 1998: 360–365; Peters 2009: 282). The televised public hearings of senior public servants before parliamentary committees have got more attention of the public in recent decades, and almost instant spread of information that marks the digital age will likely to prevent breaching the ethical standards in public service to some extent.

In some parliamentary systems, ministers are subjected to regular questioning—either for oral or written answers—about the implementation of departmental policies or the performance (results) of particular organisational units of the public administration for which they are responsible. For example, the Common House of the UK Parliament regularly cross-examines the Prime Minister once a week, and the members of his cabinet once a month (Parliamentary Questions 2013). Cabinet ministers are under a duty to give accurate and truthful information to Parliament supported by the facts, and to justify reasonably the decisions made or actions undertaken at any level of the administrative hierarchy under their responsibility. In Sweden, ministers have to publicly answer for their (in)actions on open committee hearings (Examine the work of the Government 2016). Even though ministers are not required to attend the Committee hearings or respond to particular questions, it has become the convention to do so; yet, they appear rarely as witnesses at public hearings of the other committees (Arter 2008: 142).

Rozenberg and Martin (2011) cast doubt on the role of parliamentary questions as an effective oversight tool. They argue that MPs use questions primarily to bring an issue to attention of ministers, col-

leagues, and the public, with having no naïve expectation that they will be provided with full and sincere answers by ministers and senior public servants. On the contrary, Pond (2008) suggests that parliamentary questions may reinforce the public's confidence in the integrity of the selection for high-profile administrators, which is in the long run substantial for maintaining or seeking sound public administration integrity. Pond analysed how the Ontario Legislature's Standing Committee on Government Agencies (Canada) uses its prerogative to question partisan appointees to public agencies at the provincial level to determine whether they are qualified for their positions. While the ruling party retains the discretion to make partisan appointments, it also does not hesitate to withdraw candidates exposed as inadequate which means that this practice at least encourage the government to meet a higher standard in performing public duties (Pond 2008: 69). Matthews and Flinders (2015) examined the role of the House of Commons and its select committees in scrutinising and controlling executive patronage i.e. a growing portfolio of ministerial appointments. Although the overwhelming majority of hearings supported the government's candidate, Matthews and Flinders conclude that select committees have become *de facto* veto players due to the impact a negative report would have on the credibility of the appointee and the appointing minister.

The practice of parliamentary questions as a tool for indirect monitoring the activities of public administrators is by no means a mere political ritual, and this is evidenced by the rules of procedure of the German Bundestag and of the Eduskunta (Finnish Parliament). In both cases, the rules of procedures stipulate that the questioning procedure may be concluded by holding the vote confidence in credibility of the answers given by minister (Parliament's rules of procedure 2000: 8). In all parliaments, the part of regular session dedicated to questioning the members of the government orally always gets the greatest attention of the media, and is usually broadcasted live on radio and television stations.

The written parliamentarians' questions addressed to the government are perhaps the most common and effective tool of parliamentary scrutiny. They are mostly aimed at providing a detailed explanation of an issue of public concern under the responsibility of the executive branch, which would be impractical to give in an oral answer or may include answers of several ministers. Ministers are required to respond within the prescribed time limit, which in various post-industrial pol-

yarchies ranges from seven to 60 days, although in practice it often happens that the response is delayed. For instance, ministries in the UK government are allowed to submit only a preliminary response within the statutory deadline of seven days, and later they can send the final version. Interpellations are especially important written parliamentary questions concerning to the requirements for more detailed information or further clarification of a segment of departmental policy, or a decision made or an action taken by an organisational unit of the public administration (Yamamoto 2007: 59–60). After the answer provided by a minister or the government as a whole, the debate can be followed by voting confidence in the minister or the entire government (censure motion); Otherwise, parliament can only hold a position on the received answer without calling to account the government. In the United Kingdom, the opposition can table the interpellation procedure during the regular session in order to express a lack of confidence in how the government as a whole or some of its cabinet ministers perform their tasks. In the case of a motion of no confidence, which is a statement that a person in a position of responsibility is no longer deemed fit to hold that position, the government is obliged to call new elections, or replace the responsible minister.

When it comes to the importance of regular and special reports on the activities of ministries and various parts of the public administration as useful tools of exercising the democratic control over their performance, parliamentary committees in addition may hold public hearings to get more detailed explanations of the information referred to in the reports or information about issues that are omitted in the reports or are inadequately dealt with. Using meeting to share information directly between a minister and the parliamentary committee provides a clearer insight into the implementation of the questioned segments of a departmental policy. The presence of either the minister or his representative at the hearing before a parliamentary committee reaffirms the constitutional responsibilities of the executive branch to be held accountable to the legislative branch. An interview with the minister can take place in an informal setting, which is sometimes labelled as “consultations”—a feature in the practice of the Dutch and Danish Parliament. Consultations may be related to the consideration of the status of a departmental policy implementation in general or can be focused on discussing specific topic—for example, a ministry document. While the consultation in the Netherlands are commonly organised without official minutes, in Denmark there is a possibility of make an audio recording at the request

of at least three members of the parliamentary committee (Rules of Procedure 1994: 7–8, 10–11; Standing Orders of the Danish Parliament 2012: 15–16). In the Netherlands, parliamentarians can hold consultations with public servants as well, but with the prior authorisation of the responsible minister.

Parliamentary committees may hold either a public hearing or informal consultations with selected independent experts and interested stakeholders with the aim to collect and delve into diverse opinions on an issue that has been already opened before the committee, and on which the relevant minister or any other public servant has given her/his statement (Yamamoto 2007: 31–32). While independent expertise can be vital due to the role of specialised professional knowledge, skills and experience in assessing the problem, the views of stakeholders affected by the problem under study provide parliamentarians the perspective of the users of public policies and programmes, since they represent a part of the population which is directly affected by the public administration performance.

The British House of Commons introduced the practice of setting up semi-standing committees composed of MPs from all parties represented in the Parliament, often led by an opposition MP (a shadow minister), with a mandate to investigate a particularly decisive area of Cabinet ministers' work or any controversial decision (Budge 2002: 33). This type of committee has the power to ask ministers and civil servants to testify. However, the real power of semi-standing parliamentary committees in investigating serious breaches of ethical standards is constrained for three reasons related to the number of seats secured by the ruling and opposition MPs respectively. Firstly, relative parity in number between the ruling and opposition MPs in a committee means that a burning issue is not likely to be tabled and become the matter of concern of a parliamentary inquiry, because oftentimes there is a deep gap in views about such issues between the opposing sides. In an effort to avoid the possible slowdown and even an obstruction, the committee chair deliberately selects the policy issues that are not substantial for the government of the day and interests of the ruling party (or coalition). Such a selective approach in setting the agenda seems to water down the role of parliamentary scrutiny in the long run. Secondly, a consensus between the ruling party (coalition) and the opposition is needed when it comes to producing the final report with conclusions on the conducted inquiry, which *per se* removes from the report any legitimate criticism

of the government or its policies whatsoever. Thirdly, the success of a parliamentary inquiry heavily depends on the willingness of public servants to testify about classified information, which often plays the role of key evidence for determining whether there is a violation of ethical rules. For example, British public servants are well known for their loyalty to the government of the day, and their professional behaviour is shaped by the administrative culture based on a pragmatic motto that one should be economical with the truth.

Conducting investigations initiated by the submitted petitions of citizens—as a bottom-up form of political participation—is another powerful mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny of how the public administration implement government policies and programmes (Escher & Riehm 2016). For instance, the Committee on Petitions of German Bundestag (*Deutscher Bundestag Petitionsausschuss*) receives complaints about the performance of public administration, and it has jurisdiction similar to ombudsperson in other post-industrial polyarchies. Complaint may be submitted in writing on the behalf of oneself, a third party or in the public interest, it may be submitted collectively and publicly, and it has to include a complaint about (in)action of public authorities or a proposal to amend law (Principles 2012: 12). The Committee on Petitions has the right to hear the petitioner, witnesses and experts, and to conduct an investigation based on access to documents and official premises of the organisational unit of the public administration on whose work the complaint refers to (Act 2012: 7). The Committee may propose to the petitioner to give up her/his complaint if there is a reasonable assumption that the procedure will not be completed successfully. The procedure ends with drafting a report that includes a recommendations for resolution of the petition and with forwarding the report to the Bundestag for adoption, which might be preceded with a debate but only if it is requested by at least one parliamentary group or five per cent of the total number of MPs (Provisions 2012: 10).

All parliamentary investigation committees share several common characteristics: 1) They can be established by a decision of the plenary session of Parliament; 2) They are temporary, which means they cease to exist after the investigation is concluded and the report is adopted by parliament; 3) They have a special investigative powers that are greater than those of the standing committees, but which can be applied only within the narrow limits of the assigned jurisdiction (Yamamoto 2007: 39–40). For example, an *ad hoc* committee of the Bundestag has provi-

sional prerogative to collect evidence under the rules of criminal procedure, while the courts and the law enforcement agencies are obliged to provide legal and logistical assistance to the committee.

Although parliamentary investigations in the United States are part of the eternal struggle for institutional power defined by the system of checks and balances, two basic tactics commonly used by the US congressmen when engaging in oversight of the executive branch might be useful for our analysis (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984). The first is “police patrol” oversight tactic which focuses on an active search for flaws in the work of public managers and servants that might fall into some of various categories of criminal activity. In contrast, “fire alarm” oversight tactic shifts control over bureaucracy on civil society organisations and interest groups, which spot violation of ethical standards and then address the competent congressional committee. Since the former monitoring tactic requires more time and resources, it is likely that far more congressmen use the latter tactic.

In some post-industrial polyarchies, there is a tradition of addressing a member of parliament from local constituency with the request for help in solving a problem that one has with the public administration, but in an informal fashion, without pursuing any official investigation. In France and Belgium, the possibility of performing more than one public duty simultaneously enables MPs elected for national parliaments to withhold the position that she/he has in the local government; it thus opens an avenue for solving the complaints of citizens by putting pressure on local public administrators. In Ireland, voters traditionally expected MPs to use their influence and reputation to help them in solving their major problems they face in communication with public servants.

The Case of Serbia

The role of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in overseeing the performance of the public administration is indirect, as well as in other parliamentary systems in post-industrial polyarchies, which means that it takes place primarily through the scrutiny of the government as the core institution of the executive branch. In controlling the work of either the government or any of cabinet ministers, the National Assembly uses tools such as examination of the government’s annual

reports, posing MPs' questions, submitting interpellation requests, the set up of an inquiry committee, and motion of a no confidence in either the government as a whole or any of its cabinet ministers (The Law of the National Assembly 2010: Art. 56). Serbian parliament via its standing committees monitors the implementation of government policy, the execution of laws and other acts, and considers work plans and reports of competent ministries and other public authorities, organisations and bodies (Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly 2014: Art. 44).

The review of the National Assembly's opinions on the reports of various public institutions and bodies, adopted in the period 2001–2014, shows that the parliamentary committees in the largest numbers of cases had no recommendations for the government with a view to improving the integrity of public administration performance. The only recommendations that tackle the creation of ethical climate in the public sector were made, at least in broad manner and indirectly, in support of the conclusions drawn in annual reports of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, Ombudsman, and Anti-Corruption Agency (National Assembly 2016). More worrying is the lack of Assembly's recommendation after the government report on massive floods that hit Serbia in 2014. The report omitted to deal with the issue of responsibility of public authorities for failing grossly to help victims and thus ignored a considerable body of on-the-ground evidence of dysfunctional performance of the emergency system actors on all governance levels.

Post-industrial polyarchies alike, regular reporting by the government and other public institutions and organisations within the executive branch is a traditional form of parliamentary scrutiny in Serbia. The government submits a report to the Serbian parliament at least once a year or on the request of the National Assembly itself, if there is the proposal of the Committee to examine the work of the government. The government reports on its work, in particular on implementation of departmental policies, execution of laws and other acts, implementation of development and spatial plans, and execution of the budget (Ibid: Art. 228). The Serbian parliament may decide, acting on a proposal of a committee which considered the government report, that the report also be considered at a sitting. Every minister shall inform the competent committee of the National Assembly on the work of her/his ministry four times a year. At committee sittings, questions related to the information submitted by the Minister may be posed to the minister by members of the competent committee (Ibid: Art. 229). The committee

shall submit a report to the National Assembly on its conclusions relating to the information submitted. The public institutions, organisations, and bodies of the executive branch also regularly submit reports to the parliament, and a relevant committee may request additional information from their jurisdictions. The committee may call on the competent representative of a public institution, organisation, and body whose report is under consideration, after which the committee shall report to the National Assembly with a proposal for the conclusion and recommendations. The committee may propose to the National Assembly to: 1) accept the report, if it considers the report formally and substantially complete, and if the monitored (in)action was in accordance with the law; 2) oblige the government and other state bodies to undertake appropriate measures or activities within their jurisdiction; and 3) to request additional information to the report (Ibid: Art. 237–241).

Parliamentary committees can hold public hearings to obtain information or expert opinions for the sake of an effective monitoring of the implementation of laws and other acts (Ibid: Art. 83). However, none of public hearings have been conducted so far on the issue of systemic misconduct in any part of the public administration or the control of its (in)actions in terms of protection of the public interest.

The National Assembly may establish *ad hoc* inquiry committee with task to assess the situation in a departmental policy, and to determine the important facts on some events or aspects of policy or programme implementation. Although it is not entitled to perform investigative actions, the inquiry committee has the right to access any data, information, and documents held by public institutions and organisations, and to take statements from individuals; the officials of public institutions and organisations are obliged to provide truthful statements, data, information, and documents (Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly 2014: Art. 68). Inquiry Committee over the past decade is rarely used as a tool of control work and determining the responsibilities of the executive power for bad outcomes of public policies. The Serbian Radical Party submitted in 2004 a proposal for set up of a committee of inquiry with the aim to investigate whether the government and other responsible public bodies acted unlawfully in the privatisation procedure of Knjaz Miloš Company. In March 2005, after two months of work, the committee failed to adopt draft report on the issue, and this case has remained unsolved to this day (Aktivnosti 2005). In April 2014, a gross and systemic misuse of budget funds was established by a committee of inquiry after scrutinising the performance of ministries and other

public institutions and bodies responsible for implementation of the government policy in Kosovo and Metohija in the period 2000–2012. The committee recommended the government to initiate an exhaustive criminal investigation and a comprehensive audit of the unsound performance of the police, judiciary and public health centres in the southern province based on the evidence collected before the committee. The mandate of the then government had ended soon promptly followed by election campaign, and the recommendations gradually fell into oblivion. The next government has never acted on the recommendations with no criminal investigation has instigated so far.

The public was most interested in the work of the committee of inquiry established in July 2005 following the requests made to the Assembly by several hundreds of parents who complained they were unable to find information on their newborn children and voiced their concern their children might have been stolen from maternity hospitals across the country for the last four decades. During its inquiry, the Committee heard the parents' representatives and 38 officials from various parts of public administration were interviewed (health institutions, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, local self-government managing bodies, public enterprises, social security institutions, public prosecution offices and courts). On the basis of the Inquiry Committee Report (2006), the National Assembly launched an initiative to amend the legislation regulating the collection and use of medical records. When it comes to the integrity control, the Inquiry Committee concluded that health institutions, Registry Offices and responsible ministries had made serious omissions that justifiably caused the parents to doubt the truthfulness of the facts of their children's death after birth or stillbirth as they were presented to them. The Inquiry Committee proposed the set up of a specialised police unit mandated to investigate in detail all cases where parents have raised suspicion about possible disappearance of their children from birth clinics; regular inspection of keeping medical documentation; and scrutiny of the work of Registry Offices on a regular basis.

Another tool of the control of public administration is parliamentary questions to prime minister or cabinet ministers. The questions can be posed once a month, either orally during an ongoing session or in writing between two sessions (Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly 2014: Art. 204–216). The minister or the Prime Minister may respond the oral questions immediately or in writing—if it is not pos-

sible to make an instant response due to complexity of the issue tackled by the question. MP has the right to comment back on the given answer or to ask a supplementary question, and upon hearing the reply to the supplementary question, the MP declares her/his opinion on the reply received. Parliamentary questions are the most common tool of overseeing the executive, and MPs often use the largest part of acquired information in daily work of the standing committees. Yet, in Serbia only one tenth of questions posed in the period 2009–2015 included, either directly or indirectly, issues pertaining integrity of public administration. MPs touched upon: the government's responsibility for the unsuccessful privatisation of state companies and for granting public infrastructure projects without using a public procurement procedure; the ubiquitous problem of politicisation of managerial positions in the public sector and partisan recruitment in public administration; the performance of public agencies, particularly Privatisation Agency (ceased to exist in January 2016); individual cases of unethical performance of the Ministry for environment, the police, public health services, and natural disaster emergency response system; the slowdown in the national anti-corruption policy implementation. A survey on parliamentary scrutiny in Serbia, created by "Open Parliament" coalition of NGOs in 2014, shows that almost two-thirds of MPs have used this control tool but only a half of them have been satisfied with the responses (Otvoreni parlament 2014: 15–21). The results of the survey suggest that parliamentary questions are considered primarily as a tool for giving directions to the government and for collecting of information, rather than to scrutinise the performance of the executive (ibid: 20).

At least 50 MPs may submit an interpellation as a formal question that usually covers issue of general political significance in the area of responsibility of the Government or a cabinet minister (Ibid: Art. 220–227). Interpellation is submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly in writing, and has to provide a clear and concise question with a rationale why it demands to be considered. The Government or the government minister submits to the Speaker of the National Assembly response to the interpellation no later than 30 days from the date of receipt of interpellation. If the Serbian parliament votes not to accept the reply to the interpellation, then it proceeds with the vote of no confidence in the Government or a cabinet minister—unless they previously resign. This control tool has been used rarely: only three times in analysed period, but only once with a view to the integrity issue. In 2011,

the Serbian Radical Party submitted an interpellation claiming that the then minister of religion and Diaspora had embezzled budget funds appropriated for financing projects of cooperation between the Diaspora and the homeland during 2010 (Šesta posebna sednica 2011). In its response, the government rejected the allegations, and the parliamentary majority gave support to the work of the cabinet minister rejecting the opposition's demand for a vote of no confidence.

The power to table a motion of no confidence in the Government or a cabinet minister is an important supervisory tool in the hands of MPs. At least 60 MPs may submit a proposal for a vote of no confidence stating the reasons for tabling it (Ibid: Art. 217–219). The Serbian parliament debates in plenary a proposal for a vote of no confidence at the first subsequent sitting or no earlier than five days after the date of the submittal of the motion. Immediately on the conclusion of the debate on the issue of no confidence, the motion shall be put to vote. If the Serbian parliament passes a vote of confidence, the signatories of the motion may not table a new motion of no confidence before the expiry of a period of 180 days from the date of the vote on the motion. In the opposite case, the Speaker of the Serbian parliament immediately notifies the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. In practice, this control prerogative has been used only twice since 2001, when the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party in separate occasions tried unsuccessfully to table a motion of no confidence in the government and some of cabinet minister in 2005.

Obstacles to an Effective Parliamentary Oversight of Public Administration Ethical Performance

The effectiveness of constitutional and legal tools available to national parliaments seems to suffer from a number of limitations when it comes to monitoring the performance of public administration, particularly in the context of compliance with ethical standards. The limitations primarily stem from the very constitutional design of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches.

In Westminster systems, parliament can be considered rather as a political framework within which government operates than as its independent supervisor or an external counterweight to government's constitutional and real institutional power (Budge 2002: 31–32). The ma-

majority electoral system supported by a strict party discipline and loyalty of MPs to the party leadership—which usually holds top positions in a government—in practice makes it less likely, or even almost impossible, that the parliamentary majority demands the dismissal of a responsible minister or votes no confidence in the government as a whole for some gross morally wrong (in)action or chronic maladministration. The opposition can hardly imagine getting the majority of votes for any parliamentary decision against the government policy, since it cannot count on the cooperation even with individual MPs from the ruling majority due to strict party discipline. The weakness of the opposition is rooted in the fact that it acts as a “government in waiting room” focused on the sharp criticism of the ongoing government policy solely motivated by the desire to win public support for the upcoming elections, rather than to provide constructive proposals for the change in the actual policy aimed at improving ethical decision making in the public administration. In the circumstances where the voting for the government’s policy proposals goes “automatically”, the parliamentary debate has been reduced to a mere ritual for exercising influence on the public to opt for government policies, instead of being an useful deliberation that does serve as a mechanism for negotiating the best policy proposal possible (Budge 2002: 32).

Strøm maintains that in a Westminster parliamentary system *ex post* oversight tends to be weak and ineffectual because the effectiveness of *ex post* electoral accountability is hindered by the lack of institutional mechanisms for credible *ex post* oversight, the capacity to determine when sanctions are appropriate, and motivation of the parliamentary majority to sanction its agents (Strøm 2006: 71–73). Constrained parliamentary oversight of the compliance of public administration with ethical standards may deteriorate rapidly in a situation when the majority of MPs has no interest in uncovering and publicising corruption practice or other serious type of abuse of public office, as well as in determining the personal responsibility of the perpetrators and the minister in charge of department in which the misconduct occurred (Lambsdorff 2006: 12–13). When single party (coalition) prevails in both branches of government the oversight may be thwarted by either intra-coalition fighting for supremacy or by an intention to cover up systemic violations of ethical standards in public administration to prevent embarrassment in public of those responsible in the government. Russo and Wiberg (2010) stress that the frequent presence of coalition governments impedes the development of effective ways to extract information from the

government departments, organisations and bodies. However, there is still a slight chance of appearance of an honourable MP from the ruling majority, who will reveal to the opposition or to the public a secret deal of the majority to obstruct the investigation of abuse.

In the last decade and more, the coalition governments in Serbia have hampered the effective use of the parliamentary oversight as a mechanism of external control over ethical behaviour in the public administration. Due to strict distribution of government departments, defined in terms of feudal fiefdoms, over which they have absolute power, the members of the coalition had no real interest in dealing with ministerial responsibility even in the cases of suspicion of gross misconduct and biased decision making harmful to the public interest. Striving to maintain the fragile inter-party coalition balance, based on the complex of intertwined particular interests, has prevented the initiation of a motion of no confidence in the government or cabinet ministers, while parliamentary questions and interpellations have had a very limited effect. It is a structural obstacle embedded in the parliamentary system that is based on the fact that the parliamentary majority elects the government, and it logically prevents any scrutiny of the public administration as part of the executive branch that could undermine the position of the very same government. In October 2016, the National Assembly's majority rejected the proposal of an opposition party to establish an inquiry committee with the aim to investigate the case of allegedly unlawful demolition of several houses in Hercegovačka Street (Belgrade) and to determine whether the Belgrade city government is responsible for the secretive coordination of this act. It also happens that the succeeding parliamentary majority loses an interest in pursuing inquiry initiated during the previous government. For example, the conclusions of the inquiry committee on embezzlement of the state budget in Kosovo and Metohija became a dead letter due to the lack of will of the parliamentary majority to implement the recommendations. Similar happened to the inquiry committee that dealt with the privatisation procedure of Knjaz Miloš Company which ended its mandate without reaching consensus on the conclusions.

Conclusion

I have examined comparatively the competences, powers and practices of parliaments in post-industrial democracies and Serbia as a transitional society with the aim to determine to what extent the legislative branch is an effective external control mechanism of the public servants' performance when it comes to the issue of ethics management. The analysed cases evidence that there is a correlation between the success of parliamentary scrutiny of public administration's compliance to ethical standards and the skills of MPs in using a variety of oversight tools available. Yet, the analysed normative framework and parliamentary oversight practices suggest there are structural weaknesses embedded in the parliamentary system of government that decrease the impact of MPs control over public administration integrity. The constitutional design and loyalty of majority MPs to the government of the day are main contributors in setting the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches in such a way so that parliamentary tools are rarely used in monitoring and investigating the unethical performance of public administration. While the opposition usually does not have enough votes to make a parliamentary decision that questions the failed government and/or minister responsibility for the serious misconduct of public administration, the majority of MPs may have no interest in uncovering and publicising corruption practice pursued by the government they support.

In the period 2001–2015, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia as one of the primary democratic accountability mechanisms in the political system have not used to the full extent its scrutiny powers to examine responsibility of cabinet ministers and public managers regarding the issue of improving the quality of ethics management in public administration. When it comes to opinions on the reports of public institutions and bodies, the analysed official documents and activities show that the National Assembly has had no recommendations for the government on the public administration integrity. The MPs stayed away from assessing the unethical performance of public officials even in the case of obviously failed management of the emergency system when massive floods hit Serbia in 2014. Public hearings have not been used so far on the issue of systemic misconduct in any part of the public administration or the control of its (in)actions in terms of protection

of the public interest. The parliamentary power to table a motion of no confidence in the government or a cabinet minister has been used only twice, while interpellation has been used only once – but both control tools with unsuccessful outcomes. Inquiry committee has been also rarely used as a tool of monitoring and determining the responsibilities of the executive power for bad outcomes of public policies over the past decade; even when it was used, this tool has not resulted in concrete decisions and actions taken by the government. Due to the lack of political will of the parliamentary majorities, inquiry committee failed to adopt a report on the case of allegedly unlawful privatisation of Knjaz Miloš Company, and in the case of systemic misuse of budget funds in Kosovo the subsequent governments have disregarded the parliament's recommendations. Only in the case of allegedly abducted babies from birth clinics the National Assembly and the government have made steps towards the implementation of the adopted recommendations. Parliamentary questions to prime minister or cabinet ministers have been used only sporadically as another tool of scrutinising the performance of the executive.

All things considered, the structural obstacles of an effective parliamentary scrutiny in Serbia, post-industrial polyarchies alike, result from the logic of parliamentary system of government itself. The obstacles provide tight room to holding to account effectively the government and its administration when they are being supported by the very same parliamentary majority. In Serbia, parliamentary scrutiny is more specific because of the political practice of treating government departments as feudal fiefdoms in reaching equilibrium for survival of the fragile coalition governments. None of coalition parties have real interest in dealing with ministerial responsibility but try to avoid the loss of a hardly reached equilibrium which chiefly benefits party leadership. The plausible avenues towards an effective parliamentary scrutiny of the public administration are, firstly, raising awareness among MPs of the substantial role that the parliament plays in good governance, and, secondly, strengthening of their integrity as top public officials.

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Media Addiction and Political Participation in Serbia

Abstract

Appearance of the Internet and its spread to 38.8% of world population from 1995 to 2013 indicate that new media bring significant changes to societies around the world. Features of new media such as interactivity and possibility to use it from anywhere anytime indicate the Internet may be highly addictive. Data point to increases in overall media use over the last 60 years. On the other hand, decreases in political participation are registered together with decline in socializing and active membership in professional organizations for the same period. Research is conducted through nationally representative survey in Serbia during 2013. All hypotheses of this study have been confirmed including main one, saying that increases in media addiction cause decreases in political participation. Those who have less confidence in future are bigger media addicts, those who fear about present and future are bigger media addicts, those who are not interested in politics are bigger media addicts, those who have less political knowledge are bigger media addicts and finally that low participants in elections are bigger media addicts. This study is limited to Serbia, while it would be useful to measure media addiction in all countries. New methodology introduced by this study should be improved. Results of further studies should be presented with 3D graphs.

Key words: political participation, media addiction, new media, democracy, the Internet

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Introduction

There may be two crucial characteristics of the Internet possibly explaining its spread to 38.8% of world population (Internet World Stats 2013). First, this is an interactive media. Contrary to television, radio and print, the Internet enables its users to use it as a platform for communication, for example by commenting news, communicating on social networks and writing e-mails.

Second crucial characteristic of the Internet may be its accessibility. Through wireless technology and various forms of hardware like mobile phones, tablets, net-books, etc., the Internet can be accessed from anywhere anytime. In addition, an attention is pointed towards possible dangers that the Internet may bring to societies around the world in terms of its addictive potential.

Increase in media use

Ownership of TV sets increased since 1975 until 2010 in the United States (Figure 1). In this period, homes with three TV sets increased from 11 to 55 percents (Nielsen 2009).




Figure 1 Television set ownership, number of sets per households (Nielsen, 2009)

Average time spent per day with major media by US adults has been increasing from 635 to 693 minutes since 2008 until 2011 (Figure 2). Increases were measured in domains of TV, the Internet and mobile use, while slight decreases were measured in the domains of radio, newspapers, magazines and other media use. These data clearly indicate increases in overall media use (eMarketer 2011).




Figure 2 Average time in minutes spend per day with major media by US adults, 2008 – 2011 (eMarketer, 2011)

Number of media devices has been increasing too. For example, 381000 iPods were sold in 2002, while in 2010 this number jumped to 52.3 million globally. Logically, user generated content has been increasing as well. There were 3 million blogs in 2004, while in 2010 there were 130 million of them (Elliot 2010).

Decrease in participation

Other data indicate decrease in direct communication as well as decrease in participative activities. There is decrease in sport activities, while watching matches on TV is more frequent than before (Putnam 2000). There is decrease in kids socializing when working on computers as opposed to coloring books (Le 2001). Also, there is a decrease in national park visits which coincides with the rise in electronic entertainment media in the United States (Pergams and Zaradic 2006). It is evident that there is decrease in person to person socializing with kids as they get older and is being replaced by social networks, cell phone usage and video chatting (NPD 2011).

Literature review

Above data indicate increase in media use and decrease in participation, among else possibly in political participation. There are many examples that addiction endangers daily lives, which is main reason why it is considered disorder. Internet addiction is correlated with offline anti-social behaviors and chemical drug use experience (Fisoun et al., 2012).

Participation in social processes may be part of personal interests of every individual in society. Reason for this is that one may not take care about his security, decide on laws of conduct and cure himself in case of illness and so on. In modern society these common functions are taken care by representatives of people or otherwise called social agents or elected politicians. Participation on the other hand is needed to elect these social agents. This participation can also be offered to society as service by individuals in their effort to become social agents.

Various studies have been examining political participation. Some of the findings are that better educated citizens are more likely to be engaged by the political process (Lake & Huckfeldt¹¹), effect of nonformal education generally appears to be stronger as it increases the likelihood that one will vote (Kuenzi 2006), engagement in different organizations may have impact to political participation (Campbell 2004) and solidarity may be one characteristic of functional citizenship that bears strong connection to political participation (Chong & Rogers 2005). To sum it up, there are various studies on how to increase political participation, but the ones that relate to media addiction lack.

Research hypothesis

Establishing relation of media addiction and political participation is goal of this study because of higher infiltration of media into people lives and appearance of new media, use of the Internet on the go, and new technology. This study examines possible dangers of new technology – media addiction and decline of political participation. If people use extensively media, they might not have time for voting or participating in activities of common interest. Political participation may be basic pillar of democracy and lack of interest toward “common interest” participative activities may be dangerous for societies.

Grounded in above written theoretical frameworks, this exploratory study seeks to expand previous research by addressing the main research hypothesis that increase in media addiction causes decrease in political participation. Further research hypotheses are that the bigger media addicts are people who have less confidence in future, who fear about present and future, who are not interested in politics, who have lower political knowledge, and who have lower participation in elections. In this research, these hypotheses are addressed by adequate research questions.

Materials and Methods

Research questions are examined through nationally representative survey conducted in Serbia during the first half of 2013. Research of media addiction was conducted by Faculty for Culture and Media. The research was done on multistage random sample of 2208 participants. This sample is representative for Serbian population older than 15 years of age. Research participants have been interviewed from January to May of 2013. Interviewers had an assignment to interview wider public as a part of their Media Analytics course. The response rate of the interviews was 70%. An average interview lasted 30min. The sample included urban areas (Beograd, Novi Sad, Nis, etc.) and rural areas. Coordinators of the course received 2505 inputs from students.

The sample is formed in three stages: first, samples are randomly chosen without replacement, from the lists of voting stations; Voting station plays the role of sample point. It is the most accurate statistical list of adults, which covers approximately one neighborhood. Voting population corresponds with the adult one (18+); There are about 10,000 voting stations in Serbia. This is a territorial unit with 709 voters on an average (standard deviation = 609). This fact shows that voting station perfectly corresponds with statistical criteria for sample point.

Statistical database of voting stations is used as a source for selecting sample points. Selection is conducted randomly, with probability of selecting that is proportional to the share of a given sample point in the total number of adult citizens. Ten respondents in each sample point are selected.

The sample was weighted for variables age and education, because in early research, it was found that age and education were the most connected with media customs and media behavior of population. The IBM SPSS Statistics 20 package was used (Nie et al., 2011).

Filtering research participants

For the first time, the model for excessive media use (addiction) progression is applied. In this model, the media addiction is measured through duration of use and seven “subjective” indicators. The duration of media use is calculated for each of four media (the Internet, television, radio, and print) to filter the research participants who do not

practice excessive and potentially addictive use. Only those research participants, 1942 (88%) of 2208, who use any of four noted media in the top 40% of duration, are put in the group of the potential media addict indicating a prolonged media use. This potential media addict sample has a margin of error of ± 2.22 percentage points.

Indicators applied to media.

The term Internet addiction was first mentioned the first time by Goldberg (Goldberg 2006). After that, Diagnostic Questionnaire for Internet Addiction was made consisting of eight questions (Young 1996). After some critiques, she expanded the original questionnaire to a 20-item Internet Addiction Test (Young, 1998). Later, another prominent measure appeared. It was a multidimensional measure of Internet addiction using social comfort, loneliness/depression, diminished impulse control and distraction as factors (Davis et al., 2002).

Having an assignment to measure addiction to all media there was a need for new media addiction questionnaire to be created. It was checked for consistency with Young's IAT. When making the research indicators, the duration of media use is considered as an objective indicator and the addiction related questions are considered subjective indicators. The paper uses 21 questions for seven subjective media addiction indicators: (a) feeling that media are not over-consumed (over consumption), (b) feeling that media use cannot be resisted (attempts to cut media use), (c) feeling that the media cannot be abandoned (attempts to abandon media use), (d) feeling that media can be substitution for problems (substitution), (e) feeling bored without media (withdrawal), (f) feeling that one cannot be in the place without media access (nonexistence), and (g) feeling that media should be continually used despite negative news (continued use). Each indicator is investigated by using three questions for each media including Internet, TV, radio and print, answered by ten-degree scale. These seven subjective indicators in total correspond with seven factors from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Fourth Edition (American Psychiatric Association 1995).

The research participants are first filtered to obtain the prolonged media users (potential media addict). Then, the potential media addicts are divided into five groups, each with different level (0, 1, 2, 3, and 4) of media addiction. Each level of media addiction corresponds to different numbers of subjective signs of media addiction that potential media addicts have (Table 1).

Table 1 Numbers of PMA with different levels of excessive media use

Media addiction Level	Nr. of subjective signs of PMA	Nr. of PMA	% of PMA	Margin of error for 95% confidence
0	0	441	22.7	±4.67%
1	1	611	31.5	±3.96%
2	2	464	23.9	±4.55%
3	3	258	13.3	±6.10%
4	4-6	168	8.6	±7.56%

Survey about political participation

Question about confidence in future was “How confident are you in future?” with possible answers: “I have no confidence at all”, “I have some confidence”, “I have lots of confidence” and “I have maximal confidence”.

Question about fear in present or future was “How much do you fear about present or future?” with possible answers: “I have no fears at all”, “I have some fears”, “I have lots of fears” and “I have maximal fears”.

The survey question was “How often do you speak about politics now?”. The possible answers were “Everyday”, “One time a week”, “Rarely”, or “Never”.

To access political knowledge of research participants, the participants were asked the following questions: “Who is president of Serbia?” “Who is prime minister of Serbia?” “What is the biggest political party in Serbian Parliament?” “What political parties are members of government?”

With possible answers “Yes” or “No”, questions for research participants examined if they took part in latest elections and whether they are members of political parties, associations or organizations.

Multivariate regression model has been performed. Level of media addiction is taken as dependant variable, while fear about presence and future, interest in politics, political knowledge and election participation are taken as independent variables. Multicollinearity has been checked. VIF coefficient is less than 5, which means there is no dependence between variables.

Results

This study was initiated because increasing importance of new media in societies around the world- Internet with e-mailing, messaging, social networking and browsing frequently on the go. This research would find out how digital media are affecting Serbian society, through prism of addiction to all media and in relation to political participation as basic pillar of democracy.

There are various elements of political participation examined by research within this study. First, two research results are presented, those relating to confidence and fear about present and future. Second, research results relating more to political participation are presented including political knowledge, political interest and participation in elections.

Confidence about future and fear about present and future

The relations between confidence and fear on one side and media addiction on another side are investigated. Research participants that answered that had no confidence at all in their future scored higher degree of media addiction, while people who answered that they had some confidence scored lower media addiction level (Figure 3). On the other hand those who answered to have lots of confidence in their future scored even lower in terms of media addiction. Finally, those who answered that they had maximal confidence showed lowest levels of media addiction. These results clearly indicate that as media addiction increases, confidence in future decreases.

From Figure 4, it can be seen that people that fear about their present and future more are bigger media addicts. These results indicate that fear may be paralyzing factor that has to do something with media addiction. Those research participants that answered to have no fears at all scored lowest levels of media addiction of 2,5. Finally, Those who have maximal fears scored highest levels of media addiction of 4,8.




Figure 3 Comparison between averages of media addiction of research participants and their answers on question about confidence in future (95% confidence interval)




Figure 4 Comparison between averages of media addiction of research participants and their answers on question about fear about present or future (95% confidence interval)

These results about relation between media addiction and fear about present and future on one side and confidence in future on one side indicate that fear and lack of confidence may be paralyzing factors in terms of political participation.

Media content may provoke decrease in confidence and increase in fears with their users, because of nature of media contents. Fear provoking news in today's media may be plentiful in homicide, suicide, deaths while neglecting what may be called positive side of social reality, as most of research participants answered in survey of this study. On the other hand, numerous advertisements and commercials in today's media may pressure people to seek ideal superficial goals.

People who have lack of confidence and increased fears may not be able to deal with common interest and therefore participate in political processes.

Interest in politics

The political participation is examined in terms of interest towards politics. This relates to talks about political matters with other people. If person speaks about politics it means interest in politics exists. Talking about politics with people derives political opinions as basis for actions.

Speaking about politics every day, rarely and one time a week does not make significant difference when media addiction is in question (Figure 5). Although level of addiction is similar, this percentage may include those who are addicted to politics as well as non-addicts. The people may take care of their own personal and business priorities and then after that may look at common interest. On the other side, person that never speaks about politics may more possible be addict than that who speak about politics sometimes. Level of average addiction is higher than 3.5 for persons that never speak about politics.




Figure 5 Comparison between media addiction averages of research participants and their answers on question about how often they speak about politics (95% confidence interval)

To conclude, research result suggests that less interest in politics means more media addiction. This is logical, as people who use media extensively lack time for political talks. Except time, media addicts may also lack interest in politics.

Political knowledge

Another aspect of political participation is political knowledge. This question relates to knowing factual information about politics. The more people know about politics the more they are interested in political issues.

Similarly as with interest in politics this research inquiry showed reverse relation between media addiction and political knowledge. The more people know about politics, the less addicted to media they are (Figure 6). This may be logical, as addicted persons lack time to think and learn about politics. Knowing that area of common interest including various political decisions affects everyday lives of citizens in societies, it is clear how much engagement in this field is important for individuals, society and functioning democracy.




Figure 6 Survey points for research participants with different media addiction levels for their answers on question about their political knowledge- for parameters of shown OLS regression see Table 2

Table 2 Parameters of the model of the OLS regression that shows the variable (y) as a function of different levels (x) of media addiction

Fig.	Variable y	a'	b	R ²
6	Survey points (political knowledge)	-0.394	6.194	0.854
7	Survey points (political participation)	-0.567	5.781	0.8717

Election participation

Results of research inquiry show that as political participation increases by voting, media addiction decreases (Figure 7). The participating in elections is less present in case of media addiction, because simply there may not be interest and time to participate. Caring for common interest would be more present if person in question has stable income and stable family. If one is happy with his or her personal and professional life, there are necessary conditions for taking care of common interest. If fact, common interest may be largely important because as it affects both personal and professional life, but most people may not see it that way. In some cases when people have desire to change repressive ruling structures they may perceive this as priority. Not only addicts neglect common interest, because many non-addicts may want to take care and fix their personal and professional life first before dealing with common Interest, but this research results suggest media addicts are noticeable in neglecting political participation as opposed to non-addicts.




Figure 7 Survey points for research participants with different media addiction levels for their answers on question about their voting -- for parameters of shown OLS regression see Table 2

Discussion

Three aspects of political participation have been examined in relation to media addiction: interest, knowledge and voting. All three aspects of political participation have shown same relation towards media addiction. First, as interest in politics decreases, media addiction increases. Second, as political knowledge decreases, media addiction increases. Third, as election participation decreases, media addiction increases. As all aspects of political participation show the same in relation to media addiction, it is possible to presume that media addiction is in inverse relation to political participation. Explanation includes lack of time with media addicts, so that they cannot dedicate themselves to common interest to some extent. Media addicts may also see common interest as not important or they may feel they cannot deal with it because they want to solve issues from personal and professional life first. Relating other research results it is noted that media addicts feel less confidence in present, future and themselves in terms of impacting political changes.

Research results confirmed all hypotheses including the main one. Indications that increases in media addiction cause decreases in political participation were confirmed. This issue may be important for any society, not just Serbian, where the research inquiry took place, because political participation is basic pillar of democracy. If people are not capable or willing to take part in political processes, then minorities in power may establish full control over societies. With ever-increasing presence of mobile phones and other electronic devices in lives of people in modern communities, threat of media addiction is high. That is why further examination in field of social sciences may be of importance to modern societies.

As for result display, 2D graphs have been chosen. In the future, the methodology to measure media addiction should be improved, while research results should be examined and presented through 3D graphs. Limitation of this study is measurement of addiction that is done in one country while it would be useful to do such measurement in all countries. That way research results could be compared between countries and answers could be found to question about society features that affect higher or lower media addiction levels. Also, after throughout measurement and analysis, governmental policies, strategies and laws may be established in order to decrease media addiction.

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
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 Book review

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Bogdana Koljević and Dijego
 Fuzaro. *Ustanak evropskih
 naroda [The Uprising of
 European Peoples]*. Filip Višnjić,
 Belgrade, 2016.

The word crisis receives its meaning from medicine; it is a point “in the course of disease when the patient either descends to death or returns to health.” In his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci wrote about the nature of crisis, which “consists precisely in the

fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this inter-regnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Gramsci was probably aware of Karl Marx’s writings from 1848. For Marx, crisis is periodic return that puts on trial, each time more threateningly, “the existence of the entire bourgeois society.” In other words, in the moment of crisis, all of capitalism is put in question. Capitalism is the patient, and its crisis should lead to cautious joy, or careful hope that revolution and attendant “expropriation of the expropriators” is drawing near.

The authors of this magnificent new book do indeed approach crisis with cautious joy. But also with careful awareness of the “morbid symptoms” we are bound to experience as we struggle to bring anew world into existence (attempting to prevent complete descent into new barbarism). It’s not just about the crisis of the European Union (Habermas), but more importantly, crisis of the very idea of politics—an “integral de-politization of the world--” and of European civilization.

Koljević and Fuzaro share the insight of the great Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi about the unprecedented rupture brought

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about the institution of capitalism: the domination of society by the economy in the form of exchange value. They offer an explosive and convincing *Zivilisationkritik*, while lunging into a fiercely compelling attack on the pretensions of liberal democracy (a truly monstrous contradiction in terms!) responsible for the destruction of collective imagination (*Phantasiemord*). The modern equivalent of Gothic Cathedral is not a bathroom, as Ernest Bloch once complained, but the Central European Bank. Banks are far less useful institutions than public toilets, especially the one that these authors denounce as an integral part of the inexorable reign of money of new European pseudo-elites. For new European rulers, humans are indeed the most precious form of capital (Stalin). Koljević and Fuzaro's inspired criticism of neoliberal quantification, mechanization, and dissolution of social bonds, draws its inspiration from the rich source of European emancipatory traditions from the left as well as from the right. The comparisons Koljević and Fuzaro make, call to mind the famous conclusion to Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, haunted as it was by the specter of bureaucratic Empire of the Egyptian type.

The originality of the book lies in the way authors put the arguments and themes of contem-

porary melancholic *Kulturpessimismus* to work in service of an insightful political-activist perspective. They are persuaded that the current crisis constitutes a historic turning point. It is manifested in a variety of "morbid symptoms," which include the institution of the European Union, neoliberalism as a form of conservative utopia, and absolute capitalism (ab-solutus: detached from any ethical consideration or socio-economic breaks). In order to recover our health, to see that day when the expropriators will be expropriated, we need to build a movement that breaks not only with liberal superficiality and consumerist banality, but also represents a much grater danger to the pseudo-elites of Europe. We need another Germany in Europe, and another Europe in Germany. The modern European project is anything but European; rather, it is a colonizing project of Americanized political imagination defined by a depoliticized economy emptied of culture, is concealed by the utopia of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should not be perceived as a solely economic phenomenon. It is, first and foremost, a political project, whose conservative utopian character resides in stubborn denial of any other structure of political authority. For the authors of the book, this conservative utopia needs to be replaced by a social ideal legitimately opposed

to the existing state of affairs, a utopia that is political as much as a metaphysical form of oppositional reality, “superior to that of vulgar empirical facticity” (Bloch). What this conservative utopia conceals is hidden in plain sight: the rise of new technocratic elite, the specific form of power embodied institutionally in European Union, and a new configuration of popular struggle. The consensus of new elites contributes to rapid and unpredictable radicalization of the “extreme” political tendencies. This process is particularly evident in the European South (the Balkans and the Mediterranean), located by the authors both as the “weak link” in the chain of German colonialism and as the primary locus of resistance to Eurocratic structural violence (a form of suffering that shapes political community without political subjectivity). Young *indignados* from public squares and activists of the right are both in the agora of new politics. New continental struggle for another Europe could take a form of transnational strikes and mass assembly movements, or the form of demands for national sovereignty and democratic sovereignty of economy.

The originality of Koljević and Fuzaro’s argument lies in their proposed synthesis that aspires to unite apparently opposed ideological projects. The strength of their proposal, and a marvelous con-

densation of the main argument, is their active hope in the productive encounter of European liberatory traditions. This is a synthesis of a different order: it traverses the right and left without either opposing them or identifying with them. Some of these apparent paradoxes likely stem from our own preconceived notions about the incompatibility of particular ideas, ideas that lead us to experience cognitive dissonance where, in historical reality, none should exist. This approach reinforces the complexity of intellectual legacies and the difficulty of placing historical tendencies in labeled boxes, a task made all the more difficult by the continuous redefinition of the labels themselves. By employing this theoretical position, the volume attains remarkable breadth.

Koljević and Fuzaro invite us to revisit Karl Marx’s concept of true democracy (*wahredemokratie*), one of the more neglected parts of his rich thought. Their reading of Marx’s critique of Hegel’s *Rechtphilosophie* leads them to recognize collective self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*) as the principal *topos* of politics. In erudite dialogue with philosophers and theorists of “real democracy,” including Mouffe and Laclau, but also Alan Badiou, they identify the indissolubility of the concepts of popular rule and active processes of popular subjectification. In equal measure, the New Euro-

pean idea should draw the heart of its articulation from those enlightened expressions of the European right, conscious of national sovereignty, economic equality and national identity. *The Uprising of European Peoples* incorporates discussions of the manifold intellectual currents that formed Kolevic's and Fuzaro's perspective in such theoretical detail that it is easy for a reader to forget at times that the book is, in essence, a dialogue. The choice of dialogue as a form is not accidental. *Dialogos* is the beginning not only of philosophy, but also of European civilization as a whole. To write collaboratively, to find oneself in a dialogue, is to remind the reader of the crucial place of conversation in the process of knowing. It is also a powerful dialogical rebuttal of one of the central-- and most devastating--- tenets of neoliberalism: ceaseless production of the fragmented world of atomized consumers.

Overall, I highly recommend this book to those interested in political theory, European politics, neoliberalism and its European discontents. The book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of European politics. I believe that both academics and activists will find it a clear and excellent book to read on this complex topic.

Citing and Referencing

We welcome articles reporting research on substantive topic, concepts, and/or methodologies in all fields of political science. Authors of single country cases are strongly advised to consider the theoretical and comparative implications of the case. All articles are refereed by domestic and international experts in the field. Deadlines for sending the manuscripts are: March 15 (for Issue 1) and September 15 (for Issue 2).

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Intext References

Any intext reference should include the authorship and the year of the work. Model: (Author year: page).

Example: (Przeworski 1991: 28)

Books

Use the title page, not the book cover, for the reference details. Only include the edition where it is not the first. A book with no edition statement is most commonly a first edition. The required elements for a book reference are: Author, Initials. (Year) *Title of book*. Edition. (only include this if not the first edition) Place of publication (this must be a town or city, not a country): Publisher.

Example: Lijphart, A. (1984) *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Intext reference: (Lijphart 1984: 44).

Journal articles

For journal articles the required elements for a reference are:

Author, Initials. (Year) "Title of article". *Full Title of Journal*, Volume number (Issue/Part number): Page numbers.

Example: Thelen, K. (1999) "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 369-404.

Intext reference: (Thelen 1999: 399).

Books which are edited

For books which are edited give the editor(s) surname(s) and initials, followed by ed. or eds.

The required elements for a reference are:

Author, Initials. (ed.) (Year) *Title of book*. Place: Publisher.

Example: Schulzinger, R. D. (ed.) (2003) *A Companion to American Foreign Relations*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Intext Reference (Schulzinger 2003: 285).

Chapters of edited books

For chapters of edited books the required elements for a reference are: Chapter author(s) surname(s) and initials. Year of chapter. Title of chapter fol-

lowed by **In:** Book editor(s) initials and surnames with (ed.) or (eds.after the last name. Title of book. Place of publication: Publisher. Chapter number or first and last page numbers followed by full-stop.

Example: Parekh, B. (1996) "Political theory: Traditions in political philosophy". In: Goodin, R. E., Klingemann, H. (eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 503-518.

Intext reference: (Parekh 1996: 505).

Magazine or journal articles available on the internet

For an article from a web based magazine or journal, which is freely available over the web, the required elements for a reference are:

Authors, Initials., (Year) Title of article, *Full Title of Magazine*, [online]. Available at: web address (quote the exact URL for the article) [Accessed date].

Kipper, D. (2008) Japan's new dawn, *Popular Science and Technology*, [online] Available at: <http://www.popsci.com/popsci37b144110vgn/html> [Accessed 22 June 2009].

Intext reference: (Kipper, 2008).

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