The Budgetary Process: An Analysis of the Legislative Measures in Serbia and Croatia

Dušan Pavlović

Ivan Stanojević

Sažetak

This paper looks into the effects of political institutions on government fiscal policy. Our aim is to establish whether a legislative body has the power to influence the budget proposal tabled by the government. This leverage is measured in the analysis of the six indicators (so-called Wehner scale) which combined, make up the index of parliamentary power in Serbia and in Croatia. In the final section, the results obtained from our analysis are presented in a comparative perspective. Our assessment refers exclusively to legislative measures, not practice.

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