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OGLEDI I STUDIJE

REFORMA KORPORATIVNOG UPRAVLJANJA – PRAVNI I EKONOMSKI ASPEKTI

Sažetak

Rad predstavlja opsežnu analizu niza istraživanja kao i razmatranja uporedne teorije koja ima daleko veće praktično i teorijsko iskustvo u sveri korporativnog upravljanja i korporativnog prava. Svrha ovog rada je da sagleda postojeće uticaje različitih zakonodavnih struktura i predoči njihove prednosti i nedostatke. Istraživanja koja su vođena početkom ovoga veka, dokumen­tovala su velike razlike u koncentracii vlasništva javno kotiranih privrednih društava, veličini i dubini tržišta ka­pitala, politici isplate dividendi i dostupnosti eksternih finansija firmama u različitim zamljama. Zajednički element u objašnjenjima ovih razlika je koliko dobro su investitori, zajedno akcionari i kreditori, regulativom zaštićeni od preuzimanja od strane menadžera i većinskih vlasnika odnosno akcionara sa kontrolnim paketom akcija. Ovaj rad opisuje razlike u zakonima i efikasnosti njihove primene u različitim zemljama, raspravlja o mogućim korenima ovih razlika, sumira njihove posledice, i procenjuje moguće strategije reforme korporativnog upravljanja. Pravni pristup je svakao korisniji za razumevanje korporativnog upravljanja i njegove reforme od konvencionalnog razlikovanja bankarski orijentisanih i tržišno orijentisanih finansijskih sistema.

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Reference

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