



02

THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Conflict in Ukraine

Jelica Stefanović
Slobodan Popović
Giuliano Bifulchi
Marko Parezanović

Marija Đorić
Strahinja Obrenović
Liljana Kolarski
Vanja Glišin



THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Conflict in Ukraine



THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The Policy of National Security

Publisher

Institute for Political Studies

Address: 36 Svetozara Markovića Street, Belgrade

www.ips.ac.rs

Telephone: 011/3349 203; 011/3349 204; 011/3349 205

Mail address: pnb@ips.ac.rs

For publisher

Živojin Đurić

ISSN 2334-959X UDK 351.862/.863(497.11)

DOI: 10.22182/pnb.2322022

Vol. 23 No. 2/2022.

The journal is published twice a year

Editor in Chief

Marija Đorić

Editorial Board

Ljubiša Despotović, Dejana Vukasović, Dragana Kolarić, Vladan Petrov, Eugen
Strautiu, Dejan Antić, Slobodan Popović

Publishing Council

Sima Avramović, Mile Bjelajac, Radovan Radinović, Darko Tanasković, Milenko
Dželetović, Goran Matić, Bojan Dobovšek, Snežana Nikodinovska Stefanovska,
Marius Vacarelu, Markéta Kocmanová

Editorial Secretaries

Vanja Glišin,

Strahinja Obrenović

Business Secretary

Smiljana Paunović

Translation and proofreading in English

Tanja Milošević

Printed by

Sitoprint, Žitište

50 copies

The papers printed in this journal shall not be reprinted, whether in their entirety or in sequences, without the express consent of the publisher. The statements presented in these articles represent personal attitudes of their authors and by no means represent the opinion of the editorial staff or the institutions in which the authors are employed.

THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword.....5

Jelica Stefanović, Slobodan Popović

“A THOUSAND MILES” AND “A THOUSAND TASKS”:
CHINA’S DIPLOMATIZATION OF MULTIFACETED
RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT AND GLOBAL SECURITY7-31

Giuliano Bifulchi

CONFLICT IN UKRAINE, RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE
JIHADIST PROPAGANDA, CHECHENS BATTALIONS
AND THE LINK WITH THE RUSSIAN NORTH
CAUCASUS..... 33-47

Marko Parezanović

RUSSIAN SPECIAL OPERATION IN CRIMEA IN 2014.....49-65

Marija Đorić, Strahinja Obrenović

EVOLUTION OF EU ENERGY LAW AND POLICY:
A BIG COMEBACK OF ENERGY SECURITY IN 2022?.....67-86

Liljana Kolarski

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE
WESTERN BALKANS.....87-107

BOOK REVIEW

Vanja Glišin

POLITICS BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND POWER.....109-112

FOREWORD

Dear readers,

Here lies before you a final edition of “The Policy of National Security” journal in 2022, which covers the most current topics in the field of security at both national and global levels. Without a doubt, the central event of this year was the beginning of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine which has not only intensified but, by all accounts, will, unfortunately, continue for some time. Russia describes the conflict in Ukraine as a “special operation”, while in Ukraine and the West this qualifies as “Russian aggression”.

It is obvious that the modern world is currently in a very complex geopolitical situation within which a “new world order” is being created and where everything is uncertain. In order to resolve at least part of this complexity and contribute to a better understanding of the war in Ukraine, we made a selection of several research papers that analyze the Ukrainian crisis from different perspectives.

The first article analyses China’s role in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and global security. We included international researchers and Italian expert Giuliano Bifulchi writes about jihadist propaganda of the Chechen battalions in the North Caucasus. In order to understand the present, our domestic experts look back on the events in 2014, and these are well elaborated in papers. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is affecting not only the security and military sectors but has consequences for almost all segments of society, including energy. This is the reason why one of the main topics is energy security, especially in a European context. Given that the Western Balkans as a region is also affected by the events in Ukraine, the authors investigate how the war in Ukraine influences our region.

As you can notice, many important topics are covered for the year 2022. We hope that we will be able to devote a special issue to long-awaited peace and the end of conflict between Ukraine and Russia in the following year. It might sound unrealistic at the moment but *hope dies last*.

*Editor-in-chief,
Dr Marija Đorić*

Jelica Stefanović Štambuk*

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Slobodan Popović**

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

“A THOUSAND MILES” AND “A THOUSAND TASKS”: CHINA’S DIPLOMATIZATION OF MULTIFACETED RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT AND GLOBAL SECURITY ***

Resume

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC, China) unflinching stance throughout the ongoing Russian-Ukraine conflict has raised many eyebrows and provoked diverse reactions. The lingering question in different quarters is why China acts as it does and with what intentions. Once again, one troubling international turmoil was laid at the Chinese doorstep, almost turning into “China’s dilemma”. The starting assumption is that PRC’s conduct shows an unswerving strategic orientation toward “building a community with a shared future for mankind” (建设人类命运共同体) through persistent diplomatization. Diplomatization is a distinct process of containing grave security problems by making them a matter of diplomacy. Current analysis falsifies this starting proposition through conceptual inquiry into key actions and documents in China’s diplomatic and political relations with Ukraine in the period from the establishment of the strategic partnership in 2011 up to the head-start of diplomatization of the convoluted Russia-Ukraine conflict by the Global Security Initiative in April 2022. A strong diplomatization pattern is found, showing that China’s stand regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict

* Full PhD Professor of International Studies and Diplomacy. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-5154-718; Contact: vzorin@gmail.com; Institutional address: jelica.stefanovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs.

** Research Associate. Personal mail: slobodan.popovic89@yahoo.com; Contact: slobodan.popovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs.

*** This research received a grant from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia under the Contract on realization and financing scientific research of the SRO in 2021 (No. 451-03-9/2021-14 of 14. 01. 2021).

is a case of diplomatized security concerns as a trigger for the head-started diplomatization of global security. China consistently pursued conceptualization and persuasion to dispel insecurities and contain warfare and ensuing global disturbances through conversation and deliberation focused on boosting major joint leaps for transforming obsolete modes of governance structures to becoming aligned to the manifest direction of epochal change. Furthermore, China's global security outlook is firmly anchored in the national security concept.

Keywords: China, Ukraine, war, diplomacy, diplomatization, China's national security concept, China's global security outlook, China's Global Security Initiative, peace, epochal change

INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China's (PRC, PR China, China) diplomatization of security, i.e., the pursuit of making global security a matter of diplomacy, has been intensified by its efforts to diplomatize the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Considering the military engagement of Russia, which is PRC's comprehensive strategic coordination partner "for a new era" (China [MFA] 2021), against Ukraine, which is PRC's strategic partner, being detrimental to both of its partners, to global development agenda and own ideas, ideals, inclinations, interests, and integrity (face) China has head-started diplomatization of global security.

Why and how has China tried to diplomatize the convoluted Russia-Ukraine conflict and practiced diplomatization are two questions aimed to be answered by undertaken research. The article ventures from theoretical clarification of diplomatization as a distinct process of making issues and problems a matter of diplomacy. Primarily within the article's subject scope, the making of security issues a matter of diplomacy matters. The inquiry is posited on the premise that PR China's consistency in diplomatizing the multifaceted Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates its unflinching stance toward the diplomatization of the challenges of unfolding global changes.

The first part of the article uses a diplomatic theory relational lenses to critically identify the Chinese privileging of security challenges as a part of the diplomatic discourse. This move is needed to clearly discern the PRC's genuine conceptualization of diplomacy and security from the "thinking fog" of the vehemently laying responsibility for mounting insecurity at its door. The current hollowing out of the

international order is almost turned into a “China’s dilemma” as a new adage to the “China threat theory”. The second part addresses the People’s Republic of China’s foregrounding diplomatic moves preceding the eruption of Russia’s direct military engagement in Ukraine. The third part analyzes China’s relationship with Ukraine and the actions the PRC has taken related to the multifaceted Russia-Ukraine conflict. Analysis of China-Ukraine diplomatic and political relations is going to be centered on the period from establishing a strategic partnership in 2011 up to the launching of the Global Security Initiative (GSI - 全球安全倡议 – quanqiu anquan changyi) on April 21st, 2022. The GSI is the cornerstone of the PRC’s diplomatization of global security intensified by the intricate Russia-Ukraine conflict and ensuing global disturbances. China embarks on containing and mitigating them through the instigation of joint conversation and deliberation. The linchpin of the PRC’s efforts to diplomatize the multifaceted Russia-Ukraine conflict and head-start diplomatization of global security is the unique Chinese seeing of the directions of the flows of changes and working in the direction of those flows giving shape to China’s ideations, intents, interests, involvements, and integrity (face). The concluding remarks point out key relations that China deems necessary to be the foundation for global security, and firm anchoring of the Chinese global security outlook in the national security concept.

A STEP TOWARDS DECIPHERING CHINA: UNDERSTANDING THE CHINESE WAY OF DIPLOMATIZATION

So many bits and bytes have been spent on alarming people across the planet after the end of the Cold War, determined by “incongruences between real power in the global community and formalized power in institutions of global governance” (Stefanović Štambuk 2008, 34), that China is challenging the world order. Those who find in China’s every move or rest in acting its determination to change the distribution of power in the international system, revise the foundational tenet of global governance and take the reins of normative and institutional development of international relations in the ongoing systemic change, do warn that China intends to be a new world hegemon. That is the gist of the “China threat” theory.

In truth, the “China threat” theory is hardly a theory. It is more of a label for a body of thoughts, less theoretically based, and vastly ideologically biased, put up to inform, activate, and issue a rallying call

to close ranks behind the US and tighten the sense of (Western) identity around its core values allegedly under jeopardy from Chinese ambitions to ignite the joint re-evaluation of the decaying base of international politics. The critical security studies scholarship has been helpful in clarifying that although security is differently conceptualized it is not an “empty signifier” (Fierke, 2015). From the variously conceptualized security of states the core meaning of security could be found to be “the absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers 1952, 485).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) corroborated this by singling out for the first time the PRC as a security challenge. At the NATO summit held in Madrid, the heads of the states and governments endorsed on June 29th, 2022, a new Strategic Concept to make this military alliance of 30 countries in the next ten years fit and resourceful. The allied leaders declared that the PRC by “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values” (NATO 2022, point 13). They noted diverse fields and the means China employs running counter to their values and interest including: “[T]he deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order” (NATO 2022, point 13). These utterances ranked China discursively as a threat to the United States of America (U.S., America) and by that fiat to its formal allies and close friends throughout the world. China by being talked about, talked into, and talked over throughout is made a primary security threat. The U.S. securitization of China with the helping hands of others worked “miracles” for NATO. It has now two threats to deal with.

Discovery of China-related threats, colored in the red as existential ones to the U.S. and the world at large, has not been “the result” of any of the purported “explanatory” theories”. Actually, they are closer to “battle cries” vying to elicit immediate policy actions to be set on the inevitable course of securitizing the PRC. There is nothing thus far away from the truth than the several strands of thinking, posturing as “theories”, supposedly unearthed the “China threat”. Neither “power transition theory” (Thompson 2009) nor “theory of the Soviet Union successor-state image” (Kaplan 2005) did any theorization. Power transition theory since A.F.K. Organski’s (1958) work, proclaimed that it achieved the status of “one of the most successful structural theories in world politics” (Lemke and Tammen 2003, 269) is simply recycled the Gibbon’s (2001) argument in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Both its claims that China will wage war with the United States, either to overtake it or to displace it as global hegemon, are devoid of the shred of truth.

David Shambaugh (2004-5), renown Chinese specialist, did disagree on key claims of “power transition” theorists. He noticed that China of their descriptions is nowhere to be seen and there is no evidence for their “theories”. Based on historical analogies, closer to myths than to systemic and structural comparison, such thinking is peddling the “China threat” which actually projects the fear of the American scholarly class of their country’s decline. Instead of finding facts of China’s rise and its concocted plans to take the helm of world leadership they need the Chinese threat to stay in the business of theorizing, satisfying the U.S. metrics of academic achievements and having the ear of political class. As for the other “theory” of successor-state image there is no need to use many words to dismiss its reasoning even in regard to China’s socialism.

A theoretical explanation of the political application of the “China threat”, and its ending on the securitized part of the spectrum of public issues placements is the securitization theory in the study of security. Securitization theory was a disciplinary saving device when the Cold War ended making security studies an “endangered species” whose survival was nearly threatened with extinction. Several scholars in security studies wisely reached out to the speech act theory, introduced in the 1960s by John Langshaw Austin (1962) and furthered by John Searle (1969) and Bach and Harnish (1979), resulting in the construction of securitization theory. It posits that the leaders, be they political, intellectual or societal, through talking about security issues in categories of existential threats against something which is valued “referent object” (Buzan 1997, 14) could align the public and effectuate political support for measures outside established political bonds justified by the actions required to counter existential threats.

China in terms of its inter-subjectively established salience as an existential threat is being talked about being such a foremost menacing force to the America’s present and future security. The U.S. President, Joseph Biden, after a two-hour phone conversation with China’s President, Xi Jinping, on February 10th, 2021, purported in his conversation on February 11th, with US Senators how the Chinese must be contained and the US victorious in out-competing them or else, “they are going to eat our lunch” (Biden 2022a). On March 3rd, 2021, the newly sworn US Secretary of State in the President Biden administration, Antony Blinken, enlarged and deepened talking the talk about China to press into the public mind how the PRC is the gravest challenger. He presented it as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S. The main emphasis is on that China has “the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system – all

the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to, because it ultimately serves the interests and reflects the values of the American people” (Blinken 2021). Thus, the relationship with the PRC for the U.S. is “the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century” (Blinken 2021). The culled strategic approach epitomized that America will manage this relationship to “be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be” (Blinken 2021) having always as “the common denominator...the need to engage China from a position of strength” (Blinken 2021).

The critical security studies scholarship clarifies how comes that the scope of U.S. power was found lacking to amount to lasting U.S. hegemony or even to an U.S. empire due to its own incapacities and set of changes in governance of global commons unique in history in dispersion of power from the state down to society, and up to international institutions, and laterally across borders (Stefanović Štambuk, 2010; Baumann and Dingwerth 2015). Also via securitization theory it is clear how through historical analogies, political myth, and allegedly scientific theory, as three dominant modes of discursive securitization, China has been securitized (Song 2015). It is far-fetched to discover as the main hindrance to U.S. world preeminence the concurrent rise of China to global power and its supposed expansionism (Bijian 2005; Brown 2000; Buzan 2010; Christiansen and Maher 2017; Economy 2022; Goodhart and Xu 1996; Huang 2022; Ikenberry 2008; Kim and Gates 2015; Kristof 1993; Lemke and Tammen 2003; Mahbubani 2022; Mearsheimer 2014; Meijer 2022; Nye 2011; Posner and Yoo 2006; Rosecrance 2006; So and Chu 2015; Thies 2015; Wang, 2004). If we talk in terms of China’s rise to power it is still rising (Mahbubani 2022a; Mastro and Scissors 2022; Yang 2022) despite some disagreeing foresight (Roach 2022, Brands and Beckley 2022).

The core of fixations on how China acts and what her true intentions are, must be admitted, that they are not only made of the U.S. imagined fears. Some fixations are of Chinese own making. “The rise of China”, prefacing “the rise” with attributive peacefulness or not, is a major disservice the Chinese have done to themselves. They dipped into the shallow pond of America’s representationalism instead of working in the main direction of the flow of the thought today to relational ontology and ontology which is China’s own forte (Wang 2008) were sadly disregarded.

If relationality of Chinese worldview is taken seriously, the diplomatization which China practices now will be studied more and understood better. Most of the time practitioners of diplomacy exactly

practice bringing in security matters out of the confines of securitization. They keep them up as a matter of diplomacy by “privileging the dialogical where war, and we may add, militarizing securitization, privileges the monological” (Neumann 2020, 18). What makes diplomacy “indeed an alternative to war and securitization” (Neumann 2020, 18), are its travails and trials “to maintain normal, dialogical politics” (Neumann 2020, 18). That is veritably what diplomacy is and should be. Yet, diplomatization is insufficiently understood among the wider public. Paradoxically, Neumann contends that “[O]ne thing students of diplomacy may learn from students of security, then, is to conceptualize how and when something becomes a matter of diplomacy – that is, how a phenomenon becomes diplomatized” (Neumann 2020, 18).


Students of history of European diplomacy made conceptualizations of how to make something a matter of diplomacy under different names throughout the times. They thought how to make something become a matter of dialogical exchange across borders and differences instead of monologues of war. This bifurcation of times passing and the new times coming, diplomacy is in the process of acquiring the new name “governancy” (Stefanović Štambuk 2022). Global governance (Rosenau 1992) has already negotiated its new meaning and practices. Still, the habituated name diplomacy, even for systemically novel developments, is widely applied. Therefore, diplomatization, and not governcialization (Stefanović Štambuk 2022), refers to how something becomes its matter, i.e. “how a phenomenon becomes” (Neumann 2020, 18) really governcized (Stefanović Štambuk 2022), but named still as diplomatized.

Let’s stay with the old words diplomatization and diplomatized for now. And name as diplomatization, the distinct process of lifting global security out of general political discourse and privileging it as the part of “the diplomatic one” (Neumann 2020, 19), thus making it the “subject to diplomatic practices” (Neumann 2020, 19). China’s discourse of global security has at its core the national security concept. Xiong Guangkai (2009, 96) stated that China has put forward a new security concept, with “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination”. He explained that mutual trust is the foundation of the new security concept, mutual benefit its objective, equality its guarantee, and coordination the way it operates (Xiong 2009, 96). It stems from the concept of security as a relational one in the highly interdependent world of today where active cooperation is the only way to ensure mutual security (Xiong 2009, 96; Popović 2018). Now is the age for human commonality and community of understanding through dialogic and dialectic entanglements of mutuality and non-violent encountering of differences to contain global insecurities

and war. It then becomes clearer that governcialization names better the process of making global security its own matter in a web of interlocking institutions of global governance (Stefanović Štambuk 2009) and modes of diplomacy – plural diplomacies as Cornago (2013) aptly observed. The matter of diplomacies (Medeiros and Fravel 2003), must be a mutual relating anew of humans as a species – sobered by climate emergency, pollution, biodiversity loss, and a plethora of crises rising out of these three in the shadow of nuclear weapons and nuclearity threatening the existence of Earth. All these on the planet damaged by humans through their enmity to nature, to other species, to each other and to the future. This is diplomatization of today. And to diplomatize now means not solely to make all these matters a matter of “governcy”, but to make them its sole prerogative. In other words, it is the “ending of the global regime of unsustainability” (Fry 2009) by redirective futuring practices toward humanity in peace with relationality of life itself on the planet that is the entangled relationality.


China is a traditional homeland of relational thinking all the way through coupled with relationality of the Marxist worldview. That is way and how it was able to diplomatize the Russia-Ukraine convoluted conflict by diplomatization of global security through reframing the “four rings” of ideational cooperative security (Cohen and Mihalka 2001). This conceptualization of cooperative security as a matter of diplomacy after the end of the Cold War served its purpose. It is no long applicable today. Chinese attempts to conceptualize a cooperative security which is common, comprehensive, and sustainable in diplomatization of global security by the GSI of April 2022 served as a foundation for the success of diplomatized Russia-Ukraine conflict. This initiative launched by the President Xi is clearly presented in comparison to the “old” conceptualization of cooperative security by the following diagrams.

Figure 1. Cohen’s “cooperative security four rings” of the strategic system of cooperative security



Source: Cohen, Richard and Michael Mihalka. 2001. *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, The Marshall Center Papers 3, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, 10)

Figure 2. “Five rings” of China’s diplomatized vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security (共同，全面，合作，可持续安全) in the Global Security Initiative



Source: Processed by the authors

THE CONTEXT OF A RENEWAL OF THE BAFFLING “CHINA’S PUZZLE”

Despite heavy COVID 19 restrictions at the start of the third year of the global pandemic, on the night of February 4th, 2022, the magnificent opening ceremony of the XXIV Winter Olympic Games stunned the world with artistic ingenuity intertwined with holographic and 3D technology. It was staged at Beijing National Stadium, known as the “Bird’s Nest”, constructed for the 2008 Summer Olympics the first time held in China. The chilly temperature, restricting the ceremony to run just a bit more than an hour and a half, was forgotten, at least for the duration of the event, amidst only 150 000 spectators present due to precautionary epidemic measures. The beginning of the Chinese Season of Spring (立春 – lichun) with its first pentad (东风解冻 – dong feng jie dong – “east wind” thaw), celebrated on that date, presented the warmth of nature’s tremendous energy of self-renewal and budding life cycle. This was represented through the enmeshment of 3000 dancers of all ages from all walks of life with lasers, brightening lights, pyrotechnics, and 40,000 LED modules, projected on the world’s largest LED screen of 10,552 sq meters (or 113,580 sq ft).

The Game’s slogan “Together for a Shared Future” (一起想未来 – yiqi xiang weilai) palpably promoted the spirit of Olympic sport diplomacy and the Chinese sport diplomacy tradition, of which the “ping-pong” episode during the Cold War is a well-known example. This time, China again tried to diplomatize heightened global tensions. These tensions even spiked, on the pretext of PR China’s human rights record, in a “diplomatic boycott” of the ceremonies of the Games Beijing hosted, both the Winter Olympics and Paralympic later in March. With the “simple, safe and splendid” organization of the gathering of 2834 athletes from all over the world, the message has been sent of unimpeded contact, communication, collaboration, and mutual openness within humankind that make global peace as Othering of war, not of humans Othering each other.

On the same day of February 4th, several hours before the official start of the Winter Olympics, the President of the People’s Republic of China and the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi Jinping threaded the same diplomatized message through talks with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. The two leaders issued in the Joint Statement on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development (Putin and Xi 2022),

and voiced in common that “the international and regional security situation is complicating and the number of global challenges and threats is growing from day to day” (Putin and Xi 2022). The main thrust of their argument on the ongoing momentous global change was how the “trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world” (Putin and Xi 2022). They concluded that “the international community is showing a growing demand for the leadership aiming at peaceful and gradual development” (Putin and Xi 2022).

On that very day it seemed that Putin’s and Xi’s joint diplomatisation effort might bear the fruit as they called:

“on all States to pursue well-being for all and, with these ends, to build dialogue and mutual trust, strengthen mutual understanding, champion such universal human values as peace, development, equality, justice, democracy and freedom, respect the rights of peoples to independently determine the development paths of their countries and the sovereignty and the security and development interests of States, to protect the United Nations-driven international architecture and the international law-based world order, seek genuine multipolarity with the United Nations and its Security Council playing a central and coordinating role, promote more democratic international relations, and ensure peace, stability and sustainable development across the world” (Putin and Xi 2022).

Although China was sympathetic to and expressed support for the offer “put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe” (Putin and Xi 2022), the train of developments that should have such outcome achieved peacefully, led to the opposite.

Mounting confrontations in Ukraine were dealt with in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), at the official Ukrainian request from February 18th, 2022. Tragically, the situation deteriorated. Russia recognized the independence of Ukraine’s regions Luhansk and Donetsk, referred to as the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LPR) and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR). This decision was justified as the necessity to “protect” and “preserve” their residents, and then sent “peacekeepers” in the Russian manner of application of “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine. Further on February 24th, the Russian Federation proceeded to a full-scale military attack on Ukraine while the UNSC deliberated the worsening situation. Bewilderment, fear, disappointment, and outrage shook the world. Reactions of the Member States of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America and Canada were immediate, unanimous, and harsh in condemning Russia for violating the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent European state. Their pronouncements expressed regret for the shattering of the post-Cold War security and peace architecture in Europe by the Russian Federation aggression against neighboring Ukraine. The Chinese reaction to Russia's actions, dubbed as a "special military operation", from that day, and since has been "puzzling" for many in the international community.

Chinese economic "miracle", technological prowess, ideational confidence, political steadfastness, and diplomatic proteanism, so visible in the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Beijing and high-level bilateral talks held on the same day, briefly referred to at the beginning, is the background against which could be clearly seen why China's actions are of utmost importance for the prospects of the global security. The jury is still open about whether the People's Republic of China will become the world leader in realizing the goals of a global transformation. For China, it is a long road of "a thousand miles" (Xi 2022) and with "a thousand tasks" (Xi 2022) of unprecedented epochal change to be traveled. Despite turbulence, turmoil, and hardships the People's Republic of China has achieved impressive overall prosperity. During a rather short time span, its governance is consolidated by intertwining the market economy structure with the communist system. It is astonishing how China's committed pursuit of peaceful development and the way she worked up to gain, fairly and squarely, prominence as a global economic powerhouse, and the Chinese ideational valour have been met from the beginning of this century with the upsurge of starkly contradicting opinions.

Unfortunately, the optimistic side is over-clustered around bragging silos for the contrary advancement and ascendance to "ruling the world", so common for the cultural lining of Martin Jacques, the author of the extremely vitriolic text *When China Rules the World* (Jacques 2009). It became the best-seller in China and inflamed imagination of quite significant numbers of its inhabitants to propound values and behaviors contrary to Chinese worldview of virtuousness and falling as a ripe fruit into the lap of those who were in business to securitize China. The affirmative views of China as a positive force in the fast-changing international environment, capable to be the most pivotal country for providing global public goods, and willing to contribute significantly to enhancing processes of governing world affairs do not need either of the following "clutches".

First, the line of reasoning favoring underpinning thinking of China's merits and achievements by the "China Model" of development, is often equated with the "Beijing Consensus" (Ramo 2004). It straddles two extremes. The first one expands upon Zhang Weiwei's thesis (2012)

of Chinese exceptionalism as a civilizational state of “four supers” – large population, vast territory, long traditions, rich culture – and “four uniques” – language, politics, society, economy – propounding non-replicability of the China’s model of development. But, there are dissenting voices in this regard. Some are pointing out that there is no genuine “China Model”, since China has emulated the development model of other East Asian states (Huat 2017; Kroeber 2016; Liu and Wang 2015; Zhao 2010). Others insist on seeing three distinct China models flowing out in three development waves from specific institutional co-evolving through interactions with economic and political forces (Naughton 2017).

Second, is the line of argumentation of “China’s peaceful rise”. These views oppose the arguments that China is a grave threat to the structure and functioning of the existing U.S.-led international system, and inevitably poised to challenge the United States as the current hegemonic power. Such arguments do great injustice and major disservice since “peaceful” does not assuage qualms of “rise” (Mitrović 2022). Throwing out “development” and taking over “rise” is just the “trap” the nationalists are rarely able to see. They hardly have eyes to think that what they value most be respected. But, it is not their own image of their nation and country at all; it is the image they were molded into as a part of a securitization which others needed. Such an image elicited public support in some countries to establish China as an existential threat and, thereby, effectuate significant political justification of actions and measures outside established procedures of decision-making, control and use of public funding (for instance NATO 2022, The White House 2022). The more nationalists are boisterous and clamoring for roughness, getting greatly excited by the “bravados” and “braggadocio” of the infamous “Wolf Warrior” resent strand in China’s diplomatic culture, the merrier are all those who live on, by and for the securitization of China.

Therefore, the PRC’s choice to diplomatize the multifaceted Russia-Ukraine conflict and to thread it through the diplomatization of global security proves resilience of China’s diplomacy. Even more, it builds “governcy” which is the correct name for the process of jointly creating future where no one nowhere is left behind (Stefanović-Štambuk forthcoming). How China tried to diplomatize budding Russia-Ukraine conflict for when it started is analyzed in the next part.

TENDENCIES IN CHINA DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE FROM 2011 UP TO NOW

Political relations between China and Ukraine were regulated during the last decade of the 20th century by two joint communiques from 1992 and 1995 respectively, and two main declarations, the Joint (Kiev) Declaration from September 6th, 1994, and the Declaration on development and intensification of friendship and cooperation from December 4th, 1995. Furthermore, at the very beginning of the 21st century, relations were guided by Joint declaration on friendship and comprehensive cooperation adopted on July 21st, 2001, and Joint (Beijing) Declaration from November 18th, 2002. In the second decade the joint statement of two countries from September 2nd, 2010, regulated a comprehensive growing of their “relations of friendship and cooperation” (Ukraine 2020), with the biannual Basic Directions of their relations adopted on the same day.

The Joint Declaration on the establishment and development of strategic partnership from June 20th, 2011, gave new impetus to bilateral relations. It was followed by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on December 5th, 2013, and to adopting the Joint Declaration and operationalized program for the period 2014-2018. This set of documents might be seen as the highest point in regulating PRC-Ukraine relations. It was marked with a high-level talks between China’s President, Xi Jinping, and then Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovich, held at the Great Hall of People in Beijing. What transpired from their exchange was convergence on four main points stressed by the President of China (China [MFA] 2013).

1. Consensus building on main bilateral issues in a timely manner by strengthened exchanges on the highest level and enhanced mutual trust in strategic regard.
2. Earnest promotion of practical cooperation in the fields of agriculture, energy resources, infrastructure construction, finance and high-tech through advancement of major cooperation projects and creation of a conducive environment for operation of Chinese businesses.
3. Unhindered expansion of people-to-people communication and exchanges in the areas of science and technology, education, culture, health, sports and tourism, especially of their personnel and children, as main actors of deepening mutual understanding.
4. Closer cooperation on issues of international and regional

importance recognizing Ukraine's location on "the way that the Eurasia Continental Bridge must pass" (China [MFA] 2013), and its important contribution "to communication between the Eastern and Western civilizations" (China [MFA] 2013) for jointly promoting "establishment of a fair and reasonable new international political order" (China [MFA] 2013), and coping together "with global challenges in order to safeguard common interests" (China [MFA] 2013).

In 2014 tensions caused by the change of Ukrainian Government through people's uprising led to the decision of Ukraine's autonomous Crimea region, invoking the right of self-determination by referendum on March 16th. Diplomatic efforts to diffuse the crises failed to produce de-escalation. The last attempt to solve the problem was taken by the UNSC at its 7138th meeting on March 15th. The drafted resolution urged UN member states not to recognize planned referendum results or any alteration of the region's status, but was vetoed by Russia. China abstained. China's permanent representative to the UN at that time, Ambassador Liu Jieyi, expressed the view that the draft resolution is not a step in the right direction since only a political solution to the crises in Ukraine would "truly maintain peace and stability in the region" (China UN 2014). He accentuated how problems resulted from entwinement "of historical and contemporary factors" (China UN 2014) having "elements of the inevitable, and therefore calls for a comprehensive and balanced solution" (China UN 2014).

It was clear that China was trying to diplomatize situation. The emphasis was on the search for a solution in Ukraine "within the framework of law and order, seeking an early solution to the differences through dialogue and negotiations, with due respect for the legitimate rights and interests of all those in the various communities and regions" (China UN 2014). The PRC was determined to continue to mediate playing a more significant role in needed engagement for a resolution of the crisis. China's effort was to diplomatize it by proposing the "establishment as soon as possible of an international coordination mechanism, comprising all the parties concerned, in order to explore means for the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis" (China UN 2014). Also, the Chinese proposed that "all parties should refrain from taking any action that may further escalate the situation" (China UN 2014). The third proposition called for engagement of international financial institutions on examining "how to help to maintain the economic and financial stability of Ukraine" (China UN 2014).

Closely following Chinese proposal for diplomatization of Ukraine's crisis the heads of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization during a meeting in Tashkent on September 12th, 2014, pronounced their support for "early restoration of peace in Ukraine and continuation of the negotiation process in order to achieve a comprehensive solution to the crisis in that country" (SCO 2014). Being in favor of diplomatization they welcomed the Peace Plan initiatives of the President of Ukraine and the President of Russia in the process of the implementation started with the signed Protocol on September 4th, 2014, of the consultations of the Trilateral contact group on joint steps (SCO 2014).

During the 2015 annual winter meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos the prime minister of the PR China, Li Keqiang, met with the then President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. Keqiang confirmed China's respect of the "national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine" (China [MFA] 2015). Diplomatization is highly visible in the expressed support for Ukraine's decision for a path of development of its own choice and the willingness of China "to continue practical cooperation with Ukraine in various fields on the principle of mutual benefit and win-win outcome to benefit the two peoples" (China [MFA] 2015). The stance to diplomatize Ukrainian crisis is reconfirmed by underlining political resolution in which China "will continue to play an active and constructive role" (China [MFA] 2015), based on an "objective and just standpoint" (China [MFA] 2015). Ukraine's President expressed hopes for such engagement with China in resolving the "Ukrainian issue" (China [MFA] 2015) by political means as Ukraine highly values its relations with China and continuation of bilateral cooperation.

China's pursuit of diplomatization centered on making the Ukrainian crisis a matter of diplomacy was intensified by the inclusion of Ukraine in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) though signing of a joint action plan to develop the new Silk Road on December 27th, 2017. (OBOREurope 2017).¹ In the following year, the institutionalization of the inclusion of Ukraine in BRI was formalized by establishment of the "Belt and Road" Trade and Investment Promotion Center in Kyiv (May 2021).

Many cooperative projects were started and fully implemented, while even more were planned and pondered to enhance Ukraine's infrastructure, advance its development and spur trade between two

¹ At that time of signing the Initiative had the official name One Belt one Road (OBOR), later changed to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

countries. Undertaken amelioration of business environment for operation of Chinese companies in difference sectors of Ukrainian economy in need of both China's state financial support and private capital investments proved its worth. There were some hiccups in the implementation of projects. Yet, the overall trend of bilateral relations was stable, proving that China's diplomatization of the "Ukraine issue" yielded benefits to both countries and making the road opened to joint finding of a political solution within diplomatic formats framed for that purpose.

During the pandemic solidity of the strategic partnership was tangible. That was stressed in the telephone conversation held on July 13th, 2021, between the President of China, Xi Jinping, and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, marking the occasion of the first decade of the strategic partnership. The Chinese President's continuing diplomatization underlined PRC's willingness for furthering the partnership, deepening mutual understanding, and reinforcing practical cooperation with the intention for using "the next year commemoration of 30 years of diplomatic relations as another opportunity to actively promote mutual relations and achieve developmental goals" (PRC Embassy 2021).

An optimistic outlook of Xi Jinping for the smooth sailing of the bilateral relations with Ukraine through consistent diplomatization of the "Ukraine issue", including on the track with Russia, was significantly challenged with the outbreak of violence and full-scale deployment of Russia's military force against Ukraine on February 24th, 2022.

Nevertheless, on a number of fronts, China continued to diplomatize the breakup in European security order. First, it was within the UN setting to make the Russia-Ukraine conflict a matter of sustained diplomatic dealing. The Chinese protean diplomatization in this key multilateral framework saw the day on February 25th, 2022. In explaining China's abstention in the vote in the UNSC on the draft resolution on Ukraine, permanent representative of PRC to UN, Ambassador Zhang Jun, elaborated the essence of Chinese approach to diplomatize Russia-Ukraine conflict by taking it as a matter of conversation and deliberation, instead of "blindly exerting pressure and imposing sanctions" (PRC UN 2022). He contended that doing otherwise "may only lead to more casualties, more property loss, more complicated and chaotic situations, and more difficulties in bridging differences" (PRC UN 2022). What would become clear only after two months is that Ambassador's Zhang Jun speech presented the outline of Chinese's fully-fledged global security outlook on how to make the mounting global insecurity a matter of diplomacy. The essence is to have a conversation and dialogue about

the joined-up boost to major joint leaps for transforming obsolete modes of governance structures to become aligned to the manifest direction of epochal change.

CONCLUSION

The People's Republic of China has been acting unswervingly to diplomatize the convoluted Russia-Ukraine conflict and head-start diplomatization of global security. For China, the multifaceted Russia-Ukraine confrontation is a case of the intervention that arose from the undermining of the constitutive principle of equal and indivisible security and the United States of America's and the European Union's securitization of the Russian Federation. Hence, the Chinese well-considered opting to diplomatize the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It was not taken for the mere reason that the PRC has been securitized by the U.S.

Leading reason for China to diplomatize the Russia-Ukraine conflict and initiate diplomatization of global security was astute recognition that the "spinning wheel" of the vicious cycle of securitization threatens to spin out of control, thus needing joined-in work to arrest such calamity from happening by joint conversation and dialogical deliberation on global security. Therefore, Chinese diplomatization of global security, being understood as a development precondition, and for all of "the humanity... living in an indivisible security community" (Xi, 2022), is initiated to enable the Russia-Ukraine conflict to be fully diplomatized. The most dangerous path for this conflict is choosing to allow it to run its entire military course till the undoubtful defeat of one or the other side. Only then will diplomacy be let in just to "hammer out" military victory into the peace settlement, which bodes ill for the future.

The PRC's choice amidst bifurcation in world politics within the unprecedented "changes of the world, of our times and of history" (Xi 2022) is to discern the directions of flows and work with the direction of the mainstream of flows. Consequently, the diplomatization of global security is head-started underpinned by China's commitment to "the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security (共同, 全面, 合作, 可持续安全)" (Xi 2022) as a precondition for sustainable development and mitigation of the four most dangerous global challenges – "terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity and biosecurity" (Xi 2022) – and overarched by Chinese concept of "building a community with a shared future for mankind" (人类命运共同体 – renlei mingyun gongtongti).

Critical review of the key official statements, initiatives, and decisions of the PRC taken in the bilateral formats and some relevant multilateral settings and actions related to different facets of the raging conflict in and around Ukraine has shown the pattern of consistency and coherence in Chinese diplomatization of global security issues. The findings corroborated the main assumption that China's diplomatization of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine is devoted to paving the way for dialogue and consultations towards the consensus on achieving common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security impelled by the fast-forwarded disordering of global security governance.

REFERENCES

- Austin, John. L. 1962. *How to do thing with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baumann, Rainer and Klaus Dingwerth. 2015. “Global governance vs empire: Why world order moves towards heterarchy and hierarchy.” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 18 : (1) 104 –128.
- Biden, Joseph. 2022a. “Remarks by President Biden Before Meeting with Senators on the Critical Need to Invest in Modern and Sustainable American Infrastructure.” Oval Office, February 11, 2021. The White House. Last access 1 August 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/11/remarks-by-president-biden-before-meeting-with-senators-on-the-critical-need-to-invest-in-modern-and-sustainable-american-infrastructure/>.
- Biden, Joseph. 2022b. “Remarks by President Biden on the Continued Battle for the Soul of the Nation.” Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 1, 2022. The White House. Last access 1 September 2022. Independence National Historical Park Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (September 1, 2022)
- Bijian, Zheng. 2005. “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status.” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005 : 18 – 24.
- Blinken, Antony J. 2021. “A Foreign Policy for the American People”. Speech on 3 March 2021, Washington D.C. U.S. Department of State. Last access 1 August 2022. <https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/>.
- Brands, Hal, and Michael Beckley. 2021. “China Is a Declining Power—and that's the Problem: The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the

- opposite.” Foreign Policy. Last access 25 August 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/>.
- Brown, Michael E. Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. 2000. *The rise of China*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Buzan, Barry. 1997. “Rethinking Security after the Cold War.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 32 (1): 5–28.
- Buzan, Barry. 2010. “China in international society: Is ‘peaceful rise’ possible?” *The Chinese Journal of international politics* 3 (1): 5-36.
- China [MFA]. 2015. “Li Keqiang Meets with President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Last access 6 August 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/jhdq_665435/3265_665445/3250_664382/3252_664386/201501/t20150123_561656.html.
- China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA]. 2013. “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine, the Two Heads of State Agree to Further Deepen China-Ukraine Strategic Partnership.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nepal. Last access 5 August 2022. <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cenp/eng/zgwj/t1106661.htm>.
- China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA]. 2021. “Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin Respectively Send Congratulatory Letters to the Third China-Russia Energy Business Forum”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China official website. Last access 19 August 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzdbdfyyq/202111/t20211130_10459004.html.
- China UN. 2014. “Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi after Security Council Voting on the Draft Resolution on Ukraine.” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, March 15, 2014. Last accessed 6 August 2022. http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/europe/oc/201403/t20140324_8417847.htm.
- Christiansen, Thomas, and Richard Maher. 2017. “The rise of China: challenges and opportunities for the European Union.” *Asia Europe Journal* 15 (2): 121-131.
- Cohen, Richard and Michael Mihalka. 2001. *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, The Marshall Center Papers 3, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.
- Cornago, Noe. 2013. *Plural Diplomacies: Normative Predicaments and Functional Imperatives*. Leiden: BRILL.
- Economy, Elizabeth. 2022. “Xi Jinping’s New World Order: Can China

- Remake the International System?" *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2022 : 52-67.
- Fierke, K. M. *Critical Approaches to National Security*. London: Polity.
- Fry, Tony. 2009. *Design futuring: sustainability, ethics, and new practice*. New York: Berg.
- Gibbon. Edward. 2001. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Ebook Mall.
- Goodhart, Charles, and Chenggang Xu. 1996. "The Rise of China as an Economic Power." *National Institute Economic Review* 548 : 56 – 80.
- Huang, Chin-Hao. 2022. *Power and Restraint in China's Rise*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Huat, Chua Beng. 2017. "National Development of Singapore." *Routledge Handbook of Asia in World Politics*. Singapore: Routledge.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2008. "The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008 : 23 - 37.
- Jacque, Martin. 2009. *When China Rules the World*. London: Penguin.
- Kaplan, Robert D., 2005. 'How we would fight China', *Atlantic Monthly* 295 (5) : 49 - 64.
- Karen M. Fierke. 2007. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kent and Robert Harnish M. 1979. *Linguistic communication and speech acts*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kim, Woosang, and Scott Gates. 2015. "Power transition theory and the rise of China." *International Area Studies Review* 18 (3): 219-226.
- Kristof, Nicholas D. 1993. "The Rise of China." *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1992 : 59–74.
- Kroeber, Arthur. 2016. "Can China Avoid the Japan Trap?" Keynote presentation for the China Matters National Meeting, Sydney, Australia, April. Vol. 6. 2016.
- Lemke, Douglas, and Ronald L. Tammen. (2003). "Power transition theory and the rise of China." *International interactions* 29 (4): 269-271.
- Li, Xi, Xuwen Liu, and Yong Wang. 2015. "A model of China's state capitalism." Available at SSRN 2061521.
- Mahbubani, Kishore 2022. "What China threat? How the United States and China can avoid war." In *The Asian 21st Century*, ed. Kishore Mahbubani. 147-154. Singapore: Springer.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. 2022a. "Is China Expansionist?" *The Asian 21st Century*, ed. Kishore Mahbubani. 131-140. Singapore: Springer.

- Mastro, Oriana Skylar, and Derek Scissors. 2022. "China Hasn't Reached the Peak of Its Power: Why Beijing Can Afford to Bide Its Time." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2022. Last access 28 August 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-hasnt-reached-peak-its-power>.
- May, Lisa. 2021. "Chinese Investments in Ukraine." *Russia and Eurasia Program*. Last access 18 August 2022. <https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherussia/lisa-may-chinese-investments-in-ukraine/>.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Can China rise peacefully?" *The National Interest*. Last access 18 August 2022. <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>.
- Meijer, Hugo. 2022. *Awakening to China's Rise: European Foreign and Security Policies toward the People's Republic of China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Medeiros, Evan S. and M. Taylor Fravel. 2003. "China's New Diplomacy." *Foreign Affairs* 82 (6): 22-35.
- Mitrović, Dragana. 2022. "Pandemic's Effects on China's Foreign Policy And Its Global Power Role", *Serbian Political Thought* 75 (1) : 139-166. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7512022.7>.
- NATO. 2022. *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022. Official North Atlantic Treaty Organization website. Last access 1 July 2022. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
- Naughton, Barry. 2017. "Is China Socialist?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31 (1) : 3-24.
- Neumann, Iver B. 2020. *Diplomatic tenses: A social evolutionary perspective on diplomacy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Nye Jr, Joseph S. 2011. "China's Rise Doesn't Mean War..." *Foreign Policy* January/February 2011 : 66.
- OBOREurope. 2017. "The BRI and the modernization of infrastructure in Ukraine." *OBOREurope*. Last access 18 August 2022. <https://www.oboreurope.com/en/infrastructure-ukraine/>.
- Organski, A. F. K., 1958. *World politics*. New York: Knopf.
- Popovic, Slobodan. 2018. "The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in China's New Security Concept." *Asian Issues* 4 (1) : 73-100.
- Posner, Eric A., and John Yoo. 2006. "International law and the rise of China." *Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper* 7 (1) : 1 - 17.

- PRC Embassy. 2021. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ukraine. "习近平同乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话" (Xi Jinping tong Wukelan zongtong ze lian si ji tong dianhua – Xi Jinping held phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky). Embassy of the People's Republic of China official website. Last access 19 August 2022. http://ua.china-embassy.gov.cn/zwxg/202107/t20210713_9033655.htm.
- PRC UN. 2022. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to UN. "Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the UN Security Council on the Draft Resolution on Ukraine." Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. Last access 20 August 2022. http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/europe/202202/t20220226_10645825.htm.
- Putin, Vladimir V., and Jinping Xi. 2022. "Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development." President of Russia official website. Last accessed 30 August 2022. <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770>.
- Ramo, Joshua. 2004. *The Beijing Consensus*. London: Foreign Policy Center.
- Roach, Stephen S. 2022. "China's Growth Sacrifice." Project Syndicate. Last access 27 August 2022. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/three-reasons-for-china-growth-slowdown-since-2012-by-stephen-s-roach-2022-08?barrier=accesspaylog>.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 2006. "Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and Its Effects." *International Studies Perspectives* 7 (1): 31–35.
- Rosenau, James N. 1983. "'Fragmegrative' Challenges to National Security." In *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry Heyns, 65–82. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
- Rosenau, James, ed. 1992. *Government without Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SCO. 2014. "Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization." Official Website of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Last access. 9 August 2022. <http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/>.
- Searle, John, R. 1969. *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shambaugh, David. 2004-5. "China engages Asia." *International Security* 29(3): 64-99.

- So, Alvin Y., and Yin-Wah Chu. (2015). The global rise of China. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Song, Weiqing. 2015. „Securitization of the ‘China Threat’ Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account.“ *China Review* 15 (1): 145-169.
- Stefanović Štambuk, Jelica. 2010. “Diplomacy: Is It Still Sustainable?” *Međunarodni problemi* LXII (4) : 641 – 677. [In Serbian].
- Stefanović Štambuk, Jelica. 2008. Diplomacy in the International Relations. Beograd: Čigoja štampa [In Serbian].
- Stefanović Štambuk, Jelica. 2009. “Multilateralism and Interregionalism for the New Architecture of the Global Governance.” *Godišnjak FPN* 3 (3) : 417 – 436. [In Serbian].
- Stefanović Štambuk, Jelica. 2022. “The European Union’s ‘competitive sustainability’: Could it be a dangerous trap on the path toward climate-neutral Europe by 2050.” Paper and eposter presented at the 2022 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, March 28th-April 2nd, 2022, Nashville, USA.
- The White House. 2022. National Security Strategy 2022. *The White House*. Last access. 13. October 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.
- Thies, Cameron G. 2015. “China’s Rise and the Socialisation of Rising Powers.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8 (3): 281–300, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov006>.
- Thompson, William R, ed. 2009. Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ukraine 2020. Embassy of Ukraine in People’s Republic of China. 2020. “Legal basis of Ukraine and China.” Embassy of Ukraine in the People’s Republic of China. Last access 22 August 2022. <https://china.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/184-dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-kitajem>.
- Wang, Gungwu. 2004. “The fourth rise of China: cultural implications” *China: An International Journal* 2 (2): 311-322.
- Watson, Adam. 1984. Diplomacy: Dialogue between States. London: Routledge.
- Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. “National Security” as an Ambiguous Concept.” *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (4) : 481 – 502.
- Xi, Jinping. 2022. “Rising to Challenges and Building a Bright Future Through Cooperation.” Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022. Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 Official Website. Last access 20 June 2022. <https://www.boaoforum.org/ac2022/html/>

detail_2_486_15865_meetingMessage.html.

Xiong, Guangkai. 2009. *International Situation and Security Architecture*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

Yang, Xiugang. 2022. “A New Model for the Economic Rise of China” *Asian Economic and Financial Review* 12 (7) : 518-536.

Yiwei Wang. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1) : 257-273

Zhang, Weiwei. 2012. *Civilizational state*. Singapore: World Scientific.

Zhao, Suisheng. 2010. “The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?” *Journal of Contemporary China* 19 (65) : 419-436.

Giuliano Bifulchi*

*Special Eurasia and University of Rome Tor Vergata***

CONFLICT IN UKRAINE, RUSSIAN- LANGUAGE JIHADIST PROPAGANDA, CHECHENS BATTALIONS AND THE LINK WITH THE RUSSIAN NORTH CAUCASUS

Resume

Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, international media have reported the presence of Chechen battalions among the ranks of Kyiv and Moscow's forces. The Chechen presence in the conflict has nourished the jihadist propaganda in the Russian language and created a debate in the Russian North Caucasus and among the Russian Muslim *umma* (community) regarding the legitimacy of fighting with or against the Russian Federation. This paper wants to analyse the Russian jihadist propaganda's narrative over Ukraine, the Chechen battalions' role in support of the Ukraine army, and the geopolitical risk for the entire Eurasian region from terrorist groups' exploitation of the Ukraine conflict.

Keywords: Ukraine conflict, North Caucasus, terrorism, jihadist propaganda, geopolitical risk

INTRODUCTION

When the Russian Federation began its 'special military operation' in Ukraine in support of the People's Republic of Donetsk and the People's Republic of Lugansk, the West harshly reacted to the Kremlin's military intervention labelling it as an 'act of war'.***

* Contact: giuliano.bifulchi@gmail.com

** Giuliano Bifulchi is PhD in Islamic History (University of Rome Tor Vergata). He was Adjunct Assistant Professor at the University of Rome Tor Vergata 2017-2019.

*** Since February 2022 the Kremlin has always promoted the idea of a 'special military operation' in Ukraine while the West and part of the international media community have described the events in Ukraine as 'Russian invasion', 'Russian aggression', 'Ukraine war'. Therefore, the author of this research preferred to use the term 'Ukraine conflict'.

In a few days, the Ukraine conflict had become an 'international conflict' because it had attracted western soldiers and foreign fighters from all over the world to support the Ukrainian army. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, since the start of the Ukraine conflict, 7,107 mercenaries have arrived in Ukraine to become members of Kyiv's 'international legion': while 4,366 fighters were killed or left the combat zone, 2,741 continue to participate in the conflict. Russian officials reported that among the Ukrainian ranks there are Poles, Americans, Canadians, Romanians, British, Georgians, Turks, Chechens and people from the Middle East who are fighting against the Russian army (RBC 2022, Bifolchi 2022a).

Soon after the beginning of the hostilities, international media informed that the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, sent his troops' well-known *kadyrovtsy*¹ to the Mariupol area in support of the Russian military forces. A video showed Chechen soldiers praying on Ukrainian soil while Grozny local and international media outlets denounced that Ramzan Kadyrov gathered his troops and special forces in the Chechen capital and was ready to support the Kremlin with more than 10 thousand soldiers (Bifolchi 2022b). The presence of the *kadyrovtsy* in Ukraine had a huge psychological impact on the ground since the Chechen soldiers are famous in the post-Soviet space and the Arab-Muslim world as highly skilled fighters who fought against the Russian troops during the Chechen conflicts and then contrasted terrorist groups in Chechnya (Šmíd and Mareš 2015; Ratelle and Souleimanov 2016; Chambers 2022).

Kadyrovtsy's presence in Ukraine created a link between the Ukraine conflict and the Russian struggle in North Caucasus to counter local militant groups and terrorist organisations such as Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) and Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus province) and control a region which plays a strategic role in Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy (Bifolchi 2020).² Furthermore, since 2014, when Donetsk and Lugansk decided to become independent from the Ukrainian central Government after the Euromaidan and thanks to the support of the Kremlin, several Chechen fighters have arrived in Ukraine to military support Kyiv's army in Donbas in the fight against the pro-Russian separatists forces. The Chechen presence in Ukraine and the Kyiv-

1 The term *kadyrovtsy* refers to the Chechen paramilitary group that plays the role of private and personal guard of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

2 The North Caucasus has been defined a 'bridge' between Europe and Asia and a 'barrier' between the Muslim and Orthodox Christian worlds. In recent decades, local militancy and terrorist groups have negatively influence the regional dynamics pushing the Kremlin to elaborate a military and socioeconomic strategy to guarantee local stability and security and improve the living standard conditions.

Moscow confrontation over Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk, have attracted the interests of North Caucasian militancy and terrorist groups and media and social networks related to the Russian jihadist propaganda's galaxy.

It is undeniable that North Caucasian armed militancy, as well as terrorist groups, have been monitoring the Ukrainian crisis since 2014 and subsequently, since February 2022, have extensively analysed the Russian military operation in Ukrainian territory by promoting a strategic communication aimed at portraying Vladimir Putin's Russia as the first enemy for the Caucasian and Muslim community and labelling as 'traitors' the Muslim allies of the Russian Federation like the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

This investigation aims to analyse the essential points of the jihadist propaganda in the Russian language promoted by the portals belonging to the world of armed militancy and terrorist groups of the North Caucasus. Furthermore, the research wants to provide an overview of the Chechen battalions in Ukraine against Russia that invoke jihad against the Russian troops and recall the Russian Muslims to their effort 'on the path of Allah' against the Russian 'invader'.

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

This qualitative study investigates jihadist propaganda in the Russian language and the presence of North Caucasian foreign fighters in Ukraine among the ranks of Kyiv's forces.

This paper is based on media and journal articles and NGO reports concerning the role of the Chechen battalions in Ukraine and the impact of jihadist propaganda in the Russian language on the Russian Muslim community. The author of this paper collected open sources (articles, videos, posts, and social messages) from February 2022 to April 2022 to assess the impact of the Ukraine conflict and Russian foreign policy in the North Caucasus and the Russian jihadist galaxy.

In the paper context, it should be stressed that the North Caucasus, thus Chechnya, plays a fundamental role in the Kremlin's foreign and domestic politics. The region was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union; nowadays, the North Caucasus represents a federal administrative entity inside the Russian Federation, which attracts the economic and political interests of foreign countries and plays a strategic role as a transport and infrastructure corridor between Europe and Asia where different commercial ways intersect, first among all the New Silk Road.³ Indeed, the North Caucasus is a logistic cluster which links Russia

3 In 2013 China started the Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road, an attempt

with the Caspian Sea area, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Many consider the region a barrier that has divided the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim world and protected the Middle East, Turkey and Iran from Russian expansion. Today the North Caucasus continues to play this fundamental and decisive role of protection and division, so its control remains one of the primary goals of the Russian Federation.

Due to its geostrategic centrality, the Russian Federation needs to maintain its control over the North Caucasus. Since the '90s, the Kremlin has faced local ethnonationalist movements, first among all the Chechen requests for independence which culminated in two conflicts, and then terrorist activities and jihadist propaganda that have undermined regional stability and development and threatened entire Russian territory. The Kremlin's necessity to control the region affects the Russian political discourse and influences jihadist narrative and propaganda. Therefore, the jihadist propaganda in the Russian language on the Ukraine conflict as the Chechen battalions' support to the Ukrainian armed forces have links to the North Caucasus and represent a potential threat to the Russian central authority.

THE CONFLICT NARRATIVE OF KAVKAZCENTER AND CHECHENINFO

The web portals Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo have often discussed the conflict in Ukraine and supported Kyiv's resistance against Moscow. Since the Kremlin considers Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo as means of propaganda for different terrorist groups operating in Russia and the post-Soviet space because they depict Moscow as an enemy of the Muslim community, an investigation of their narrative might provide valuable information regarding the possible support or link between North Caucasian jihadist organisations and Chechen fighters in Ukraine.

Kavkazcenter⁴ has found space in academic and scientific investigations since the beginning of its activities and the Kremlin's accusation of being a terrorist portal which supported local North Caucasian militancy and terrorist groups. Kavkazcenter started its activity in 1999 during the outbreak of the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). From the beginning, the portal's managers declared that they wanted to create a media agency to provide information about the events of the Chechen

to create a commercial and human interconnection between Europe and Asia. This strategy is composed by the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. At the beginning this initiative was called One Belt, One Road but in mid-2016 the Chinese decided to change its name in Belt and Road Initiative.

4 Link: www.kavkazcenter.com.

conflict, overcoming the Moscow narrative labelled as ‘propagandistic’ and ‘false’. Although scholars and specialists do not entirely agree on whether to call Kavkazcenter a pro-terrorism portal, a connection between the website managers and the exponents of ImaratKavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) has been demonstrated in the past (Hann 2014; Dobaev and Cherevkov 2017; Bifulchi 2021).⁵

Compared with Kavkazcenter, ChechenInfo⁶ is the official information agency of ImaratKavkaz - VilayatNokhchichoy, which published its first post in April 2014. Looking at the website structure and posts’ chronology, ChechenInfo publishes original materials, external articles, and sources that might support VilayatNokhchichoy’s cause and the propaganda message.

Both websites cite each other as sources for their articles. Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo have followed and analysed Kadyrovtsy’s presence in the Ukraine conflict and Moscow’s military operation in the Ukraine territory, using their articles and posts to interest and spread their messages among the North Caucasians and Russian Muslims.

On February 22nd, 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the decree to recognise Donetsk and Lugansk (“Russia Recognised the Independence of Donetsk and Lugansk” 2022), Kavkazcenter published an interview with Abu Hamza, the emir of the Mujahidīn-Muhajir (fighters-migrants) of ImaratKavkaz – VilayatNokhchichoy. Abu Hamza described Kadyrov as Putin’s “personal project” and accused Moscow of using the “Kadyrov gang” (kadyrovtsy) to pursue its purposes according to his will and personal desires. Abu Hamza defined the Chechen leader as “one of the many Putin puppets who follow the Russian president on every mission.” ImaratKavkaz – VilayatNokhchichoy’s emir also commented on the news about the presence of 300-500 Chechen fighters on the Ukrainian territory and the eventuality that Moscow could have used

5 The Russian central authority considers *ImaratKavkaz* (Emirate of the Caucasus) a terrorist group that has organised attacks against Russian and North Caucasian civilians and military personnel. The Caucasus Emirate was composed of: *VilayatNokhchichoy* (Chechnya), *VilayatGalgayçö* (Ingushetia and North Ossetia), *VilayatCherkessia*, *Vilayat Dagestan*, *Vilayat of Kabarda, Balkar* (Kabardino-Balkaria) and *Karachay* (large area of Caraciai-Circaxia), *VilayatNogay* (areas inhabited by Nogai in the Territory of Stavropol). In 2007, DokuUmarov, the self-proclaimed emir of *ImaratKavkaz*, founded the Caucasus Emirate with the final goal to establish an Islamic state in the North Caucasus based on the *shari’a* (Islamic law). During the years, Kavkazcenter has published press releases and videos of the Caucasus Emirate and demonstrated its connections with some members of the Caucasus Emirate. Between 2013 and 2015, *ImaratKavkaz* saw a strong downsizing when Russian forces eliminated the leadership of the group (including DokuUmarov) pushing some main figures of the North Caucasian terrorist scene to swear allegiance to the Islamic State giving life to the *Vilayat Kavkaz* (Caucasus Province). The Russian Federation has repeatedly worked to close Kavkazcenter, whose server has been located in the Baltic countries and also in Sweden.

6 Link: www.checheninfo.com

more North Caucasian soldiers to fight the Ukrainian army. Regarding the possible involvement of the Chechen Diaspora in Ukraine, Abu Hamza stressed that “There is no Islamic basis in this participation, except for the situation where a mutually beneficial agreement with specific obligations between Caucasian volunteers and the highest authorities of Ukraine will be concluded. In this case, participation in hostilities is allowed because Ukraine and the Muslims of the Caucasus have only one enemy - Russia. Caucasians (Chechens) living in Ukraine have a different situation; they have property, relatives and families there. They are obliged to defend their home, honour and homeland on a par with Ukrainians. They are obliged to fight on the side of Ukraine against the aggressor.” (Kavkazcenter 2022a).

On February 28th, 2022, a few days after the beginning of the conflict, Kavkazcenter published a video where Abu Hamza, speaking in the Chechen language, labelled kadyrovtsy as “Putin’s slaves” and “infidels” who “...sold everything to the Russian infidels: their honour, people, religion, and homeland.”. In a 7-minutes video, Abu Hamza emphasised that sending Chechen troops to Ukraine is part of the bigger Kremlin’s strategy to reduce the number of Chechen fighters who might wage war against Russia in the future and free their motherland. The emir of ImaratKavkaz – VilayatNokhchichoy, also accused Ramzan Kadyrov of having transformed Chechnya into a Russian concentration camp isolated from the rest of the world; therefore, the international community has become hostile against the Chechens due to Kadyrov’s domestic policy and support to Moscow (SvobodnijKavkaz 2022b).

Usually, it is possible to watch Abu Hamza’s videos on the YouTube channel SvobodnijKavkaz (Free Caucasus), which collect videos and messages from currently and previously leaders of the Caucasus Emirate and the North Caucasian militancy. Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo have recently commented, reported, or published several videos firstly broadcasted on the SvobodnijKavkaz YouTube channel. For instance, the channel posted Abu Hamza’s tape where the emir attacked what he called “Kadyrov’s shameless mullah, Salah Mezhiev” for declaring jihad in Putin’s name and thus allowing the participation of Chechen soldiers in the conflict in Ukraine in support of the Russian armed forces. Abu Hamza, urging Salah Mezhiev to meet him in Turkey to discuss the reasons for his statements, stated in his video message that “The deceptive rogue (Salah Mezhiev) agreed that the dirty murderer of Muslims, the executioner of Chechen children and women, Putin, who publicly declared that he would fight with Allah, can almost be considered the ‘caliph of the Islamic State’” (SvobodnijKavkaz 2022a),

Kavkazcenter published an interview with Sheikh Hasan al-Zabadi who reiterated that the Russian Federation is the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims. Al-Zabadi emphasised that “Currently it is the duty of Muslims, particularly in Ukraine, to repel the aggression of our traditional enemy: Russia. This enemy is attacking Islam and Muslims today, just as it did before” (Kavkazcenter 2022b).

Kavkazcenter also distributed the interview with Shaykh Abu Qatada al-Filastini⁷, who exalted the Chechen jihad and the figure of Shamil Basayev, whose “example still gives rise to heroes in the ummah, gives rise to the Mujāhidīn”⁸. Al-Filastini concluded the interview by declaring that “Chechnya was a place where great events took place, a great exchange of believers with Allah, a real downfall, a legend! This was the greatest jihad in which Allah exalted men and allowed them to crush (Russia), the state of the criminals, inflicting such damage on them that none of the larger states could inflict on them” (Kavkazcenter 2022c).

On the one hand, at the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, Kavkazcenter published articles, news and interviews which defamed Chechen soldiers who were fighting against the Ukrainian forces and provided clarification about why the Chechens who live in Ukraine might conduct jihad against the Russians. On the other hand, ChechenInfo tried to convince the Russian Muslims to take arms against Mosco because the Kremlin and Putin are the “greatest enemy” of the Muslim society.

In a bilingual article (Russian/Arabic) published towards the end of February reporting what was defined as a “stray message” sent to the editorial staff, ChechenInfo stressed that “... it is currently the duty of Muslims, particularly in Ukraine, to repel the aggression of our traditional enemy: Russia. This enemy is attacking Islam and Muslims today, just as before. Muslims must persevere in reining in the enemy, wherever he may be, taking advantage of every lawful opportunity from the point of view of the shari’a. Islam and Muslims have no greater enemies than Russia. In particular, if Muslims have the opportunity to coordinate with a government hostile to the aggressor, even non-Islamic, to protect themselves from Muslims (the Chechens), as well as to take revenge on

7 Abū Qatāda al-Filastīnī, born in Bethlehem in 1960, is a Muslim cleric of Jordanian-Palestinian origin accused of being in contact with or belonging to *al-Qaida*.

8 Shamil Basayev was a Russian soldier, terrorist and politician who fought the first and second Chechen wars as an Islamist militant and Chechen independence leader, adopting the name of ‘Abd Allāh Shamil Abu Idrīs al-Bassī. During the two Chechen wars Shamil Basayev adopted guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorist attacks to influence the Russian and international public opinion. Indeed, according to Russian security forces, he was behind the attacks of Dubrovka Theater in 2002 and the No. 1 School in Beslan in 2004. He was killed on July 10th 2006, in an explosion in the town of Ekazhevo in the Republic of Ingushetia.

an old Bolshevik enemy, every time the opportunity arises, it must be used". This paragraph underlined the idea that the Russian Muslims and every Muslim in the world should ally with the Ukrainian Government, even if not Muslim, in the fight against Russia and Chechnya's Ramzan Kadyrov. Looking at the history of Islam, also the Prophet Muhammad fought with the non-Muslims in the battles of Badr and Uhud against the Meccan enemies, who were friends and relatives of some of the Prophet's companions. Thus, in this framework, ChechenInfo saw an alliance between Muslim Chechens and Orthodox Ukrainian as a possible and helpful strategy against the common enemy (ChechenInfo 2022).

These articles and interviews might relate to several posts, images, and videos spread among Twitter and Facebook accounts and YouTube and Telegram channels which painted Russia as the greatest danger and enemy of the Muslim ummah and Islam against whom Chechens and North Caucasians as every Russian Muslim should fight "in the path of Allah". According to Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo narrative, Russia is an adversary that oppressed Muslim believers in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Bashkiria, Tatarstan, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and Egypt. Therefore, these portals considered legitimate that all Muslims, especially those living in Russia, can fight against the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.

THE DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV AND SHEIKH MANSUR BATTALIONS OPERATING IN UKRAINE

Since 2014, Chechen fighters have operated in Ukraine by supporting Kyiv's army in Donbas among the ranks of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and Sheikh Mansur Battalion. The Ukrainian Government allowed Chechen fighters' participation in the military conflict against pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, especially when, in 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree on a simplified procedure for obtaining Ukrainian citizenship even for those who "participate in counter-terrorism operation in eastern Ukraine, ensure the national security of Ukraine or discourage the aggression of the Russian Federation in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk."

On this issue, before the beginning of the conflict, several Chechens were subjected to sanctions or restrictions on the process of obtaining citizenship due to the Kremlin's request for extradition. By contrast, since February 2022, the Ukrainian Government has changed its approach by allowing the Chechens to live in the Ukrainian sovereign territory and fight in support of Kyiv's army in Donbas. Among these people there are

the Chechen soldiers who fight in the ranks of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and Shaykh Mansur Battalion (Belov 2022; ChechenjaSegodnja 2022).

THE DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV BATTALION

The International Peacekeeping Battalion, named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, is defined as a voluntary non-governmental armed formation that takes part in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine alongside the Ukrainian security forces. It is mainly composed of Chechens who emigrated from Russia after the Second Chechen Conflict (1999-2009). Among its ranks, there are also volunteers from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, England, Norway, Denmark, France, Austria, and Finland (Korrespondent 2014).⁹

The battalion is named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, killed in 1996 by the Russian armed forces. In 2014, in Denmark, the social and political movement SvobodnjKavkaz (Free Caucasus) established the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion to create an armed group capable of taking part in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Currently, the Chechen activist Adam Osmaev is the battalion leader. Russian authorities accused Osmaev of attempting to assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin. In 2017, according to Russian and Western sources, Osmaev managed to escape an attack in Kyiv, where his wife was killed (“Batal’on Im. Dudaeva Vozglavil Chechenec, Obvinjaemyj v Pokushenii Na Putina” 2015).

In the past, among its ranks, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also included Isa Munaev, a Chechen commander who fought in both the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). After fighting the Russian troops in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, Isa Munaev received political asylum in Denmark, where he created the movement SvobodnjKavkaz. In 2014, after the establishment of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion, Isa Munaev went to Ukraine and fought against pro-Russian separatist forces of Donetsk and Lugansk until February 1st, 2015, when he died in the battle of Debaltseve (Muradov and Sokolovskaja 2015).

Russian sources reported that among the creators or supporters of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion there are: Sergey Melnikoff, an activist and photographer with US citizenship, awarded the Order of Heroes of

9 The Second Chechen Conflict (1999-2009) broke out following a series of organized attacks in Russia that recorded a high number of civilian casualties has often been defined by Moscow as an anti-terrorist operation linked to the global fight against terrorism launched by the United States.

the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; Isa Sadigov, a military leader and an Azerbaijani public and political figure; Nureddin Ismailov, a former commander of the Boz Qurd detachment (Gray Wolves); Shamil Tsuneoka Tanaka, a Japanese journalist who converted to the Muslim religion in 2001 and took part in the clashes in the Kodori Gorge; Hasan Isaev, also known as Kazbich Chechenskiy (ChechenNews 2017).

In recent years, the Dzhokar Dudayev Battalion has released several videos and messages via its media channels and social networks to draw attention to its activities and influence the Chechen and Muslim communities. In a video published in February 2022, Adam Osmaev declared that it was necessary to join forces against “the terror suffered by the Chechen people carried out with the tacit consensus of Russian President Vladimir Putin”. He also added that the Chechens living in Turkey and Europe could have joined the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion in the fight against the Russian forces when the situation on Ukrainian soil would have been stable. In addition, Osmaev addressed Chechen soldiers’ parents who fought for the Russian armed forces inviting them to urge their sons to go back home and abandon “the army of the empire that killed their people” (Magomedov 2022).

SHAYKH MANSUR BATTALION

The Shaykh Mansur International Peacekeeping Battalion is considered a voluntary, non-governmental organisation that takes part in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine alongside the Ukrainian security forces. The military group mainly consisted of Chechens who emigrated from Russia after the Chechen wars. The battalion is named after *Shaykh Mansur Ushurma*, who led the resistance against the Russian expansionism of Tsarina Catherine the Great during the late eighteenth century. The figure of *Sheikh Mansur* remains a symbol of resistance to the external invasion both in Chechnya and the entire North Caucasian region. Indeed, the North Caucasian jihadist propaganda has often used *Shaykh Mansur* as Imam Shamil to revoke unity and urge Muslims to take up arms against the Russian central authority (Bifolchi 2022c, 39-41).

Muslim Cheberloevsky is the battalion leader. In February 2022, he published a video to confirm that he was fighting with his Chechen comrades in Ukraine against the Russian armed forces. In addition, Cheberloevsky accused *kadyrovtsy* and other Chechens who fight for the Russian Federation of misrepresenting the Chechen people. He stressed that “Chechens have no enmity with Ukrainians. I am sure that the participation of Chechens in military aggression on someone’s side goes

against the national interests of the Chechen republic and its people. Those who want to support Ukrainians and express their protest [...] against Russia's actions should do so in peaceful demonstrations in the squares of the cities where they live"(NovostiOdessi 2022).

The battalion has its Facebook page and a significant presence on social networks. At the end of March 2022, the *Shaykh* Mansur Battalion published a video that exalted an incursion conducted against the Russian armed forces in a village near the Ukrainian capital(Maskhadov 2022).

CONCLUSION

We define geopolitical risk as the danger associated with wars, terrorist attacks and state tensions (Caldara and Iacovello 2018, pag.2). The Ukraine conflict has raised the geopolitical risk in Europe, especially due to foreign fighters' presence in military operations on the Ukrainian soil thanks to the Kyiv's "international legion".

Jihadist propaganda and terrorist organisations might exploit the Ukraine conflict to convey their message and reach a broader audience. This framework includes portals such as Kavkazcenter and ChechenInfo, and foreign military groups operating in Ukraine, such as the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and *Shaykh* Mansur Battalion, that might become the fertile ground for the jihadist recruiting campaign.

Due to its strategic location, Ukraine might become a 'bridge' between Europe and Asia, particularly the Middle East, for jihadist and terrorist groups. The vacuum of power registered on Ukrainian soil due to the conflict and Kyiv's strategy to use foreign fighters and mercenaries against the Russians might push terrorist combatants to join the so-called "international legion" to acquire Western training and weapons, using them against Europe in violent attacks.

Considering that in 2021 Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree granting citizenship to foreigners fighting against Russia, if Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union, these foreign fighters could quickly move on European soil and carry out targeted attacks. Among them could also be the Chechens and the North Caucasian fighters who currently are among the ranks of Dzhokhar Dudayev and Shaykh Mansur battalions or other people that Kavkazcenter or ChechenInfo exhorted to join the fight in Ukraine as "truly Muslim believers".

Since the propaganda aims to weaken or destroy the Russian Federation, this eventuality will increase the geopolitical risk associated with the proliferation of jihadist groups, which see Moscow as their first enemy.

Furthermore, due to the consistent presence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Europe, especially the Chechens, the European Union cannot underestimate the threat posed by jihadist propaganda in Russian related to the Ukraine conflict. Even though articles, videos, and messages published on Kavkazcenter, ChechenInfo, and other social media channels are a direct threat to Moscow, in the past, these websites have also targeted Brussels accusing the European Union of oppressing Muslim believers.

In this perspective, the European Union cannot overlook the impact that jihadist propaganda in the Russian language can have on the Chechen and North Caucasian Diaspora present in Europe. In contrast, the Ukrainian Government considers heroes those people who are on Russia's terrorist lists. Therefore, after the end of the conflict, these foreign fighters might stay in Europe and organise the activities of the Caucasus Emirate, al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, increasing the European geopolitical risk.

REFERENCES

- Belov, Evgeny. 2022. "Chechency – JetoLjudi, KotoryeZaNas'. Predstavitel' Prezidenta Ukrainy – o Dobrovol'cah i Jekstradicijah." ("Chechens are people who are for us." Representative of the President of Ukraine on volunteers and extraditions) *Kavkaz.Reali*. April 20, 2022 (Evgeny 2022)
- Bifulchi, Giuliano. 2020. *Geopolitica Del Caucaso Russo. Gli Interessi e l'influenza Del Cremlino e Degli Attori Stranieri Nelle Dinamiche Locali Nordcaucasiche* (Geopolitics of the Russian Caucasus. Kremlin and foreign actors' interests in the North Caucasian local dynamics). Roma: Sandro Teti Editore. (Bifulchi 2020)
- Bifulchi, Giuliano. 2021 "The Impact of Jihadist Propaganda in the Russian Language: Analysis of Kavkazcenter." *The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development* 11 (1): 6–14. (Bifulchi 2021)
- Bifulchi, Giuliano. 2022. "Geopolitical Risk of Foreign Mercenaries in Ukraine." *SpecialEurasia*. April 19, 2022. (Bifulchi 2022a)
- Bifulchi, Giuliano. 2022. "Ukraine Conflict, Kadyrovtsy, and Chechnya." *SpecialEurasia*. February 25, 2022. (Bifulchi 2022b)
- Bifulchi, Giuliano. 2022. *Storia Del Caucaso Del Nord Tra Presenza Russa, Islam e Terrorismo* (History of the North Caucasus between Russian presence, Islam, and terrorism). Roma: Anteo Edizioni. (Bifulchi 2022c)

- Caldara, Dario, and Iacovello, Matteo. 2018. "Measuring Geopolitical Risk", *International Finance Discussion Papers* 1222, pag.2. (Caldara and Iacovello 2018)
- Chambers, Harold. 2022. "One Month on in the Ukrainian War: What Role for the Kadyrovtsy?" *Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique*. April 6, 2022.
- Chechen Info*. 2022. "Doshedshee Do Nas Aktual'noe Poslanie." (Actual Message that has come down to us). February 27, 2022. (ChechenInfo 2022)
- Chechen News*. 2017. "Pis' mai Obrashhenijaona Dobrovol' cevImeni Dzhohara Dudaeva." (Letters and Appeals in Support of the Creation of the International Battalion of Volunteers named after Dzhokhar Dudayev). November 12, 2017.
- Chechnja Segodnja*. 2022. "Million Dollarov Obeshhal Kadyrov Za Informaciju o Mesto na hozhdenii Batal'onov v Ukraine." (One Million Dollars Kadyrov Promised For Information About Battalion Locations In Ukraine). April 26th, 2022.
- Dobaev, Igor P., and O. Cherevko. 2017. "Transformacija Radikal'nogo Islamistskogo Dvizhenija Na Severnom Kavkaze: Ot 'ImarataKavkaz' - k 'Vilajjatu Kavkaz.'" (Transformation of the Radical Islamist Movement in the North Caucasus: From 'Caucasus Emirate' to 'Caucasus Vilayat'). *RossijaiMusul'manskij Mir* 9 (303): 13–31.
- Hann, Gordon M. 2014. *The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Kavkazcenter*. 2022. "Abu Hamza: Ukraina, Svoboda iKadyrovskie Bandy" (Abu Hamza: Ukraine, freedom and kadyrovtsy's band). February 22, 2022. (Kavkazcenter 2022a)
- Kavkazcenter*. 2022. "MnenieShejhaHasanaAz-Zabadi Ob UchastiiMusul'man v Russko-UkrainskojVojne." (Opinion of Sheikh Hasan Az-Zabadi On the Participation of Muslims in the Russian-Ukrainian War.). February 28, 2022. (Kavkazcenter 2022b)
- Kavkazcenter*. 2022. "Shejh Abu Katada Al'-Filistini: ChechenskijDzhihad - VelikijDzhihad, v Kotorom Allah VozvysilMuzhchini Dal ImSokrushit' Rossiju." (Sheikh Abu Qatada Al'-Filistina: The Chechen Jihad is the Great Jihad in which Allah Exalted the Men and Let Them Crush' Russia). March 19, 2022. (Kavkazcenter 2022c)

- Korrespondent*. 2014. rotvorcheskij Batal'on Dlja Okazaniya Pomoshhi Ukraincam." (Peacekeeping Battalion Created In Chechnya To Help Ukrainians). March 7, 2014.
- Magomedov, Zakir. 2022. "Ne mest', a dolg musul'manina". Liderchechenskogobatal'ona Adam Osmaev – o vojne v Ukraine" ("Not revenge, but the duty of a Muslim." The leader of the Chechen battalion Adam Osmaev - about the war in Ukraine). *Kavkaz Reali*. March 22, 2022.
- Maskhadov, Anzor. 2022. "Obrashhenie Komandira Chechenskogo Batal'ona Imeni Shejha Mansura Muslima Cheberlojskogo." (Message from the Commander of the Chechen Battalion named after Sheikh Mansur Muslim Cheberlozhsky). *Facebook*.
- Muradov, Musa, and Jalina Sokolovskaja. 2015. "Na Ukraine Pogib Komandir Ne s Toj Vojny." (Commander from the wrong war died in Ukraine). *GazetaKommersant*, February 3, 2015.
- Novosti Odessi*. 2022. "Prishlo Vremja Vsem Zashhitit' Ukrainu." (It's time for everyone to protect Ukraine). February 16, 2022.
- Ratelle, Jean François, and Emil AslanSouleimanov. 2016. "A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow's Policy of Chechenisation." *Europe - Asia Studies* 68 (8): 1287–1314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1230842>.
- RBC*. 2022. "Minoborony Opublikovalo Obnovlennyye Dannyye Po Chislui Naemnikov Na Ukraine." (The Ministry of Defense Published Updated Data on the Number of Mercenaries in Ukraine). July 22, 2022.
- Šmíd, Tomáš, and Miroslav Mareš. 2015. "'Kadyrovtsy': Russia's Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (5): 650–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.942035>.
- Special Eurasia*. 2022. "Russia Recognised the Independence of Donetsk and Lugansk." February 21, 2022.
- Svobodnij Kavkaz*. 2022. "Abu Hamza: Kadyrovskij «dzhihad» vo Imja Putina v Ukraine." (Abu Hamza: Kadyrov's "jihad" in the Name of Putin in Ukraine). March 3, 2022. (SvobodnijKavkaz 2022a)
- SvobodnijKavkaz*. 2022. "Abu Hamza: Obrashhenie k Putinskim Rabam, Kadyrovcam, Kotoryh Posylajut Na Vojnu Protiv Ukrainy." (Abu Hamza: Appeal to Putin's Slaves, Kadyrovites, Who Are Sent to War Against Ukraine). February 26, 2022. (SvobodnijKavkaz 2022b)

Ukrainskaja Pravda. 2015. “Batal’ on Im. Dudaeva Vozglavil Chechenec, Obvinjaemyj v Pokushenii Na Putina.” (Battalion Im. Dudayev Headed by Chechen Accused of Assassination of Putin). February 3, 2015. (Ukrainskaja Pravda 2015)

Marko Parezanović*

Academy for National Security in Belgrade

RUSSIAN SPECIAL OPERATION IN CRIMEA IN 2014

Resume

The Russian special operation of capturing the Crimean Peninsula represents a highly complex military-political operation, carried out by the Russian Federation at the end of March 2014, shortly after the color revolution in Ukraine. With the skillful, lightning-fast and daring engagement of its military forces and special services, Russia captured and established itself in Crimea in a short time, to the surprise not only of official Kyiv, but also of the entire international public. Using available legal and political mechanisms, Russia supported the implementation of a series of activities that resulted in the declaration of independence of the Republic of Crimea and its accession to the Russian Federation.

Keywords: Crimea, Russian Federation, special operation, color revolution, referendum.

INTRODUCTION

The Russian special operation in Crimea in 2014 refers to the capturing of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian army and Russian special services, with the aim of permanently securing this territory and annexing it to the Russian Federation. In Russian literature, this event is often called the "Crimean Spring".

After the outbreak of the color revolution in November 2013, it became clear that the contradictions and divisions in Ukrainian society had reached such a level of polarization, on the pro-Russian and pro-Western side, and that there were no chances for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Although all the most important international factors advocated the necessity of a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis, in essence

* Contact: beogradbg15@gmail.com.

each of these actors worked in the opposite direction, following their own interests.

The circumstances in Crimea were very specific, but also favorable from the Russian point of view, primarily due to the territorially limited and clearly defined geographical area (it is a peninsula), the majority of the population consisted of ethnic Russians, as well as the already established Russian bases in Crimea, which was in the immediate vicinity of Russia (Granholm and Malminen 2014). Also, according to the official data of the Ukrainian Statistical Office from 2009, nearly two million inhabitants lived in Crimea, of which almost 60% declared themselves to be of Russian nationality, and after 2014 the percentage of Russians increased further.

In December 2013, the Autonomous Region of Crimea formed its organized “Self-Defense” formation, which, in principle, represented a form of territorial defense, while its armament was not legalized, primarily because there were no formal-legal prerequisites for it. “Self-defense” was formed by the residents of Crimea, who voluntarily joined the said formation, and as the situation on Maidan worsened, “Self-defense” gained more and more importance among the residents of Crimea. It is known that extremist and neo-Nazi structures from Maidan organized attacked and carried out violence against the pro-Russian part of the population of Ukraine, which is why this form of organization of the inhabitants of Crimea was a kind of response to that, bearing in mind that the Ukrainian state authorities at the time had no desire, but nor the ability to ensure the safety of all citizens of Ukraine.

Based on the analysis of a large number of documents, the review of dozens of hours of documentary video materials and the testimonies of various and unrelated actors, but also based on the suitable time distance, we are free to express the opinion that the Russian special operation in Crimea is a forced action by official Moscow. By all accounts, Russia made the decision to seize Crimea in a very short period of time, without long-term planning and developing appropriate strategies, in order to do it in some different and, conditionally speaking, more usual circumstances.

In this sense, we believe that the real reason for the quick reaction of the Kremlin was the result of acknowledging that after the color revolution, the new Ukrainian authorities will allow NATO forces to occupy Ukrainian military bases on the entire territory of Ukraine, including those located on the Crimean Peninsula. It is known that NATO has been operationally present in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 (Парезановић 2013, 80-83), and that numerous advisers from Western countries have been involved in the Ukrainian special services,

who were in charge of training and “reforming” the Ukrainian military and security system, since then. Given that Ukraine was not a member of NATO, the formal legal reason for the legalization of NATO’s presence on Ukrainian territory would be found in the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, through an agreement on military-technical cooperation or similar. In this way, although Russia has the headquarters of its Black Sea Fleet based on the international agreement in Simferopol, would not have an even remotely safe position, nor an appropriate strategic and tactical potential, surrounded by NATO forces in the immediate vicinity.

In addition to the above, when considering the necessity of launching a special operation to seize Crimea, Russia also had in mind the humanitarian component, which is to ensure the safety of pro-Russian citizens and the unequivocal will of the Crimean population to be part of the Russian Federation in the future, which was confirmed by an overwhelming majority in the conducted referendum.

EVENTS ON THE MAIDAN AS A TRIGGER FOR LAUNCHING A SPECIAL OPERATION

In November 2013, mass protests began in Kyiv’s central Maidan square against the then Ukrainian authorities led by President Viktor Yanukovych. The formal reason for the protests was the refusal of the Ukrainian authorities to sign the then unfavorable Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. Then the International Monetary Fund (IMF) added fuel to the fire, which suspended further credit arrangements with Ukraine, i.e. it gave Ukraine extremely unfavorable conditions which, in case of acceptance by the Ukrainian side, would produce social and economic difficulties in the country that would be unbearable (the request of the IMF referred to the “recommendation” that Ukraine immediately increase the price of energy and heating by 40%, as well as significantly reduce budget expenditures).

On the other hand, Russia latently pressured Ukraine regarding its membership in the Eurasian Union and closer cooperation on energy issues. President Yanukovych achieved the new presidential mandate and the parliamentary majority in the Verkhovna Rada on the basis of pro-European policies and promises, however, in the vortex of complex and tense geopolitical relations between the West and Russia (Пророковић 2018), Yanukovych “began to wander” and did not find his way in the role of balancing between opposing side. Certainly, the key actors and organizers of the color revolution were the Ukrainian opposition and the Western external factor, which is most responsible for the realization of

the political coup in Kyiv.

Given the pronounced pro-Western narrative of the new Ukrainian revolutionary authorities, it was absolutely clear that there would be intense pressure and a process of political and any other social isolation and ostracism of the pro-Russian population in Ukraine. And not only that, numerous extremist organizations that followed the neo-Nazi ideology, according to the mentioned category of the population, also proposed significantly more radical scenarios, such as the crime in Odessa in 2014, when 48 pro-Russian citizens were set on fire in the building of the House of Trade Unions. In such circumstances, the residents of Crimea and other areas in the southeast of Ukraine could not sit idly by and desperately called official Moscow to help them and protect them from the neo-Nazi wave. Thanks to the Kremlin's reaction, that wave failed to wash over the Crimean Peninsula, but it washed over and submerged the Kharkov, Luhansk, Donbas, Kherson and Odessa regions from 2014 to February 2020, that is, until the beginning of the Russian special military operation.

According to a number of Western authors, the Russian goals of the special operation are twofold. On the one hand, there is geopolitics, because Ukraine belongs to Russia's sphere of interest, and in 2014 it was considered that Ukraine would join the Eurasian Union. Also, the naval base in Sevastopol is of special military-strategic importance for Russia. On the other hand, the goals were also contained in the internal policy of the Russian Federation, because President Putin wanted to further unite the country around traditional values, to raise his popularity and to make it clear that no Maidan or color revolution would be tolerated in Russia (Persson and Vendil Pallin 2014, 25).

COMPLEX POLITICAL AND SECURITY EVENTS IN CRIMEA

After the embodiment of the color revolution on Maidan, on March 23rd and 24th, 2014, large rallies were held in Crimea, from which messages were sent that the violent and illegal change of power in Kyiv is not recognized, and that the population of Crimea demands joining the Russian Federation. However, the new authorities from Kyiv reacted swiftly and organized a counter rally in the capital Simferopol, where they mobilized thousands of Crimean Tatars¹ and "Right Sector" extremists

¹ Crimean Tatars are a people of Turkish origin who mainly live in Crimea, where they make up about 10% of the total population. They are Muslim, and official Kyiv, during the period of complex political and security events in Crimea, intimidated members of this nationality that mass

who had traveled to Crimea from Kyiv and the western parts of Ukraine for this purpose. The Ukrainian police in Crimea, which was still under the formal control of official Kyiv, did not do anything to prevent violence and conflicts at the aforementioned meeting. It was a group of extremists from the “Right Sector”, which had rich experience from the protests on Maidan in carrying out violence, causing disorder and forcibly occupying buildings, that tried to occupy the building of the Supreme Council in Simferopol (the central government building of the then autonomous region of Crimea), however the Crimean “Self-defense” prevented them from doing so as soon as the violent groups entered the ground floor of the mentioned building. There are indications that members of the Russian special forces were already in the building at that time, well-armed, in green camouflage uniforms and without signs of their affiliation. Also, a week before the beginning of the special operation, the Russian special services disrupted all radio-telephone communications and Internet traffic between Ukraine and Crimea. Ukraine actually had difficulties with command and control over that part of its territory, due to strong cyber-attacks from the Russian side². These attacks were initially carried out by hacker attacks, as well as special electronic actions from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol.

Immediately before the beginning of the Russian special operation, Ukraine had about 18,800 soldiers in Crimea, most of whom belonged to the navy. However, at the end of February, Igor Tenyukh estimated that this number was lower and amounted to 15,000 soldiers (Howard and Pukhov 2014). On the other hand, Russia at that time had about 12,000 soldiers in the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, and at that time these forces were inferior to the Ukrainian units in Crimea. They lacked infantry fighting vehicles, armored-mechanized units and artillery pieces. However, there were good conditions, which were part of the international agreement, to deliver significant military potential to the base of the Black Sea Fleet from Russia in a short time, which would strengthen the firepower and overall capacities of the existing Russian units (Kofman et al. 2017, 6).

Although in available open sources, the official beginning of the Russian special operation in Crimea is given as February 27, 2014,

violence would be carried out against them on the Russian side as a sign of decades-long and historical intolerance between the two peoples, which was certainly part of a planned special war disinformation by the Ukrainian authorities.

2 Cyber-attacks are almost always a prelude to military interventions. In 2020, the Azerbaijani army was taught this Russian doctrine, also a few days before the start of the military intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh, it carried out strong cyber-attacks on Armenia and Armenian positions in the Nagorno-Karabakh area.

based on the results of the research, we reasonably assume that the direct Russian military presence in Crimea, and also on the territory of Ukraine, existed a few days before official announcements. Namely, on the night of February 22 to 23, from the Donetsk region (the city of Berdyansk, on the coast of the Sea of Azov), a detachment of Russian special forces, using military helicopters, secretly evacuated Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to Crimea, after whom the new Ukrainian authorities and extremist structures intensively searched after the political coup (Баранец 2019, 188-195).

When organizing and realizing goals of this nature, it is very important to find legal models to satisfy the legality and legitimacy of all actions, which will also follow the course of military actions, and legalize them in a certain way, to the extent that it is objectively possible. For the above reasons, on February 26, a session of the Supreme Council of Crimea was held, during which the decision was voted to hold a referendum on the future status of the peninsula in the upcoming period, which definitely gave the full political support of the Crimean authorities for the further implementation of the special operation.

In addition to the above, from the aspect of the topic we are investigating, a very important event took place on February 27, and it refers to the military and civilian part of the airport in Simferopol. For the rebels in Crimea, it was of particular importance, because there were indications that the authorities in Kyiv would use the said airport to carry out the landing of military forces in order to take the peninsula by force. The plan was to join the disembarked forces with regular units of the Ukrainian army and police, about twenty thousand of whom were already in Crimea, to isolate the Russian base of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as to seize and put under control all of the most important administrative facilities of the political government. On the other hand, the establishment of control over this airport enabled the landing of a large number of Russian military transport planes, which delivered a large number of personnel and military equipment to Crimea in a very short period of time. At the same time, two more strategically important military airfields in Crimea were captured, namely Kacha (Russian: Кача) near Sevastopol and Dzhankoyi (Russian: Джанкой) in the south of the peninsula, where transport planes were soon located (Баранец 2019).

Figure 1. Operational situation on the ground on March 3, 2014



Source: (Баранец 2019, 214)

At the beginning of March, the Russian sides in Crimea were strengthened edlanding ships and occupied Ukrainian naval bases. Great firepower and extreme mobility were the main characteristic of the Russian forces in that period. Russian troops exerted strong psychological pressure and propaganda actions towards the Ukrainians commanders, providing them with security guarantees if they go over to the Russian side. In mid-March, through the Kerch ferry crossing, Russia began a mass landing conventional troops, primarily motorized rifle brigades, heavy artillery, various air defense unit and several anti-ship missile batteries (Kofman et al. 2017, 10).

Regarding the number of soldiers engaged for the implementation of the special operation, Russia issued already existing international agreements, according to which she had approval to enter composition of the base of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea can simultaneously contain a little more than twenty thousand soldiers, so it used the provisions of that agreement for formal and legal purposes cover and engagement of their forces. This means that the President of Russia did not have to ask for approval of the Federation Council for the engagement of the military abroad. Estimates indicate that it this special operation carried out with a smaller number of engaged forces, that is, that it was not exceeded the figure of twenty thousand participants, which is not the result of successful action of Russian forces, but also the support of the local

population. Without the support of the local population, no territory can be held. It can be conquered, but in order to keep it under control and make it stable for a longer period of time, the aforementioned support is necessary. Also, when it comes to the number of engaged forces, in the execution of special operations of this type, the quality of soldiers is much more important than their number. The quality of a soldier implies his ability to participate in operations of this nature, because it is not about classic conventional combat operations at the front, but about a very delicate form of a hybrid model of task implementation.

Figure 2. Military capacity agreement that was in effect during the outbreak period of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014



Source: (Ria.ru)

In response to the Russian special operation in Crimea, NATO soon organized a military exercise in the Black Sea with the participation of a large number of forces and the use of offensive weapons. As a countermeasure, the Russian side additionally strengthened the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, among other things, by installing the “Bastion” anti-ship system, as well as the S-400 air defense system, in such a way that it would be visible, so that the rival side could register the presence of a strong military- of technical potential in Crimea (deterrence factor).

In order to better analyze the operational and tactical elements of the military operation in Crimea, Western authors believe that it is necessary

to explain the strategic characteristics of hybrid warfare. In this sense, one of the first specificities of hybrid warfare is that such an undertaking most often represents a military-political campaign with insufficiently defined, i.e. fluid strategic goals, whereby military force plays the role of an auxiliary means. The overarching character of hybrid warfare is essentially non-military given the nature and scope of the instruments of state power employed. The instruments used include cyber-attacks, pressure diplomacy, economic mechanisms, threats related to energy issues and the intensive use of media to build a political narrative and legitimize military operations. Until February 2014, this included the use of volunteer units, the provision of logistical and armed assistance to separatist groups, and the constant presence of the Russian army on the borders of Ukraine, which occasionally helps rebel groups with direct or indirect actions (Pejić 2019, 429).

In this sense, in the years preceding the special operation in Crimea, the Russian armed forces carried out a reorganization of the military structure. Two elite divisions of the land army (fourth Tamanskaya and fifth Kantemirovskaya), which were previously organized according to the principle of brigades, were restored. The increase and reorganization of units was also noticeable in the airborne forces. Three new airborne brigades assigned to the southern and eastern military districts have been redeployed as rapid response forces in crisis situations (Pejić 2019, 432). It is important to emphasize that the share of defense expenditures in Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 1.5% in 2010 to 3.2% in 2013 and 4.1% in 2014 (Baev 2015, 8).

Immediately before the beginning of the special operation in Crimea, the distribution of members of the Russian armed forces by military districts was visibly uneven. While in most districts the number of troops was lower than planned, the occupancy was around 60%, in the southern military district covering the Transcaucasia (Жељски 2018) and Black Sea area, the occupancy was around 95%. This information indicates the importance of the southern military district and the perception of Russian foreign policy from where threats can come, as well as the possibility of projecting Russian military power in the region (Pejić 2019, 432).

A very significant part of the operation was related to the peaceful surrender of twenty thousand Ukrainian soldiers who were stationed in Crimea in various units. At first, those events did not go well for the Russian side, because the Ukrainian army in Crimea received commands from Kyiv, which has since changed its government. The soldiers were aware that by handing over objects, military equipment and themselves,

they were breaking their oath and committing criminal acts. Criminal proceedings were initiated against those who switched to the Russian side in the first days before the military court in Kyiv. When it comes to the oath, there were different interpretations and views among the Ukrainian soldiers themselves, and more and more the question arose among them to whom they actually swore. Whether to the deposed Yanukovych, who at that time was still legally and legitimately elected president, or to the new Kyiv authorities who, on the wave of the colored revolution, came to power illegally and violently. In the negotiations on surrender and transfer to the Russian side, not only Russian military forces and special services participated, but veterans of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church also made a significant contribution.

The only Ukrainian military formation in Crimea that did not want to voluntarily lay down its arms and hand over its facilities was the first battalion of naval infantry in the town of Feodosia, which was mainly composed of soldiers from the west of Ukraine. By the way, since January 8, 2014, that battalion has been subordinated to the NATO rapid reaction forces, which was also documented by the official agreement between the Ukrainian army and NATO. It is interesting that the battalion commanders in Feodosia maintained direct contact with the United States Consulate General in Kyiv from their base. In a short time, this facility was also placed under the control of the Russian forces, and it was the only direct use of force by the Russian forces during the realization of the special operation. The captured soldiers were extradited to Ukraine, but they later operated in Donbas and Donetsk, where they committed war crimes and atrocities against the pro-Russian population as part of the Galicia battalion.

In order to better understand the military background of the Russian special operation in Crimea, it is expedient to analyze the statement of the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, who in his now famous speech in February 2013 pointed out that things have changed in the XXI century ways and doctrines of warfare. Gerasimov also emphasized that the rules of war have changed dramatically, as well as that non-military means are now much more effective than weapons themselves in achieving political and strategic goals. In his opinion, the use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military means greatly affects the protest potential of the population, as an integral part of modern conflicts. According to some Western authors, Russia used this hybrid strategy of warfare in Ukraine (Persson and Vendil Pallin 2014, 32).

In addition to the above, the special operation in Crimea illustrated

the ability of the Russian Federation for strategic coordination of military and non-military assets. It is interesting that on February 26 (just a few days after the realized political coup in Kyiv), the armed forces of Russia held a large military exercise in the Western and Central Military Districts (Norberg, Franke, and Westerlund 2014, 41). The exercise was intended to send a strong message to the new Ukrainian leadership and their Western partners. Also, Russia used its army in three ways in the implementation of the special operation in Crimea: *it threatened Ukraine with its strong military potential; the Russian army was still carrying out diversions in the depth of Ukrainian territory; the Russian army and special services supported the local population to take power in Crimea* (Norberg, Franke, and Westerlund 2014, 42).

As for the budget of the Russian armed forces, according to Western authors, it has increased significantly in the last few years. In fact, the fundamental reorganization of the Russian armed forces began in 2009. Military exercises were carried out more and more often, which resulted in the military capability of the Russian army increasing significantly. An increasing number of professional contract soldiers were hired, who were disciplined and well trained for operations abroad, above all they were durable, capable of long-term warfare and keeping the occupied territory under control. Regular infantry units, which were mostly filled with one-year conscripts with weaker morale and discipline, were gradually replaced by professional personnel.

In addition, one of the main directions of action of the Russian forces in Crimea was the control of information content and transmission media infrastructure. The Russian army and special services initially provided that media infrastructure, such as TV and radio stations, as well as base stations for Russian mobile phone operators (Norberg, Franke, and Westerlund 2014, 43).

The key factor that gave the Russian military an advantage at both the strategic and tactical levels was surprise. The high-quality and well-equipped armed forces of Russia acted synergistically and chose where, when and how to seize Crimea. Another key advantage was the large military base of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Гуменный 2021). Its role was reflected in the possibilities of assuming military dominance on land, as well as anti-aircraft protection and defense against potential attacks from the sea. The fleet also blockaded the forces of the Ukrainian Navy while still in their ports. Furthermore, the size of Crimea and the configuration of the peninsula naturally limited the area of operations. The developed road infrastructure, numerous airports and ports supported the landing of units, while the entire peninsula was also suitable for defense

against possible attacks from the Ukrainian side from the mainland. In addition, Crimea was already defined as an autonomous administrative region in Ukraine, as a separate entity, which in a formal and legal sense facilitated the annexation. Also, the proximity to Russia was also important, as it facilitated the landing of a large number of armed forces and their logistical support. The ethnic composition of the peninsula and the Russian-speaking area also supported the implementation of the special operation. This is very important, because there was no language barrier between the Russian forces and the local population. The weakness of the new Ukrainian authorities, as well as the weakness and disorganization of the Ukrainian armed forces, the largest number of which in Crimea went over to the Russian side (Norberg, Franke and Westerlund 2014, 45), contributed to Russia's success.

RESOLUTION ON INDEPENDENCE AND REFERENDUM ON JOINING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Until the vote on the independence of Crimea and the referendum that followed shortly after, there were numerous security threats aimed at obstructing these political processes. The Kyiv regime tried in every possible way to destabilize the political and security situation in Crimea, using the capacities of its own and Western special services. American drones and other reconnaissance systems were present in large numbers around Crimea. In order to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism, the Ukrainian special services used parts of the agency network of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in Crimea, which remained on the line of official Kyiv, but they also introduced sabotage groups to the peninsula.

For the above reasons, the Kremlin sent specialists from the Federal Security Service (FSB) to Crimea, who in a short time stopped several diversions, sabotage and terrorist acts. As the most impressive sabotage-terrorist act that was prevented at that time, and which carried with it the greatest social danger, it referred to the attempt of Ukrainian saboteurs to poison the city's water supply in Simferopol.

According to the original plan, the referendum was supposed to be held on May 25, 2014, however, due to the rapid complication of political and security events on the peninsula and its surroundings, the decision was changed and the deadlines were shortened. Accordingly, on March 11, the Crimean parliament voted a resolution on independence and declared the independent Republic of Crimea. This created the formal and legal conditions to hold a referendum on the future status of Crimea.

On March 16, 2014, a referendum was held in which, based on the official statement of the Supreme Council of Crimea, 96.77% of voters declared that they wanted the peninsula to join the Russian Federation. For the Russian side, it was of particular importance that the referendum took place safely and without any incidents of a political nature. Two days later, on March 18, in a solemn ceremony in Moscow, the Republic of Crimea was admitted to the full membership of the Russian Federation, with the city of Sevastopol receiving the status of a city of the Southern Federal District.

Only a few countries recognized Crimea's independence, and this political-legal event caused the United States and the European Union to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation. However, although few recognized the independence of Crimea, UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 of March 27, 2014, which condemned the declaration of independence of Crimea and its annexation to the Russian Federation, further divided the world community on this issue. Namely, a significant number of countries did not vote for the adoption of that resolution, among which was the Republic of Serbia, which opened up space for new different interpretations and contradictions. The Russian side generally interprets the non-voting for the resolution as *de facto* recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, while the opposite side sees it the other way around.

Figure 3. The relation between the states regarding the independence of Crimea and its annexation to Russia

СТРАНЫ МИРА, ПРИЗНАВШИЕ КРЫМ ЧАСТЬЮ РОССИИ



Редактор: Владислава Макачук
 Дизайнер: Игорь Беляков

f /aif.ru D /aif_ru v /aifonline g /aifru

АРГМЕНТЫ
ФАКТЫ
aif.ru

Source: (Krym.aif.ru)

In any case, regardless of different legal-political, historical, social-economic, military-security, cultural and other views on Crimea, since 2014 this peninsula has been part of the Russian Federation and that will remain an unchanging category. In international politics, international public law and justice often do not guarantee the preservation of national interests and values, but, unfortunately, the achievement and protection of those goals also requires force (Milosavljević 2014, 149).

CONCLUSION

The Russian special operation in Crimea is an intriguing topic, which attracted a lot of international attention in 2014. However, in the

available scientific and research materials there is no proportion on that basis, that is, there is no corresponding fund of scientific works that equivalently follows that level of social interest, especially in domestic literature. We especially emphasize that during this research, relevant literature from Western sources was used to a significant extent, in order to avoid the possibility that the research would acquire the character of one-sidedness and non-objectivity.

No matter what anyone in the world community thinks about the Russian Federation, the undivided opinion is that Russia brilliantly carried out a special operation in Crimea in 2014. That operation was carried out with a large and visible use of force, but essentially non-violently. The success of its implementation is largely due to President Putin, who personally took responsibility and managed the special operation in the “manual control” mode. In this way, Russia has shown and proved that it has an efficient army and special services that are extremely capable of sudden hyper and hybrid models of combat operations.

The support of the local population was essential for the success of this operation. If it were otherwise, then it could be said that it is an occupation, with an uncertain outcome, which would mainly depend on the intensity of the use of force. Such conditions are unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, Russia knew very well that embarking on such a complex operation was only possible if it was wanted and supported by the majority population of Crimea. What is certainly not in the available literature, for understandable reasons, is that the special operation was preceded by good intelligence preparation, which could not be realized overnight, but is the result of years of continuous work by the Russian special services. This does not mean that the Russian side has been preparing for the invasion of Crimea for years, but it is caused by the fact that there was a Russian military base of strategic importance on the peninsula, that the majority of the population of Crimea was of Russian nationality, that the peninsula was located on the border of Russia, and not just any place, but in an extremely sensitive area of the Caucasus region. There are certainly more reasons, but the importance of intelligence preparation and quality intelligence work, from which, when necessary, goals of not only military and security, but also political, economic and any other vital character can be effectively realized is indisputable.

The population and political leadership of Crimea showed great courage and daring, especially in the period until the special military operation began. The violence from Maidan threatened to spread to the Crimean Peninsula, and in such social circumstances, the pro-Russian population in Ukraine did not have a secure perspective. And significantly

less than that, it can also be said that it was fundamentally endangered, bearing in mind the destructive activities of Ukrainian extremists and neo-Nazis.

The Russian state leadership perfectly harmonized the proportionality between political and military measures, whereby all mechanisms from that range were used in a timely and effective manner. In this way, it was avoided that the special operation had an exclusively military character, but in parallel with the execution of military actions, it also had a political-legal component, which is as important as the military, if not more important (declaration of independence, conducting a referendum, joining the Russian Federation and similarly).

REFERENCES

- Baev, Pavel. 2015. *Ukraine: a Test for Russian Military Reforms*. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales.
- Carlsson, Märta, Johan Norberg, and Fredrik Westerlund. 2013. „The Military Capabilities of Russian Armed Forces.“ In eds. Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective– 2013*. Stockholm: FOI.
- Defense Intelligence Agency. 2017. *Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support a Great Power Aspirations*. United States: Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Granholm, Niklas, and Johannes Malminen. 2014. „A Strategic Game Changer?.“ In *A Strategic Game Changer? Rude Awakening Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine*, eds. Niklas Granholm and Johannes Malminen, pp. 9-17. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI.
- Howard, Colby, and Ruslan Pukhov. 2015. *Brothers armed: military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine*. East View Press.
- Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer. 2017. *How Russia Annexed Crimea, Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Mazzar, J. Michael. 2015. *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding the Channing Era of Conflict*. New York: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, Carlisle Barracks.
- Milosavljević, Sladan. 2014. *Rusija i mir*. Beograd: Akademska misao – Inovacioni centar Fakulteta bezbednosti Univerziteta u Beogradu.
- Norberg, Johan, Franke Ulrik and Fredrik Westerlund. 2014. „The Crimea Operation: Implications for Future Russian Military

- Interventions.“ In eds. Niklas Granholm and Johannes Malminen, *A Rude Awakening Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine*, pp. 41-50. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI.
- Pejić, Igor. 2019. „Ruske vojne hibridne operacije u Ukrajini: prilagođavanje strategije i taktike savremenoj strukturi rata.“ *Međunarodni problemi*, str. 423-446. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Vol. 71, br. 4. doi: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP1904423P>.
- Persson, Gudrun, and Carolina Vendil Pallin. 2014. „Setting the scene—The view from Russia.“ In eds. Niklas Granholm and Johannes Malminen, *A Rude Awakening: Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine*, pp. 25-34. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI.
- Баранец, Виктор. 2019. „Спецоперація Крим 2014.“ *Комсомольская правда*, 6 март 2019.
- Гуменный, Александр. 2021. „Флаг Родины“. *Газета Краснознаменного Черноморского флота Российской Федерации*. Москва: Министерство обороны Российской Федерации.
- Жельски, Релџа. 2018. *Политика у сенци насиља-политичко насиље на Северном Кавказу*. Београд: Службени гласник.
- Парезановић, Марко. 2013. *Политички преврат-савремени приступ*. Београд: Нова српска политичка мисао.
- Пророковић, Душан. 2018. *Ера мултиполарности*. Београд: Службени гласник.

Marija Đorić*

Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

Strahinja Obrenović**

*Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade*

EVOLUTION OF EU ENERGY LAW AND POLICY: A BIG COMEBACK OF ENERGY SECURITY IN 2022?

Resume

The armed conflict in Ukraine in 2022 and subsequent worsening of relations between Western countries, including the EU and its Member States, and the Russian Federation, have deeply shaken the existing EU energy law and policy foundations. During the past decades, the EU attempted to develop a comprehensive energy policy based on three pillars – competitiveness and internal market principles, security of supply, sustainability and environmental protection. Starting in the 1990s, liberalization efforts dominated the electricity and natural gas markets. It did not take long for energy security and environmental protection to gain attention. Enlargement of the European Union and occasional problems with external suppliers prompted new measures regarding the security of supply, while a growing body of legislation is also present in the field of environmental protection. The three objectives of the EU energy policy are not always complementary, and some tension and even confliction between them can't be excluded. Although the European Union and its institutions attempt to embrace all three pillars under the sustainability umbrella, this hasn't brought a desirable outcome yet. We are witnessing the big comeback of energy security in 2022, including the adoption of some measures by the Member States that are not in line with decarbonization efforts, at least in short term.

* Contact: mara.djoric@yahoo.com

** Contact: strahinja.obrenovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs

Keywords: EU energy law, EU energy policy, energy security, energy crisis, 2022 Ukraine crisis.

INTRODUCTION

The energy industry has become very important for the development of modern countries, especially in the 20th century. The situation was the same when speaking of European countries. One of the main ideas after World War Two was to create an organization on the European continent that will regulate steel and coal markets. That idea was materialized through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which consisted of six Western European countries. A few years later, another community emerged, dealing with the regulation of civil use of nuclear energy, namely the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). By that time, two out of three European Communities had the energy sector as a field of their activity. Paradoxically, that was not enough to establish an energy policy on the European level. It was a *domaine réservé* for Member States, and there was no will to delegate powers in this field to some supranational institution on the European level. The idea of a common energy policy resurfaced from time to time, especially when the European Community faced some challenges in this field of policy. The obvious examples were two oil crises during the 1970s and subsequent problems with energy supplies, as well as rising energy dependency on non-EU exporters. Most Member States, if not all of them, approached this crisis unilaterally and tried to find a solution by negotiating bilaterally with external suppliers (Labbate 2014, 119). It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the European Commission tried to make a breakthrough regarding the energy markets in the EU, especially when speaking of electricity and natural gas markets. That action was a part of a wider liberalization effort directed towards bringing a Single European Market into existence. Nevertheless, most Member States were against the ambitious European Commission's proposal to radically change the energy industry in short term and all of the Member States, including the United Kingdom, which strongly supported the liberalization process, were not happy with the idea of transferring more competence to the European institutions, particularly to the European Commission (Herweg 2017, 96). An attempt to introduce the energy chapter in the Treaty during the 1990s was also unsuccessful; however, triggering the liberalization process brought a "wind of change" to the European energy market. Adoption of the two Directives by the end of the century was the first important step towards changing the energy industry

in the European Union, and even beyond this institution (Directive 96/92/EC, Directive 98/30/EC).

It was quite clear that the main objective behind these first legislative instruments regarding liberalization of electricity and natural gas sectors was competition and establishing a functional internal energy market. Security of supply and environmental objectives did not play a prominent role during the first phase of the liberalization of energy markets, but that does not mean that European institutions, Member States, and a wide range of stakeholders (i.e., energy companies, consumers associations, NGOs) did not discuss and address these issues. One possible interpretation of this approach was that effective competition and a truly functional energy market will contribute to security and sustainability objectives, so that no further measures are necessary, except those of market forces and its “invisible hand”. As we will see further in the text, this can be true in some situations, but these objectives can potentially be conflicting in some cases.

At the heart of the liberalization process was the phased opening of national markets and integration of fragmented energy markets into a single energy market. The beginning of the process coincided with relatively low energy prices and abundant volumes of energy from external suppliers. One of the main security concerns at that time was energy relations between the EU and countries established in the post-Soviet space. Some important questions arose regarding the security of supplies and security of transit, but neither of them is particularly addressed in the abovementioned Directives on common rules for electricity and natural gas markets.¹ Instead, the European Union chose to employ separate instruments with countries belonging to the former Eastern bloc, including a new group of countries called Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics.

The adoption of the European Energy Charter coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late December 1991, intending to bring a new political and legal framework for the cooperation of the former East and West.² Initially, this was a non-binding declaration that

1 The exception is a provision that incorporates the concept of “security of supply” as a part of public service obligation (PSO), and according to Art. 3 of both Directives (Directive 96/92/EC, Directive 98/30/EC), Member States may impose this obligation on electricity or natural gas undertakings “in the general economic interest”. This notion of security of supply is different from the external dimension of energy security, which relates to dependency on non-domestic producers and/or suppliers.

2 Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed a new platform for energy relations and cooperation between the East and the West in June 1990. See: Martha M. Roggenkamp, Anita Rønne, Catherine Redgwell, and Iñigo del Guayo, eds. 2001. *Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Law and Institutions*, first edition. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 173.

subsequently evolved into the binding instrument known as the Energy Charter Treaty, covering different areas such as trade, investment, and transit of energy products and materials between different parties. The European Union parallelly deployed bilateral agreements with individual countries alongside this multilateral approach. The first group of countries consisted of Central and Eastern European countries, which were obliged to adopt *acquis communautaire*, including the evolving *energy acquis*, in order to become members of the European Union. Separate Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) were concluded with some of the former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation as a key partner and supplier of energy in the post-Soviet space.

These activities in the field of energy marked the first phase of establishing a common ground for a broader energy policy in Europe. There is little doubt that competition concerns and internal market objectives dominated this phase, while energy security and environmental goals were addressed through internal market paradigm. Radical changes happened at the beginning of the 21st century, such as increased volatility of energy prices, enlargement of the European Union, supply disruptions, and tensions between import-dependent countries and their external suppliers.

TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE EU ENERGY POLICY

It became clear that further measures are necessary to speed up the liberalization process in the energy markets in Europe. The European Commission prepared a new legislative package regarding common rules on electricity and natural gas markets, which would become known as the Second energy package. This package of new legislative acts consisted of two Directives and two Regulations, again addressing only the electricity and natural gas sectors (Directive 2003/54/EC, Directive 2003/55/EC, Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005). Further measures, such as regulated third-party access to networks (regulated TPA), instead of the possibility to choose the negotiated third-party access, as well as stricter unbundling rules (legal and functional unbundling), were adopted. Furthermore, there was an obligation imposed on the Member States to establish independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs), thus contributing to more complex governing and regulation of the energy sector. Internal market concerns still prevailed in these legal acts, while in comparison to previous natural gas and electricity Directives, more attention was directed towards securing supply and environmental protection.

A solid basis for the comprehensive energy policy and eventually EU common energy policy was an energy article incorporated in the Treaty, establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE2004, Article III-256). However, this Treaty never entered into force because of the referendum results in France and the Netherlands. Quite a similar (energy) article was later added through the Treaty of Lisbon, namely Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As we will see, it was the first time that a Treaty article dedicated solely to energy became part of primary EU law. Until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission and other EU institutions used powers invested by the other Treaty provisions, such as internal market rules (including free movement provisions or the so-called *four freedoms*), competition law, state aid rules, and environmental policy. The absence of a clear legal basis and energy article in the EU's primary law represented an obstacle to the comprehensive and all-encompassing energy policy.

The failure of the *European Constitution* in this context did not affect the European Commission's determination to actively promote broader energy policy. The Commission used existing powers granted by other Treaty articles in order to shape the European energy sector. Alongside liberalization efforts, several other legal acts were adopted during this period regarding the security of supply, promotion of renewable energy sources, and reduction of CO₂ emissions. This was obviously in contrast with the first phase of the EU activity in the field of energy, when the main concern was how to introduce more competition in the market. One of the first measures directed towards promotion of the use of renewable energy sources (RES) in electricity generation was the adoption of the so-called RES Directive in 2001 (Directive 2001/77/EC). This legal act set only indicative targets for the Member States and no mandatory targets in the first phase of its adoption. In many Member States, there was already a variety of support schemes for the development of renewable energy sources, and the Directive 2001/77, in that sense, did not change any of these support schemes, nor did it harmonize those different schemes (Cameron 2007, 497). Earlier individual initiatives in the Member States regarding renewable energy sources now received formalization at the EU level through adoption of new legislation and establishment of a Union-wide framework for the promotion of new technology and clean energy sources. Growing awareness of climate change and its consequences, including the impact of the energy sector on the environment, pressured European institutions to take action in this field.

With a similar aim, the EU adopted Directive 2003/87, which established the so-called Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), or greenhouse gas emission (GHG) allowance trading inside the European Union (Directive 2003/87/EC). It was expected that this instrument would help reduction of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions coming from large industries and electricity generation. One of the drawbacks of this mechanism was that, in the first phase of its implementation, most of the emission allowances were allocated without charge, and a minor part of allowances was allocated through auctions (Convery 2009, 402, 404). Nevertheless, this instrument was perceived as an effective tool that would contribute to two objectives of energy policy – reduction of CO₂ emissions and energy efficiency.

In parallel, the security of supply concerns gained more importance, at least in an attempt to formalize this concept in the EU energy law and policy. The security of supply objective attracted a lot of attention during the two oil crises back in the 1970s (Gaćinović 2014, 18). At that time, the European Community acted on a predominantly *ad hoc* basis, due to the absence of a comprehensive energy policy in the EU. The central part of the security of supply consideration was a dependency on external and non-EU suppliers, so one of the possible solutions was to diversify energy imports. To some extent, similar fear existed regarding natural gas imports but, as we already pointed out, energy security was not a priority in the initial stage of liberalization during the 1990s. With the expected enlargement of the European Union in 2004, energy security *gained momentum*. The main reason behind this was that many Central and Eastern European countries heavily relied on a single external supplier, while they lacked interconnection capacities and the possibility to import energy from other sources. This was in stark contrast to the situation in Western and Northern Europe.

In the very same year of the enlargement, the European Union adopted Directive 2004/67 concerning measures that would contribute to security of natural gas supply (Council Directive 2004/67/EC). Two years later, a similar Directive was adopted regarding the security of electricity supply (Directive 2005/89/EC). These instruments gave the Member States a wide discretion in the application of their provisions, while emphasizing the importance of coordination and cooperation between them. A wide range of actors were supposed to contribute to energy security, not only the Member States and European institutions, but also regulatory authorities, system operators, producers/generators, suppliers, and finally consumers. Disruptions of gas supplies from Russia in 2006, and especially in 2009, prioritized even further the security component


of the EU energy policy (Kovacevic 2009).

The turning point for EU energy law and policy was the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. For the first time, the energy chapter was introduced to the Treaty. Article 194 TFEU established a legal basis for a comprehensive energy policy, with a few objectives – completing the internal market and making it effective, taking into account the security of supply concerns, working on energy efficiency, promoting renewable energy sources and new forms of energy, and, last but not least, enhancing the connectivity between the Member States. Energy policy under the Treaty of Lisbon falls under the shared competence between the EU and its Member States, while the Member States retain the right to decide on their energy mix and different sources of energy, but also exploitation rights and setting the conditions for such exploitation (TFEU 2016, Art. 4 and 194). Finally, different segments of energy policy were covered under the same umbrella, namely Article 194 TFEU. In the same year, the Third energy package was adopted, further strengthening the existing rules and bringing complexity that reflected the evolving nature of energy policy (Directive 2009/72/EC, Directive 2009/73/EC, RegulationEC No 713/2009, RegulationEC No 714/2009, Regulation EC No 715/2009).

SUSTAINABILITY AS AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING PILLAR OF EU ENERGY POLICY

With the adoption of the Third energy package, many believed that the completion of the internal energy market is on the horizon. Additionally, it was clear that a pure *laissez-faire* approach would not be enough to achieve security of supply and environmental objectives and that further measures were necessary. Thus, the Third energy package brought a new complexity and even more regulation. The *three pillars* structure of EU energy policy was more evident than ever, covering competitiveness and internal market, security of supply, and environmental policy. Similarly, Heffron presented this pillar structure of EU energy policy through the energy law and policy Triangle, located in the heart of three other triangles – economics, politics, and environment.

Figure 1. Energy law and policy triangle (energy trilemma)



Source: (Heffron 2015, 3)

Although these three objectives can supplement each other, none can't exclude conflicting interests. The initial assumption was that the competitive and well-established market would contribute to the security of supply and provide market-based mechanisms for environmental protection, without distorting competition. In the same vein, the security of supply measures should contribute to new entrants and more competition by building new infrastructure and diversifying routes and sources of supply, while the promotion of new and renewable energy sources would reduce import dependency and thus minimize energy security concerns. Finally, working on sustainability would bring more competition between new entrants and existing market players and, at the same time, lower the quantity of fossil fuels in the overall energy mix. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In reality, the EU energy policy is often about balancing different objectives and making a decision on a case-by-case basis. Something similar is happening in 2022, as it will be described in the last part of the paper.

In the same year when the Third energy package was adopted, there was a disruption of gas supplies from Russia. In contrast to the situation in 2006, this crisis lasted longer and had greater consequences

for many European countries, including non-EU states in Southeast Europe (Kovacevic 2009). This rose energy security high on the EU agenda, followed by the adoption of new legislation concerning the security of natural gas supply (Regulation EU No 994/2010).³ Since then, energy security has been an important topic at the EU level, but additional measures were also taken towards sustainability. New Renewable Directive introduced mandatory targets for renewable energy in overall energy consumption, instead of indicative targets present until 2009 (Klessmann et al. 2010, 4679). Further steps were taken to reduce CO2 emissions in various sectors, while new instruments were deployed in order to improve energy efficiency.

A real challenge for EU-Russia energy relations came with the crisis and armed conflict in Ukraine in 2014, once again bringing back the energy security issue. Russia was one of the leading countries in terms of energy export to the European Union, while Ukraine was the main transit route for exporting natural gas from Russia to European consumers. However, the armed conflict in Ukraine did not affect gas supplies from Russia to the European Union, transiting through the Ukrainian territory. This event and other challenges gave impetus for the EU initiatives under the Juncker Commission, and soon enough, the Energy Union was launched in 2015. This project reflects 5 main dimensions of EU energy policy – energy solidarity, security and trust between the EU Member States, internal energy market dimension, energy efficiency, decarbonization, and finally research, innovation, and competitiveness (Austvik 2016, 376-378).

The European Commission came in 2016 with the proposal “Clean energy for all Europeans package”, which was supposed to contribute to decarbonization efforts and bring climate and energy policy closer (Ringel, and Knodt 2018, 2010). This proposal was later adopted, and thus brought major changes to the electricity market in the EU. However, the legislative changes in the natural gas sector were minimal, and this segment is still largely governed by the Third energy package provisions. Highly ambitious climate targets were set, and the EU revealed its goal to become the first climate-neutral continent in the world. Those ambitions are now clearly reflected through the European Green Deal, presented in 2019 by the European Commission (European Commission 2019). Two years later, the Commission presented a *Fit for 55* (or 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions), an initiative that is supposed to

3 Regulation EU No 994/2010 was repealed in 2017. See Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1-56.

considerably reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union by 2030 (Oroschakoff 2021).

It could be argued that the European Union, and primarily the European Commission, prioritize sustainability as one of the traditional pillars of EU energy policy, in order to bring more competition, open up possibilities for employment and new players on the market, and contribute to energy security by reducing dependence on external suppliers. Still, the EU nowadays largely relies on fossil fuels imports and that becomes obvious with the armed conflict in Ukraine in 2022 and the EU's response to it.

THE GRAND RETURN OF ENERGY SECURITY IN 2022 OR AN IMPULS FOR A FASTER DECARBONIZATION?

The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 has a strong impact on the EU energy policy, both at the national and EU levels. Since 2014, the European Union and its allies imposed sanctions on Russia over the annexation of Crimea and armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, while Russia introduced counter-sanctions. The energy relations between the European Union and Russian Federation underwent serious challenges, including the possible interruption of energy supply through the territory of Ukraine, which served as an important transit route to European consumers. Nevertheless, the energy sector was largely excluded from sanctions, with some exceptions regarding oil production equipment and technology necessary for the extraction of unconventional sources; natural gas production wasn't sanctioned (Coote 2018, 1). They also didn't prevent energy companies from the West to invest and participate in joint ventures with Russian companies in Russia and vice versa, while Russian undertakings continued activity in the European energy market.⁴ Despite the overall tensions in political relations between Russia and the European Union, energy cooperation was maintained to a large extent and even deepened in some fields.

One of the planned projects – the “South Stream”, was abandoned, largely due to newly adopted and more complex rules under the Third energy package and Russian opposition to it (Stern, Pirani, and Yafimava 2015, 3-7). Despite volatile political and economic relations between Russia and Türkiye, especially after the downing of a Russian jet by Turkish air forces in 2015, they managed to bring the “TurkStream” project into existence. The importance of this pipeline is that, alongside

4 Sanctions relating to the energy sector primarily targeted exploration and production in the Arctic, deepwater Russian offshore, and shale oil deposits utilization.

one string that serves the Turkish natural gas market, the other string extends through the territory of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary, bringing an additional 15.75 billion cubic meters capacity for transport of natural gas per year (Obradović, Stanojević, and Jeftić 2021, 270-272). Another project that provoked much more controversy was the “Nord Stream 2” pipeline, directed towards bringing additional volumes of natural gas from Russia to the German and European markets. This pipeline faced strong opposition inside the European Union, primarily coming from Poland and Baltic countries, but also outside the EU, as was the case with the United States of America or Ukraine (Šekarić 2020, 120). Contrary to the firm determination by Germany and Russia to proceed with the project, this pipeline fell under the sanction regime introduced by the US (Willn et al. 2021). Even a company based in one of the Member States could fall under the sanctions if it was involved in this project, and Germany strongly opposed to this, criticizing the extraterritorial effects of sanctions (Sinha, and Talmon 2020; Stojadinović 119-120).

Since the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the EU and other Western countries have imposed several packages of restrictive measures, i.e., sanctions.⁵ This time, the introduced sanctions have more impact on the energy sector and overall energy relations between the European Union and Russia. A large number of European countries depend on energy imports from Russia, and that dependency varies greatly from one Member State to another. Europe imports large quantities of natural gas, coal, and oil, but also uranium and other energy sources from Russia. Once again, energy security resurfaced, and this time, it brought along a lot of headaches for energy policymakers in the EU.

The most obvious change came with the decision of Germany to suspend the “Nord Stream 2” project in February 2022. Previously, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (now Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action) under the former German government concluded that providing certification to the “Nord Stream 2” operator “does not endanger the security of gas supply in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union”, as it was published in October 2021 (BMWK 2021).⁶ The assessment of the previous government

5 Russian officials claim that they started a “special military operation” (*О проведении специальной военной операции*) in Ukraine. See: Владимир Путин. 2022. „Обращение Президента Российской Федерации.“ *Kremlin.ru*. 24 февраля 2022 года <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>.

6 This procedural step to make an assessment whether issuing the certification to a third country operator would endanger the security of supply of the EU and its Member States represents a requirement of the 2009 Gas Directive and it is transposed to the German national law (Energy Industry Act – *Energiewirtschaftsgesetz*). That requirement is a necessary step before a national regulatory authority (*Bundesnetzagentur* in Germany) decides on certification.

was withdrawn under the new German government in February 2022, effectively depriving *Bundesnetzagentur* (German regulatory authority) of the possibility to proceed with the certification procedure and make a decision (BMWK 2022). This step was a radical change from the previous German position, which had significant consequences, given the fact that this country has been the largest European market for Russian gas exports.

Already in March this year, the EU extended its sanctions in the energy sector, further limiting energy cooperation between the West and Russia. That had a strong impact on the existing business of European companies active in the Russian market and involved in cooperation with Russian energy undertakings. Many Western energy giants announced that they are quitting the Russian market and withdrawing from joint ventures.⁷ Against this, the Russian president signed a decree in August 2022 that effectively limits investors from “unfriendly countries” from selling their assets and shares in Russia at least until the end of the year, while some foreign investors could be exempted from this prohibition by special presidential permission.⁸ Moreover, the EU undertakings fall under the prohibition of the EU restrictive measures to engage in commercial transactions with many Russian state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including energy companies. It is evident that Russian gas major Gazprom is largely excluded from the EU sanctions, given its importance as the main supplier of natural gas.

After a lot of discussion, the European Union managed to agree on banning the imports of coal from Russia. At the same time, there were tough negotiations regarding oil imports from Russia, and after strong opposition from some Member States, the ban on oil imports will be gradually introduced, initially covering the oil coming from Russia by sea. In addition, German and Polish representatives said that they will

7 Among those are Equinor (former Statoil), ExxonMobil, British Petroleum, and Shell. Italian Eni revealed its decision to pull out its 50% stake from the “Blue Stream” natural gas pipeline, which connects Russia with Türkiye under the Black Sea. Interestingly, French TotalEnergies announced it won’t enter into new projects in Russia and provide necessary capital, but remains involved and active in existing projects. Likewise, Japanese companies didn’t cease activities in the Russian market, particularly in the LNG sector. Le Monde. 2022. “Total Energies in Russia: France must stop turning a blind eye.” September 1, 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/08/25/totalenergies-in-russia-france-must-stop-turning-a-blind-eye_5994694_23.html; Yuka Obayashi. 2022. “Japan’s JERA signs new LNG deal with Russia’s Sakhalin-2.” August 26, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/jera-signs-deal-with-new-operator-russias-sakhalin-2-keep-lng-contract-2022-08-26/>.

8 Jeniffer A. Josefson, Vasilisa Strizh, Andrey Ignatenko, Alexandra Rotar, Valentina Semnikhina. 2022. “Russia introduces ban restricting ability of investors to exit from Russian investments in certain industries.” *Morgan Lewis*. August 10, 2022. <https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2022/08/update-russia-introduces-ban-restricting-ability-of-investors-to-exit-from-russian-investments-in-certain-industries>.

voluntarily end the imports of Russian oil coming by pipelines by the end of this year. In contrast, the situation with the natural gas imports is quite different due to the peculiarities of this sector and dependency on infrastructure. However, the absence of decision at the EU level to ban natural gas imports from Russia did not prevent some Member States from a unilateral ban on Russian gas. Lithuanian parliament adopted amendments to the Natural Gas Law that effectively prevent importing natural gas from countries that threaten Lithuania's national security, while allowing transit of natural gas to the Russian exclave Kaliningrad (Interfax 2022a). A similar step was taken by the Latvian parliament, formalized by amending the existing Energy law and banning imports of natural gas from Russia, starting from January 1, 2023 (Interfax 2022b). Estonia announced that it will stop importing Russian natural gas until the end of this year (Mürk 2022), but has not yet taken similar steps as Lithuania and Latvia to amend the existing law.

The situation with natural gas imports from Russia deteriorated even further with the adoption of the decree in Russia which requires the EU and other "unfriendly states" customers to open a specific bank account in rubles in order to pay for deliveries of natural gas (Reuters 2022; Ason 2022). The European partners who refused to open bank accounts in rubles were cut off from supplies of natural gas. Another trouble was associated with the flows of natural gas through the "Nord Stream 1" gas pipeline, connecting Russia with Germany under the Baltic Sea. One of the turbines from the compression station pumping the natural gas through "Nord Stream 1" was sent to Canada for maintenance. Since this country followed the path and, as the EU, imposed a wide sanction regime on Russia, the problem appeared with its delivery after the maintenance was finished. After the Canadian authorities managed to deal with their German counterparts, the sanction waiver was introduced and the turbine was sent to Siemens Energy in Germany. Although the turbine is ready for delivery to Gazprom, the Russian company rejects to take it from Siemens Energy, claiming that the German side hasn't delivered all necessary documents as proof that the maintenance and delivery of the turbine don't fall under the scope of sanctions introduced by the EU and Western partners (Fulwood et al. 2022, 5). This caused the volumes of natural gas transported through the pipeline "Nord Stream 1" to be lowered.

We are witnessing that energy security comes back after a while and threatens to overshadow the decarbonization process, at least in short term. Although the European Commission announced a stronger push towards energy transition and accelerating the deployment of renewable

energy sources which will reduce dependency on fossil fuels and reliance on external suppliers, this can't be achieved in short term.⁹ Part of the European answer to the current situation in the energy sector is bringing back coal, which undermines decarbonization efforts, at least in short term, and reveals that energy security and sustainability are not always compatible and can be quite conflicting. The worsening energy relations with Russia aren't the only challenge to the European energy security, given that a *perfect storm* is looming above the European continent.¹⁰ The EU and neighboring countries have to find solutions for maturing energy infrastructure and its upgrade, building new energy facilities, finding additional volumes of energy, working better on energy saving and efficiency, and securing enough resources to invest in new and renewable energy sources, just to name a few. Until then, it seems that the energy policy of the European Union will stay for a while under the shadow of energy security.

CONCLUSION

Energy law and policy of the European Union have undergone significant challenges and transformations during the decades of its existence. Although energy, or some segments of it, has been present since the establishment of the first European communities, it was only in the 1990s that major novelties were introduced. First energy packages aimed to introduce competition in energy markets, while energy security and environmental protection were in the shadow of liberalization efforts. This coincided with a period of relatively low energy prices and a new chapter in the relationship between the West and the East, echoing cooperation in this field by the end of the Cold war. An important aspect of new relations was the adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty, in parallel to several agreements on cooperation and partnership, which covered energy matters.

9 European Commission issued *REPowerPlan* in 2022, following the Russian attack on Ukraine, to get rid of Russian energy imports before 2030 and promote energy savings and clean energy. See: European Commission. 2022. "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition." 18 May, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.

10 The EU faces obstacles in finding alternative supplies and it becomes evident that there are difficulties in negotiation between Germany and Qatar over a long-term gas contract. Also, the latest visit of Chancellor Scholz to Canada couldn't secure an LNG contract; instead, negotiation focused on hydrogen cooperation and possible export to Germany. Michael Nienaber. 2022. "Germany's Drive to Replace Russian Gas Can't Rely on Canada." *Bloomberg*. August 19, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-19/germany-s-drive-to-replace-russian-gas-can-t-rely-on-canada>.

By the end of the century, energy policy in the EU became more complex, including growing concerns about energy security and the environmental impact of the energy sector. With the enlargement of the EU, the issue of security of supply received particular attention. Similarly, growing awareness of climate change paved the way for the rapid development of environmental law and principles, highly relevant for the energy sector. A turning point for this comprehensive approach towards energy policy was the incorporation of the “energy article” in the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of complex and detailed rules through the Third energy package and subsequent legislative activity.

A major challenge to the comprehensive EU energy policy came in 2022, with the armed conflict in Ukraine. This announced a big comeback of energy security and its complex relations with the internal market and competition objectives, as well as sustainability or environmental pillar of energy policy. Although the European Commission publicly speaks in favor of renewable energy as a solution for the current situation, it is questionable whether this transition could effectively happen in the short to medium term. It seems that recent steps taken by the many Member States, such as redeployment of coal power plants and uncertainty in securing enough volumes of energy, mean that the environmental objective would be overshadowed by the security of supply at least in short term.

REFERENCES

- Ason, Agnieszka. 2022. Ruble gas payment mechanism: implications for gas supply contracts. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
- Austvik, Ole Gunnar. 2016. “The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply.” *Energy Policy* 96: 372-382. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.06.013>.
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz [BMWK]. 2021. “Economic Affairs Ministry transmits supply security analysis in Nord Stream 2 certification procedure to Bundesnetzagentur.” October 26, 2021. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2021/10/20211026-economic-affairs-ministry-transmits-supply-security-analysis-in-nord-stream-2-certification-procedure-to-bundesnetzagentur.html>.
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz [BMWK]. 2022. “Minister Habeck comments on the situation in eastern Ukraine and the discontinuation of the certification procedure for Nord Stream 2.” February 22, 2022. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pre>

- ssmittelungen/2022/02/20220222-minister-habeck-comments-on-the-situation-in-eastern-ukraine-and-the-discontinuation-of-the-certification-procedure-for-nord-stream-2.html.
- Cameron, Peter Duncanson. 2007. *Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European Union*, second edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], *Official Journal of the European Union* C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 47–199.
- Convery, Frank J. 2009. “Origins and Development of the EU ETS.” *Environmental and Resource Economics* 43: 391–412. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9275-7>.
- Coote, Bud. 2018. Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. Washington DC: Atlantic Council.
- Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 127, 29.4.2004, p. 92–96.
- Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 027, 30.1.1997, p. 20–29.
- Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 1–12.
- Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 33–40.
- Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 37–56.
- Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 57–78.
- Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, *Official Journal of the European*

- UnionL* 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32-46.
- Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 33, 4.2.2006, p. 22-27.
- Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 55-93.
- Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 94-136.
- European Commission. 2019. "A European Green Deal" 11 December, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.
- European Commission. 2022. "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition." 18 May, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.
- Fulwood, Mike, Jack Sharples, Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava. 2022. *The Curious Incident of the Nord Stream Gas Turbine*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
- Gaćinović, Radoslav. 2014. „Energetska bezbednost države“. *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* 6 (1): 9-29. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.12014.1>.
- Heffron, Raphael J. 2015. *Energy Law: An Introduction*. Heidelberg: Springer Cham.
- Herweg, Nicole. 2017. *European Union Policy-Making: The Regulatory Shift in Natural Gas Market Policy*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Interfax. 2022a. "Lithuanian parliament officially bans Russian gas imports, except for transit to Kaliningrad." June 28, 2022. <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/80721/>.
- Interfax. 2022b. "Latvian parliament approves ban on Russian natural gas supplies as of 2023." July 14, 2022. <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/81322/>.
- Josefson, Jeniffer A., Vasilisa Strizh, Andrey Ignatenko, Alexandra Rotar, and Valentina Semenikhina. 2022. "Russia introduces ban restricting ability of investors to exit from Russian investments in certain industries." *Morgan Lewis*. August 10, 2022. <https://www>.

- morganlewis.com/pubs/2022/08/update-russia-introduces-ban-restricting-ability-of-investors-to-exit-from-russian-investments-in-certain-industries.
- Klessmann, Corinna, Patrick Lamers, Mario Ragwitz, and Gustav Resch. 2010. "Design options for cooperation mechanisms under the new European renewable energy directive." *Energy Policy* 38(8): 4679-4691. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.04.027>.
- Kovacevic, Aleksandar. 2009. *The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies: NG 29.
- Labbate, Silvio. 2014. "Energy and Transatlantic Relations: From the Attempts to Establish a European Policy to the Eve of the 1973 oil crisis". *Journal of European Integration History* 20 (1): 97-119. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2014-1-97>.
- Le Monde. 2022. "TotalEnergies in Russia: France must stop turning a blind eye." September 1, 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/08/25/totalenergies-in-russia-france-must-stop-turning-a-blind-eye_5994694_23.html.
- Mürk, Ken. 2022. "Estonia to stop importing Russian gas by end of 2022." *ERR*. April 7, 2022. <https://news.err.ee/1608557521/estonia-to-stop-importing-russian-gas-by-end-of-2022>.
- Nienaber, Michael. 2022. "Germany's Drive to Replace Russian Gas Can't Rely on Canada." *Bloomberg*. August 19, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-19/germany-s-drive-to-replace-russian-gas-can-t-rely-on-canada>.
- Obayashi, Yuka. 2022. "Japan's JERA signs new LNG deal with Russia's Sakhalin-2." *Reuters*. August 26, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/jera-signs-deal-with-new-operator-russias-sakhalin-2-keep-lng-contract-2022-08-26/>.
- Obradović, Žarko, Petar Stanojević, and Zoran Jeftić. 2021. "Natural Gas as a Subject of Geopolitical Interests of States". *Serbian Political Thought* 4: 255-286. <https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7442021.11>.
- Oroschakoff, Kalina. 2021. "5 things to know about EU's Fit for 55 climate package". *Politico*. June 21, 2021. <https://www.politico.eu/article/fit-for-55-eu-5-things-to-know/>.
- Путин, Владимир. 2022. „Обращение Президента Российской Федерации.“ *Kremlin.ru*. 24 февраля 2022 года <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>.
- Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, *Official Journal of the*

- European Union* L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 1–10.
- Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 289, 3.11.2005, p. 1–13.
- Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 1-14.
- Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 15-35.
- Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 211, 14 August 2009, p. 36-54.
- Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 1-22.
- Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1-56.
- Reuters. 2022. “TEXT-Putin’s decree on Russian gas purchases in rubles”. March 31, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-gas-putin-decree-idUSL5N2VY5U7>.
- Ringel, Marc and Michèle Knodt. 2018. “The governance of the European Energy Union: Efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance of the Winter Package 2016.” *Energy Policy* 112: 209-220. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.047>.
- Roggenkamp, Martha M., Anita Rønne, Catherine Redgwell, and Iñigo del Guayo, eds. 2001. *Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Law and Institutions*, first edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sinha, Rohan, and Stefan Talmon. 2020. “Germany considers U.S. extraterritorial sanctions illegal”. *GPIL – German Practice in*

- International Law*. 8 January, 2020. <https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2020/01/germany-considers-u-s-extraterritorial-sanctions-illegal>.
- Stern, Jonathan, Simon Pirani, and Katja Yafimava. 2015. *Does the cancellation of SouthStream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy?* Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
- Stojadinović, Miša. 2020. „Geopolitika i energetska bezbednost balkanskih država“. *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* 19 (2): 113-131. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.1922020.5>.
- Šekarić, Nevena. 2020. „Evropska energetska bezbednost: slučaj Severnog toka 2“. *Međunarodna politika* 1179-80: 119-138. doi: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_mp.2020.71.1179_80.6.
- Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [TCE], *Official Journal of the European Union* C 310, 16.12.2004, p. 1-474.
- Willn, James, Leigh T. Hansson, Finlay Donaldson, and Tan Albayrak. 2021. “Navigating sanctions of Nord Stream 2.” *Reed Smith*. 16 December, 2021. <https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2021/12/navigating-sanctions-of-nord-stream-2>.

Ljiljana Kolarski*
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Resume

The war in Ukraine represents a turning point in international relations that significantly affects the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. By taking place on European soil and mainly between Russia and Ukraine, it really indirectly affects several countries united in two important entities, the European Union and NATO. In this paper, we will deal with the analysis of the impact of the war in Ukraine on the countries of the Western Balkans, which are in a significant geopolitical position and have developed relations with Russia in the fields of foreign policy, security, and energy. The work aims to contribute to the understanding of the implications that are happening and that may arise in the domain of internal and foreign policy of the Western Balkan countries, and especially regional relations, as a consequence of the war in Ukraine. In the first part of the paper, attention is paid to a theoretical explanation of war and realism in international relations which could be implied to this war. Furthermore, a brief overview of the political events that led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine will be presented in order to understand the next chapter, which is dedicated to considering the response of each Western Balkan state to the beginning of the war and the events that came as a result of it.

Keywords: war, Ukraine, Russia, region, Western Balkan, European Union

INTRODUCTION

The war in Ukraine represents a complex political, security and economic issue in international relations in modern history. Before a

* Contact: ljiljana.kolarski11@gmail.com.

succinct explanation of its background and its impact on the Western Balkan countries, which is the topic of this paper, the author will present a theoretical approach to war and one of the theories of international relations necessary for understanding it as it unfolds. Therefore, it will be presented with Clausewitz's theory of war as well as realism as a theory of international relations that implies this war. The methodology will be comparative and based on factors in each country, such as changes in politics, security, and the economy brought on by the war.

As aforementioned, by taking place on the soil of Europe, the war in Ukraine leads to a re-examination of the theories of international politics, important democratic principles, and the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. It is certain that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shaken the European geopolitical and security architecture since it has involved the EU and NATO standing together with Ukraine. The war, which began on February 24, 2022, when Russia's military entered the country after being stationed for months on the Ukrainian border, has brought casualties, migrations, a halt in the Russian economy, and new diplomatic measures. Although being "local" and between two states, the war in Ukraine is a proxy war that involves several actors: two main countries, the Russian Federation and Ukraine; political and security alliances; and NATO and EU states. As a consequence, other countries could also be dragged into the conflict, including those that remain in the sphere of influence of many superpowers (Lachert 2022). Some of those countries are undoubtedly Western Balkan countries, with their peculiar geopolitical position and relations with Russia. This paper aims to provide a thorough and comprehensive explanation of the impact of the war in Ukraine on each Western Balkan country and to indicate the key moments in internal and regional relations.

THEORY ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Although the paper isn't focused on the theoretical study of war, its causes, and classifications, it is certainly necessary to offer certain theoretical determinations that are crucial for further understanding of the current war in Ukraine. Despite all the changes that human society has experienced in cultural, scientific, technological, political and every other aspect of development, war is a social phenomenon that accompanies all of humanity. Although the actors, strategies and tactics changed frequently, the war persisted. This was well noted by the Tunisian sociologist Gaston Bouthoul that "conditions change, but the war remains" (Matić and Podunavac 1993, 955). These authors

also contend that, as the harshest form of social relations, war implies attempting to achieve political goals that could not or did not want to be achieved in other, peaceful ways (Matić and Podunavac 1993, 955). Regardless of this difficulty, it is undeniable that (Aron 2001) “wars imply the organization of violent actions by conflicting communities” (354). War could be explained as the strategic-diplomatic behavior of states referring to the possibility of armed conflict as the ultimate solution to previous operations (Aron 2001, 179). Despite the tremendously diverse theoretical-analytical, legalistic and operational oeuvre of numerous theorists who tried to define war, the understanding of the former Prussian general and highly respected theorist of war art, Carl von Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1976, 51 cited in: Aron 2001) is one of the most popular for defining that “war is an act of violence aimed at forcing the opponent to do our will, and that such an act of violence has no limits” (59).

However, a high-quality and comprehensive analysis of war is not possible without considering its connection with politics. War, in particular, can be studied from the perspectives of psychology, sociology, law, and military security science, but its primary focus is on politics. War is an inseparable part of it. To back this up, Clausewitz’s well-known pattern suggests that war is a real political tool, the continuation of political relations, their realization through other means (Clausewitz 1976, 252). The above clearly indicates that it is necessary to take into account its connection with politics because it includes states and their political goals. Thomas Waldman additionally elaborates Clausewitz’s view, stressing out that the “war as an instrument of politics is presented almost nowhere as independent from the idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse. To state that war is a continuation of politics is to make a point beyond war’s instrumentality. Continuation powerfully conveys the idea that war is itself a form of political behavior, and thus, even if subjective policy loses control of its instrument, the lines that run through war remain fundamentally political in nature” (Waldman 2010, 3).

By taking place on the soil of Europe, the war in Ukraine leads to a re-examination of the theories of international politics, important democratic principles, and the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Which mechanisms failed, which one were misinterpreted, or were moves made on the spur of the moment? At this stage, it would be helpful to briefly mention theories of international relations that could offer further explanation of their cause. The explanation of war events in international politics reaches into political philosophy and the question of the state of nature. The different views of

the state of nature as seen by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, at the same time, shaped the philosophical principles of the two most famous views on world politics: the realistic and liberal approaches to international politics.

Although both theories offer their own explanations, it is very challenging to explicitly opt for only one of them because the combination of their elements and the changes that are taking place make a synthetic explanation impossible. The combination, but also the intertwining of many elements of both theories, is noticeable. Realists see the central problem of international politics in war and the use of force, with states as the main actors, while liberals point to a slightly broader picture of international relations through the understanding of states within the global society in which they operate (Naj 2006, 20). Realism, as a more pessimistic theory, has a narrower view of observing international relations, focused on individual states and their cooperation with other states, as opposed to liberalism, the so-called more optimistic theory that provides a broader insight through the observation of the international system and global society in which states participate and are part of that context (Naj 2006, 20).

In addition to the aforementioned theories, we believe that another aspect of observing international politics deserves attention. The aspect within realism, the so-called “defensive neorealism,” that has its roots in the work of Kenneth Waltz. The introduction of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in the late 1970s marked the beginning of defensive realism, often known as “structural realism.” According to Waltz, “great powers aren’t inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to power; instead, he starts by assuming that states merely aim to survive. Above all else, they seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power. In particular, anarchy forces security-seeking states to compete with each other for power because power is the best means of survival” (Mearsheimer 2001, 10). This theory contends that governments are encouraged to adopt moderate and cautious policies in order to achieve national security by the design of the international system.

Defensive realists generally hold that states are not intrinsically aggressive, aim to maximize security, maintain the current balance of power, and try to minimize relative losses brought on by changes in their relative positions and standing (Grieco 1990 cited in Steven E. Lobell 2017). Conflict is occasionally necessary, according to defensive realists, such as in the case of aggressor states, when their security

is in danger, when they feel insecure, or when their differences are insurmountable (Lobel 2017). The above sentence can be taken as a key starting point to explain the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The expansion of NATO and its literal encirclement of Russia have been viewed as threats to Russia for decades. NATO on the border led to caution and the perception of security threats, which led Russia to act in a way already known.

WAR IN UKRAINE IN A NUTSHELL

In order to understand the impact of the war in Ukraine on the countries of the Western Balkans, it is necessary to briefly present the war in Ukraine itself, or more precisely, the context in which it arose. The war, which was initiated by Russia on February 24, 2022, has unified the Ukrainian people, the Transatlantic Alliance, European defenses, and isolated Russia from the global economic system (Douglas 2022). Its origins can be traced back to 2004, when the so-called “Orange Revolution” erupted. The wave of street protests that fueled the rise of a pro-Western government in Kiev will likely be considered the very first modern episode in the drama that will eventually lead to the current Ukraine War (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). The West warmly embraced this turning point as a significant ideological victory for liberal democracy and, more importantly, as a geopolitical tipping moment in NATO and the EU. According to a Russian viewpoint, the USA and the EU supported the Orange Revolution with the intention of aggressively encircling Russia. The pinnacle of the encirclement would be Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO. That scenario would put Russia in a defensive position.¹ However, it is hardly imaginable that Russia would have stayed silent. Besides the mobilization of its political proxies in Ukraine so that pro-Russian leadership could take over, Russia also annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and “overt support for pro-Russian separatist militias in the Donbass with the purpose of compromising Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sowing a degree of chaos so that Ukraine could not be absorbed by Western structures in the near future, as well as to remind Kiev that Russian interests could not be overlooked” (Alonso-Trabanco 2022).

As an act of “vigilance”, Russia placed its troops on the Ukrainian border in 2021. After the EU and NATO remained immune

¹ More on Russia-Ukrainian war in the paper written by Gajić Aleksandar and Nikola Rajić “Geopolitical Framework of Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine”, *The Policy of National Security*. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.2212022.6>.

to Russia's demands, which included: "guarantee that no more states from the post-Soviet space ever join NATO or host military activities undertaken by the transatlantic alliance; the withdrawal of offensive weapons from neighboring European countries; the removal of NATO military infrastructure placed in Eastern Europe since 1997; and a series of restrictions related to both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles." Russia initiated the aggression as the only remaining solution (Alonso-Trabanco 2022).

The Ukraine War is a conflict that combines conventional and cutting-edge tactics. In terms of its traditional components, it includes the conventional encirclement of enemy forces in urban positions in an effort to stifle the flow of supplies, obstruct the arrival of reinforcements, demoralize the defenders, and increase psychological pressure (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). The peculiarity of the full span of conflict is the extreme measures of economic and financial warfare. The Russian ultimatum to stop the flow of natural gas to European consumer markets unless payments are denominated in rubles shows that weaponized vectors of coercion and disruption are used on such a massive scale. Similarly, the West has retaliated with economic sanctions and the confiscation of monetary assets to weaken Russia (Alonso-Trabanco 2022).

As the war unfolds, it is questionable how it will further influence European countries. The region which is particularly vulnerable is the Western Balkans. In Europe, the word "Balkan" conjures up images of ethnic conflicts and rivalries between regional great powers. Traditionally, the Balkans represent a potential geopolitical award in the run for European supremacy due to their geopolitical position (Bžežinski 2001, 117). It has always been of high importance to two or three powers, such as the EU and Russia. As each country in the Western Balkan region has unique political and diplomatic ties with Russia, it will be examined how this war affects them in the next chapter.

WAR AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

The Western Balkans is particularly sensitive to possible serious repercussions linked to the conflict in Ukraine due to its geopolitical, diplomatic, security, and economic ties with Russia. The Russian presence in the Western Balkan region isn't negligible because it affects some vital sectors such as energy and the economy, and countries in this region are differently exposed to it.

It is undeniable that the Western Balkans is one of the regions where Russia has intervened most in opposition to the European Union

and the United States in recent years, and one of the indicators is the establishment of a “Russian-Serbian humanitarian center” in Nis in 2012, (a training center that the EU called for the closure of) to reframe the geopolitical pattern of this region (Vale 2022). Another indicator of the Russian presence here is Russian gas. Countries in the Balkan region are still heavily dependent on Russian gas, making them highly vulnerable (Stojkovski 2020). As an example of this statement, we could indicate that Serbia supplies almost 90% of its needs through Russia, while North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are completely dependent on Russian gas (Vale 2022).

Aside from Russian influence, what makes the situation even more challenging is the EU’s enlargement agenda and EU influence, which are also in the spotlight in the Western Balkans. Aware of the vulnerability of the region and Russian influence, Western diplomats were quick to react. In August, German Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Sarajevo, Prishtina, and Belgrade, while Borrell visited Albania to start a tour in the region and delivered messages of hope for the quick EU integration of the Western Balkans countries in light of recent events in Europe (Lumezi 2022).

Western Balkan countries are facing challenges at national and regional level as a consequence of this war. The decision to apply sanctions against Russia has not been unanimously agreed upon at the regional level, which is one of the points that has caused strife among Western Balkan countries. The fact that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, more notably the eastern areas of Donbass and Luhansk, opens up many sensitive issues for this region is another issue that is worrisome and might potentially have a detrimental impact on regional dynamics. The right to self-determination and the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, which are crucial problems in the Western Balkans, are especially brought up.

Analogies do not necessarily have to be drawn, but we have already seen that it has been done. Donbass and Kosovo^{2*} are compared by Putin himself, so the opening of those sensitive issues in countries that have an influence on the Western Balkans, such as Russia, could have a negative impact on the region.³ This situation does not necessarily have catastrophic consequences for the Balkans, but it is certainly not a unifying factor either. Additionally, EU integration is a particularly significant issue in the Western Balkans. The granting of candidate

2 *This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

3 More on the Russian presence in the Balkan is written in the paper “The Balkans and the Russian Federation-Geopolitical and Security Aspects.” by Vinko Pandurević. *The Policy of National Security*. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.1722019.1>.

status to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia without strict conditions has undermined its credibility in the region.

In such an unpleasant position, Western Balkan countries do have concerns about the evolution of the war in Ukraine and its impact on them and the region as well. Therefore, in the next chapter, it will be presented how Western Balkan countries reacted to the Russian invasion and how it has influenced their internal, regional, and energy policies.

Serbia

Among all the Western Balkan countries, Serbia appears to be in the most difficult position for a multitude of reasons that could be classified as historical, political, security, and energy. It is important to briefly mention that Serbia and Russia share deep historical ties, which are usually attributed to common Slavic roots, similar language, and orthodoxy. During that time, the historical bond has been maintained until today. For that reason, Serbia is quite often perceived as a Russian “satellite” in the Western Balkans. However, dynamics regarding Kosovo*, energy-related issues, security implications, and public opinion have all had a significant impact on Serbia-Russian ties, which are highly complex (Novaković 2022).

Close relations with Russia make the EU consider Serbia, although a candidate country, as one that does not follow EU interests. Doubt arose in 2014 with the Russian annexation of the Crimea Peninsula when Serbia refused to apply restrictive measures towards Russia and align with the EU. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has also contributed to Serbia’s being perceived in that way. The lack of an acceptable “compromise solution” for Kosovo* and the likelihood of EU membership, particularly given the opposition to enlargement by a number of member states, are the reasons why the government has balanced its position toward Moscow (Novaković 2022).

As one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia has enough to veto Kosovo’s* ambitions to join the UN as an independent state. This in itself makes Russia Serbia’s precious ally in its fight against the international recognition of Kosovo’s* independence, a key issue of national interest for Serbia (Anastasakis 2022). That means that Resolution 1244, along with Serbian territory, is at stake. Even the potential expulsion of Russia from the UN according to Article 6 would be concerning. In that scenario, Serbia wouldn’t have international law to call on and other members of NATO and the EU that haven’t recognized Kosovo* would do that. Nevertheless, the abovementioned statement is

only a prediction, a possible scenario, but still not confirmed.

When Russia started its invasion of Ukraine, the official Belgrade took 48 hours to state its position. The National Security Council of Serbia has met twice since the war in Ukraine and made an official statement that Serbia adheres to international law principles and supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, but it will not impose sanctions on Russia. Even Serbian President Vučić stated that, out of 13 articles on Ukraine's aggression, Serbia voted for four because the others referred to sanctions (Dunai 2022). President Vučić reiterated again at the United Nations General Assembly in March that Serbia supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, but that sanctions are not an option since Serbia must preserve its own vital national interest. Although, Serbia did vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council it is the only country in the Western Balkans to have chosen not to support European sanctions on Russia.

Aside from sanctions, Serbia has not prohibited Russian planes from flying over its territory. Due to the European ban on the flight of Russian planes, the only current air connections between Europe and Russia are via Belgrade and Istanbul. Two European companies that offer flights to Russia are Air Serbia and Turkish Airlines.

Media, energy and economic aspects

As public opinion and media coverage play a significant role in this crisis, we find it of great importance to briefly mention it because it could ease understanding of certain political decisions. Public opinion polls conducted by the BiEPAG Group (Balkan Policy Advisory Group in Europe) in December 2021 show that 2/3 of Serbian citizens have a positive opinion of Putin (BiEPAG2021). Even President Vučić stated that 80% of Serbia's media were "always, no matter what occurs, on the Russian side" while 20% "have no objective attitude, and they are a priori against the Russians" on the evening when Putin recognized the two separatist territories (Stojanović 2022). The previously mentioned results have been misused several times by the media from Kosovo* and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can undermine and significantly harm regional relations. As an example of this statement, certain media have tried to exaggerate Serbian-Russian friendship by only transmitting pro-Russian announcements like the march of support for Russia, while other acts that harmonize Serbia with the West and the EU (such as the march of support for Ukraine) are ignored or partially broadcast. This crisis is gradually having implications for the relations between the

countries of the Western Balkans, showing that the wars of the 1990s are still alive in everyone's memories and that the policy of reconciliation and regional cooperation is on shaky ground. While demonizing Russia, the countries of the region can easily apply this to Serbia because of its historical relations with Russia, which could potentially cause strained relations between Serbia and the countries of the region. This particularly refers to Bosniaks and Kosovars. They seem to rely on unreliable and unverified (often fake) sources and present them as facts. It is noticeable in the media of the countries in the region that Serbia stands out as a country that can use the Russian invasion and world attention on Ukraine to "annex" the territories in the region inhabited by Serbs (Xharra and Isufi 2022). They believe that the rhetoric of the 1990s was revived with the region's perception that Serbia plans to implement the idea of a "Great Serbia." By doing so, Serbia would resolve issues with Kosovo* and be united with the Republika Srpska. However, these statements are based on remembrance of the 1990s wars and could significantly harm regional relations. So far, no one from Serbia has made any statements regarding the expansion of territory. The biggest challenge for Serbia at the moment is how to deal with pressures that are coming from the West rather than the annexation of territories.

When it comes to the influence of the Ukraine war on energy sources and food products, the concern was immediate because of two things: firstly, the upcoming heating season and secondly, elections. The additional problem for Serbia is that the country is scheduled to hold general elections on April 3, and the vast majority of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party voters have a strong pro-Russian sentiment (Miković 2022). High gas prices lead to higher costs for heating, electricity, and groceries—all the things, voters observe in the run-up to elections. At the beginning of the war, Serbian citizens formed a line at petrol stations, fearing that prices would rise, which they did. The government tried to reassure the citizens that there is enough supply of all resources and that Serbia will form, nine to ten teams to monitor the situation with oil, gas, and the supply of other products. Nevertheless, the concern about the gas dependency remained. It is worth mentioning that in 2008, Russia acquired the majority of shares in NIS, Serbia's National Oil and Gas company, 51% to 49%. Additionally, NIS became the major shareholder in Serbia's leading petrochemical producer, HIP Petrohemija (Miković 2022). In such a position, high gas prices would seriously impact the Serbian economy and citizens. Despite the alternative proposal, whereby the price would be determined 70 per cent by oil formula and 30 per cent by spot market prices, all in all, \$510 (€451) per 1,000 cubic meters, the

gas price for Serbia would remain at \$270 and the amount of delivered gas would increase for the next six months, decided after the Putin-Vučić meeting (Vuksanović 2022).

Given that work has been underway for years to build a narrative of Serbian-Russian friendship as well as the fact that Russia continues to support Serbia's territorial integrity, it was unrealistic to expect Serbian officials to turn their backs on Russia (SubotićiOmergaić 2022). Serbia's stance on the Ukrainian war is a difficult test of "balancing" the need to appear to be in line with the EU in foreign policy while maintaining a strong partnership with Russia. Western governments have expressed satisfaction over the condemnation of Russian aggression, despite the fact that in the days that have followed, Belgrade has once again been under increasing pressure to join the sanctions against Moscow. What makes this constellation even more complex is good relations with Ukraine, which does not accept Kosovo's* independence and has good economic cooperation (Palombaro 2022). Serbia insists on Ukraine's territorial integrity because it considers Ukrainian efforts to keep Donbas tantamount to its attempts to maintain Kosovo* within its borders. As the Ukrainian war has caused severe migration, Serbia has shown understanding and support for the Ukrainian people. On March 18, 2022, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Decision on providing temporary protection to displaced persons coming from Ukraine: citizens of Ukraine and members of their families who have resided in Ukraine; asylum seekers who have been granted asylum in Ukraine; temporary protection shall last for 1 year from the date of entry into force of this Decision (Odluka 2022).

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Serbia's position is described as "sitting in two chairs." On the one hand, there is the EU perspective; on the other hand, there is Russia as friend and protector in terms of Kosovo* and energy supplier. Thus, the future steps should be calculated because one wrong step could possibly lead to unpredictable responses from both sides.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the Western Balkan countries with the most complicated internal political situation. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and RepublikaSrpska are quite opposed to a myriad of internal issues, and the condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine is one of them. The country's state bodies, which collectively serve as the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprise three

members, three constituent peoples: Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, who look differently at Russia and the West (Lachert 2022). On one side is Republika Srpska, an entity of Bosnian Serbs oriented towards Russia and strongly opposed to NATO membership, and on the other side is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Bosniaks are pro-Western oriented. Therefore, it is understandable why the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina faced major trouble in deciding a common position on the war in Ukraine.

Strong, bitter memories of NATO and the West among Bosnian Serbs provide a platform for Russia to expand its influence. In the last decade, Russia has built close relations with Republika Srpska, investing in the entity's oil refineries and cooperating intensively in security. What serves Russia's interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to avoid the country's membership in NATO and to increase Republika Srpska's dependency on Russia in military, economic, and energy fields. So far, the Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, has strongly supported Russia and opposed sanctions. In March, Dodik abandoned a meeting of the tripartite presidency arguing that the other two members of the Presidency, the Croatian Željko Komšić and the Muslim Šefik Džaferović, did not want to discuss the position on Ukraine (Palombaro 2022). In the West, there are concerns that Russia could use Dodik, who insists that Bosnia and Herzegovina should maintain its neutrality in the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, to destabilize the situation in the country and the region (Miković 2022). However, Dodik represents the minority since Sarajevo, and the representatives of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Bosniaks, supported the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion as well as the EU sanctions against Moscow (Palombaro 2022).

Similarly, Milorad Dodik opposes the entry of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO, whose negotiations have been ongoing since 2008. Even though the country has a Membership Action Plan (MAP), it is the only country in the Western Balkans (among Serbia and Kosovo*) that remains outside of NATO. There is concern for Russia that Bosnia and Herzegovina's joining the alliance will undermine Russia's credibility in the Western Balkans. Russia maintains close ties with Republika Srpska in order to keep a loyal ally in the Balkans. Even Sergey Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina (together with Albania and Kosovo*) have deployed foreign fighters to Ukraine and pose a threat to the region due to terrorism and drug smuggling to show support for Republika Srpska (Isufi and Sinoruka 2022). For that reason, the West, primarily the EU and NATO, deems

RepublikaSrpska a factor of instability and a possible “powder keg” in the Balkans, for fear that it could try to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Russia’s help.

The Bosnian side hasn’t hesitated to react. Bosnian leaders urged NATO to send troops and warned of Serbia’s “aspirations” towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN has supported a number of resolutions denouncing Russian aggression and urging sanctions. For the first time since the 1990s, the EU has increased its military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in response to these worries. Concerns that the Ukrainian crisis could potentially lead to instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina led EUFOR, the EU’s peacekeeping force, to announce the deployment of 500 additional reserve troops from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia to Bosnia and Herzegovina on top of the existing 600 troops (Reuters 2022). Despite the small number of forces involved, the strategic action is seen as a warning to the RepublikaSrpska and a reflection of Western expectations for provocations in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The strongest support for Ukrainians comes from Bosnian Bosniaks who saw themselves as the victims of both Serbian and Croatian aggression and who connected with Ukrainians who had been targeted by Russians or insurgents who supported Russia. Bosnian Bosniaks also perceived the declarations of secession made by the self-declared People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as being similar to those made by the Republic of Srpska (Anastasakis 2022).

Among political issues, the energy sector is also a topic that entails consideration as a challenging point in relations between Russia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sections of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s energy sector are controlled by Russian Zarubezhneft, which owns oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modriča in the RepublikaSrpska entity (Miković 2022). Prior to TurkStream, Bosnia and Herzegovina was entirely dependent on Russian gas to meet its needs because its gas supply was secured through an interconnection point at Beregovo, traveling through Ukraine and Hungary before entering the country. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s distribution firm, BH Gas, had a receiving station in Hungary from which it sent gas, via Serbia, to the entire Bosnian territory (Čančar 2021).

At this point, it is challenging to make predictions on how the war will unfold and influence Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and energy situation. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that this crisis has traced the division among an already divided society. In the next chapter, we

will analyze the political reaction in one of its neighboring countries, Montenegro, regarding the current war.

Montenegro

What is peculiar to Montenegro's response due to the war in Ukraine are three things: internal, bloc divisions, Montenegrin orthodox church issue, and Russian real estate in Montenegro. Montenegro's government is having severe trouble regarding sanctions on Russia. Officially, sanctions haven't been imposed yet. Despite the fact that the government of Montenegro announced that it has joined all restrictive measures, including the EU's eight packages of individual and economic sanctions on Russia, the government has yet to make decisions on their implementation. The session of the Government of Montenegro, held in March, at which the decision on sanctions was supposed to be adopted, was interrupted after a quarrel between Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić and Foreign Minister Djordje Radulović over the imposition of sanctions on Russia. Nonetheless, now former Deputy Prime Minister Dritan Abazović, unanimously adopted a package of sanctions against Russia two days earlier, previously adopted by the Council of the European Union (RTS 2022). The quarrels among political circles in Montenegro are a clear indicator of conflict between "Serbian parties in favor of Russia" and "pro-Western" parties.

The significance of the orthodox church should be mentioned in this matter as well. In terms of church issue, Montenegro and Ukraine have experienced some similarities, as well as sporadic Russian interventions. The Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches have both vehemently condemned acts of religious autonomization and aren't willing to accept the existence of distinct Ukrainian and Montenegrin religious orthodox identities. President Vucic requested assistance from Russia to safeguard the unity of the Orthodox Church in the Balkans after the Montenegrin Parliament passed the law on religious freedom in December 2019. He saw this as an attempt by the Church of Montenegro to obtain autocephaly, as had happened in Ukraine, and the Serbian Orthodox Church reacted angrily. Russia's engagement in this case is another indication of how the country uses cultural and historical ties and religious diplomacy for political matters (Anastasakis 2022).

Another aspect that has already started to feel the implications of the war is the real estate market. The real estate market in Montenegro is in the public eye due to its popularity among Russian tourists. According to the data of the Real Estate Administration of Montenegro, the citizens

of Russia own or co-own 18,906 real estate properties and 3.9 million square meters of land (Despotović 2022). Even though there is no official information about the potential freezing of Russian property it is noticeable that the number of Russian tourists has drastically decreased since the beginning of the war. On the other hand, the latest data shows that roughly 300 Ukrainians enter Montenegro every day on average (Stekić 2022). The majority of Ukrainian refugees arrive in Montenegro via Serbia. A large number of those people had already visited Montenegro for summer vacations. Until now, 588 people have applied for temporary protection in Montenegro today, with 391 adults and 197 children among them. The government of Montenegro has agreed to provide temporary protection to those from Ukraine who are unable to return home and have been forced to flee due to conflict (Stekić 2022).

Albania

Albania is a NATO member (joined in 2009) and EU candidate country which has a solid track record of aligning with the EU's foreign and security policy. As part of the Transatlantic family, Albania is clear when it comes to the approach to the current war in Ukraine. Albania condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, imposed economic sanctions on Russia and banned Russian aircraft from its airspace. Albania also voted at the UN General Assembly to exclude Russia from the Human Rights Council. There are certain claims that the war in Ukraine is affecting some backstage NATO countries, including Albania, North Macedonia, and Greece, being asked to contribute with their own bases and resources, if these are needed. If so, Albanian President, Ilir Meta stated that Albania is ready to participate in any future mission to Ukraine (Popović 2022). Due to Albania's alignment with the EU and NATO, Russia added Albania to its "enemy list", along with Montenegro and North Macedonia. Shortly after, on March 8th, Russian missiles demolished the Albanian honorary consulate in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, which was immediately condemned by the Albanian government (EURACTIV 2022). As an act of support, it renamed a street in its capital, Tirana, where the Russian and Ukrainian embassies are located, "Free Ukraine", to honour Ukraine's resistance to war (Reuters 2022). This retaliation clearly indicates that relations between Albania and Russia are under pressure as Russia is particularly vigilant due to Albania's membership in NATO.

Albania, like other Western Balkan countries, is suffering from the Ukraine conflict in terms of food and energy. The impact could be defined as direct due to Albania's dependence on wheat and oil supplies

from Russia. The indirect impact, on the other hand, is related to rising commodity prices because they are imported from Ukraine. In other words, trade volume is dominated by imports of goods, which is clearly indicated in the latest data: “Albania imports from Russia and Ukraine all 19 billion of goods, which constitutes 99.5% of the trade volume, and 0.5% is represented as Albanian exports to these countries” (Kote 2022). As a consequence, the negative impact is notable through increased food and energy costs as well as rising external finance expenses. Since Albania can cover only 30% of the country’s oil needs with domestic production, it is quite dependent on Russian oil. Therefore, the oil supply will be dictated by the war’s trajectory.

North Macedonia

Similar to Albania, North Macedonia rapidly joined EU economic sanctions, condemned Russia’s invasion, and banned Russian aircraft from using its airspace. The fact that North Macedonia joined NATO only two years ago, in 2020, and hasn’t experienced a comparable circumstance makes it significant. Thus, this conflict serves as something of a test for its members. Although there are no official NATO decisions on the potential participation of Macedonian forces in the war, the Macedonian government has already considered possible engagements in the conflict.

As a part of regional unity in terms of support for Ukraine, North Macedonia, along with Bulgaria, Romania, and Montenegro, attended NATO’s Multilateral Business Union meeting organized by Prime Minister Kiril Petkov in Sofia. Macedonian Prime Minister Dimitar Kovacevski said the meeting sent another strong message of unity and solidarity with Ukraine. He said its participants “remain firm in condemning the war in Ukraine as an illegal and illegitimate invasion of Russia (Öztürk 2022). However, North Macedonia is unique for one more reason: its relationship with the EU as a whole and Bulgaria. It is well-known that North Macedonia changed its name as one of the EU measures, but with no improvement in its EU path. This situation has raised euroscepticism, and a certain number of North Macedonia’s citizens have become restrained towards the EU and more open towards Russia. There appears to be a growing popularity on social media for Russia’s role in Ukraine. These pro-Russian attitudes are quite recent and predate the invasion. Part of the public seems to accept the Russian narrative of its legitimacy to intervene in the “denazification” of Ukraine. For instance, Levica (The Left), established in 2015, was the 3rd in the last local elections among ethnic Macedonians who appear to support Russia. Why this shift? Due

to the Bulgarian veto on opening accession talks in 2020, resentment toward the EU is evidently growing. The resentment toward, what is felt to be an EU betrayal, of North Macedonia is fueling the turn of a portion of the public toward Russia (Marušić 2022).

Historically, political pro-Russia sentiment in North Macedonia has been negligible. From independence in 1991, there has been an almost absolute consensus for Euro-Atlantic integration across the political spectrum and across ethnic lines. Public opinion polls have consistently reflected this consensus. However, the rise of euroscepticism could undermine years of progress in North Macedonia and could also undermine the EU's influence in the region, opening avenues for increased Russian meddling in the neuralgic spots of the region. In terms of the influence of this war on the economy of North Macedonia, it doesn't differ much from the challenges that other Western Balkan countries are facing. North Macedonia has faced "supply shock" when it comes to food, the metal industry, and electricity. It is a significant importer of supplies because it can fully meet domestic food needs. The same situation could be applied to the energy sector. This situation has caused a dramatic rise in prices on the market. In this situation, North Macedonia should find a way to acquire enough energy and food for its citizens and maintain the economy.

CONCLUSION

It is undoubtedly true that the war in Ukraine has generated a re-examination of certain issues in the Western Balkans, as its influences have been visible in many aspects. The economy, energy, and food supplies, as well as regional relations, appeared to be the most vulnerable to this war. This war has proved that the Western Balkan countries find themselves in a difficult position due to scarcities in food and energy, followed by a high rise in prices, as they cannot meet their domestic needs. These countries are big importers of grains, oil, and gas from Ukraine and Russia; thus, this war makes the exportation of these goods uncertain and limited. The current situation clearly indicates that food and energy supplies should be reconsidered and new, alternative production methods developed. What else makes the war in Ukraine specific for the Western Balkan countries is its impact on sensitive regional relations, especially those related to sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is well known that, after the war in the 1990s, the question of borders and regional relations became sensitive, and it has intensified even more since 2008, when so-called Kosovo* declared independence. Therefore, it makes it impossible for the Western Balkan countries to have a unanimous

response to Russian aggression. Among all Western Balkan countries, Serbia is deemed particularly vulnerable due to its very close historic ties with Russia. It is the only country from this region, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is still not part of the U.S.-led military alliance, which has continued to maintain good relations with no restrictions. As a candidate country, Serbia's position isn't well accepted on behalf of the EU and other countries in the region, which perceive Serbia as a potential threat to regional cooperation due to its "isolation" from the Western attitude towards this crisis. It is certain that the war has caused trauma and fears of new wars in the region among the population that still have vivid memories of the war in the 1990's, which is causing a sense of trepidation, distrust, and identification with either Russia or Ukraine. While Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo* have openly supported Ukraine and condemned Russia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have faced deep internal political division regarding the war. During the current seven months of the war, Western Balkan countries have confronted each other's reactions to Russian aggression and will have to balance in the future as the war unfolds to preserve peace and stability in the region.

REFERENCES

- Alonso-Trabanco, Jose Miguel. 2022. „The Evolution of Russia's Ukraine Strategy.” *Geopolitical Monitor*. Last access 10 August, 2022. <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-evolution-of-russias-ukraine-strategy/>.
- Anastasakis, Othon. 2022. „The Russo-Ukrainian Crisis and the Western Balkans: Associations and knock-on effects.” *ACM Briefs*. Last access: August 20, 2022. https://ascg.me/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ACM-Brief_January-2022-final.pdf.
- Aron, Remon. 2001. *Mir i Rat među nacijama*. Sremski Karlovci: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića.
- Balkan Policy Advisory Group in Europe [BiEPAG]. 2021. “Geopolitically irrelevant in its ‘inner courtyard’?” Last access August 18, 2022. https://balkanfund.org/pubs/uploads/Geopolitically_irrelevant_in_its.pdf.
- Bžežinski, Zbignjev. 2001. *Velika šahovska tabla*. Banja Luka: CID i Romanov.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. 1976. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Čančar, IsmetFatih. 2021. "Russia is Weaponising Bosnia and Herzegovina's Gas Dependence." *RUSI-The Royal United Services Institute*. Last access: August 27, 2022. <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-weaponising-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-gas-dependence>.
- Despotović, Bojana. 2022. „Rusivlasnici 18.906 nekretnina, izstrahaihpredisjudrugima. "Pobjeda. Last access: August 25, 2022. <https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/rusi-vlasnici-18906-nekretnina-iz-straha-ih-prepisuju-drugima>.
- Douglas, Alexander. 2022. „Impacts of Russia's War in Ukraine. " *Harvard Kennedy School-Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*. Last access 10 August, 2022. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/impacts-russias-war-ukraine?_gl=1*1i06yu*_ga*MTI2NDQ3MDQ2My4xNjYwMjM4Nzg3*_MTY2MDM5NTMyMy40LjEuMTY2MDM5NTQwOC4w.
- Dunai, Marton. 2022. „Serbia's president AleksandarVucic rejects sanctions on Russia." *Financial Times*. Last access: August 29, 2022. <https://www.ft.com/content/0041d1a9-7fbd-4ea3-8176-e8b7d99e4a92>.
- GajićAleksandar, Nikola Rajić. "Geopolitical Framework of Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine". *The Policy of National Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, 2022, pp. 127-146. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.2212022.6>.
- EURACTIV. 2022. „Russian strike in Ukraine destroys Albanian consulate." Last access: August 27, 2022. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russian-strike-in-ukraine-destroys-albanian-consulate/.
- Isufi, Perparim, and Fjori, Sinoruka. 2022. "Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia Deny Sending 'Mercenaries' To Ukraine." *BalkanInsight*. Last access: August 26, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/18/albania-kosovo-bosnia-deny-sending-mercenaries-to-ukraine/>.
- Kote, Kristo. 2022. "Albania Affected in Four Aspects by Ukraine War." *Albanian Daily News*. Last access: November 14, 2022. <https://albaniandailynews.com/news/albania-affected-in-fours-aspects-by-ukraine-war-1>.
- Lachert, Jakub. 2022. „Western Balkans and the War in Ukraine." *Warsaw Institute*. Last access August 17, 2022. <https://warsawinstitute.org/western-balkans-war-ukraine/>.
- Lumezi, Arian. 2022. "In Kosovo, fears that Russia could inspire a new Serbian offensive." *Euronews*. Last access August 20, 2022. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/17/in-kosovo-fears-that->

- russia-could-inspire-a-new-serbian-offensive.
- Maručić, Stefan Jakov. 2022. "North Macedonia's Faith in EU Influence Plummeting, Survey Shows." *BalkanInsight*. Last access: August 29, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/25/north-macedonian-faith-in-eu-influence-plummeting-survey-shows/>.
- Matić, Milan i Milan, Podunavac. 1993. *Enciklopedijapolitičkekulture*. Beograd: Savremenaadministracija.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Miković, Nikola. 2022. "How Will the Russia-Ukraine War Affect the Balkans?" *Politics Today*. Last access: August 20, 2022. <https://politicstoday.org/how-will-the-russia-ukraine-war-affect-the-balkans/>.
- Naj, Dzozeif. 2006. *Kakorazumevatimeđunarodneodnose*. Beograd: Stubovikulture.
- Novaković, Igor. 2022. "Serbia's Position in the Context of the War in Ukraine – Reasons and Perspectives." *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*. Last access: August 10, 2022. <https://rs.boell.org/en/2022/03/25/serbias-position-context-war-ukraine-reasons-and-perspectives>.
- Odluka o pružanjuprivremenezaštite u Republici Srbiji raseljenim licima koja dolaze iz Ukrajine, „SlužbeniglasnikRepublikeSrbije”, br. 36/2022.
- Öztürk, Mustafa Talha. 2022. "NATO members of Western Balkans voice solidarity with Ukraine." *Anadolu Agency*. Last access: August 20, 2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/nato-members-of-western-balkans-voice-solidarity-with-ukraine/2548451>.
- Palombaro, Valerio. 2022. "Western Balkans countries and the war in Ukraine." *NEU Newsletter for the European Union*. Last access August 23, 2022. <http://www.newslettereuropean.eu/western-balkans-countries-war-ukraine/>.
- Pandurević, Vinko. "The Balkans and the Russian Federation-Geopolitical and Security Aspects". *The Policy of National Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, 2019, pp. 15-48. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.1722019.1>.
- Popović, Sofija. 2022. "Support for Ukraine, balancing, ignoring: How the Western Balkans is reacting to the crisis." *European Western Balkans*. Last access: August 25, 2022. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/02/15/support-for-ukraine-balancing-ignoring-how-the-western-balkans-is-reacting-to-the-crisis/>.

- Reuters. 2022. "Albania renames street in capital Tirana as Free Ukraine." Last access: August 18, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/albania-renames-street-capital-tirana-free-ukraine-2022-03-06/>.
- Reuters. 2022. "Berlin to again deploy troops in Bosnia 10 years after withdrawal." Last access: August 23, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/berlin-again-deploy-troops-bosnia-10-years-after-withdrawal-2022-07-08/>.
- RTS. 2022. „Прекинута седница црногорске владе због свађе око санкција Русији.” Last access: August 28, 2022. <https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/3/region/4743087/crna-gora-vlada-sednica-prekid-rusija-sankcije.html>.
- Stojanović, Milica. 2022. "Serbian Pro-Regime Media Praise Russia 'Overrunning' Ukraine." *BalkanInsight*. Last access August 8, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/25/serbian-pro-regime-media-praise-russia-overrunning-ukraine/>.
- Stojkovski, Bojan. 2020. "Balkan Countries 'Still Heavily Dependent on Russian Gas'." *Balkan Insight*. Last access August 18, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/24/balkan-countries-still-heavily-dependent-on-russian-gas/>.
- Subotić, Strahinja, i Anesa Omeragić. 2022. „Ukrajina i Rusija su u ratu. Šta to znači za budućnost odnosa EU i Srbije?” Centar za evropske politike. Last access: August 01, 2022. <https://cep.org.rs/blogs/ukrajina-i-rusija-su-u-ratu-sta-to-znaci-za-buducnost-odnosa-eu-i-srbije/>.
- Vale, Giovanni. 2022. "War in Ukraine, the Balkans hold their breath." *Osservatorio balcani e caucaso transeuropa*. Last access August 15, 2022. <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Balkans/War-in-Ukraine-the-Balkans-hold-their-breath-216258>.
- Vuksanović, Vuk. 2022. "Russia's gas gift to Serbia comes with strings attached." *Euronews*. Last access: August 25, 2022. <https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/04/russia-s-gas-gift-to-serbia-comes-with-strings-attached-view>.
- Waldman, Thomas. 2010. „Politics and War: Clausewitz's Paradoxical Equation.” *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 40 (3): 1–14.
- Xharra, Jeta, and Perparim Isufi. 2022. "Serbia Aims to Create Tensions in Balkans: Kosovo President." *BalkanInsight*. Last access: August 17, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/20/serbia-aims-to-create-tensions-in-balkans-kosovo-president/>.

UDC: 94.32(100)
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.2322022.6>
Book review

Vanja Glišin*

*Institute for Political Studies,
Belgrade*

POLITICS BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND POWER



Ljubiša Despotović. 2022. *Politics between Authority and Power: Introduction to Political Science*. Novi Sad: Nacional, p. 294.

Political science, as an inexhaustible discipline, requires creative and daring steps upon research of complex subjects and research problems and processes and phenomena that are often invisible to the eyes of ordinary citizens. Since ancient times, politics has been theoretically perceived as acting for the common good, which has, during the centuries-long continuity of implementation of politics in practice, been lost between authority and power. The mere knowledge (*episteme*) is not enough in order to recognize the said processes, but skills (*techne*) and wisdom (*phronesis*) are necessary as well, being perceived as particularities that contribute to quality of research.

Professor Ljubiša Despotović, the author of scientific monograph entitled “Politics between Authority and Power”, faced the challenging currents of politics, analyzing politics from the mere term to its practice, through the use of scientifically responsible and multidimensional approach, thus giving a fruitful scientific contribution to the Serbian political thought. With academic responsibility and methodological precision, professor Despotović grapples with a broad research field of political science, attempting to unify significant terms, occurrences and processes that concern every individual in the world through

* Contact: vanja.glisin@ips.ac.rs

extensive research work. Here lays the social significance of the presented monograph.

The scientific monograph is consisted of sixteen chapters, enriched with innovative and multidimensional texts that systematically clarify the given problem and research subject. Having in mind that the monograph deals with the development of political science and important terms and segments of the said science, the author uses the first three chapters to provide conceptual and disciplinary definition of politics, that is, political science. Professor Despotović clearly marks temporal phases of development of political science with a tendency to present ancient, Middle Age and modern perceptions of the terms of politics, as well as provide disciplinary determinations, starting from political theory, political philosophy and political sociology, political systems and political ethics, but also the world politics, geopolitics and globalism as an ideology. An important segment of the monograph is presented in the fourth chapter, in which the author deals with the structure of politics, that is, its institutional (*polity*), procedural (*politics*) and normative (*policy*) aspects.

The next chapter deals with fundamental terms of politics, such as state, authority and power, but also overthrow and coup

d'état, declining towards giving attention to political capital and political modernization. Professor Despotović approaches the said issues with precision, with a goal to define and bring closer to the readers with as much efficiency as possible. After acquiring new knowledge on fundamental terms of politics, the reader shall with much more ease be able to follow the next chapters, in which the author depicts political parties, social movements, interest and lobby groups. We are speaking of quite a complex field of politics that should be examined both in theory and in practice, which is another challenge *extraordinaire* when speaking of researching this topic. It is important stressing that political parties have a complex role, to which the author testifies as well, singling out four most significant functions: articulation of political ideas and ideologies, aggregation of political interests of citizens, mobilization of their own electorate, as well as political representation of interests of citizens. Following the intended functions of parties, Despotović takes a serious scientific approach to pathological deviations in functioning of political parties as well, with the goal of presenting "the both sides of the coin".

The author dedicates a separate chapter to civil society as one of the most significant legacies of modernity. Civil society takes

actions towards construction and preservation of democratic political culture of citizens, which the author especially stresses, adding that this is quite a significant condition of establishment of democracy. In this context, the author singles out the most significant principles and strategies of civil society. In the next chapter, the professor singles out political culture. We are speaking of one of the most significant segments of political science, given that it expresses attitudes of the majority of citizens regarding the corpus of political values and norms that define politics. Formative factors of political culture, as professor Despotović also stresses, are the following: political tradition and political socialization.

Significant chapters of the monograph refer to types of political regimes and forms of government. The author depicts in this segment autocracy and democracy as political regimes, as well as monarchy and republics as forms of governments. Despotović pays special attention to models of democracy, offering a precise overview of models of liberal democracy, participative and cosmopolitan democracy, as well as hyperdemocracy. The latter model assumes the existence of a global order with one world government as a central level of governance. Regarding this, professor Despotović wisely notices that we

are speaking of a projection of the new world order that, in the field of economy and social life, will be based on transhumanism and related companies, which could have unfathomable consequences for the humanity.

Indispensable fields of politics refer to political marketing, political communication and political propaganda, all of which are depicted by the author in the following chapters. We are speaking of terms that are interlinked in practice, thus making the effort made by the author scientifically and socially justified. In the next chapter, the readers are enabled to get acquainted with political violence and its forms, a quite common occurrence in realpolitik processes of the 21st century.

Finally, professor Despotović makes an additional step forward with the goal of entering the political spheres that are, as any dark corridors of power, most often hidden from the citizens' sight. Therefore, the final chapter of this monograph is entitled "Politics as Subversion", through which the author clearly states the goal of his research mission. Only a handful of authors in scientific circles deal with the topic of network society, conspiracy and cryptopolitics, which adds to the uniqueness of this monograph. When speaking of network society, the author stresses that the entire reality in which we live

is structured exactly in accordance with the rules of network society, defining our existence and building on new forms of postmodern totalitarianism (pp. 264-265). The next segment of the chapter deals with arcane structures of political processes, that is, cryptopolitics and those segments of politics that are insufficiently transparent to the eyes of the public. Cryptopolitics is closely related to conspirology, which deals with practice and doctrine of conspiracy, thus giving the reason to the author to define and distinguish them. The complex and multi-meaning discourse on conspiracy represents a multidisciplinary engagement and seeks for knowledge originating from numerous scientific fields, and the pages of the presented monograph undoubtedly present the seriousness and dedication of professor Despotović to research of insufficiently researched phenomena and processes.

The scientific monograph entitled "Politics between Authority and Power", written by professor Ljubiša Despotović, represents the result of many decades of dedicated and scientifically responsible work. The monograph represents a guidebook for anyone who wishes to learn about political science, thus confirming its scientific and social value, quality, as well as pedagogical approach of professor Despotović.

Списак рецензената - 2022. година

Проф. др Зоран Кековић, редовни професор, Факултет безбедности Универзитета у Београду

Проф. др Љубиша Деспотовић, научни саветник, Институт за политичке студије

Др Дејана Вукасовић, научни саветник, Институт за политичке студије

Др Момчило Суботић, научни саветник, Институт за политичке студије

Dr Stefano Valente, Associate Professor, La Sapienza University of Rome

Проф. др Марија Ђорић, виши научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Проф. др Мина Зиројевић, виши научни сарадник, Институт за упоредно право

Др Миша Стојадиновић, виши научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Др Ђуро Бодрожић, виши научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Проф. др Бојан Јанковић, ванредни професор, Криминалистичко-полицијски универзитет у Београду

Проф. др Владимир М. Цветковић, ванредни професор, Факултет безбедности Универзитета у Београду

Проф. др Душан Пророковић, научни сарадник, Институт за међународну политику и привреду

Проф. др Ивана Бодрожић, ванредни професор, Криминалистичко-полицијски универзитет у Београду

Проф. др Ивана Дамњановић, ванредни професор, Факултет политичких наука Универзитета у Београду

Проф. др Снежана Кнежевић, ванредни професор, Факултет организационих наука Универзитета у Београду

Проф. др Хатица Бериша, ванредни професор, Школа националне одбране, Универзитет одбране

Др Зоран Милосављевић, научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Др Ивана Лукнар, научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Др Ненад Стекић, научни сарадник, Институт за међународну политику и привреду

Др Сања Стошић, научни сарадник, Институт за политичке студије

Доц. др Александра Илић, доцент, Факултет безбедности Универзитета у Београду

Доц. др Милан Миљковић, научни сарадник, Универзитет одбране Министарства одбране

Доц. др Слободан Поповић, доцент, Факултет политичких наука Универзитета у Београду

AUTHOR GUIDELINES

Academic journal *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* publishes articles that are the result of the latest theoretical and empirical research in the field of political science. Authors should refer mainly the results of scientific research published in academic journals, primarily in political science journals.

The papers are published in Serbian, English, French, or Russian.

The journal is published two times a year. The deadlines for submitting the manuscripts are: April 1st and October 1st.

Two consecutive issues cannot contain articles written by the same author, whether single- authored or co-authored.

Manuscripts should be sent to the following e-mail address: pnb@ips.ac.rs.

Research article can have up to 40,000 characters with spaces, including footnotes. When counting the characters leave out the reference list.

Review can have up to 15,000 characters with spaces.

Book review can have up to 10,000 characters with spaces.

When counting the characters, use the option Review/Word Count/Character (with spaces) and check the box Include textboxes, footnotes and endnotes.

CITING AND REFERENCING

Academic journal *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* adopts a modified version of Chicago citation style (17th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*), the author–date system of in-text parenthetical citation, with the list of references with full bibliographic information being placed at the end of the paper.

The bibliographic data in both the parenthetical citation and reference list should be cited in the original language of the source. The English translation of the reference title should be enclosed in square brackets after the original title. The references originally written in Cyrillic script should be transliterated into Latin script.

Below are the rules and examples of citing the bibliographic information in the reference list and in the text. For each type of source, a citation rule is given first, followed by an example of citation in the reference list and bibliographic parenthesis.

The bibliographic parenthesis, as a rule, is set off at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark. It contains the author's surname,

the year of publication and page numbers pointing to a specifically contextual page or range of pages, as in the following example: (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17).

Books

Books with one author

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. (Mearsheimer 2001)

Books with two or three authors

Surname, Name, and Name Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

(Brady and Collier 2010)

Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998)

Books with four or more authors

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, Name and Surname, and Name and Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Pollitt, Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

(Pollitt et al. 2005)

Editor(s) or translator(s) in place of the author(s)

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al. 2017)

Chapter in an edited book

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the chapter." In *Title*, ed. Name Surname, pages range. Place of publication: Publisher.

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. "Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism." In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23–46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Journal Articles

Regular issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Journal* Volume, if available (issue): page range. DOI.

Ellwood, David W. 2018. "Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?" *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5–14. doi: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018)

Special issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." In "Title of the special issue", ed. Name Surname, Special issue, *Journal*: page range. DOI.

Chin, Warren. 2019. "Technology, war and the state: past, present and future." In "Re-visioning war and the state in the twenty-first century." Special issue, *International Affairs* 95 (4): 765–783. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz106.

(Chin 2019)

Encyclopedias and dictionaries *When the author/editor is known*

Surname, Name, Name Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Vol. Place of publication: Publisher.

Badie, Bertrand, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2011. *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Vol. 1. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

(Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino 2011)

When the author/editor is unknown

Title. Year of publication. Place of publication: Publisher.

Webster's Dictionary of English Usage. 1989. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc. (*Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* 1989)

PhD dissertation

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the dissertation." PhD diss. University.

Munger, Frank J. 1955. "Two-Party Politics in the State of Indiana." PhD diss. Harvard University. (Munger 1955, 17–19)

Newspapers and magazines

Signed articles

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Newspaper/Magazine* Date: page range.

Clark, Phil. 2018. "Rwanda's Recovery: When Remembrance is Official Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2018: 35–41. (Clark 2018)

Unsigned articles

Title of the newspaper/magazine. Year of publication. "Title of the article." Date: page range.

New York Times. 2002. "In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor." July 30, 2002. (*New York Times* 2002)

Corporate author

Name of the corporate author [acronym if needed]. Year of publication. *Title of the publication*. Place of publication: Publisher.

International Organization for Standardization [ISO]. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015*. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 2019) – *The first in-text citation* (ISO 2019) – *Second and all subsequent citations*

Special cases of referencing

Citing edition other than the first

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*, edition number. Place of publication: Publisher.

Bull, Hedley. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in*

World Politics, 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
(Bull 2012)

Multiple sources of the same author

1) *Multiple sources by the same author* should be arranged chronologically by year of publication in ascending order.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4): 381–396. doi: 10.1093/cjip/poq016.

2) *Multiple sources by the same author from the same year* should be alphabetized by title, with lowercase letters attached to the year. Those letters should be used in parenthetical citation as well.

Walt, Stephen M. 2018a. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (Walt 2018a)

Walt, Stephen M. 2018b. "Rising Powers and the Risk of War: A Realist View of Sino-American Relations." In *Will China's Rise be Peaceful: Security, Stability and Legitimacy*, ed. Asle Toje. 13–32. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Walt 2018b)

3) *Single-authored sources precede multiauthored sources beginning with the same surname* or written by the same person.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. "Clarifying convergence. Striking similarities and durable differences in public management reform." *Public Management Review* 3 (4): 471–492. doi: 10.1080/14616670110071847.

Pollit Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

4) *Multiauthored sources with the same name and surname* of the first author should continue to be alphabetized by the second author's surname.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998.

Decentralising Public Service Management. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Special cases of parenthetical citation

Exceptions to the rule of placing the parenthetical citation at the end of a sentence

1) If the *author is mentioned in the text*, even if used in a possessive form, the year must follow in parenthesis, and page numbers should be put in the brackets at the end of the sentence.

For the assessment, see
Kaltwasser *et al.* (2017)
... (112). According to
Ellwood (2018) ... (7).

2) When *quoting directly*, if the name of the author precedes the quotation, the year and page numbers must follow in parenthesis.

Mearsheimer (2001, 28) claims that: "..."

3) When *using the same source multiple times in one paragraph*, the parenthetical citation should be placed either after the last reference (or at the end of the paragraph, preceding the final period) if the same page (or page range) is cited more than once, or at the first reference, while the subsequent citations should only include page numbers.

Do not use *ibid* or *op. cit.* with repeated citations.

Using brief phrases such as “see”, “compare” etc.

Those phrases should be enclosed within the parenthesis.

(see Ellwood 2018)

Using secondary source

When using a secondary source, the original source should be cited in parenthesis, followed by “quoted in” and the secondary source. The reference list should only include the secondary source.

“Its authority was greatly expanded by the constitutional revision of 1988, and the Court of Arbitration can now be regarded as a ‘genuine constitutional court’” (De Winter and Dumont 2009, 109 cited in: Lijphart 2012, 39–40).

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd edition. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Multiple sources within the same parentheses

- 1) When *multiple sources* are cited, they should be separated by semicolons.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 34; Ellwood 2018, 7)

- 2) When *multiple sources by the same author*, but published in different years are cited, the name of the author is cited only the first time. The different years are separated by commas or by semicolon where page numbers are cited.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010) or (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17; 2010, 390)

- 3) When *different authors share the same surname*, include the first initial in the parenthesis.

(M. Chiti 2004, 40), (E. Chiti 2004, 223)

Chiti, Edoardo. 2004. “Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 219–236.

Chiti, Mario. 2004. “Forms of European Administrative Action.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 37–57.

Legal and Public Documents

Sections, articles or paragraphs can be cited in the parentheses. They should be appropriately abbreviated.

Constitutions and laws

The title of the legislative act [acronym if needed], “Official Gazette of the state” and the number of the official gazette, or the webpage and the date of last access.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 98/06. (The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 33)

The Law on Foreign Affairs [LFA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 116/2007, 126/2007, and 41/2009. (LFA 2009, Art. 17)

Succession Act [SA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia”,

No. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, and 33/15 and 14/19.

(SA 2019, Art. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Government decisions and decisions of the institutions

The name of the government body or institution [acronym or abbreviation], the title and number of the decision, date of the decision passing, or the webpage and the date of the last access. Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia [Protector of Citizens], Opinion No. 19–3635/11, 11 January 2012, https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/attachments/064_2104_Opinion%20HJC.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Protector of Citizens, 19–3635/11)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, <https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx>, last assessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Legislative acts of the European Union

The title of the legislative act, the number of the official gazette, the publication date and the number of the page in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Treaties

European Union founding treaties

Title of the treaty or title of the consolidated version of the treaty [acronym], information on the treaty retrieved from the official gazette in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Treaty on European Union [TEU],
OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.
(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union
[TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45. (TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.
(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Other treaties

Title of the treaty [acronym or abbreviation], date of conclusion,
UNTS volume number and registration number on the *United Nations Treaty Collection* website: <https://treaties.un.org>.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.
(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], 16
December 1966, UNTS 999, I-14668. (ICCPR 1966)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994,
UNTS 2042, I-35325.
(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Decisions of international organizations

The name of the international organization and its body
[acronym], the decision number, the title of the decision, the
date of the decision passing.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999),
Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th
meeting, on 10 June 1999.
(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc.
14326, Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April
2017), 29 May 2017.
(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Case law *Case law of the courts in the Republic of Serbia*

The type of the act and the name of the court [acronym of the
court], the case number with the date of the decision passing,
the name and number of the official gazette where the decision is
published – if available.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia
[CCRS], IUa-2/2009 of 13 June 2012, “Official gazette of the

Republic of Serbia”, No. 68/2012.
(Decision of CCRS, IUa-2/2009)

Decision of the Appellate Court in Novi Sad
[ACNS], Rzr–1/16 of 27 April 2016. (Decision of
ACNS, Rzr–1/16)

Case law of the International Court of Justice

The name of the court [acronym], *the case title*, type of the decision with the date of the decision passing, the name and number of I.C.J. Reports issue where the decision is published, page number.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.
(ICJ Judgment 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.
(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010)

Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The case title, the case number, type of the case with the date of the decision passing, ECLI.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-270/12) or
(CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.
(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The case title, number of the application, type of the case with the date of the judgment passing, ECLI.

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court

(Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006,
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina*
v. Ukraine
63566/00,
par. 20) or
(ECHR,
63566/00,
par. 20)

Case law of other international courts and tribunals

The name of the court [acronym], the case number, *the case title*, type of the decision with the date passing.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*. Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin. Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) or (ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Archive sources

Name of the repository [acronym], title or number of the fond [acronym], box number, folder number – if available, reference code, “title of the document” – or, if it is not available, provide a short description by answering the questions who? whom? what?, place and date – or n.d. if no date is provided.

Arhiv Srbije [AS], MID, K-T, f. 2, r93/1894, “Izveštaj Ministarstva inostranih dela o postavljanju konzula”, Beograd, 19. april 1888.

(AS, MID, K-T, f. 2)

(AS, MID, f. 2) – *When the folder number is known only*

Dalhousie University Archives [DUA], Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, “List of written judgements by Laskin,” n.d.

(DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Web sources

Surname, Name or name of the corporate author [acronym]. Year of publication or n.d. – if the year of publication cannot be determined. “The name of the web page.” *The name of the web site*. Date of creation, modification or the last access to the web page, if the date cannot be determined from the source. URL.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. "Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada." *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html>.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Institute for Political Studies [IPS]. n.d. "The 5th International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth." *Institute for Political Studies*. Last accessed 7 December 2019. <http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/news/the-5th-international-economic-forum-on-reform-transition-and-growth/>.

(Institute for Political Studies [IPS] n.d.) – *First in-text citation* (IPS n.d.) – *Second and every subsequent citation*

Associated Press [AP]. 2019. "AP to present VoteCast results at AAPOR pooling conference." May 14, 2019. <https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2019/ap-to-present-votecast-results-at-aapor-polling-conference>.

(AP 2019)

TEXT FORMATTING

General guidelines in writing the manuscript

The manuscript should be written in Word, in the following manner:

- Paper size: A4;
- Margins: Normal 2.54 cm;
- Use roman font (plain letters) to write the text, unless specified otherwise;
- Line spacing: 1.5;
- Footnote line spacing: 1;
- Title font size: 14 pt;
- Subtitles font size: 12 pt;
- Text font size: 12 pt;
- Footnote font size: 10 pt;
- Tables, charts and figures font size: 10 pt;
- Use Paragraph/Special/First line at 1.27 cm;
- Text alignment: Justify;
- Font color: Automatic;
- Page numbering: Arabian numerals in lower right corner;
- Do not break the words manually by inserting hyphens to continue the word in the next line;
- Save the manuscript in the .doc format.

Research article manuscript preparation

The manuscript should be prepared in the following manner:

Name and surname of the first author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Name and surname of the second author

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE PAPER**

** In the footnote: Optionally, include one of the following (or similar) information: 1) name and number of the project on which the paper was written:

2) the previous presentation of the paper on a scientific conference as an oral presentation under the same or similar name; or 3) the research presented in the paper was conducted while writing the PhD dissertation of the author.

Abstract

Abstract, within 100–250 words range, contains the subject, aim, theoretical and methodological approach, results and conclusions of the paper.

Keywords: Below the abstract, five to ten **key words** should be written. Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

The paper can have maximum of three levels of subtitles.

Subtitles should not be numbered. They should be used in the following manner:

FIRST LEVEL SUBTITLE

Second level subtitle

Third level subtitle

Tables, charts and figures should be inserted in the following manner:

- Above the table/chart/figure, center the name of Table, Chart or Figure, an Arabic numeral, and the title in roman font;
- Below the table/chart/figure, the source should be cited in the following manner: 1) if

the table/chart/figure is taken from another source, write down *Source*: and include the parenthetical citation information of the source; or 2) if the table/chart/figure is not taken from another source, write down *Source*: Processed by the author.

Use in-text references according to *Citing and referencing*.

Use the footnotes solely to provide remarks or broader explanations.

REFERENCES

References should be listed after the text of the paper, prior to the Resume in the following manner:

- the first line of each reference should be left intended, and the remaining lines should be placed as hanging by 1.27 cm using the option Paragraph/Special/Hanging;
- all the references should be listed together, without separating legal acts of archives;
- the references should not be numbered;
- list only the references used in the text.

After the reference list, write the name and surname of the author, the title of the paper and resume in Serbian in the following manner:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Име и презиме другог аутора

НАСЛОВ

Резиме

Resume (Резиме) up to 1/10 length of the paper contains the results and conclusions of the paper which are presented in greater scope than in the abstract.

Keywords (Кључне речи): Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

Review preparation

A review should be prepared in the same manner as the research article, but leaving out abstract, keywords and resume.

Book review preparation

Book review should be prepared in the following manner:

Split the text into **two columns**.

*Name and surname of the
author**

Affiliation

*In the footnote:E-mail address:The
institutional e-mail address is strongly
recommended

TITLE OF THE BOOK REVIEW

Below the title **place the image of
the front cover;**

Below the image of the front
cover list the book details
according to the following rule:

Name and surname of the
author. Year of publication.

Title of the book. Place of
publication: Publisher, total
number of pages.

The text of the book review
should be prepared following the
guidelines of the research article
preparation.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

351.862/.863(497.11)

ПОЛИТИКА националне безбедности = The
Policy of National Security / главни и одговорни
уредник Марија Ђорић. - Год. XIII, 2 (2022)- .
- Београд : Институт за политичке студије, 2013-
(Житиште: Ситопринт). - 24 cm

Полугодишње. - Преузима нумерацију зборника
“Србија”.

ISSN 2334-959X = Политика националне безбедности
COBISS.SR-ID 203583500



02
2022

THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

ISSN 2334-959X UDK 351.862/.863(497.11) Year XIII vol. 23 № 2/2022.

I S S N 2 3 3 4 9 5 9 X



9 772334 959002